Simulating O_NOFOLLOW (2): Is this other approach safe?

Posted by Daniel Trebbien on Stack Overflow See other posts from Stack Overflow or by Daniel Trebbien
Published on 2010-05-30T12:17:24Z Indexed on 2010/05/30 12:22 UTC
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As a follow-up question to this one, I thought of another approach which builds off of @caf's answer for the case where I want to append to file name and create it if it does not exist.

Here is what I came up with:

  1. Create a temporary directory with mode 0700 in a system temporary directory on the same filesystem as file name.
  2. Create an empty, temporary, regular file (temp_name) in the temporary directory (only serves as placeholder).
  3. Open file name for reading only, just to create it if it does not exist. The OS may follow name if it is a symbolic link; I don't care at this point.
  4. Make a hard link to name at temp_name (overwriting the placeholder file). If the link call fails, then exit. (Maybe someone has come along and removed the file at name, who knows?)
  5. Use lstat on temp_name (now a hard link). If S_ISLNK(lst.st_mode), then exit.
  6. open temp_name for writing, append (O_WRONLY | O_APPEND).
  7. Write everything out. Close the file descriptor.
  8. unlink the hard link.
  9. Remove the temporary directory.

(All of this, by the way, is for an open source project that I am working on. You can view the source of my implementation of this approach here.)

Is this procedure safe against symbolic link attacks? For example, is it possible for a malicious process to ensure that the inode for name represents a regular file for the duration of the lstat check, then make the inode a symbolic link with the temp_name hard link now pointing to the new, symbolic link?

I am assuming that a malicious process cannot affect temp_name.

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