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  • csrf error in django

    - by niklasfi
    Hello, I want to realize a login for my site. I basically copied and pasted the following bits from the Django Book together. However I still get an error (CSRF verification failed. Request aborted.), when submitting my registration form. Can somebody tell my what raised this error and how to fix it? Here is my code: views.py: # Create your views here. from django import forms from django.contrib.auth.forms import UserCreationForm from django.http import HttpResponseRedirect from django.shortcuts import render_to_response def register(request): if request.method == 'POST': form = UserCreationForm(request.POST) if form.is_valid(): new_user = form.save() return HttpResponseRedirect("/books/") else: form = UserCreationForm() return render_to_response("registration/register.html", { 'form': form, }) register.html: <html> <body> {% block title %}Create an account{% endblock %} {% block content %} <h1>Create an account</h1> <form action="" method="post">{% csrf_token %} {{ form.as_p }} <input type="submit" value="Create the account"> </form> {% endblock %} </body> </html>

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  • Django CSRF framework cannot be disabled and is breaking my site

    - by MikeN
    The django csrf middleware can't be disabled. I've commented it out from my Middleware of my project but my logins are failing due to missing CSRF issues. I'm working from the Django trunk. How can CSRF cause issues if it is not enabled in middleware? I have to disable it because there are lots of POST requests on my site that CSRF just breaks. Any feedback on how I can completely disable CSRF in a django trunk project? The "new' CSRF framework from Django's trunk is also breaking an external site that is coming in and doing a POST on a URL I'm giving them (this is part of a restful API.) I can't disable the CSRF framework as I said earlier, how can I fix this?

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  • Make CSRF middleware work in Django's 404 error pages

    - by jack
    I put a login box alone with a keyword search box in 404.html in a Django project so in case a 404 error is raised, visitors get more options to jump to other parts. But the CSRF middleware doesn't work in 404 error page with no csrf token rendered. I tried move 'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware' to first of MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES in settings.py but did not work either. Anyone knows a solution?

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  • Is Rails default CSRF protection insecure

    - by schickb
    By default the form post CSRF protection in Rails creates an authenticity token for a user that only changes when the user's session changes. One of our customers did a security audit of our site and flagged that as an issue. The auditor's statement was that if we also had a XSS vulnerability that an attacker could grab another user's authenticity token and make use of it for CSRF attacks until the user's session expired. But is seems to me that if we had an XSS vulnerability like that an attacker could just as easily grab another user's session cookie and login as that user directly. Or even just make call to our REST Api as the user being attacked. No secondary CSRF attack needed. Have I missed something? Is there a real problem with the default CSRF protection in Rails?

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  • codeigniter csrf protection with ajax

    - by Yarandi
    i have a small problem here which i cannot fix,This post goes through but the response returns a “500 internal server error” who to fix it? JS in view: function load(value) { var utype = value; if(utype>0) { new Ajax.Request('<?php echo base_url().'another/load';?>'+'/'+utype, { method:'post', onSuccess: function(transport){ var response = transport.responseText || "no response text"; if(response!="no response text") document.getElementById('prog_id').innerHTML = response; }, onFailure: function(){ alert('Something went wrong ...') } }); } error in firebug : An Error Was Encountered The action you have requested is not allowed. when i change CSRF protection to False in config file its work for me.but i want protect this request with CSRF enabled. after search in CI forum i found this this link codeigniter-csrf-protection-with-ajax but i cant solve by it.can any one help me?

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  • Symfony 1.4: Custom error message for CSRF in forms

    - by Tom
    Hi, Can anyone tell me where/how to customise the CSRF token error message for forms in Symfony 1.4. I'm using sfDoctrineGuard for logins and in this form particularly, whenever a session runs out and you still have the page open, it throws a very user-unfriendly error: "CSRF attack detected". Something like "This session has expired. Please return to the home page and try again" sounds better. What's the right way to do this in the form class? Thanks.

