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• DNSSEC - Ad Flag not activated

  - by Arancha

  Hi all, I have some doubts regarding DNSSEC. I have one server acting as an Authoritative Name Server and another one as a Cache/Resolver. I'm using Bind 9.7.1-P2 and these are my configuration files: Named.conf (Authoritative Server) // Opciones de configuracion del servidor include "/etc/rndc.key"; controls { inet 127.0.0.1 allow { localhost; } keys { rndc-key; }; }; options{ version "Peticion no permitida/Query not allowed"; hostname "Peticion no permitida/Query not allowed"; server-id "Peticion no permitida/Query not allowed"; directory "/etc/DNS_RIMA"; pid-file "named.pid"; notify yes; #files 65535; dnssec-enable yes; dnssec-validation yes; allow-transfer { 172.23.2.37; 172.23.3.39; }; transfer-format many-answers; transfers-per-ns 5; transfers-in 10; max-transfer-time-in 120; check-names master ignore; listen-on {172.23.2.57; 80.58.102.13; 80.58.102.103; 127.0.0.1; }; }; zone "test.dnssec" { type master; key-directory "keys"; file "db.test.dnssec.signed"; also-notify { 172.23.2.37 ; 172.23.3.39 ; }; allow-transfer { 172.23.2.37 ; 172.23.3.39 ; }; }; test.dnssec zone test.dnssec. 86400 IN SOA ns.test.dnssec. mxadmin.test.dnssec. ( 2010090902 ; serial 21600 ; refresh (6 hours) 3600 ; retry (1 hour) 1814400 ; expire (3 weeks) 172800 ; minimum (2 days) ) 86400 RRSIG SOA 5 2 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. eY99laB6PrtETaXLdCS+G8Uq1lIK7d5vxUB1 pAQ9npv/YbvX1pdWZKGojDgPGw8V65Q0zKQo YW1VuBzvwfSRKax+yrjJzvHQGfCZPJWARehK hgLxHOfXLVH7tyndvLD49ZKcWtrop+Tuy4n9 apWWfSJZxCOngwS7zUi0zCTKfPs= ) 86400 NS ns1.test.dnssec. 86400 RRSIG NS 5 2 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. lmlP/Mb2qEXPSlajgSDn/CqWk/jokVCmqjeo idNuytxbiFnbCOunzvaYpgvDpEr0CPrwXaDL TSnb/w53tZl7GHRImJo50vwwNZljLzNT6CFw aaQXFc3rDLsXjCi+WF0/Z7meteM4jYdx5nrV Qx9pgur7VPbP88bJOqWCPBev2Ho= ) 172800 NSEC a.test.dnssec. NS SOA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY 172800 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 172800 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. E76ayamsAAz8Zcj7060KY0nTFzHPztM/Pkc5 OM0EcP7C5+ocn4L8M2J0rmR3jxfYvCpOk0BQ Zniqn9Aw41Qk068yJ2dfDPwV5zT0+te0nzwC /awJGPMXLzMj4JejYTlTiKfspGDJCG44F+lb lHXdcUhbjXf3loqMQadZFQ/eSn0= ) 86400 DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AwEAAbQ8qrNN5vetx/7E1VOgXZ7fLqwG1y/i 55hWGCeLbcS95ratT9A6UospOvPSwPTlrFgF RWP67Pubzbsy7/damS1F1+p4GgBQway52Hd1 8HjdHKKC6kIxna9pOJBRfhCdzAsv9LnpRvrw mDpcFAqhdn5k5RqwcUF1eOZrKjxXjAOr ) ; key id = 40665 86400 DNSKEY 257 3 5 ( AwEAAcd4dxWyTgOuqha0DJADUH0pk5jvnwdM ZhgZaqnayUdeTh8U9WOjOUHdVCGywZS6NTVp xXqhcegWzh2ZR5VN6thuhezt7kbzLNWbPe7m YF29/ZTXB6nmdSxruQlSvYhzkWTaPNtfrUnI UlbDRxUFWQkSHj9LA1TG76FpR6uqOj1sNrWX nPb/Hwp1Sb2Ik4FlifKb/Vu1+/UnclRJgfPm p2HGTeNYpfk15JHBPSYxJ1TuedXQIdkPGlQX