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  • How is a software backdoor implemented?

    - by rdasxy
    The wikipedia article on Limewire says that "LimeWire 5.5.11 and newer have been disabled using a backdoor installed by the company". How are such backdoors implemented? Is it as simple as the the program going out and checking a web service and disabling itself? If it's in fact so simple, it has to be stored somewhere on the user's drive (in a plist, or in the registry for example). It's hard to imagine no one has in fact figured out a way to turn that flag off and use the program.

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  • Week in Geek: Google Drive Desktop Client Allows Backdoor Access to Google Accounts

    - by Asian Angel
    Our last edition of WIG for October is filled with news link coverage on topics such as Microsoft may not issue a second Windows 7 service pack, Windows Media Center is free for Windows 8 Pro users for limited time, CyanogenMod logged swipe gestures used to unlock Android devices, and more. What Is the Purpose of the “Do Not Cover This Hole” Hole on Hard Drives? How To Log Into The Desktop, Add a Start Menu, and Disable Hot Corners in Windows 8 HTG Explains: Why You Shouldn’t Use a Task Killer On Android

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  • Backdoor Strategy- opinion needed.

    - by the Hampster
    I'm creating an application to track publications and grants for a university. Professors will need to put they CV into the system when it is up and running. Yeah, right. The person in charge is planning on hiring someone to input all of the information, but my questions is how? The strategy I'm thinking of is to install a backdoor. The lucky undergrad can log in as any professor using the backdoor. Once all the data is removed, the backdoor can be removed. Doing so would probably be as simple as editing out a comment in the config file. The IT guys would still have access, but since they control the machines, they would have access anyway. Are there any flaws to this strategy?

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  • Backdoor in OpenBSD how is it that no developer saw it ? And what about other Linux ? [closed]

    - by user310291
    It had been revealed that there have been backdoor implanted in OpenBSD http://www.infoworld.com/d/developer-world/software-security-honesty-the-best-policy-285 OpenBSD is opensource, how is it that nobody in the community developper could see it in the source code ? So how can one trust all the other "opensource" Linux Of course OpenBSD is only a case, the point is not about OpenBSD, it is about opensource in general. my question is not about Openbsd per se it's about source code os inspection especially c/c++ since most are written in these languages. Also once the source is compiled how one can be sure that it really reflects the source code ? If a law requires that a backdoor being implanted and obliges to deny that kind of action under the guise of security, how can you be sure that the system has not been corrupted by some tools ? As said there is there is a "nondisclosure agreement" My guess is that 99.99% of developpers in the world are just incapable of understanding os source code and won't even bother to look at it. And above all nobody wonders about why the gov wants such massive backdoor, and that of course they will pressure medias to deny.

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  • Wirenet : découverte du premier trojan Linux/Mac OS X interplateforme de vol de mot de passe

    Wirenet : le premier trojan Linux/Mac OS X interplateforme De vol de mot de passe Doctor Web, l'éditeur russe d'antivirus, a annoncé l'émergence du premier Trojan Linux/OSX interplateforme de vol de mot de passe. Par l'utilisation d'un backdoor, le malware au nom de code BackDoor.Wirenet.1 arrive à transporter les données de l'utilisateur vers un serveur de contrôle situé à l'adresse 212.7.208.65. Les données récoltées comportent les touches de claviers tapées à l'image d'un keylogger et les mots de passe des utilisateurs enregistrés dans les navigateurs Opera, Firefox, Chrome et Chromium et dans les applications Thunderbird, SeaMonkey et Pidgin. L'AES (Advanced Encryption...

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  • question about working with System.Drawing.Graphics

    - by backdoor
    hi all. i have a System.Drawing.Point[] filled with some System.Drawing.Point's. so when i want to draw this points as a polygon in a System.Windows.Form instance , the final drawn polygon is not all in the screen or sometimes is very small (in screen shown as 2-3 pixel). i wonder if there is some Library that using that i can just send Point[] to that and thatself scales and ... points and draws polygon manner that all points shown in screen and they are scaled to fit the screen (i mean small objects that shown as 2-3 pixel scale up to fit entire screen); thaks all and sorry for my bad english...

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  • question about System.Net

    - by backdoor
    hi all. when i use some code like this: System.Net.WebClient objClient = new WebClient(); string url = "http://google.com"; objClient.DownloadString(url); it takes some seconds to connection stablished and downloading starts... i reinstall my windows yesterday. before yesterday i havent this problem. some times when i reinstall my windows this problem occures. does anyboddy know why this problem occures?? thanks all and sorry for my bad english....

