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• Cryptographic Validation Explained

  - by MarkPearl

  We have been using LogicNP’s CryptoLicensing for some of our software and I was battling to understand how exactly the whole process worked. I was sent the following document which really helped explain it – so if you ever use the same tool it is well worth a read. Licensing Basics LogicNP CryptoLicensing For .Net is the most advanced and state-of-the art licensing and copy protection system you can use for your software. LogicNP CryptoLicensing System uses the latest cryptographic technology to generate and validate licenses. The cryptographic algorithm used is the RSA algorithm which consists of a pair of keys called as the generation key and the validation key. Data encrypted using the generation key can only be decrypted using the corresponding validation key. How does cryptographic validation work? When a new license project is created, a unique validation-generation key pair is created for the project. When LogicNP CryptoLicensing For .Net generates licenses, it encrypts the license settings using the generation key. The validation key can be safely distributed with your software and is used during validation. During license validation, LogicNP CryptoLicensing For .Net attempts to decrypt the encrypted license code using the validation key. If the decryption is successful, this means that the data was encrypted using the generation key, since only the corresponding validation key can decrypt data encrypted with the generation key. This further means that not only is the license valid but that it was generated by you and only you since nobody else has access to the generation key. Generation Key This key is used by CryptoLicensing Generator to generate encrypted license codes. This key is stored in the license project file, so the license project file must be kept secure and confidential and must be accorded the same care as any other critical asset such as source code. Validation Key This key is used for validating generated license codes. It is the same key displayed in the 'Get Validation Key And Code' dialog (Ctrl+K) and is used by your software when validating license codes (using LogicNP.CryptoLicensing.dll). Unlike the generation key, it is not necessary to keep this key secure and confidential. Note that the generation key pair is stored in the project file created by LogicNP CryptoLicensing For .Net, so it is very important to backup this file and to keep it secure. Once the file is lost, it is not possible to retrieve the key pair. FAQ Do I use the same validation key to validate all license codes? Yes, the validation key (and generation key) for the project remains the same; you use the same key to validate all license codes generated using the project. You can retrieve the validation key using the "Project" menu --> "Get Validation Key & Code" menu item. Can license codes generated using generation key from one project be validated using validation key of another project? No! Q. Is every generated license code unique? A. Yes, every license code generated by CryptoLicensing is guaranteed to be unique, even if you generate thousands of codes at a time. Q. What makes CryptoLicensing so secure? A. CryptoLicensing uses the latest cryptographic technology to generate and validate licenses. The cryptographic algorithm used is the RSA asymmetric key algorithm which can use upto 3072-bit keys. Given current computing power, it takes years to break a 3072-bit key. Q. Is is possible for a hacker to develop a keygen for my software? A. Impossible. The cryptographic algorithm used by CryptoLicensing consists of a pair of keys called as the generation key and the validation key. Data encrypted with one key can only be decrypted by the other key and vice versa. Licenses are generated using the generation key and validated using the validation key. Without the generation key, it is impossible to generate valid licenses. Q. What is the difference between validation key and generation key? Generation Key This key is used by CryptoLicensing Generator to generate encrypted license codes. This key is stored in the license project file, so the license project file must be kept secure and confidential and must be accorded the same care as any other critical asset such as source code. Validation Key This key is used for validating generated license codes. It is the same key displayed in the 'Get Validation Key And Code' dialog (Ctrl+K) and is used by your software when validating license codes (using LogicNP.CryptoLicensing.dll). Unlike the generation key, it is not necessary to keep this key secure and confidential. Q. Do I have to include the license project file (.licproj) with my software? A. No!!! This goes against the very essence of the security of the asymmetric cryptographic scheme because the project file contains both the validation and generation key. With your software, you only need to include the validation key which will be used to validate licenses generated by CryptoLicensing using the generation key. The license project file should be treated as any other valuable and confidential asset such as your source code. Q. Does the license service need the license project file? A. Yes. The license project file is needed whenever new licenses are generated (via the UI, via the API or via the license service). As just one example, the license service generates new machine-locked licenses when activated licenses are presented to it for activation, therefore the license service needs the license project file. Q. Is it possible to embed my own data in the generated licenses? A. Yes. You can embed any amount of additional data in the licenses. This data will have the same amount of security as the license code itself and will be tamper-proof. The embedded user data can be retrieved from your software. Q. What additional steps can I take to ensure that my software does not get cracked? A. There are many methods and techniques which can make it extremely difficult for a hacker to crack your software. See Writing Effective License Checking Code And Designing Effective Licenses for more information. Q. Why is the license service not working? A. The most common cause is not setting the CryptoLicense.LicenseServiceURL property before trying to validate a license. Make sure that this property is set to the correct URL where your license service is hosted. The most common cause after this is that the license project file on the web server where your license service is hosted is not the latest. This happens if you make changes to the license project (for example, set the 'Enable With Serials' setting for a profile), but don't upload the updated project file to your web server. Q. Why are my serials not working? Serial codes require the user of a license service. See Using Serial Codes for more details. Also see the earlier question 'Why is the license service not working?' Q. Is the same validation key used to validate license codes generated from different profiles. A. Yes. Profiles are just pre specified license settings for quickly generating licenses having those settings. The actual license code is still generated using the license project's cryptographic generation key and thus, can be validated using the project's validation key. Q. Why are changes made to a profile not getting saved? A. Simply changing license settings via UI and saving the license project does not save those license settings to the active profile. You must first save the license settings to a profile using the Save/Save As command from the Profiles menu (see above). Q. Why is validation of activated licenses failing from CryptoLicensing Generator, but works from my software? A. Make sure that you have specified the URL of the license service using the Project Properties Dialog. Also see the earlier question 'Why is the license service not working?' Q. How can I extend the trial period of my customer? A. To extend the evaluation period of the customer, simply send him a new license code specifying the desired evaluation limits. Evaluation information such as the current used days, executions, etc are stored in garbled form in a registry location which is derived from the license code. Therefore, when a new license code is used, the old evaluation information will not be used and a new evaluation period will be started.