ISmAeV1evGomCC/x9DNleDHCszJOptwurzRP Z7wRXcWnbXz1BU8rAqvUZL3M4UgdNRR5LLTz CkRnrlvXYJpgzDtgmQxE9Bs= ) ; key id = 59647 86400 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. sa4W3tvl6n0TkIcq3xzhG17C2O0lRhllrpUd n5Hs6yVo8r7stewP6tm2XscQiAeseDgmv28w s6Mtiz8uPUbrgFRb6SJk7coH2n/2Y3//S9YP NldDFv3luPnnU1TBb3jDsBKIZWHU9yl/cLNA OKUhlMDd40txk+fQi3iiV5Ls9K8= ) 86400 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 59647 test.dnssec. b5fz0dEp2co2pVO7biY896XmsJanjQIR69vC MvSF104/9iZk6eGVFi6hsa4aZcXutEjUDESB ynPkDjMWWIIhN6K1jYKGIc/sFKv1IUONRYHF KXGgZhC6aI0B1E4NA9AXLjlBVF60nHdc3iw8 5gTLDjypP3qAZrnzMvdiBopLnVdB25UZYKn8 mGpOuzKqX02TGMCFMlEVtMX4FP/XKAE8UjiQ 5ehC1JvIKIyg/2zM+ot3nmcqqtUfzp/Hweyc aIkl/9wPJPwMedfTqOjfUKFdB+GiZ0Zz16HZ 5MfJui5IGh5Y6Q04kMrnap2V5U7mByTzx/ud V/eFYhmSHGtAXzBjMA== ) a.test.dnssec. 86400 IN A 1.1.1.1 86400 RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. P52N9ypCrYsgS4CFcUmII0xjyE6KNL9ndhzH oU63fHJHQHeQV+fc0Rx8cCmZSzuqk1lSBelV 3Gcl9UNNuCAQ4ORQ/yJkiZ1zn7h93Mep9qsg YEUQJMfk4FLjYW67DHNcuoCnKbDJhZS0ndVf I474k7ZEZJsGslwk/vcIoFnTa4o= ) 172800 NSEC b.test.dnssec. A RRSIG NSEC 172800 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 172800 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. TCduf7xPSrWvEAzBO7Kx5haR85yA/lbsswkQ v0QxlskqAqo+9YedGQV+wGblbCIOmkomrYcq u/rXQ5yoQ3SDXd/bw6EFdoQmH8UJOjMc7SdR xY93MjawPB6XXlJsSlbBFPWJwEpILVRhdBFX czdS5VCa1KmhAYZYQp1FY9rMelA= ) b.test.dnssec. 86400 IN A 2.2.2.2 86400 RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. f0M6Tcqe6B09ctaN3BGAit4u4cJE8x3Ik8sh gyMu0GN/lMv/Bo7PB6hgylLam3HXtF1pPAzX oYudXmhU8afPapHMXfUitC1lFQB5ZW052ZC7 JXV9MnGULydz1blj2EdN+JL3Za8SJKM0LrLB XdQ+QUV+A/6N7hUV6usz5YmdBeI= ) 172800 NSEC ns1.test.dnssec. A RRSIG NSEC 172800 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 172800 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. sc6v19dcOFVa295/Xf1pKxBhbdpEErY8CTDQ fw2fjJf0Y3wL1Y1Mlr5zi5ShceQwgua+6YHE DWNbAPcXrJ0lLMU4DU5r0sAyBiBCgCavngGk i59W+nv11zuIpPMnlaMHpJVfJrQ+c4z7H9MH 77B0fMRFTUnvAXoq6ag8Q5POITI= ) ns1.test.dnssec. 86400 IN A 3.3.3.3 86400 RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. UQ3hR/++ta1GokxGz8Yh+GomMcA+xhd3z2Ke z0tdFiNfxvGbm85XyCtSqJIo2S/ZLVJUv/mG nGJbicTfJSziKzYZsD7dp0WJiUK3l7lQ/HpP 5FL8SbjlovVYYAG5woW4p3+os28mmCAJA8gP JTywbcREEhFB4cir2M/QVP+9h+Y= ) 172800 NSEC test.dnssec. A RRSIG NSEC 172800 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 172800 20101009062248 ( 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. i7F/ezGl/pGXCC6JyVDaxuwdZMAgv9QLxwzi PTgjCG8Sj6pTIxaQkSLwXsoB9gF77WWBANow R2SWdz0Zai2vWnv/NYoNm9ZfRJEQ9NuExeYp rvX/+lLOHvZXN6tUerIQbWAxO2GwdzHoejSn wReUNVr9MxzZUvuJ33Z7X/7s9VQ= ) Named.conf (Cache/Resolver) include "/etc/rndc.key"; controls { inet 127.0.0.1 allow { localhost; } keys { rndc-key; }; }; options{ version "Peticion no permitida/Query not