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  • Windows: what is the difference between DEP always on and DEP opt-out with no exceptions?

    - by Peter Mortensen
    What is the difference between DEP always on ("/NoExecute=AlwaysOn" in boot.ini) and DEP opt-out ( "/NoExecute=OptOut" in boot.ini) with no exceptions? "no exceptions" = empty list of programs for which DEP does not apply. DEP = Data Execution Prevention (hardware). One would expect it to work the same way, but it makes a difference for some applications. E.g. for all versions of UltraEdit 14 (14.2). It crashes at startup for DEP always on, at least on Microsoft Windows XP Professional Edition x64 edition. (2010-03-11: this problem has been fixed with UltraEdit 15.2 and later.) Update 1: I think this difference is caused by the backdoors that Microsoft has put into hardware DEP for OptOut, according to Fabrice Roux (see below). In the case of IrfanView, for which Steve Gibson observed the same difference as I did for UltraEdit (see below), the difference is caused by a non-DEP aware EXE packer (ASPack) that Microsoft coded a backdoor for. Is there a difference between Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 7 ? Is there a difference between 32 bit and 64 bit versions of Windows ? Sources: From [http://blog.fabriceroux.com/index.php/2007/02/26/hardware_dep_has_a_backdoor?blog=1], "Hardware DEP has a backdoor" by Fabrice Roux. 2007-02-26. "IrfanView was not using any trick to evade DEP ... Microsoft just coded a backdoor used only in OPTOUT. Bascially Microsoft checks the executable header for a section matching one of the 3 strings. If one these strings is found, DEP will be turned OFF for this application by windows. ... 'aspack', 'pcle', 'sforce'" From [http://www.grc.com/sn/sn-078.htm], by Steve Gibson. "I can’t find any documentation on Microsoft’s site anywhere, because we’re seeing a difference between always-on and opt-out. That is, you would imagine that always-on mode would be the same as opting out if you weren’t having any opt-out programs. It turns out it’s not the case. For example ... the IrfanView file viewer ... runs fine in opt-out mode, even if it has not been opted out. But it won’t launch, Windows blocks it from launching ... in always-on mode." From [http://www.grc.com/sn/sn-083.htm], by Steve Gibson. "... IrfanView ... won’t run with DEP turned on. It’s because it uses an EXE packer, an executable compression program called ASPack. And it makes sense that it wouldn’t because naturally an executable compressor has got to decompress the executable, so it allocates a bunch of data memory into which it decompresses the compressed executable, and then it runs it. Well, it’s running a data allocation, which is exactly what DEP is designed to stop. On the other hand, UPX, which is actually the leading and most popular EXE compressor, it’s DEP- compatible because those guys realized, hey, when we allocate this memory, we should mark the pages as executable."

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  • Configuring UCM cache to check for external Content Server changes