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• CVE-2009-2409 Cryptographic Issues in OpenSSL

  - by chandan

  CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2009-2409 Cryptographic Issues vulnerability 5.1 OpenSSL Solaris 10 SPARC: 147707-02 X86: 146672-03 Solaris 9 Contact Support This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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• Are python's cryptographic modules good enough?

  - by Aerovistae

  I mean, say you were writing professional grade software that would involve sensitive client information. (Take this in the context of me being an amateur programmer.) Would you use hlib and hmac? Are they good enough to secure data? Or would you write something fancier by hand? Edit: In context of those libraries containing more or less the best hashing algorithms in the world, I guess it's silly to ask if you'd "write something fancier." What I'm really asking here is whether it's enough on its own.

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• Looking for a non-cryptographic hash function that returns a single character

  - by makerofthings7

  Suppose I have a dictionary of ASCII words stored in uppercase. I also want to save those words into separate files so that the total word count of each file is approximately the same. By simply looking at the word I need to know which file it should be in (if it's there at all). Duplicate words should go into the same file and overwrite the last one. My first attempt at solving this problem is to use .NET's object.GetHashCode() function and .Trim() to get one of the "random" characters that pop up. I asked a similar question here If I only use one character of object.GetHashCode() I would get a hash code character of A..Z or 0..9. However saving the result of GetHashCode to disk is a no-no so I need a substitute. Question: What algorithm (or subset of an algorithm) is appropriate for pigeonholing strings into a single character or range of characters (Like hex 0..F offers 16 chars)? Real world usage: I'll use this answer to modify the Partition key used in Azure Table storage as described here

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• How do I design a cryptographic hash function?

  - by Eyal

  After reading the following about why one-way hash functions are one-way, I would like to know how to design a hash function. http://stackoverflow.com/questions/1038307/help-me-better-understand-cryptographic-hash-functions/1047106#1047106 Before everyone gets on my case: Yes, I know that it's a bad idea to not use a proven and tested hash function. I would still like to know how it's done. I'm familiar with Feistel-network ciphers but those are necessarily reversible, horrible for a cryptographic hash. Is there some sort of construction that is well-used in cryptographic hashing? Something that makes it very one-way?

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• C# RSA Cryptographic Algorithm

  - by karthik

  Hi, Is C# 'RSACryptoServiceProvider' cryptographic algorithm is a part of Microsoft- CryptoAPI? Any advantage we have for normal asymmetric encryption by using CryptoAPI over 'RSACryptoServiceProvider' in .Net? I cannot understand the difference between them?And which one is best and safty? Could you please help? Thanks Karthik

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• implementing cryptographic algorithms, specifically the key expansion part

  - by masseyc

  Hey, recently I picked up a copy of Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier and it's been a good read. I now understand how several algorithms outlined in the book work, and I'd like to start implementing a few of them in C. One thing that many of the algorithms have in common is dividing an x-bit key, into several smaller y-bit keys. For example, blowfish's key, X, is 64-bits, but you are required to break it up into two 32-bit halves; Xl and Xr. This is where I'm getting stuck. I'm fairly decent with C, but I'm not the strongest when it comes to bitwise operators and the like. After some help on IRC, I managed to come up with these two macros: #define splitup(a, b, c) {b = a >> 32; c = a & 0xffffffff; } #define combine(a, b, c) {a = (c << 32) | a;} Where a is 64 bits and b and c are 32 bits. However, the compiler warns me about the fact that I'm shifting a 32 bit variable by 32 bits. My questions are these: what's bad about shifting a 32-bit variable 32 bits? I'm guessing it's undefined, but these macros do seem to be working. Also, would you suggest I go about this another way? As I said, I'm fairly familiar with C, but bitwise operators and the like still give me a headache.

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• New cryptographic algorithms ?

  - by redbull

  I was wondering about new trends in cryptography. Which algorithms are new ? Which are improved and which died beacuse of the time that past ? For example EEC ( Elliptic Curve Cryptography ) is quite new approach, but definitly not the only one. Could you name some of them ?

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• Why the cryptographic key was not provided at ubuntu 12.04 first run?

  - by user64720

  So I installed Ubuntu 12.04 a few days ago and strangely I missed the part where we choose to encrypt home folder. However I already ran the commands on this question (How to check if your home folder and swap partition are encrypted using terminal?) to check if home folder and swap partition are encrypted and they are. So why is that Ubuntu did not provide me the cryptographic key the same way it happened when I installed Ubuntu 11.04???

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• How do I fix the error: CS1548: Cryptographic failure while signing assembly ?

  - by Paula DiTallo

  The full error in Microsoft Visual Studio on a compile looks like this: error CS1548: Cryptographic failure while signing assembly 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\Samples\Analysis Services\Programmability\AMO\AMOAdventureWorks\CS\StoredProcedures\obj\Debug\StoredProcedures.dll' This is likely due to a missing strong key pair value file. The easiest way to solve this problem is to create a new one. Navigate to:  Microsoft Visual Studio 2010>Visual Studio Tools>Visual Studio x64 Win64 Command Prompt (2010)  [if you aren't on an x64 box, pick another command prompt option that fits] Once the MS-Dos window displays, type in this statement: sn -k c:\SampleKey.snk Then copy the output *.snk file to project directory, or the *referenced directory. Remove the old reference to the *.snk file from the project. Add the paired key back to the project as an existing item. When you add back the *.snk file to the project, you will see that the *.snk file is no longer missing.   Our work is done!   *referenced directory: Pay attention to the original error message on compile. The *.snk file that is referenced may be in a directory path you aren't expecting--so you will still get the error unless you change the directory path or write the file to the directory the program is expecting to find the *.snk file.

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• Does anyone know how to implement a secure CNG key store in C#?

  - by Matt W

  Or is there a standard, default one provided in 2008? Thanks, Matt.

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• How can I ensure that a Java object (containing cryptographic material) is zeroized?