allowed"; hostname "Peticion no permitida/Query not allowed"; server-id "Peticion no permitida/Query not allowed"; directory "/etc/DNS_RIMA"; pid-file "named.pid"; recursion yes; notify no; #DNSSEC dnssec-enable yes; dnssec-validation yes; listen-on {127.0.0.1; 172.23.2.87; 80.58.102.37; 80.58.102.115; }; #listen-on {127.0.0.1; 80.58.102.37; 80.58.102.115; }; allow-query { telefonica; }; allow-transfer { none; }; recursive-clients 40000; max-cache-size 838860800; rrset-order { order fixed;}; max-ncache-ttl 600; }; trusted-keys { "test.dnssec." 257 3 5 "AwEAAcd4dxWyTgOuqha0DJADUH0pk5jvnwdMZhgZaqnayUdeTh8U9WOjOUHdVCGywZS6NTVpxXqhcegWzh2ZR5VN6thuhezt7kbzLNWbPe7mYF29/ZT XB6nmdSxruQlSvYhzkWTaPNtfrUnIUlbDRxUFWQkSHj9LA1TG76FpR6uqOj1sNrWXnPb/Hwp1Sb2Ik4FlifKb/Vu1+/UnclRJgfPmp2HGTeNYpfk15JHBPSYxJ1TuedXQIdkPGlQXIS mAeV1evGomCC/x9DNleDHCszJOptwurzRPZ7wRXcWnbXz1BU8rAqvUZL3M4UgdNRR5LLTzCkRnrlvXYJpgzDtgmQxE9Bs="; }; I have configured a secure zone (test.dnssec) and I'm trying to perform some queries from the resolver to the Name server (172.23.2.57): /usr/local/bin/dig @172.23.2.57 a.test.dnssec +dnssec ; <<>> DiG 9.7.1-P2 <<>> @172.23.2.57 a.test.dnssec +dnssec ; (1 server found) ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 2654 ;; flags: qr aa rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 3 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;a.test.dnssec. IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: a.test.dnssec. 86400 IN A 1.1.1.1 a.test.dnssec. 86400 IN RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20101009062248 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. P52N9ypCrYsgS4CFcUmII0xjyE6KNL9ndhzHoU63fHJHQHeQV+ fc0Rx8 cCmZSzuqk1lSBelV3Gcl9UNNuCAQ4ORQ/yJkiZ1zn7h93Mep9qsgYEUQ JMfk4FLjYW67DHNcuoCnKbDJhZS0ndVfI474k7ZEZJsGslwk/vcIoFnT a4o= ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: test.dnssec. 86400 IN NS ns1.test.dnssec. test.dnssec. 86400 IN RRSIG NS 5 2 86400 20101009062248 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. lmlP/Mb2qEXPSlajgSDn/CqWk/jokVCmqjeoidNuytxbiFnbCOunzvaY pgvDpEr0CPrwXaDLTSnb/w53tZl7GHRImJo50vwwNZljLzNT6CFwaaQX Fc3rDLsXjCi+WF0/Z7meteM4jYdx5nrVQx9pgur7VPbP88bJOqWCPBev 2Ho= ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ns1.test.dnssec. 86400 IN A 3.3.3.3 ns1.test.dnssec. 86400 IN RRSIG A 5 3 86400 20101009062248 20100909062248 40665 test.dnssec. UQ3hR/++ta1GokxGz8Yh+GomMcA+xhd3z2Kez0tdFiNfxvGbm85XyCtS qJIo2S/ZLVJUv/mGnGJbicTfJSziKzYZsD7dp0WJiUK3l7lQ/HpP5FL8 SbjlovVYYAG5woW4p3+os28mmCAJA8gPJTywbcREEhFB4cir2M/QVP+9 h+Y= ;; Query time: 1 msec ;; SERVER: 172.23.2.57#53(172.23.2.57) ;; WHEN: Thu Sep 9 09:47:14 2010 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 605 I obtain the right answer along with the RRSIG records, but the problem is that I'm not seeing the ad flag activated. Any idea about what is wrong????