    - by Martin Deh
    Recently, I was involved in a customer scenario where they were modifying the Content Server's contributor data files directly through Content Server.  This operation of course is completely supported.  However, since the contributor data file was modified through the "backdoor", a running WebCenter Spaces page, which also used the same data file, would not get the updates immediately.  This was due to two reasons.  The first reason is that the Spaces page was using Content Presenter to display the contents of the data file. The second reason is that the Spaces application was using the "cached" version of the data file.  Fortunately, there is a way to configure cache so backdoor changes can be picked up more quickly and automatically. First a brief overview of Content Presenter.  The Content Presenter task flow enables WebCenter Spaces users with Page-Edit permissions to precisely customize the selection and presentation of content in a WebCenter Spaces application.  With Content Presenter, you can select a single item of content, contents under a folder, a list of items, or query for content, and then select a Content Presenter based template to render the content on a page in a Spaces application.  In addition to displaying the folders and the files in a Content Server, Content Presenter integrates with Oracle Site Studio to allow you to create, access, edit, and display Site Studio contributor data files (Content Server Document) in either a Site Studio region template or in a custom Content Presenter display template.  More information about creating Content Presenter Display Template can be found in the OFM Developers Guide for WebCenter Portal. The easiest way to configure the cache is to modify the WebCenter Spaces Content Server service connection setting through Enterprise Manager.  From here, under the Cache Details, there is a section to set the Cache Invalidation Interval.  Basically, this enables the cache to be monitored by the cache "sweeper" utility.  The cache sweeper queries for changes in the Content Server, and then "marks" the object in cache as "dirty".  This causes the application in turn to get a new copy of the document from the Content Server that replaces the cached version.  By default the initial value for the Cache Invalidation Interval is set to 0 (minutes).  This basically means that the sweeper is OFF.  To turn the sweeper ON, just set a value (in minutes).  The mininal value that can be set is 2 (minutes): Just a note.  In some instances, once the value of the Cache Invalidation Interval has been set (and saved) in the Enterprise Manager UI, it becomes "sticky" and the interval value cannot be set back to 0.  The good news is that this value can also be updated throught a WLST command.   The WLST command to run is as follows: setJCRContentServerConnection(appName, name, [socketType, url, serverHost, serverPort, keystoreLocation, keystorePassword, privateKeyAlias, privateKeyPassword, webContextRoot, clientSecurityPolicy, cacheInvalidationInterval, binaryCacheMaxEntrySize, adminUsername, adminPassword, extAppId, timeout, isPrimary, server, applicationVersion]) One way to get the required information for executing the command is to use the listJCRContentServerConnections('webcenter',verbose=true) command.  For example, this is the sample output from the execution: ------------------ UCM ------------------ Connection Name: UCM Connection Type: JCR External Appliction ID: Timeout: (not set) CIS Socket Type: socket CIS Server Hostname: webcenter.oracle.local CIS Server Port: 4444 CIS Keystore Location: CIS Private Key Alias: CIS Web URL: Web Server Context Root: /cs Client Security Policy: Admin User Name: sysadmin Cache Invalidation Interval: 2 Binary Cache Maximum Entry Size: 1024 The Documents primary connection is "UCM" From this information, the completed  setJCRContentServerConnection would be: setJCRContentServerConnection(appName='webcenter',name='UCM', socketType='socket', serverHost='webcenter.oracle.local', serverPort='4444', webContextRoot='/cs', cacheInvalidationInterval='0', binaryCacheMaxEntrySize='1024',adminUsername='sysadmin',isPrimary=1) Note: The Spaces managed server must be restarted for the change to take effect. More information about using WLST for WebCenter can be found here. Once the sweeper is turned ON, only cache objects that have been changed will be invalidated.  To test this out, I will go through a simple scenario.  The first thing to do is configure the Content Server so it can monitor and report on events.  Log into the Content Server console application, and under the Administration menu item, select System Audit Information.  Note: If your console is using the left menu display option, the Administration link will be located there. Under the Tracing Sections Information, add in only "system" and "requestaudit" in the Active Sections.  Check Full Verbose Tracing, check Save, then click the Update button.  Once this is done, select the View Server Output menu option.  This will change the browser view to display the log.  