  - by Jeremy Powell

  My concern is that cryptographic keys and secrets that are managed by the garbage collector may be copied and moved around in memory without zeroization. As a possible solution, is it enough to: public class Key { private char[] key; // ... protected void finalize() throws Throwable { try { for(int k = 0; k < key.length; k++) { key[k] = '\0'; } } catch (Exception e) { //... } finally { super.finalize(); } } // ... }

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• Is the integer-factorization problem (used for many cryptographic applications) NP-Complete?

  - by Gail

  As the question states, does the integer-factorization problem fall into the class of NP-Complete problems?

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• Interesting articles and blogs on SPARC T4

  - by mv

  Interesting articles and blogs on SPARC T4 processor   I have consolidated all the interesting information I could get on SPARC T4 processor and its hardware cryptographic capabilities.  Hope its useful. 1. Advantages of SPARC T4 processor  Most important points in this T4 announcement are : "The SPARC T4 processor was designed from the ground up for high speed security and has a cryptographic stream processing unit (SPU) integrated directly into each processor core. These accelerators support 16 industry standard security ciphers and enable high speed encryption at rates 3 to 5 times that of competing processors. By integrating encryption capabilities directly inside the instruction pipeline, the SPARC T4 processor eliminates the performance and cost barriers typically associated with secure computing and makes it possible to deliver high security levels without impacting the user experience." Data Sheet has more details on these  : "New on-chip Encryption Instruction Accelerators with direct non-privileged support for 16 industry-standard cryptographic algorithms plus random number generation in each of the eight cores: AES, Camellia, CRC32c, DES, 3DES, DH, DSA, ECC, Kasumi, MD5, RSA, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512" I ran "isainfo -v" command on Solaris 11 Sparc T4-1 system. It shows the new instructions as expected  : $ isainfo -v 64-bit sparcv9 applications crc32c cbcond pause mont mpmul sha512 sha256 sha1 md5 camellia kasumi des aes ima hpc vis3 fmaf asi_blk_init vis2 vis popc 32-bit sparc applications crc32c cbcond pause mont mpmul sha512 sha256 sha1 md5 camellia kasumi des aes ima hpc vis3 fmaf asi_blk_init vis2 vis popc v8plus div32 mul32  2.  Dan Anderson's Blog have some interesting points about how these can be used : "New T4 crypto instructions include: aes_kexpand0, aes_kexpand1, aes_kexpand2,         aes_eround01, aes_eround23, aes_eround01_l, aes_eround_23_l, aes_dround01, aes_dround23, aes_dround01_l, aes_dround_23_l.       Having SPARC T4 hardware crypto instructions is all well and good, but how do we access it ?      The software is available with Solaris 11 and is used automatically if you are running Solaris a SPARC T4.  It is used internally in the kernel through kernel crypto modules.  It is available in user space through the PKCS#11 library." 3.   Dans' Blog on Where's the Crypto Libraries? Although this was written in 2009 but still is very useful  "Here's a brief tour of the major crypto libraries shown in the digraph:   The libpkcs11 library contains the PKCS#11 API (C_\*() functions, such as C_Initialize()). That in turn calls library pkcs11_softtoken or pkcs11_kernel, for userland or kernel crypto providers. The latter is used mostly for hardware-assisted cryptography (such as n2cp for Niagara2 SPARC processors), as that is performed more efficiently in kernel space with the "kCF" module (Kernel Crypto Framework). Additionally, for Solaris 10, strong crypto algorithms were split off in separate libraries, pkcs11_softtoken_extra libcryptoutil contains low-level utility functions to help implement cryptography. libsoftcrypto (OpenSolaris and Solaris Nevada only) implements several symmetric-key crypto algorithms in software, such as AES, RC4, and DES3, and the bignum library (used for RSA). libmd implements MD5, SHA, and SHA2 message digest algorithms" 4. Difference in T3 and T4 Diagram in this blog is good and self explanatory. Jeff's blog also highlights the differences  "The T4 servers have improved crypto acceleration, described at https://blogs.oracle.com/DanX/entry/sparc_t4_openssl_engine. It is "just built in" so administrators no longer have to assign crypto accelerator units to domains - it "just happens". Every physical or virtual CPU on a SPARC-T4 has full access to hardware based crypto acceleration at all times. .... For completeness sake, it's worth noting that the T4 adds more crypto algorithms, and accelerates Camelia, CRC32c, and more SHA-x." 5. About performance counters In this blog, performance counters are explained : "Note that unlike T3 and before, T4 crypto doesn't require kernel modules like ncp or n2cp, there is no visibility of crypto hardware with kstats or cryptoadm. T4 does provide hardware counters for crypto operations.  You can see these using cpustat: cpustat -c pic0=Instr_FGU_crypto 5 You can check the general crypto support of the hardware and OS with the command "isainfo -v". Since T4 crypto's implementation now allows direct userland access, there are no "crypto units" visible to cryptoadm.  " For more details refer Martin's blog as well. 6. How to turn off  SPARC T4 or Intel AES-NI crypto acceleration  I found this interesting blog from Darren about how to turn off  SPARC T4 or Intel AES-NI crypto acceleration. "One of the new Solaris 11 features of the linker/loader is the ability to have a single ELF object that has multiple different implementations of the same functions that are selected at runtime based on the capabilities of the machine.   The alternate to this is having the application coded to call getisax(2) system call and make the choice itself.  We use this functionality of the linker/loader when we build the userland libraries for the Solaris Cryptographic Framework (specifically libmd.so and libsoftcrypto.so) The Solaris linker/loader allows control of a lot of its functionality via environment variables, we can use that to control the version of the cryptographic functions we run.  To do this we simply export the LD_HWCAP environment variable with values that tell ld.so.1 to not select the HWCAP section matching certain features even if isainfo says they are present.  This will work for consumers of the Solaris Cryptographic Framework that use the Solaris PKCS#11 libraries or use libmd.so interfaces directly.  For SPARC T4 : export LD_HWCAP="-aes -des -md5 -sha256 -sha512 -mont -mpul" .. For Intel systems with AES-NI support: export LD_HWCAP="-aes"" Note that LD_HWCAP is explained in  http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E23823_01/html/816-5165/ld.so.1-1.html "LD_HWCAP, LD_HWCAP_32, and LD_HWCAP_64 -  Identifies an alternative hardware capabilities value... A “-” prefix results in the capabilities that follow being removed from the alternative capabilities." 7. Whitepaper on SPARC T4 Servers—Optimized for End-to-End Data Center Computing This Whitepaper on SPARC T4 Servers—Optimized for End-to-End Data Center Computing explains more details.  It has DTrace scripts which may come in handy : "To ensure the hardware-assisted cryptographic acceleration is configured to use and working with the security scenarios, it is recommended to use the following Solaris DTrace script. #!/usr/sbin/dtrace -s pid$1:libsoftcrypto:yf*:entry, pid$target:libsoftcrypto:rsa*:entry, pid$1:libmd:yf*:entry { @[probefunc] = count(); } tick-1sec { printa(@ops); trunc(@ops); }" Note that I have slightly modified the D Script to have RSA "libsoftcrypto:rsa*:entry" as well as per recommendations from Chi-Chang Lin. 8. References http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/features/sparc-t4-announcement-494846.html http://www.oracle.com/us/products/servers-storage/servers/sparc-enterprise/t-series/sparc-t4-1-ds-487858.pdf https://blogs.oracle.com/DanX/entry/sparc_t4_openssl_engine https://blogs.oracle.com/DanX/entry/where_s_the_crypto_libraries https://blogs.oracle.com/darren/entry/howto_turn_off_sparc_t4 http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E23823_01/html/816-5165/ld.so.1-1.html   https://blogs.oracle.com/hardware/entry/unleash_the_power_of_cryptography https://blogs.oracle.com/cmt/entry/t4_crypto_cheat_sheet https://blogs.oracle.com/martinm/entry/t4_performance_counters_explained  https://blogs.oracle.com/jsavit/entry/no_mau_required_on_a http://www.oracle.com/us/products/servers-storage/servers/sparc-enterprise/t-series/sparc-t4-business-wp-524472.pdf