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• How to find domain registrar and DNS hosting with good DNSSEC support?

  - by rsp

  Simplified problem I want to buy a domain and make a website that is fully secured with DNSSEC. Background I've been hearing about the insecurity of DNS for years. I've watched all of the talks by Dan Kaminsky and others from DNS exploits to The future of DNS Security Panel. I knew that using DNS without security is a disaster waiting to happen. I followed the development of the DNSSEC standard. I celebrated the key signing ceremony. Everything was on the right track to finally have a secure DNS system in place. And now more than 2 years later I wanted to just do what everyone said I should do: use DNSSEC for a new domain. So I need a domain registrar and a DNS hosting service that supports DNSSEC. Surprisingly it is not that easy to even find out who does support DNSSEC. It was actually much easier to find info on DNSSEC two years ago when everyone was going to support DNSSEC Real Soon Now but now years passed and I hardly see any progress done. I just hope that I was just looking in the wrong places and someone here will explain all of the doubts. I hope that other people who want to have a secure website will also find this question useful. What is needed registrar and DNS servers with full DNSSEC support for .com domains What is not needed IPv6 support Web hosting anything more What I found out so far Go Daddy offers Premium DNS service for additional $36 per year that lets you "Secure up to 5 domains with DNSSEC". easyDNS has DNSSEC available in Beta across all service levels (you need to enable the "beta" flag in configuration) but it doesn't seem to be production ready and judging from the lack of updates it isn't a feature of highest priority (the last update from March 2011 on the easyDNS blog). Name.com - according to The Register (US domain registrar does IPv6, DNSSEC) it has DNSSEC support since 2010 but right now (October 2012) I couldn't find anything related to DNSSEC on their website. Dynadot that is very often recommended doesn't support DNSSEC Namecheap that is also often recommended doesn't support DNSSEC. The support answer from 2011 suggested that it was being added but in 2012 still no ETA is given to customers. DynDNS was supposed to support DNSSEC, I found a link explaining DNSSEC support but it gives 404 Not Found page and offers a search box - when searching for DNSSEC I get "No results were found for your query." GKG was recommended online for DNSSEC support but it's hard to find any information on the level of DNSSEC support - there is a brief explanation on what is DNSSEC and how to sign Delegation Signer records in their FAQ but no information about the level of actual support can be found. Ask Slashdot: Which Registrars Support DNSSEC? from July 2011 - Answers list Go Daddy, DynDNS, GKG, Name.com as registrars that support DNSSEC but: see above. Related questions How to find web hosting that meets my requirements? What is needed to add DNSSEC to my site? DNS hosting better managed by Domain provider or Hosting provider? Registrar with good security, DNS hosting, and DNSSEC and IPv6 resolvers? In no. 1 no one is ever mentioning DNS at all. In no. 2 answers only mention the .se TLD, there are very few answers and they seem very outdated. In no. 3 one answer says "On projects that demand higher security, I might look for a web host that supports DNSSEC" but no more information is provided. The only relevant answers are in no. 4 where easyDNS is recommended by someone who has never used them personally. Meanwhile, as of October 2012, the support of DNSSEC is described as "in beta" on the easyDNS feature list. Another one recommends SiteGround but searching their site for DNSSEC returns no results. Other answers recommend web hosting providers that don't meet the requirement of DNSSEC support. Also the question mentioned above lists 9 very specific requirements other than only DNSSEC (like eg. HTTP-only login cookies, two-factor authentications, no DNS record limits, DNS statistics of queries/day, audit trails etc.) which might have excluded many possible recommendations if one is only interested in DNSSEC support. Conclusions I thought that by the end of 2012 the support of DNSSEC among domain registrars and DNS providers would be nearly universal. I am shocked that the support seems virtually nonexistent. Is this a result of some serious problems with the DNSSEC adoption? Or is it just not a hot topic and no one bothers anymore? According to the DNSSEC Scoreboard roughly about 0.1% of .com domains support DNSSEC. Could that be caused by the lack of DNSSEC support among registrars and DNS providers, is the information too hard to find or maybe no one cares? There is even no "dnssec" tag here. Questions The information is surprisingly hard to find. That is why I am asking for first-hand experience and personal recommendations. Has anyone here actually set up a website with DNSSEC, from the domain registration to the configuration of DNS servers? Can anyone recommend any of the registrars mentioned above? Can anyone recommend any registrar not mentioned above?

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• Debian DNSSEC - howto secure a domain?

  - by Daniel Marschall

  I have a beginner question about DNSSEC. I have much experience with TLS and cryptography-stuff and would like to try out this new technology. I have googled very much about this but I haven't found useful information for me. I think one confusion in information gathering is that "Debian howto DNSSEC setup" can mean "How to USE DNSSEC for resolving" OR "How to secure your domain with DNSSEC". I am searching the second. I am running a Debian Squeeze server with root privileges which has a domain name ending with ".de" (which is already signed by the root zone). The network interface at this server uses the gateway IP (DNS resolver?) of the datacentre the server is running on. My domain is hosted at freedns.afraid.org , where I can add DNS RRs for my domain. They are currently NOT capable of adding DNSSEC RRs, but I am bugging them to support this soon. ;-) My simple question is: How do I setup DNSSEC on Debian? Resp. who have I ask to? As far as I understand, all I have to do is to run dnssec-keygen on my Debian server and then add the key to my DNS-provider as DNSSEC RR. (And change it every 30 days?) I have looked at this http://www.isc.org/files/DNSSEC_in_6_minutes.pdf but it looks like you have to be the owner of a ZONE, so I don't think this applies to me. Who needs to sign my domain? My DNS-provider or my zone (DeNIC) or can I do it myself? Any help is very appreciated!