This is all that is needed to configure the Content Server. For example, the following is the View Server Output with the cache invalidation interval set to 2(minutes) Note the time stamp: requestaudit/6 08.30 09:52:26.001  IdcServer-68    GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.016933999955654144(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 09:52:26.010  IdcServer-69    GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.006134999915957451(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 09:52:26.014  IdcServer-70    GET_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.004271999932825565(secs) ... other trace info ... requestaudit/6 08.30 09:54:26.002  IdcServer-71    GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.020323999226093292(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 09:54:26.011  IdcServer-72    GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.017928000539541245(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 09:54:26.017  IdcServer-73    GET_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.010185999795794487(secs) Now that the tracing logs are reporting correctly, the next step is set up the Spaces app to test the sweeper. I will use 2 different pages that will use Content Presenter task flows.  Each task flow will use a different custom Content Presenter display template, and will be assign 2 different contributor data files (document that will be in the cache).  The pages at run time appear as follows: Initially, when the Space pages containing the content is loaded in the browser for the first time, you can see the tracing information in the Content Server output viewer. requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:12.030 IdcServer-129 CLEAR_SERVER_OUTPUT [dUser=weblogic] 0.029171999543905258(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:12.101 IdcServer-130 GET_SERVER_OUTPUT [dUser=weblogic] 0.025721000507473946(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:26.592 IdcServer-131 VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME [dID=919][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dDocTitle=DF_UCMCacheTester][dUser=weblogic][RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased][IsJava=1] 0.21525299549102783(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.117 IdcServer-132 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPES [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.5059549808502197(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.146 IdcServer-133 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.03360399976372719(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.169 IdcServer-134 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.008806000463664532(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.204 IdcServer-135 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.013265999965369701(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.384 IdcServer-136 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.18119299411773682(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.533 IdcServer-137 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.1519480049610138(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.634 IdcServer-138 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.10827399790287018(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:27.687 IdcServer-139 VCR_GET_CONTENT_TYPE [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.059702999889850616(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:28.271 IdcServer-140 GET_USER_PERMISSIONS [dUser=weblogic][IsJava=1] 0.006703000050038099(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:28.285 IdcServer-141 GET_ENVIRONMENT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.010893999598920345(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:30.433 IdcServer-142 GET_SERVER_OUTPUT [dUser=weblogic] 0.017318999394774437(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:41.837 IdcServer-143 VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME [dID=508][dDocName=113_ES][dDocTitle=Landing Home][dUser=weblogic][RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased][IsJava=1] 0.15937699377536774(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:51:42.781 IdcServer-144 GET_FILE [dID=326][dDocName=WEBCENTERORACL000315][dDocTitle=Duke][dUser=anonymous][RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased][dSecurityGroup=Public][xCollectionID=0] 0.16288499534130096(secs) The highlighted sections show where the 2 data files DF_UCMCACHETESTER (P1 page) and 113_ES (P2 page) were called by the (Spaces) VCR connection to the Content Server. The most important line to notice is the VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME invocation.  On subsequent refreshes of these 2 pages, you will notice (after you refresh the Content Server's View Server Output) that there are no further traces of the same VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME invocations.  This is because the pages are getting the documents from the cache. The next step is to go through the "backdoor" and change one of the documents through the Content Server console.  This operation can be done by first locating the data file document, and from the Content Information page, select Edit Data File menu option.   This invokes the Site Studio Contributor, where the modifications can be made. Refreshing the Content Server View Server Output, the tracing displays the operations perform on the document.  