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• Unleash the Power of Cryptography on SPARC T4

  - by B.Koch

  by Rob Ludeman Oracle’s SPARC T4 systems are architected to deliver enhanced value for customer via the inclusion of many integrated features.  One of the best examples of this approach is demonstrated in the on-chip cryptographic support that delivers wire speed encryption capabilities without any impact to application performance.  The Evolution of SPARC Encryption SPARC T-Series systems have a long history of providing this capability, dating back to the release of the first T2000 systems that featured support for on-chip RSA encryption directly in the UltraSPARC T1 processor.  Successive generations have built on this approach by support for additional encryption ciphers that are tightly coupled with the Oracle Solaris 10 and Solaris 11 encryption framework.  While earlier versions of this technology were implemented using co-processors, the SPARC T4 was redesigned with new crypto instructions to eliminate some of the performance overhead associated with the former approach, resulting in much higher performance for encrypted workloads. The Superiority of the SPARC T4 Approach to Crypto As companies continue to engage in more and more e-commerce, the need to provide greater degrees of security for these transactions is more critical than ever before.  Traditional methods of securing data in transit by applications have a number of drawbacks that are addressed by the SPARC T4 cryptographic approach. 1. Performance degradation – cryptography is highly compute intensive and therefore, there is a significant cost when using other architectures without embedded crypto functionality.  This performance penalty impacts the entire system, slowing down performance of web servers (SSL), for example, and potentially bogging down the speed of other business applications.  The SPARC T4 processor enables customers to deliver high levels of security to internal and external customers while not incurring an impact to overall SLAs in their IT environment. 2. Added cost – one of the methods to avoid performance degradation is the addition of add-in cryptographic accelerator cards or external offload engines in other systems.  While these solutions provide a brute force mechanism to avoid the problem of slower system performance, it usually comes at an added cost.  Customers looking to encrypt datacenter traffic without the overhead and expenditure of extra hardware can rely on SPARC T4 systems to deliver the performance necessary without the need to purchase other hardware or add-on cards. 3. Higher complexity – the addition of cryptographic cards or leveraging load balancers to perform encryption tasks results in added complexity from a management standpoint.  With SPARC T4, encryption keys and the framework built into Solaris 10 and 11 means that administrators generally don’t need to spend extra cycles determining how to perform cryptographic functions.  In fact, many of the instructions are built-in and require no user intervention to be utilized.  For example, For OpenSSL on Solaris 11, SPARC T4 crypto is available directly with a new built-in OpenSSL 1.0 engine, called the "t4 engine."  For a deeper technical dive into the new instructions included in SPARC T4, consult Dan Anderson’s blog. Conclusion In summary, SPARC T4 systems offer customers much more value for applications than just increased performance. The integration of key virtualization technologies, embedded encryption, and a true Enterprise Operating System, Oracle Solaris, provides direct business benefits that supersedes the commodity approach to data center computing.   SPARC T4 removes the roadblocks to secure computing by offering integrated crypto accelerators that can save IT organizations in operating cost while delivering higher levels of performance and meeting objectives around compliance. For more on the SPARC T4 family of products, go to here.

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• HOWTO Turn off SPARC T4 or Intel AES-NI crypto acceleration.