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• DNSSEC - First Signature

  - by Arancha

  I'm testing DNSSEC with Bind 9.7.2-P2. I have a question regarding the first signature created over a zone that already exists. I'm using dynamic DNS. I create the first two keys: one KSK and one ZSK. According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-key-timing/, the first ZSK needs to be published for an interval equal to Ipub, before it can be active. I create the ZSK with a Publication date previous to its Activation date. I restart the service and I can see that the key is published at Publication date, but it's no active later, when Activation date arrives. This is the configuration of the zone dnssec.es at the named.conf file: zone "dnssec.es" { auto-dnssec maintain; update-policy local; sig-validity-interval 1; key-directory "dnssec/keys_dnssec"; type master; file "dnssec/db.dnssec.es"; }; Any clue?? Regards

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• DNSSEC - What doesn't it cover?

  - by KP65

  I'm currently revising for an exam to do with DNS/DNSSEC. While I know DNSSEC provides various security enhancements for DNS, I would like to dive a bit deeper(for my own thirst for knowledge!) and would like to know what is still problematic security wise even after DNSSEC is employed? After all it can't have solved all programs DNS was having with regards to security, right? Thanks

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• OARC's DNSSEC validating resolvers validate all my records but A records

  - by demize

  I have DNS set up with powerdns. It serves my DNS pretty well, and it AXFRs to other slaves. The slaves haven't yet updated to the most recent records, but that doesn't affect the validation, it would appear. Any record I can think of (AAAA, MX, TXT, even the CNAME for www) validates -- except for A records: dig @149.20.64.20 +dnssec www.demize95.com CNAME returns ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 5, ADDITIONAL: 7 while dig @149.20.64.20 +dnssec demize95.com A returns ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 5, ADDITIONAL: 7. The same happens with any other A record I have. I set up DNSSEC with pdnssec, and it does work for all the other records, but it's never validated for my A records. What's the problem here? Also, a side-note: I have to use ISC's DLV to create the chain of trust, since my domain registrar doesn't yet support sending the DS records to the com zone.

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• Pushing DNSSEC updates with offline keys

  - by eggyal

  In a non-professional capacity, I look after the DNS of some 18 domains: mostly personal/vanity domains for immediate family. I outsource the whole shebang to an inexpensive managed hosting provider with a web interface through which I manage the zones; since the provider also offers DNSSEC, I have successfully deployed that too. These domains are so unimportant that an attack targetted against them seems much less likely than a general compromise of my provider's systems, at which point the records of all their customers might be changed to misdirect traffic (perhaps with extremely long TTLs). DNSSEC could protect against such an attack, but only if the zone's private keys are not held by the hosting provider. So, I wonder: how can one keep DNSSEC private keys offline yet still transfer signed zones to an outsourced DNS host? The most obvious answer (to me, at least) is to run one's own shadow/hidden master (from which the provider can slave) and then copy offline-signed zonefiles to the master as required. The problem is that the only machine I (want to*) control is my personal laptop, which usually connects from a typical home ADSL (behind NAT over a dynamically-assigned IP address). Having them slave from that (e.g. with a very long Expiry time on the zone for periods when my laptop is offline/unavailable) would not only require a Dynamic DNS record from which they can slave (if indeed they can slave from a named host rather than a static IP address), but would also involve me running a DNS server on my laptop and opening both it and my home network up to the incoming zone transfer requests: not ideal. I would prefer a much more push-oriented design, whereby my laptop initiates transfer of offline-signed zonefiles/updates to the provider's servers. I looked into whether nsupdate could fit the bill: documentation is a little sketchy, but my testing (with BIND 9.7) suggests it can indeed update DNSSEC zones, but only where the server holds the keys to perform the zone signing; I have not found a way to have it take an update including the relevant RRSIG/NSEC/etc. records and have the server accept them. Is this a supported use-case? If not, I suspect the only solutions which could fit the bill will involve non-DNS-based transfer of the zone updates and would welcome recommendations that are supported by (hopefully inexpensive) hosting providers: SFTP/SCP? rsync? RDBMS replication? Proprietary API? Finally, what would be the practical implications of such a setup? Key rotation is jumping out at me as being an obvious difficulty, especially if my laptop is offline for extended periods. But the zones are extremely stable, so perhaps I could get away with long-lived ZSKs**...? * Whilst I could run a shadow/hidden master on e.g. an outsourced VPS, I dislike the overhead of having to secure / manage / monitor / maintain yet another system; not to mention the additional financial costs of so doing. ** Okay, this would enable a concerted attacker to replay outdated records—but the risk and impact of such are both tolerable in the case of these domains.