requestaudit/6 08.30 11:56:59.972 IdcServer-255 SS_CHECKOUT_BY_NAME [dID=922][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dUser=weblogic][dSecurityGroup=Public] 0.05558200180530548(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:00.065 IdcServer-256 SS_GET_CONTRIBUTOR_CONFIG [dID=922][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dDocTitle=DF_UCMCacheTester][dUser=weblogic][dSecurityGroup=Public][xCollectionID=0] 0.08632399886846542(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:00.470 IdcServer-259 DOC_INFO_BY_NAME [dID=922][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dDocTitle=DF_UCMCacheTester][dUser=weblogic][dSecurityGroup=Public][xCollectionID=0] 0.02268899977207184(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:10.177 IdcServer-264 GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.007652000058442354(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:10.181 IdcServer-263 GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.01868399977684021(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:10.187 IdcServer-265 GET_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.009367000311613083(secs) (internal)/6 08.30 11:57:26.118 IdcServer-266 File to be removed: /oracle/app/admin/domains/webcenter/ucm/cs/vault/~temp/703253295.xml (internal)/6 08.30 11:57:26.121 IdcServer-266 File to be removed: /oracle/app/admin/domains/webcenter/ucm/cs/vault/~temp/703253295.xml requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:26.122 IdcServer-266 SS_SET_ELEMENT_DATA [dID=923][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dDocTitle=DF_UCMCacheTester][dUser=weblogic][dSecurityGroup=Public][xCollectionID=0][StatusCode=0][StatusMessage=Successfully checked in content item 'DF_UCMCACHETESTER'.] 0.3765290081501007(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:30.710 IdcServer-267 DOC_INFO_BY_NAME [dID=923][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dDocTitle=DF_UCMCacheTester][dUser=weblogic][dSecurityGroup=Public][xCollectionID=0] 0.07942699640989304(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:57:30.733 IdcServer-268 SS_GET_CONTRIBUTOR_STRINGS [dUser=weblogic] 0.0044570001773536205(secs) After a few moments and refreshing the P1 page, the updates has been applied. Note: The refresh time may very, since the Cache Invalidation Interval (set to 2 minutes) is not determined by when changes happened.  The sweeper just runs every 2 minutes. Refreshing the Content Server View Server Output, the tracing displays the important information. requestaudit/6 08.30 11:59:10.171 IdcServer-270 GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.00952600035816431(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:59:10.179 IdcServer-271 GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.011118999682366848(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:59:10.182 IdcServer-272 GET_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_REPORT [dUser=sysadmin][IsJava=1] 0.007447000127285719(secs) requestaudit/6 08.30 11:59:16.885 IdcServer-273 VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME [dID=923][dDocName=DF_UCMCACHETESTER][dDocTitle=DF_UCMCacheTester][dUser=weblogic][RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased][IsJava=1] 0.0786449983716011(secs) After the specifed interval time the sweeper is invoked, which is noted by the GET_ ... calls.  Since the history has noted the change, the next call is to the VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME to retrieve the new version of the (modifed) data file.  Navigating back to the P2 page, and viewing the server output, there are no further VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME to retrieve the data file.  This simply means that this data file was just retrieved from the cache.   Upon further review of the server output, we can see that there was only 1 request for the VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME: requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor Request Audit Report over the last 120 Seconds for server webcenteroraclelocal16200****  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor -Num Requests 8 Errors 0 Reqs/sec. 0.06666944175958633 Avg. Latency (secs) 0.02762500010430813 Max Thread Count 2  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor 1 Service VCR_GET_DOCUMENT_BY_NAME Total Elapsed Time (secs) 0.09200000017881393 Num requests 1 Num errors 0 Avg. Latency (secs) 0.09200000017881393  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor 2 Service GET_PERSONALIZED_JAVASCRIPT Total Elapsed Time (secs) 0.054999999701976776 Num requests 1 Num errors 0 Avg. Latency (secs) 0.054999999701976776  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor 3 Service GET_FOLDER_HISTORY_REPORT Total Elapsed Time (secs) 0.028999999165534973 Num requests 2 Num errors 0 Avg. Latency (secs) 0.014499999582767487  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor 4 Service GET_SERVER_OUTPUT Total Elapsed Time (secs) 0.017999999225139618 Num requests 1 Num errors 0 Avg. Latency (secs) 0.017999999225139618  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor 5 Service GET_FILE Total Elapsed Time (secs) 0.013000000268220901 Num requests 1 Num errors 0 Avg. Latency (secs) 0.013000000268220901  requestaudit/6 08.30 12:08:00.021 Audit Request Monitor ****End Audit Report*****  