  - by darrenm

  Since we released hardware crypto acceleration for SPARC T4 and Intel AES-NI support we have had a common question come up: 'How do I test without the hardware crypto acceleration?'. Initially this came up just for development use so developers can do unit testing on a machine that has hardware offload but still cover the code paths for a machine that doesn't (our integration and release testing would run on all supported types of hardware anyway).  I've also seen it asked in a customer context too so that we can show that there is a performance gain from the hardware crypto acceleration, (not just the fact that SPARC T4 much faster performing processor than T3) and measure what it is for their application. With SPARC T2/T3 we could easily disable the hardware crypto offload by running 'cryptoadm disable provider=n2cp/0'.  We can't do that with SPARC T4 or with Intel AES-NI because in both of those classes of processor the encryption doesn't require a device driver instead it is unprivileged user land callable instructions. Turns out there is away to do this by using features of the Solaris runtime loader (ld.so.1). First I need to expose a little bit of implementation detail about how the Solaris Cryptographic Framework is implemented in Solaris 11.  One of the new Solaris 11 features of the linker/loader is the ability to have a single ELF object that has multiple different implementations of the same functions that are selected at runtime based on the capabilities of the machine.  The alternate to this is having the application coded to call getisax() and make the choice itself.  We use this functionality of the linker/loader when we build the userland libraries for the Solaris Cryptographic Framework (specifically libmd.so, and the unfortunately misnamed due to historical reasons libsoftcrypto.so) The Solaris linker/loader allows control of a lot of its functionality via environment variables, we can use that to control the version of the cryptographic functions we run.  To do this we simply export the LD_HWCAP environment variable with values that tell ld.so.1 to not select the HWCAP section matching certain features even if isainfo says they are present.  For SPARC T4 that would be: export LD_HWCAP="-aes -des -md5 -sha256 -sha512 -mont -mpul" and for Intel systems with AES-NI support: export LD_HWCAP="-aes" This will work for consumers of the Solaris Cryptographic Framework that use the Solaris PKCS#11 libraries or use libmd.so interfaces directly.  It also works for the Oracle DB and Java JCE.  However does not work for the default enabled OpenSSL "t4" or "aes-ni" engines (unfortunately) because they do explicit calls to getisax() themselves rather than using multiple ELF cap sections. However we can still use OpenSSL to demonstrate this by explicitly selecting "pkcs11" engine  using only a single process and thread.  $ openssl speed -engine pkcs11 -evp aes-128-cbc ... type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes aes-128-cbc 54170.81k 187416.00k 489725.70k 805445.63k 1018880.00k $ LD_HWCAP="-aes" openssl speed -engine pkcs11 -evp aes-128-cbc ... type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes aes-128-cbc 29376.37k 58328.13k 79031.55k 86738.26k 89191.77k We can clearly see the difference this makes in the case where AES offload to the SPARC T4 was disabled. The "t4" engine is faster than the pkcs11 one because there is less overhead (again on a SPARC T4-1 using only a single process/thread - using -multi you will get even bigger numbers). $ openssl speed -evp aes-128-cbc ... type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes aes-128-cbc 85526.61k 89298.84k 91970.30k 92662.78k 92842.67k Yet another cool feature of the Solaris linker/loader, thanks Rod and Ali. Note these above openssl speed output is not intended to show the actual performance of any particular benchmark just that there is a significant improvement from using hardware acceleration on SPARC T4. For cryptographic performance benchmarks see the http://blogs.oracle.com/BestPerf/ postings.

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• EFS Remote Encryption

  - by Apoulet

  We have been trying to setup EFS across our domain. Unfortunately Reading/Writing file over network share does not work, we get an "Access Denied" error. Another worrying fact is that I managed to get it working for 1 machine but no other would work. The machines are all Windows 2008R2, running as VM under ESXi host. According to: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb457116.aspx#EHAA We setup the involved machine to be trusted for delegation The user are not restricted and can be trusted for delegation. The users have logged-in on both side and can read/write encrypted files without issues locally. I enabled Kerberos logging in the registry and this is the relevant logs that I get on the machine that has the encrypted files. In order for all certificate that the user possess (Only Key Name changes): Event ID 5058: Audit Success, "Other System Events" Key file operation. Subject: Security ID: {MyDOMAIN}\{MyID} Account Name: {MyID} Account Domain: {MyDOMAIN} Logon ID: 0xbXXXXXXX Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: Not Available. Key Name: {CE885431-9B4F-47C2-8415-2D766B999999} Key Type: User key. Key File Operation Information: File Path: C:\Users\{MyID}\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-4585646465656-260371901-2912106767-1207\66099999999991e891f187e791277da03d_dfe9ecd8-31c4-4b0f-9b57-6fd3cab90760 Operation: Read persisted key from file. Return Code: 0x0[/code] Event ID 5061: Audit Faillure, "System Intergrity" [code]Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: {MyDOMAIN}\{MyID} Account Name: {MyID} Account Domain: {MyDOMAIN} Logon ID: 0xbXXXXXXX Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: RSA Key Name: {CE885431-9B4F-47C2-8415-2D766B999999} Key Type: User key. Cryptographic Operation: Operation: Open Key. Return Code: 0x8009000b Could this be related to this error from the CryptAcquireContext function NTE_BAD_KEY_STATE 0x8009000BL The user password has changed since the private keys were encrypted. The problem is that the users I using at the moment can not change their password.

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• Creating Wildcard Certificates with makecert.exe

  - by Shawn Cicoria

  Be nice to be able to make wildcard certificates for use in development with makecert – turns out, it’s real easy.  Just ensure that your CN=  is the wildcard string to use. The following sequence generates a CA cert, then the public/private key pair for a wildcard certificate REM make the CA makecert -pe -n "CN=*.contosotest.com" -a sha1 -len 2048 -sky exchange -eku 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 -ic CA.cer -iv CA.pvk -sp "Microsoft RSA SChannel Cryptographic Provider" -sy 12 -sv wildcard.pvk wildcard.cer pvk2pfx -pvk wildcard.pvk -spc wildcard.cer -pfx wildcard.pfx REM now make the server wildcard cert makecert -pe -n "CN=*.contosotest.com" -a sha1 -len 2048 -sky exchange -eku 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 -ic CA.cer -iv CA.pvk -sp "Microsoft RSA SChannel Cryptographic Provider" -sy 12 -sv wildcard.pvk wildcard.cer pvk2pfx -pvk wildcard.pvk -spc wildcard.cer -pfx wildcard.pfx

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• Implementation of Diffie-Hellman algorithm of key exchange

  The article is devoted to the development of the library that implements the Diffie – Hellman cryptographic algorithm of key exchange.