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• dnssec zonesigner ignoring out-of-zone data

  - by jordi12100

  I am trying to configure DNSSec with BIND9 on CentOS 6.4 running DirectAdmin control panel. I am using this tutorial to make it work: https://www.dnssec-tools.org/wiki/index.php/Zonesigner But I can't get it work... When I run this command: zonesigner --genkeys jordikroon.nl.db jordikroon.nl.db.signed I get this error: jordikroon.nl.db:17: ignoring out-of-zone data (jordikroon.nl) jordikroon.nl.db:18: ignoring out-of-zone data (jordikroon.nl) jordikroon.nl.db:22: ignoring out-of-zone data (jordikroon.nl) jordikroon.nl.db:29: ignoring out-of-zone data (jordikroon.nl) jordikroon.nl.db:33: ignoring out-of-zone data (jordikroon.nl) zone jordikroon.nl.db/IN: has no NS records zone jordikroon.nl.db/IN: not loaded due to errors. I can't find anything on the web about this error. This is my zone db file: $TTL 14400 @ IN SOA ns1.ghservers.org. hostmaster.jordikroon.nl. ( 2013090703 14400 3600 1209600 86400 ) jordikroon.nl. 14400 IN NS ns1.ghservers.org. jordikroon.nl. 14400 IN NS ns2.ghservers.org. cp 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 ftp 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 jordikroon.nl. 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 localhost 14400 IN A 127.0.0.1 mail 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 pop 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 smtp 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 www 14400 IN A 85.17.32.228 jordikroon.nl. 14400 IN MX 10 mail jordikroon.nl. 14400 IN TXT "v=spf1 a mx ip4:85.17.32.228 ~all" localhost 14400 IN AAAA ::1 How do I have to fix this? All IN keywords are being ignored. Any help is welcome:-)

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• DNSCurve vs DNSSEC

  - by Bill Gray

  Can someone informed, please give a lengthy reply about the differences and advantages/disadvantages of both approaches? I am not a DNS expert, not a programmer. I have a decent basic understanding of DNS, and enough knowledge to understand how things like the kaminsky bug work. From what I understand, DNSCurve has stronger encryption, is far simpler to setup, and an altogether better solution. DNSSEC is needlessly complicated and uses breakable encryption, however it provides end to end security, something DNSCurve does not. However, many of the articles I have read have seemed to indicate that end to end security is of little use or makes no difference. So which is true? Which is the better solution, or what are the disadvantages/advantages of each? edit: I would appreciate if someone could explain what is gained by encrypting the message contents, when the goal is authentication rather than confidentiality. The proof that keys are 1024bit RSA keys is here.

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• Can we do a DNSSEC 101? [closed]

  - by PAStheLoD

  Please share your opinions, FAQs, HOWTOs, best practices (or links to the one you think is the best) and your fears and thoughts about the whole migration (or should I just call it a new piece of tech?). Is DNSSEC just for DNS providers (name server operators)? What ought John Doe to do, who hosts johndoe.com at some random provider (GoDaddy, DreamHost and such)? Also, what if the provider's name server doesn't do automatic signing magic, can John do it manually? In a fire-and-forget way, without touching KSKs and ZSKs rollovers and updating and headaches?) Does it bring any change regarding CERT records? Do browsers support it? How come it became so complex? Why didn't they just merged it with SSL? DKIM is pretty straightforward, IANA/IETF could've opted for something like that. (Yes I know that creating a trust anchor would be still problematic, but browsers are already full of CA certs. So, they could've just let anyone get a cert for a domain for shiny green padlocks, or just generate one for a poor blue lock, put it into a TXT record, encrypt the other records and let the parent zone sign the whole for you with its cert.) Thanks! And for disclosure (it seemed like the customary thing to do around here), I've asked the same on the netsec subreddit.

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• Could a DNSSEC at level n manipulate a zone at level n+2?

  - by jroith

  With some people wondering how DNSSEC could affect global censorship, I'd like to know if DNSSEC could protect a zone from being partially modified by a grandparent zone. (The point of this question is not to suggest that ICANN or it's members are not be trusted, but to figure out how DNSSEC affects the power they could exercise in theory.) For example: ICANN owns the root zone The .de zone is delegated to DENIC, Germany. Assume example.de is delegated to some 3rd party. Now, assuming DENIC does not remove example.de from their zone, would it be possible for them to redirect the subdomain abc.example.de elsewhere by returning signed records from the .de servers for abc.example.de ? Similarly, would it be possible for the DNS root to easily return signed fake records of a third-level domain xy.z while the second-level zone z is not participating in this and is not affected otherwise?

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• What is the reason for this DNSSEC validation failure of dnsviz.net?

  - by grifferz

  On trying to resolve dnsviz.net from a host using an Unbound resolver that is configured to use DNSSEC validation, the result is "no servers could be reached": $ dig -t soa dnsviz.net ; <<>> DiG 9.6-ESV-R4 <<>> -t soa dnsviz.net ;; global options: +cmd ;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached Nothing is logged by Unbound to suggest why this is the case. Here is the /etc/unbound/unbound.conf: server: verbosity: 1 interface: 192.168.0.8 interface: 127.0.0.1 interface: ::0 access-control: 0.0.0.0/0 refuse access-control: ::0/0 refuse access-control: 127.0.0.0/8 allow_snoop access-control: 192.168.0.0/16 allow_snoop chroot: "" auto-trust-anchor-file: "/etc/unbound/root.key" val-log-level: 2 python: remote-control: control-enable: yes If I add: module-config: "iterator" (thus disabling DNSSEC validation) then I am able to resolve this host normally. The domain and its DNSSEC check out fine according to http://dnscheck.iis.se/ so there must be something wrong with my resolver configuration. What is it and how do I go about debugging that?