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  • Having a POST'able API and Django's CSRF Middleware

    - by T. Stone
    I have a Django webapp that has both a front-end, web-accessible component and an API that is accessed by a desktop client. However, now with the new CSRF middleware component, API requests from the desktop client that are POST'ed get a 403. I understand why this is happening, but what is the proper way to fix this without compromising security? Is there someway I can signal in the HTTP header that it's an API request and that Django shouldn't be checking for CSRF or is that a bad strategy?

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  • HtmlUnit to login (post form) to csrf enable website

    - by maaz
    I am posting a form using HTMLUnit webClient by putting the username and password but it could not logging me in. When i research then found out that they have enable csrf on post request so native web browser is required. Is there any way to login (post form) in csrf enable website using HTMLUnit or any other tool in Java or it is impossible?

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  • Understanding CSRF - Simple Question

    - by byronh
    I know this might make me seem like an idiot, I've read everything there is to read about CSRF and I still don't understand how using a 'challenge token' would add any sort of prevention. Please help me clarify the basic concept, none of the articles and posts here on SO I read seemed to really explicitly state what value you're comparing with what. From OWASP: In general, developers need only generate this token once for the current session. After initial generation of this token, the value is stored in the session and is utilized for each subsequent request until the session expires. If I understand the process correctly, this is what happens. I log in at http://example.com and a session/cookie is created containing this random token. Then, every form includes a hidden input also containing this random value from the session which is compared with the session/cookie upon form submission. But what does that accomplish? Aren't you just taking session data, putting it in the page, and then comparing it with the exact same session data? Seems like circular reasoning. These articles keep talking about following the "same-origin policy" but that makes no sense, because all CSRF attacks ARE of the same origin as the user, just tricking the user into doing actions he/she didn't intend. Is there any alternative other than appending the token to every single URL as a query string? Seems very ugly and impractical, and makes bookmarking harder for the user.

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  • Guarding against CSRF Attacks in ASP.NET MVC2

    - by srkirkland
    Alongside XSS (Cross Site Scripting) and SQL Injection, Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks represent the three most common and dangerous vulnerabilities to common web applications today. CSRF attacks are probably the least well known but they are relatively easy to exploit and extremely and increasingly dangerous. For more information on CSRF attacks, see these posts by Phil Haack and Steve Sanderson. The recognized solution for preventing CSRF attacks is to put a user-specific token as a hidden field inside your forms, then check that the right value was submitted. It's best to use a random value which you’ve stored in the visitor’s Session collection or into a Cookie (so an attacker can't guess the value). ASP.NET MVC to the rescue ASP.NET MVC provides an HTMLHelper called AntiForgeryToken(). When you call <%= Html.AntiForgeryToken() %> in a form on your page you will get a hidden input and a Cookie with a random string assigned. Next, on your target Action you need to include [ValidateAntiForgeryToken], which handles the verification that the correct token was supplied. Good, but we can do better Using the AntiForgeryToken is actually quite an elegant solution, but adding [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] on all of your POST methods is not very DRY, and worse can be easily forgotten. Let's see if we can make this easier on the program but moving from an "Opt-In" model of protection to an "Opt-Out" model. Using AntiForgeryToken by default In order to mandate the use of the AntiForgeryToken, we're going to create an ActionFilterAttribute which will do the anti-forgery validation on every POST request. First, we need to create a way to Opt-Out of this behavior, so let's create a quick action filter called BypassAntiForgeryToken: [AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple=false)] public class BypassAntiForgeryTokenAttribute : ActionFilterAttribute { } Now we are ready to implement the main action filter which will force anti forgery validation on all post actions within any class it is defined on: [AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class, AllowMultiple = false)] public class UseAntiForgeryTokenOnPostByDefault : ActionFilterAttribute { public override void OnActionExecuting(ActionExecutingContext filterContext) { if (ShouldValidateAntiForgeryTokenManually(filterContext)) { var authorizationContext = new AuthorizationContext(filterContext.Controller.ControllerContext);   //Use the authorization of the anti forgery token, //which can't be inhereted from because it is sealed new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute().OnAuthorization(authorizationContext); }   base.OnActionExecuting(filterContext); }   /// <summary> /// We should validate the anti forgery token manually if the following criteria are met: /// 1. The http method must be POST /// 2. There is not an existing [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute on the action /// 3. There is no [BypassAntiForgeryToken] attribute on the action /// </summary> private static bool ShouldValidateAntiForgeryTokenManually(ActionExecutingContext filterContext) { var httpMethod = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.HttpMethod;   //1. The http method must be POST if (httpMethod != "POST") return false;   // 2. There is not an existing anti forgery token attribute on the action var antiForgeryAttributes = filterContext.ActionDescriptor.GetCustomAttributes(typeof(ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute), false);   if (antiForgeryAttributes.Length > 0) return false;   // 3. There is no [BypassAntiForgeryToken] attribute on the action var ignoreAntiForgeryAttributes = filterContext.ActionDescriptor.GetCustomAttributes(typeof(BypassAntiForgeryTokenAttribute), false);   if (ignoreAntiForgeryAttributes.Length > 0) return false;   return true; } } The code above is pretty straight forward -- first we check to make sure this is a POST request, then we make sure there aren't any overriding *AntiForgeryTokenAttributes on the action being executed. If we have a candidate then we call the ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute class directly and execute OnAuthorization() on the current authorization context. Now on our base controller, you could use this new attribute to start protecting your site from CSRF vulnerabilities. [UseAntiForgeryTokenOnPostByDefault] public class ApplicationController : System.Web.Mvc.Controller { }   //Then for all of your controllers public class HomeController : ApplicationController {} What we accomplished If your base controller has the new default anti-forgery token attribute on it, when you don't use <%= Html.AntiForgeryToken() %> in a form (or of course when an attacker doesn't supply one), the POST action will throw the descriptive error message "A required anti-forgery token was not supplied or was invalid". Attack foiled! In summary, I think having an anti-CSRF policy by default is an effective way to protect your websites, and it turns out it is pretty easy to accomplish as well. Enjoy!