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  • Shared Hosting, UID, GUID set as Apache

    - by concerncitizen
    Hello, I'm on shared hosting and today i discovered there are some backdoor script.. in .htaccess and a php file. So i went to check via FTP, cannot edit nor delete. So i checked with direct admin.. the file permission(GUID, UID) is set by APACHE while rest of file is set by my username, So my question now is.. the trojan did this is originated from my computer or host side?

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  • Does the Virtual PC XP Mode need safety measures?

    - by Ivo
    Does the Virtual PC XP-Mode (or any other virtualized mode) require safety measures, such as antivirus or a firewall? I'm just wondering if the XP-Mode would be a large security loophole, since it's so much more integrated into Windows 7. Actually I'm wondering the same for Portable Ubuntu, are their any safety measures I should undertake, so that I don't open a backdoor on my computer.

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  • Rkhunter 122 suspect files; do I have a problem?

    - by user276166
    I am new to ubuntu. I am using Xfce Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. I have ran rkhunter a few weeks age and only got a few warnings. The forum said that they were normal. But, this time rkhunter reported 122 warnings. Please advise. casey@Shaman:~$ sudo rkhunter -c [ Rootkit Hunter version 1.4.0 ] Checking system commands... Performing 'strings' command checks Checking 'strings' command [ OK ] Performing 'shared libraries' checks Checking for preloading variables [ None found ] Checking for preloaded libraries [ None found ] Checking LD_LIBRARY_PATH variable [ Not found ] Performing file properties checks Checking for prerequisites [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/adduser [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/chroot [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/cron [ OK ] /usr/sbin/groupadd [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/groupdel [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/groupmod [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/grpck [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/nologin [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/pwck [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/rsyslogd [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/useradd [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/userdel [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/usermod [ Warning ] /usr/sbin/vipw [ Warning ] /usr/bin/awk [ Warning ] /usr/bin/basename [ Warning ] /usr/bin/chattr [ Warning ] /usr/bin/cut [ Warning ] /usr/bin/diff [ Warning ] /usr/bin/dirname [ Warning ] /usr/bin/dpkg [ Warning ] /usr/bin/dpkg-query [ Warning ] /usr/bin/du [ Warning ] /usr/bin/env [ Warning ] /usr/bin/file [ Warning ] /usr/bin/find [ Warning ] /usr/bin/GET [ Warning ] /usr/bin/groups [ Warning ] /usr/bin/head [ Warning ] /usr/bin/id [ Warning ] /usr/bin/killall [ OK ] /usr/bin/last [ Warning ] /usr/bin/lastlog [ Warning ] /usr/bin/ldd [ Warning ] /usr/bin/less [ OK ] /usr/bin/locate [ OK ] /usr/bin/logger [ Warning ] /usr/bin/lsattr [ Warning ] /usr/bin/lsof [ OK ] /usr/bin/mail [ OK ] /usr/bin/md5sum [ Warning ] /usr/bin/mlocate [ OK ] /usr/bin/newgrp [ Warning ] /usr/bin/passwd [ Warning ] /usr/bin/perl [ Warning ] /usr/bin/pgrep [ Warning ] /usr/bin/pkill [ Warning ] /usr/bin/pstree [ OK ] /usr/bin/rkhunter [ OK ] /usr/bin/rpm [ Warning ] /usr/bin/runcon [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sha1sum [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sha224sum [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sha256sum [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sha384sum [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sha512sum [ Warning ] /usr/bin/size [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sort [ Warning ] /usr/bin/stat [ Warning ] /usr/bin/strace [ Warning ] /usr/bin/strings [ Warning ] /usr/bin/sudo [ Warning ] /usr/bin/tail [ Warning ] /usr/bin/test [ Warning ] /usr/bin/top [ Warning ] /usr/bin/touch [ Warning ] /usr/bin/tr [ Warning ] /usr/bin/uniq [ Warning ] /usr/bin/users [ Warning ] /usr/bin/vmstat [ Warning ] /usr/bin/w [ Warning ] /usr/bin/watch [ Warning ] /usr/bin/wc [ Warning ] /usr/bin/wget [ Warning ] /usr/bin/whatis [ Warning ] /usr/bin/whereis [ Warning ] /usr/bin/which [ OK ] /usr/bin/who [ Warning ] /usr/bin/whoami [ Warning ] /usr/bin/unhide.rb [ Warning ] /usr/bin/mawk [ Warning ] /usr/bin/lwp-request [ Warning ] /usr/bin/heirloom-mailx [ OK ] /usr/bin/w.procps [ Warning ] /sbin/depmod [ Warning ] /sbin/fsck [ Warning ] /sbin/ifconfig [ Warning ] /sbin/ifdown [ Warning ] /sbin/ifup [ Warning ] /sbin/init [ Warning ] /sbin/insmod [ Warning ] /sbin/ip [ Warning ] /sbin/lsmod [ Warning ] /sbin/modinfo [ Warning ] /sbin/modprobe [ Warning ] /sbin/rmmod [ Warning ] /sbin/route [ Warning ] /sbin/runlevel [ Warning ] /sbin/sulogin [ Warning ] /sbin/sysctl [ Warning ] /bin/bash [ Warning ] /bin/cat [ Warning ] /bin/chmod [ Warning ] /bin/chown [ Warning ] /bin/cp [ Warning ] /bin/date [ Warning ] /bin/df [ Warning ] /bin/dmesg [ Warning ] /bin/echo [ Warning ] /bin/ed [ OK ] /bin/egrep [ Warning ] /bin/fgrep [ Warning ] /bin/fuser [ OK ] /bin/grep [ Warning ] /bin/ip [ Warning ] /bin/kill [ Warning ] /bin/less [ OK ] /bin/login [ Warning ] /bin/ls [ Warning ] /bin/lsmod [ Warning ] /bin/mktemp [ Warning ] /bin/more [ Warning ] /bin/mount [ Warning ] /bin/mv [ Warning ] /bin/netstat [ Warning ] /bin/ping [ Warning ] /bin/ps [ Warning ] /bin/pwd [ Warning ] /bin/readlink [ Warning ] /bin/sed [ Warning ] /bin/sh [ Warning ] /bin/su [ Warning ] /bin/touch [ Warning ] /bin/uname [ Warning ] /bin/which [ OK ] /bin/kmod [ Warning ] /bin/dash [ Warning ] [Press <ENTER> to continue] Checking for rootkits... Performing check of known rootkit files and directories 55808 Trojan - Variant A [ Not found ] ADM Worm [ Not found ] AjaKit Rootkit [ Not found ] Adore Rootkit [ Not found ] aPa Kit [ Not found ] Apache Worm [ Not found ] Ambient (ark) Rootkit [ Not found ] Balaur Rootkit [ Not found ] BeastKit Rootkit [ Not found ] beX2 Rootkit [ Not found ] BOBKit Rootkit [ Not found ] cb Rootkit [ Not found ] CiNIK Worm (Slapper.B variant) [ Not found ] Danny-Boy's Abuse Kit [ Not found ] Devil RootKit [ Not found ] Dica-Kit Rootkit [ Not found ] Dreams Rootkit [ Not found ] Duarawkz Rootkit [ Not found ] Enye LKM [ Not found ] Flea Linux Rootkit [ Not found ] Fu Rootkit [ Not found ] Fuck`it Rootkit [ Not found ] GasKit Rootkit [ Not found ] Heroin LKM [ Not found ] HjC Kit [ Not found ] ignoKit Rootkit [ Not found ] IntoXonia-NG Rootkit [ Not found ] Irix Rootkit [ Not found ] Jynx Rootkit [ Not found ] KBeast Rootkit [ Not found ] Kitko Rootkit [ Not found ] Knark Rootkit [ Not found ] ld-linuxv.so Rootkit [ Not found ] Li0n Worm [ Not found ] Lockit / LJK2 Rootkit [ Not found ] Mood-NT Rootkit [ Not found ] MRK Rootkit [ Not found ] Ni0 Rootkit [ Not found ] Ohhara Rootkit [ Not found ] Optic Kit (Tux) Worm [ Not found ] Oz Rootkit [ Not found ] Phalanx Rootkit [ Not found ] Phalanx2 Rootkit [ Not found ] Phalanx2 Rootkit (extended tests) [ Not found ] Portacelo Rootkit [ Not found ] R3dstorm Toolkit [ Not found ] RH-Sharpe's Rootkit [ Not found ] RSHA's Rootkit [ Not found ] Scalper Worm [ Not found ] Sebek LKM [ Not found ] Shutdown Rootkit [ Not found ] SHV4 Rootkit [ Not found ] SHV5 Rootkit [ Not found ] Sin Rootkit [ Not found ] Slapper Worm [ Not found ] Sneakin Rootkit [ Not found ] 'Spanish' Rootkit [ Not found ] Suckit Rootkit [ Not found ] Superkit Rootkit [ Not found ] TBD (Telnet BackDoor) [ Not found ] TeLeKiT Rootkit [ Not found ] T0rn Rootkit [ Not found ] trNkit Rootkit [ Not found ] Trojanit Kit [ Not found ] Tuxtendo Rootkit [ Not found ] URK Rootkit [ Not found ] Vampire Rootkit [ Not found ] VcKit Rootkit [ Not found ] Volc Rootkit [ Not found ] Xzibit Rootkit [ Not found ] zaRwT.KiT Rootkit [ Not found ] ZK Rootkit [ Not found ] [Press <ENTER> to continue] Performing additional rootkit checks Suckit Rookit additional checks [ OK ] Checking for possible rootkit files and directories [ None found ] Checking for possible rootkit strings [ None found ] Performing malware checks Checking running processes for suspicious files [ None found ] Checking for login backdoors [ None found ] Checking for suspicious directories [ None found ] Checking for sniffer log files [ None found ] Performing Linux specific checks Checking loaded kernel modules [ OK ] Checking kernel module names [ OK ] [Press <ENTER> to continue] Checking the network... Performing checks on the network ports Checking for backdoor ports [ None found ] Checking for hidden ports [ Skipped ] Performing checks on the network interfaces Checking for promiscuous interfaces [ None found ] Checking the local host... Performing system boot checks Checking for local host name [ Found ] Checking for system startup files [ Found ] Checking system startup files for malware [ None found ] Performing group and account checks Checking for passwd file [ Found ] Checking for root equivalent (UID 0) accounts [ None found ] Checking for passwordless accounts [ None found ] Checking for passwd file changes [ Warning ] Checking for group file changes [ Warning ] Checking root account shell history files [ None found ] Performing system configuration file checks Checking for SSH configuration file [ Not found ] Checking for running syslog daemon [ Found ] Checking for syslog configuration file [ Found ] Checking if syslog remote logging is allowed [ Not allowed ] Performing filesystem checks Checking /dev for suspicious file types [ Warning ] Checking for hidden files and directories [ Warning ] [Press <ENTER> to continue] System checks summary ===================== File properties checks... Required commands check failed Files checked: 137 Suspect files: 122 Rootkit checks... Rootkits checked : 291 Possible rootkits: 0 Applications checks... All checks skipped The system checks took: 5 minutes and 11 seconds All results have been written to the log file (/var/log/rkhunter.log)