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• DNSSEC Moving Ahead at .Org and ICANN

  <b>Enterprise Networking Planet:</b> "The march to secure the Internet's core DNS infrastructure with DNSSEC is moving forward"

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• Bypass DNSSEC for local Stub zones

  - by Starsky

  I am using bind 9.9.2 as a DNSSEC validating recursive resolver in an Internet DMZ. I want to point to my internal DNS servers as stub zones (ideally) or anything except slave zones (to avoid very large zone transfers). We use a routable ip space for our Internal addressing. Sorry if I am using an IP space that you own in my example, but 167.x.x.x is the first zone I found that fits my issue. E.G dnssec-enable yes; dnssec-validation yes; dnssec-accept-expired no; zone "16.172.in-addr.arpa" { type stub; masters { 167.255.1.53; } } zone "myzone.com" in { type stub; masters { 167.255.1.53; } } When queries hit the DNS server, they attempt at being validated, and fail because 167.in-addr.arpa HAS an RRSIG record, but sub zones do not (and should not!). Google dns is used in this example, but in reality it would be my recursive resolver. @8.8.8.8 -x 167.255.1.53 +dnssec ; (1 server found) ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 17488 ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 512 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;53.1.255.167.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: 167.in-addr.arpa. 1800 IN SOA z.arin.net. dns-ops.arin.net. 2013100713 1800 900 691200 10800 167.in-addr.arpa. 1800 IN RRSIG SOA 5 3 86400 20131017160124 20131007160124 812 167.in-addr.arpa. Lcl8sCps7LapnAj4n403KXx7A3GO7+2z/9Q2R2mwkh9FL26iDx7GlU4+ NufGd92IEJCdBu9IgcZP4I9QcKi8DI28og27WrfKd5moSl/STj02GliS qPTfNiewmTTIDw5++IlhITbp+CoJuZCRCdDbyWKmd5NSLcbskAwbCVlO vVA= 167.in-addr.arpa. 10800 IN NSEC 1.167.in-addr.arpa. NS SOA TXT RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY 167.in-addr.arpa. 10800 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 3 10800 20131017160124 20131007160124 812 167.in-addr.arpa. XALsd59i+XGvCIzjhTUFXcr11/M8prcaaPQ5yFSbvP9TzqjJ3wpizvH6 202MdrIWbsT1Dndri49lHKAXgBQ5OOsUmOh+eoRYR5okxRO4VLc5Tkze Gh0fQLcwGXPuv9A4SFNIrNyi3XU4Qvq0cViKXIuEGTa3C+zMPuvc0her oKk= 254.167.in-addr.arpa. 10800 IN NSEC 26.167.in-addr.arpa. NS RRSIG NSEC 254.167.in-addr.arpa. 10800 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 10800 20131017160124 20131007160124 812 167.in-addr.arpa. xnsLBTnPhdyABdvqtEHPxa6Y6NASfYAWfW1yYlNliTyV8TFeNOqewjwj nY43CWD77ftFDDQTLFEOPpV5vwmnUGYTRztK+kB5UrlflhPgiqYiBaBD RQaFQ8DIKaof8/snusZjK7aNmfe09t9gRcaX/pXn3liKz7m/ggxZi0f9 xo0= ;; Query time: 31 msec ;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8) ;; WHEN: Mon Oct 7 16:52:59 2013 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 722 Is there a way to bypass DNSSEC validation for specific zones? Any zone that I host internally, I do not want DNSSEC validation performed on. I have only see this interfere w/ certain reverse zones where the top level has DS/RRSIG records. Thanks.

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• New DNSSEC Exploit Revealed, Should You Be Worried?

  Its severity is rated "low," but patches are out for the second flaw in DNSSEC to be discovered in three months. DNS experts say some exploits are to be expected as the transition continues.

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• What TLDs should I use for my NS records for redundancy? (DNSSEC support required)

  - by makerofthings7

  Question As a general practice, is it a good idea to use multiple TLDs for the name servers? How should I choose between which TLD would be a good candidate for being the root server for my NS name? More Info I am switching over 800 DNS zones to an outsourced DNS provider. I originally planned on setting the zone names to nsX.company.com, but think it would be best to have multiple TLDs such as .net , .org and .info Since I plan on supporting DNSSec at company.com I think all the 1st tier Name servers must support it as well. Part of the inspiration for this question came from our provider UltraDNS. In their configuration screen for our domains, they actively verify and alert us if our name servers aren't exactly: pdns1.ultradns.net pdns2.ultradns.net pdns3.ultradns.org pdns4.ultradns.org pdns5.ultradna.info pdns6.ultradns.co.uk

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• What are the effects of the L root server now publishing DURZ?