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  • CSRF protection and cross site form access

    - by fl00r
    Hi. I aw working on cross site authentication (some domains have got common authentication). So I want to send authentication data (login, password) to main domain from others. How should I use protect_from_forgery and how can I check if data received from valid domain? What I am thinking now is to turn off protect_from_forgery for session controller and check domain name of received data. But maybe I can configure CSRF protection for not only one domain?

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  • CSRF protecting and cross site form access

    - by fl00r
    Hi. I aw working on cross site authentication (some domains have got common authentication). So I want to send authentication data (login, password) to main domain from others. How should I use protect_from_forgery and how can I check if data received from valid domain? What I am thinking now is to turn off protect_from_forgery for session controller and check domain name of received data. But maybe I can configure CSRF protection for not only one domain?

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  • Django CSRF failure when form posts to a different frame

    - by Leopd
    I'm building a page where I want to have a form that posts to an iframe on the same page. The Template looks like this: <form action="form-results" method="post" target="resultspane" > {% csrf_token %} <input name="query"> <input type=submit> </form> <iframe src="form-results" name="resultspane" width="100%" height="70%"> </iframe> The view behind form-results is getting CSRF errors. Is there something special needed for cross-frame posting?

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  • Django, CSRF protection and js generated form

    - by Neewok
    I have to create a form dynamically via javascript (yeah, that sounds ugly, but read this for the reason) and wants to make its submission CSRF proof. Usually, I use the @csrf_protect decorator in my views, and the {% csrf_token %} tag in my templates, as recommanded in the doc. But what should I do with a client-side generated form ? If I add a '/get_token/' view to generate a token on the server and obtain its value (say, via JSONP), then that means that I'm creating a backdoor an attacker could use to bypass the protection. Kinda head-scratching. What would you recommand ?