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• June 25 changes to BIS 742.15 How does it impact SSL iPhone App export compliance

  - by Rob

  This question isn't strictly development-related but I hope it's still acceptable :) On June 25, 2010 the BIS updated 742.15 and of interest to me is the new 742.14(b)(4) "Exclusions from mass market classification request, encryption registration and self-classification reporting requirements" and 742.15(b)(4)(ii) which states… (ii) Foreign products developed with or incorporating U.S.-origin encryption source code, components, or toolkits. Foreign products developed with or incorporating U.S. origin encryption source code, components or toolkits that are subject to the EAR, provided that the U.S. origin encryption items have previously been classified or registered and authorized by BIS and the cryptographic functionality has not been changed. Such products include foreign developed products that are designed to operate with U.S. products through a cryptographic interface. I take this to mean that my Canadian produced product that uses https is now excluded from requiring a CCATTS. What does everyone else think?

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• SQL SERVER – History of SQL Server Database Encryption

  - by pinaldave

  I recently met Michael Coles and Rodeney Landrum the author of one of the kind book Expert SQL Server 2008 Encryption at SQLPASS in Seattle. During the conversation we ended up how Microsoft is evolving encryption technology. The same discussion lead to talking about history of encryption tools in SQL Server. Michale pointed me to page 18 of his book of encryption. He explicitly give me permission to re-produce relevant part of history from his book. Encryption in SQL Server 2000 Built-in cryptographic encryption functionality was nonexistent in SQL Server 2000 and prior versions. In order to get server-side encryption in SQL Server you had to resort to purchasing or creating your own SQL Server XPs. Creating your own cryptographic XPs could be a daunting task owing to the fact that XPs had to be compiled as native DLLs (using a language like C or C++) and the XP application programming interface (API) was poorly documented. In addition there were always concerns around creating wellbehaved XPs that “played nicely” with the SQL Server process. Encryption in SQL Server 2005 Prior to the release of SQL Server 2005 there was a flurry of regulatory activity in response to accounting scandals and attacks on repositories of confidential consumer data. Much of this regulation centered onthe need for protecting and controlling access to sensitive financial and consumer information. With the release of SQL Server 2005 Microsoft responded to the increasing demand for built-in encryption byproviding the necessary tools to encrypt data at the column level. This functionality prominently featured the following: Support for column-level encryption of data using symmetric keys or passphrases. Built-in access to a variety of symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms, including AES, DES, Triple DES, RC2, RC4, and RSA. Capability to create and manage symmetric keys. Key creation and management. Ability to generate asymmetric keys and self-signed certificates, or to install external asymmetric keys and certificates. Implementation of hierarchical model for encryption key management, similar to the ANSI X9.17 standard model. SQL functions to generate one-way hash codes and digital signatures, including SHA-1 and MD5 hashes. Additional SQL functions to encrypt and decrypt data. Extensions to the SQL language to support creation, use, and administration of encryption keys and certificates. SQL CLR extensions that provide access to .NET-based encryption functionality. Encryption in SQL Server 2008 Encryption demands have increased over the past few years. For instance, there has been a demand for the ability to store encryption keys “off-the-box,” physically separate from the database and the data it contains. Also there is a recognized requirement for legacy databases and applications to take advantage of encryption without changing the existing code base. To address these needs SQL Server 2008 adds the following features to its encryption arsenal: Transparent Data Encryption (TDE): Allows you to encrypt an entire database, including log files and the tempdb database, in such a way that it is transparent to client applications. Extensible Key Management (EKM): Allows you to store and manage your encryption keys on an external device known as a hardware security module (HSM). Cryptographic random number generation functionality. Additional cryptography-related catalog views and dynamic management views. SQL language extensions to support the new encryption functionality. The encryption book covers all the tools in its various chapter in one simple story. If you are interested how encryption evolved and reached to the stage where it is today, this book is must for everyone. You can read my earlier review of the book over here. Reference: Pinal Dave (http://blog.sqlauthority.com) Filed under: SQL, SQL Authority, SQL Query, SQL Server, SQL Tips and Tricks, SQLAuthority Book Review, SQLAuthority News, T SQL, Technology Tagged: Encryption, SQL Server Encryption, SQLPASS

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• certificate issues running app in windows 7 ?

  - by Jurjen

  Hi, I'm having some problems with my App. I'm using 'org.mentalis.security' assembly to create a certificate object from a 'pfx' file, this is the line of code where the exception occurs : Certificate cert = Certificate.CreateFromPfxFile(publicKey, certificatePassword); this has always worked and still does in production, but for some reason it throws an exception when run in windows 7 (tried it on 2 machines). CertificateException : Unable to import the PFX file! [error code = -2146893792] I can't find much on this message via google, but when checking the EventViewer I get an 'Audit Failure' every time this exception occurs: Event ID = 5061 Source = Microsoft Windows Security Task Category = system Integrity Keywords = Audit Failure Cryptographic operation. Subject: Security ID: NT AUTHORITY\IUSR Account Name: IUSR Account Domain: NT AUTHORITY Logon ID: 0x3e3 Cryptographic Parameters: Provider Name: Microsoft Software Key Storage Provider Algorithm Name: Not Available. Key Name: VriendelijkeNaam Key Type: User key. Cryptographic Operation: Operation: Open Key. Return Code: 0x2 ` I'm not sure why this isn't working on win 7, I've never had problems when I was running on Vista with this. I am running VS2008 as administrator but I guess that maybe the ASP.NET user doesn't have sufficient rights or something. It's pretty strangs that the 'Algorithm name' is 'Not Available' can anyone help me with this... TIA, Jurjen de Groot

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• Ideas for multiplatform encrypted java mobile storage system