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  • Microsoft Security Removal Tool détecte et éradique Renocide grâce à une mise à jour, le ver serait la quatrième plus grandes menaces actuelles

    Microsoft Security Removal Tool détecte et éradique Renocide Avec une mise à jour, le ver serait la quatrième plus grandes menaces actuelles Microsoft met en garde les utilisateurs de Windows contre le malware Win32/Renocide. Win32/Renocide est une famille de vers qui se propagent via les disques amovibles, les stockages locaux et les réseaux en utilisant les applications de partage de fichiers. Une fois installé, le malware crée des clones de lui-même en utilisant des noms de fichiers différents. Il est qualifié de ver « backdoor » (portes dérobées) et permet à un pirate distant d'exécuter des commandes sur le poste infecté pour télécharger d'autres programmes malveillants. Renoci...

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  • Win 7 Netbook refuses to ping JetDirect card (all other PCs work)

    - by Luke Puplett
    I have an odd thing occuring here. From a Windows 7 netbook, I cannot ping an HP printer on the network, while all other machines (Win7/Vista) can. And the netbook can also ping everything else on the LAN. Example showing that the netbook can ping 192.168.3.4 but not 3.6. C:\Users\backdoor>ping w7ue1m Pinging w7ue1m.corp.biz.co.uk [192.168.3.4] with 32 bytes of data: Reply from 192.168.3.4: bytes=32 time=7ms TTL=128 Reply from 192.168.3.4: bytes=32 time=4ms TTL=128 Reply from 192.168.3.4: bytes=32 time=2ms TTL=128 Reply from 192.168.3.4: bytes=32 time=2ms TTL=128 Ping statistics for 192.168.3.4: Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss), Approximate round trip times in milli-seconds: Minimum = 2ms, Maximum = 7ms, Average = 3ms C:\Users\backdoor>ping uktnprint1 Pinging uktnprint1.corp.biz.co.uk [192.168.3.6] with 32 bytes of data: Reply from 192.168.3.0: Destination host unreachable. Reply from 192.168.3.0: Destination host unreachable. Reply from 192.168.3.0: Destination host unreachable. Reply from 192.168.3.0: Destination host unreachable. Ping statistics for 192.168.3.6: Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss),`enter code here` The IPCONFIG result for the netbook is fine. IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.3.0 Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.0.0 Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.1.1 Most unusual network thing I've seen in years. I must reiterate that only this netbook is having trouble pinging/printing. Thanks, Luke ** UPDATE ** Am now on a Vista box, and here's the IPCONFIG: IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.3.3 Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.0.0 Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.1.1 Pinging uktnprint1.corp.biz.co.uk [192.168.3.6] with 32 bytes of data: Reply from 192.168.3.6: bytes=32 time=2ms TTL=60 Firewall is off. I'll look into the chance of an IP conflict because it's the only thing I can think of - compare arp caches of each machine. Cheers!

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  • How do you search for backdoors from the previous IT person?

    - by Jason Berg
    We all know it happens. A bitter old IT guy leaves a backdoor into the system and network in order to have fun with the new guys and show the company how bad things are without him. I've never personally experienced this. The most I've experienced is somebody who broke and stole stuff right before leaving. I'm sure this happens, though. So, when taking over a network that can't quite be trusted, what steps should be taken to ensure everything is safe and secure?

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  • Maybe I'm infected?

    - by aiacet
    In the last two weeks, when I was using MPC-HC (Media Player Classic Home Cinema) to watch some "justyfied" episodes, my F-Secure Client Security antivirus software alerted me that there was a threat in file A0027132.exe (the number increased each of the three times that the antivirus found a new threat). All these three threats are now quarantined and the files are: 1) C:/System Volume Information/_restore/{72AACB12-6526-40F2-81D7-69DF5809DD8A}\A0027132.exe 2) D:/System Volume Information/_restore/{72AACB12-6526-40F2-81D7-69DF5809DD8A}\A0027133.exe 3) D:/System Volume Information/_restore/{72AACB12-6526-40F2-81D7-69DF5809DD8A}\A0027134.exe The three threats are recognized like: 1. Backdoor.Generic.360086 2. Trojan.Packed.8707 3. Trojan.Packed.8807 F-secure and the OS are both updated at the last release/virus definition.

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  • May I'm infected?

    - by aiacet
    Hello again to everyone and many thanks to all the expert that will read this post and proupose a solution to my problem. In the last tw week, when i saw with MPC-HC (media player classic home cinema) some "justyfied" episodes, my F-Secure Client Security antivirus software alert-me that there is a threat in A0027132.exe file (the number still chanhe and increase each time, 3, that the antivir found a new threat). All this three threat are now quaratined and the file are: 1) C:/System Volume Information/_restore/{72AACB12-6526-40F2-81D7-69DF5809DD8A}\A0027132.exe 2) D:/System Volume Information/_restore/{72AACB12-6526-40F2-81D7-69DF5809DD8A}\A0027133.exe 3) D:/System Volume Information/_restore/{72AACB12-6526-40F2-81D7-69DF5809DD8A}\A0027134.exe the three threat are recognized like: 1) Backdoor.Generic.360086 2) Trojan.Packed.8707 2) Trojan.Packed.8807 The F-secure and the OS are both udpated at the last release/virus definition. Waiting for an answer, thanks in advance

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