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  • Getting 403 error when using CSRF filter with tomcat 6.0.32

    - by sps
    This is my filer config in web.xml <filter> <filter-name>CSRFPreventionFilter</filter-name> <filter-class>org.apache.catalina.filters.CsrfPreventionFilter</filter-class> <init-param> <param-name>entryPoints</param-name> <param-value>/login<param-value> </init-param> </filter> <filter-mapping> <filter-name>CSRFPreventionFilter</filter-name> <url-pattern>/*</url-pattern> </filter-mapping> <filter> Am I missing something? Are any code-changes necessary to enable csrf protection in tomcat

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  • Django - How to do CSFR on public pages? Or, better yet, how should it be used period?

    - by orokusaki
    After reading this: http://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/ref/contrib/csrf/#how-to-use-it I came to the conclusion that it is not valid to use this except for when you trust the person who is using the page which enlists it. Is this correct? I guess I don't really understand when it's safe to use this because of this statement: This should not be done for POST forms that target external URLs, since that would cause the CSRF token to be leaked, leading to a vulnerability. The reason it's confusing is that to me an "external URL" would be on that isn't part of my domain (ie, I own www.example.com and put a form that posts to www.spamfoo.com. This obviously can't be the case since people wouldn't use Django for generating forms that post to other people's websites, but how could it be true that you can't use CSRF protection on public forms (like a login form)?

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  • How do you protect against specific CSRF attack

    - by Saif Bechan
    I am going trough the OWASP Top 10 list of 2007 and 2010. I stumbled upon Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) this is often called session riding as you let the user usee his session to fulfill your wishes. Now a solution to this is adding a token to every url and this token is checked for every link. For example to vote on product x the url would be: 'http://mysite.com?token=HVBKJNKL' This looks like a solid solution to because a hacker can not guess the token. But I was thinking of the following scenario(I do not know if it is possible): You create a website with an hidden iFrame or div. After that you can load my website in it either using just the normal iFrame or ajax. When you have my website loaded hidden inside your website, and the user has a stored session, the following can be done. You can retrieve the token from the URLS, and still do all the actions needed. Is it possible to do something like this. Or is it not possible to do this cross domain.

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  • CSRF Protection in AJAX Requests using MVC2

    - by mnemosyn
    The page I'm building depends heavily on AJAX. Basically, there is just one "page" and every data transfer is handled via AJAX. Since overoptimistic caching on the browser side leads to strange problems (data not reloaded), I have to perform all requests (also reads) using POST - that forces a reload. Now I want to prevent the page against CSRF. With form submission, using Html.AntiForgeryToken() works neatly, but in AJAX-request, I guess I will have to append the token manually? Is there anything out-of-the box available? My current attempt looks like this: I'd love to reuse the existing magic. However, HtmlHelper.GetAntiForgeryTokenAndSetCookie is private and I don't want to hack around in MVC. The other option is to write an extension like public static string PlainAntiForgeryToken(this HtmlHelper helper) { // extract the actual field value from the hidden input return helper.AntiForgeryToken().DoSomeHackyStringActions(); } which is somewhat hacky and leaves the bigger problem unsolved: How to verify that token? The default verification implementation is internal and hard-coded against using form fields. I tried to write a slightly modified ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute, but it uses an AntiForgeryDataSerializer which is private and I really didn't want to copy that, too. At this point it seems to be easier to come up with a homegrown solution, but that is really duplicate code. Any suggestions how to do this the smart way? Am I missing something completely obvious?

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  • Is a GWT app running on Google App Engine protected from CSRF