  - by Fernando Miguélez

  Objective I am currently designing the API for a multiplatform storage system that would offer same interface and capabilities accross following supported mobile Java Platforms: J2ME. Minimum configuration/profile CLDC 1.1/MIDP 2.0 with support for some necessary JSRs (JSR-75 for file storage). Android. No minimum platform version decided yet, but rather likely could be API level 7. Blackberry. It would use the same base source of J2ME but taking advantage of some advaced capabilities of the platform. No minimum configuration decided yet (maybe 4.6 because of 64 KB limitation for RMS on 4.5). Basically the API would sport three kind of stores: Files. These would allow standard directory/file manipulation (read/write through streams, create, mkdir, etc.). Preferences. It is a special store that handles properties accessed through keys (Similar to plain old java properties file but supporting some improvements such as different value data types such as SharedPreferences on Android platform) Local Message Queues. This store would offer basic message queue functionality. Considerations Inspired on JSR-75, all types of stores would be accessed in an uniform way by means of an URL following RFC 1738 conventions, but with custom defined prefixes (i.e. "file://" for files, "prefs://" for preferences or "queue://" for message queues). The address would refer to a virtual location that would be mapped to a physical storage object by each mobile platform implementation. Only files would allow hierarchical storage (folders) and access to external extorage memory cards (by means of a unit name, the same way as in JSR-75, but that would not change regardless of underlying platform). The other types would only support flat storage. The system should also support a secure version of all basic types. The user would indicate it by prefixing "s" to the URL (i.e. "sfile://" instead of "file://"). The API would only require one PIN (introduced only once) to access any kind of secure object types. Implementation issues For the implementation of both plaintext and encrypted stores, I would use the functionality available on the underlying platforms: Files. These are available on all platforms (J2ME only with JSR-75, but it is mandatory for our needs). The abstract File to actual File mapping is straight except for addressing issues. RMS. This type of store available on J2ME (and Blackberry) platforms is convenient for Preferences and maybe Message Queues (though depending on performance or size requirements these could be implemented by means of normal files). SharedPreferences. This type of storage, only available on Android, would match Preferences needs. SQLite databases. This could be used for message queues on Android (and maybe Blackberry). When it comes to encryption some requirements should be met: To ease the implementation it will be carried out on read/write operations basis on streams (for files), RMS Records, SharedPreferences key-value pairs, SQLite database columns. Every underlying storage object should use the same encryption key. Handling of encrypted stores should be the same as the unencrypted counterpart. The only difference (from the user point of view) accessing an encrypted store would be the addressing. The user PIN provides access to any secure storage object, but the change of it would not require to decrypt/re-encrypt all the encrypted data. Cryptographic capabilities of underlying platform should be used whenever it is possible, so we would use: J2ME: SATSA-CRYPTO if it is available (not mandatory) or lightweight BoncyCastle cryptographic framework for J2ME. Blackberry: RIM Cryptographic API or BouncyCastle Android: JCE with integraced cryptographic provider (BouncyCastle?) Doubts Having reached this point I was struck by some doubts about what solution would be more convenient, taking into account the limitation of the plataforms. These are some of my doubts: Encryption Algorithm for data. Would AES-128 be strong and fast enough? What alternatives for such scenario would you suggest? Encryption Mode. I have read about the weakness of ECB encryption versus CBC, but in this case the first would have the advantage of random access to blocks, which is interesting for seek functionality on files. What type of encryption mode would you choose instead? Is stream encryption suitable for this case? Key generation. There could be one key generated for each storage object (file, RMS RecordStore, etc.) or just use one for all the objects of the same type. The first seems "safer", though it would require some extra space on device. In your opinion what would the trade-offs of each? Key storage. For this case using a standard JKS (or PKCS#12) KeyStore file could be suited to store encryption keys, but I could also define a smaller structure (encryption-transformation / key data / checksum) that could be attached to each storage store (i.e. using addition files with the same name and special extension for plain files or embedded inside other types of objects such as RMS Record Stores). What approach would you prefer? And when it comes to using a standard KeyStore with multiple-key generation (given this is your preference), would it be better to use a record-store per storage object or just a global KeyStore keeping all keys (i.e. using the URL identifier of abstract storage object as alias)? Master key. The use of a master key seems obvious. This key should be protected by user PIN (introduced only once) and would allow access to the rest of encryption keys (they would be encrypted by means of this master key). Changing the PIN would only require to reencrypt this key and not all the encrypted data. Where would you keep it taking into account that if this got lost all data would be no further accesible? What further considerations should I take into account? Platform cryptography support. Do SATSA-CRYPTO-enabled J2ME phones really take advantage of some dedicated hardware acceleration (or other advantage I have not foreseen) and would this approach be prefered (whenever possible) over just BouncyCastle implementation? For the same reason is RIM Cryptographic API worth the license cost over BouncyCastle? Any comments, critics, further considerations or different approaches are welcome.

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• VS development on FDCC compliant Workstation

  - by paramesh kudlur

  Hi, I have a FDCC compliant workstation with FIPS 140-1 (Level 1) enabled. Now, i cannot run/debug any VS 2005/2008 applications on my machine I get the following error message on my browser Parser Error Message: This implementation is not part of the Windows Platform FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms. the Error points to line no 1 of default.aspx.cs file using system; The only way to successfully debug/run my application is to set the following registry key to 0 HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\fipsalgorithmpolicy I understand that there are some Cryptographic algorithms that are not FIPS compliant on XP SP2 but i am not using cryptography at all. For that matter, the solution contains just default.aspx page with default code in .cs file, and even that fails to run. So my question is why the webpage fails to load, and why the error points to line #1 "using System;" statement? My next question is how can i develop on FIPS compliant locked down maching where i do not have edit rights on registry Thanks kudlur

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• Introducing Oracle VM Server for SPARC

  - by Honglin Su

  As you are watching Oracle's Virtualization Strategy Webcast and exploring the great virtualization offerings of Oracle VM product line, I'd like to introduce Oracle VM Server for SPARC --  highly efficient, enterprise-class virtualization solution for Sun SPARC Enterprise Systems with Chip Multithreading (CMT) technology. Oracle VM Server for SPARC, previously called Sun Logical Domains, leverages the built-in SPARC hypervisor to subdivide supported platforms' resources (CPUs, memory, network, and storage) by creating partitions called logical (or virtual) domains. Each logical domain can run an independent operating system. Oracle VM Server for SPARC provides the flexibility to deploy multiple Oracle Solaris operating systems simultaneously on a single platform. Oracle VM Server also allows you to create up to 128 virtual servers on one system to take advantage of the massive thread scale offered by the CMT architecture. Oracle VM Server for SPARC integrates both the industry-leading CMT capability of the UltraSPARC T1, T2 and T2 Plus processors and the Oracle Solaris operating system. This combination helps to increase flexibility, isolate workload processing, and improve the potential for maximum server utilization. Oracle VM Server for SPARC delivers the following: Leading Price/Performance - The low-overhead architecture provides scalable performance under increasing workloads without additional license cost. This enables you to meet the most aggressive price/performance requirement Advanced RAS - Each logical domain is an entirely independent virtual machine with its own OS. It supports virtual disk mutipathing and failover as well as faster network failover with link-based IP multipathing (IPMP) support. Moreover, it's fully integrated with Solaris FMA (Fault Management Architecture), which enables predictive self healing. CPU Dynamic Resource Management (DRM) - Enable your resource management policy and domain workload to trigger the automatic addition and removal of CPUs. This ability helps you to better align with your IT and business priorities. Enhanced Domain Migrations - Perform domain migrations interactively and non-interactively to bring more flexibility to the management of your virtualized environment. Improve active domain migration performance by compressing memory transfers and taking advantage of cryptographic acceleration hardware. These methods provide faster migration for load balancing, power saving, and planned maintenance. Dynamic Crypto Control - Dynamically add and remove cryptographic units (aka MAU) to and from active domains. Also, migrate active domains that have cryptographic units. Physical-to-virtual (P2V) Conversion - Quickly convert an existing SPARC server running the Oracle Solaris 8, 9 or 10 OS into a virtualized Oracle Solaris 10 image. Use this image to facilitate OS migration into the virtualized environment. Virtual I/O Dynamic Reconfiguration (DR) - Add and remove virtual I/O services and devices without needing to reboot the system. CPU Power Management - Implement power saving by disabling each core on a Sun UltraSPARC T2 or T2 Plus processor that has all of its CPU threads idle. Advanced Network Configuration - Configure the following network features to obtain more flexible network configurations, higher performance, and scalability: Jumbo frames, VLANs, virtual switches for link aggregations, and network interface unit (NIU) hybrid I/O. Official Certification Based On Real-World Testing - Use Oracle VM Server for SPARC with the most sophisticated enterprise workloads under real-world conditions, including Oracle Real Application Clusters (RAC). Affordable, Full-Stack Enterprise Class Support - Obtain worldwide support from Oracle for the entire virtualization environment and workloads together. The support covers hardware, firmware, OS, virtualization, and the software stack. SPARC Server Virtualization Oracle offers a full portfolio of virtualization solutions to address your needs. SPARC is the leading platform to have the hard partitioning capability that provides the physical isolation needed to run independent operating systems. Many customers have already used Oracle Solaris Containers for application isolation. Oracle VM Server for SPARC provides another important feature with OS isolation. This gives you the flexibility to deploy multiple operating systems simultaneously on a single Sun SPARC T-Series server with finer granularity for computing resources.  For SPARC CMT processors, the natural level of granularity is an execution thread, not a time-sliced microsecond of execution resources. Each CPU thread can be treated as an independent virtual processor. The scheduler is naturally built into the CPU for lower overhead and higher performance. Your organizations can couple Oracle Solaris Containers and Oracle VM Server for SPARC with the breakthrough space and energy savings afforded by Sun SPARC Enterprise systems with CMT technology to deliver a more agile, responsive, and low-cost environment. Management with Oracle Enterprise Manager Ops Center The Oracle Enterprise Manager Ops Center Virtualization Management Pack provides full lifecycle management of virtual guests, including Oracle VM Server for SPARC and Oracle Solaris Containers. It helps you streamline operations and reduce downtime. Together, the Virtualization Management Pack and the Ops Center Provisioning and Patch Automation Pack provide an end-to-end management solution for physical and virtual systems through a single web-based console. This solution automates the lifecycle management of physical and virtual systems and is the most effective systems management solution for Oracle's Sun infrastructure. Ease of Deployment with Configuration Assistant The Oracle VM Server for SPARC Configuration Assistant can help you easily create logical domains. After gathering the configuration data, the Configuration Assistant determines the best way to create a deployment to suit your requirements. The Configuration Assistant is available as both a graphical user interface (GUI) and terminal-based tool. Oracle Solaris Cluster HA Support The Oracle Solaris Cluster HA for Oracle VM Server for SPARC data service provides a mechanism for orderly startup and shutdown, fault monitoring and automatic failover of the Oracle VM Server guest domain service. In addition, applications that run on a logical domain, as well as its resources and dependencies can be controlled and managed independently. These are managed as if they were running in a classical Solaris Cluster hardware node. Supported Systems Oracle VM Server for SPARC is supported on all Sun SPARC Enterprise Systems with CMT technology. UltraSPARC T2 Plus Systems ·   Sun SPARC Enterprise T5140 Server ·   Sun SPARC Enterprise T5240 Server ·   Sun SPARC Enterprise T5440 Server ·   Sun Netra T5440 Server ·   Sun Blade T6340 Server Module ·   Sun Netra T6340 Server Module UltraSPARC T2 Systems ·   Sun SPARC Enterprise T5120 Server ·   Sun SPARC Enterprise T5220 Server ·   Sun Netra T5220 Server ·   Sun Blade T6320 Server Module ·   Sun Netra CP3260 ATCA Blade Server Note that UltraSPARC T1 systems are supported on earlier versions of the software.Sun SPARC Enterprise Systems with CMT technology come with the right to use (RTU) of Oracle VM Server, and the software is pre-installed. If you have the systems under warranty or with support, you can download the software and system firmware as well as their updates. Oracle Premier Support for Systems provides fully-integrated support for your server hardware, firmware, OS, and virtualization software. Visit oracle.com/support for information about Oracle's support offerings for Sun systems. For more information about Oracle's virtualization offerings, visit oracle.com/virtualization.

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