    - by gerdemb
    I'm developing a GWT app running on the Google App Engine and wondering if I need to worry about Cross-site request forgery or is that automatically taken care of for me? For every RPC request that requires authentication, I have the following code: public class BookServiceImpl extends RemoteServiceServlet implements BookService { public void deleteInventory(Key<Inventory> inventoryKey) throws NotLoggedInException, InvalidStateException, NotFoundException { DAO dao = new DAO(); // This will throw NotLoggedInException if user is not logged in User user = dao.getCurrentUser(); // Do deletion here } } public final class DAO extends DAOBase { public User getCurrentUser() throws NotLoggedInException { currentUser = UserServiceFactory.getUserService().getCurrentUser(); if(currentUser == null) { throw new NotLoggedInException(); } return currentUser; } I couldn't find any documentation on how the UserService checks authentication. Is it enough to rely on the code above or do I need to to more? I'm a beginner at this, but from what I understand to avoid CSRF attacks some of the strategies are: adding an authentication token in the request payload instead of just checking a cookie checking the HTTP Referer header I can see that I have cookies set from Google with what look like SID values, but I can't tell from the serialized Java objects in the payloads if tokens are being passed or not. I also don't know if the Referer header is being used or not. So, am I worrying about a non-issue? If not, what is the best strategy here? This is a common enough problem, that there must be standard solutions out there...

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  • How do you code against CSRF malicious requests?

    - by user355950
    how to Decline malicious requests.... Cross-Site Request Forgery Severity: Medium Test Type: Application Remediation Tasks: Decline malicious requests Reasoning: The same request was sent twice in different sessions and the same response was received. This shows that none of the parameters are dynamic (session identifiers are sent only in cookies) and therefore that the application is vulnerable to this issue.

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  • CSRF (Cross-site request forgery) attack example and prevention in PHP

    - by Saif Bechan
    I have an website where people can place a vote like this: http://mysite.com/vote/25 This will place a vote on item 25. I want to only make this available for registered users, and only if they want to do this. Now I know when someone is busy on the website, and someone gives them a link like this: http://mysite.com/vote/30 then the vote will be places for him on the item without him wanting to do this. I have read the explanation on the OWASP website, but i don't really understand it Is this an example of CSFR, and how can I prevent this. The best thing i can think off is adding something to the link like a hash. But this will be quite irritating to put something on the end of all the links. Is there no other way of doing this. Another thing can someone maybe give me some other example of this, because the website seems fairly fugue to me.

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  • GWT RPC - Does it do enough to protect against CSRF ?

    - by sri
    GWT's RPC mechanism does the following things on every HTTP Request - Sets two custom request headers - X-GWT-Permutation and X-GWT-Module-Base Sets the content-type as text/x-gwt-rpc; charset=utf-8 The HTTP request is always a POST, and on server side GET methods throw an exception (method not supported). Also, if these headers are not set or have the wrong value, the server fails processing with an exception "possibly CSRF?" or something to that effect. Question is : Is this sufficient to prevent CSRF? Is there a way to set custom headers and change content type in a pure cross-site request forgery method?

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  • How to implement CSRF protection in Ajax calls using express.js (looking for complete example)?

    - by Benjen
    I am trying to implement CSRF protection in an app built using node.js using the express.js framework. The app makes abundant use of Ajax post calls to the server. I understand that the connect framework provides CSRF middleware, but I am not sure how to implement it in the scope of client-side Ajax post requests. There are bits and pieces about this in other Questions posted here in stackoverflow, but I have yet to find a reasonably complete example of how to implement it from both the client and server sides. Does anyone have a working example they care to share?

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  • Am I under risk of CSRF attacks in a POST form that doesn't require the user to be logged in?

    - by Monika Sulik
    I'm probably being a total noob here, but I'm still uncertain about what a CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) attack is exactly. So lets look at three situations... 1) I have a POST form that I use to edit data on my site. I want this data to be edited only by users that are logged in. 2) I have a site, which can be used by both users who are logged in as well as guests. Parts of the site are for logged in users only, but there are also POST forms that can be used by all users - anonymous and not (for example a standard contact form). Should the contact form be safeguarded against CSRF attacks? 3) I have a site which doesn't have an authentication system at all (well, perhaps that's unrealistic, so lets say it has an admin site which is separate from the rest of it and the admin part is properly safeguarded). The main part of the site is only used by anonymous users. Do the POST forms on it need to be safeguarded? In the case of 1) the answer is clearly yes. But in the case of 2 and 3 I don't know (and is the difference between 2 and 3 even significant?).

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