  - by brent

  I'm curious what the actual effects of the L root server publishing DURZ today will be. On the nanog mailing list, someone said it's important to evaluate the systemic effects of root name servers publishing signed zones, even when not using DNSSEC. Meanwhile, RIPE's own published information on their changes to the K root server say there's no issue if your resolvers don't use DNSSEC. Can someone please clear this up? DNSSEC seems to be a messy, tangled web. If not enabling DNSSEC on my resolvers, do I have anything to worry about with the upcoming changes to the root servers?

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• Google Cloud DNS and DNSSEC?

  - by Joe Burnett

  Since Google Cloud DNS does not currently support the record types for DNSSEC, is there any way to begin implementation of DNSSEC using TXT records? If I were using Google Cloud DNS, which I am, and they currently only support record types which include SOA, A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, SPF, SRV, PTR and TXT: am I able to do it while constricted to these record types? Or do I have to wait until support is hard-coded into the service? I am just wondering because I would really like to ensure absolute integrity for my company so that I only convey realness in it's purity. =D

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• How can I disable DNSSC for Google Apps (GMail) MX records on my authoritative domains?

  - by meinemitternacht

  I'm running a BIND Master / Slave setup with DNSSEC, but some of my domains use Google Apps for e-mail services. Google doesn't support DNSSEC and BIND doesn't like it at all. Log output: Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM/A/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM/AAAA/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f755cb83950: ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM AAAA: bad cache hit (ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM/AAAA/IN': 69.147.224.178#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f755ca52c30: ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM A: bad cache hit (ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ALT2.ASPMX.L.GOOGLE.COM/A/IN': 69.147.224.178#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f755ca52c30: ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM AAAA: bad cache hit (ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM/AAAA/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f755cb83950: ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM A: bad cache hit (ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM/A/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f754c1b0bd0: ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM A: bad cache hit (ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM/A/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f754c1a6a30: ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM AAAA: bad cache hit (ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: error (broken trust chain) resolving 'ASPMX2.GOOGLEMAIL.COM/AAAA/IN': 70.32.45.42#53 Sep 6 17:12:51 srv549 named[5376]: validating @0x7f755cb83950: ASPMX3.GOOGLEMAIL.COM AAAA: bad cache hit (ASPMX3.GOOGLEMAIL.COM.dlv.isc.org/DLV) I'm not absolutely sure this is stopping Google Apps from working, because I just enabled all of the DNSSEC features. Does anyone here have experience with this?

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• windows 2003 DNS server and DNS SEC

  - by pQd

  hi, i have almost out-of-the-box windows 2003 server which is also domain name server fro some users. should i be worried of 5th of may's deployment of dnssec on root name servers ? i have already run: dnscmd /Config /EnableEDnsProbes 1 thanks a lot!

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• Registrar with good security, DNS hosting, and DNSSEC and IPv6 resolvers?

  - by semenko

  I'm looking to move my domains away from GoDaddy, but I'm having a tough time finding anyone with comparable features at a (even remotely) similar price. I've looked at the usual suggestions (NameCheap, Gandi.net, etc.), but they all seem to lack many of the GoDaddy feature base. I'm looking for: DNSSEC IPv6 Resolvers (dig pdns01.domaincontrol.com AAAA; etc. ) SSL-Logins by default HTTP-only login cookies No stupid password restrictions Two-factor authentications No DNS record limits Rough DNS statistics (queries/day, etc.) Audit trails GoDaddy has all of these, except two-factor, for $3/month. See http://www.godaddy.com/domains/dns-hosting.aspx I can't seem to find any other registrar that supports even a few of these. Is there a registrar that offers comparable features? Or, barring that, a DNS hosting service that offers similar features? (AWS Route53 doesn't offer DNSSEC or IPv6)

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• What is the equivalent of Cisco's 'ip virtual-reassembly' for a Juniper ISG 2000

  - by 2xyo

  I tested my dns servers with the oarc test and my size limit is at least 1403 bytes. I performed the same test before my Juniper ISG 2000 and the result is 2047 bytes. According to the chapter IP "Fragments Filtered" and this article, I think I have a fragmentation problem. This article talks about ip virtual-reassembly for cisco but I can't find the equivalent for Juniper. I prefer to find the good option in JunOS before I talk about this with my net admin :-) Thanks

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• Website cannot be accessed with google DNS because of unsigned DNS

  - by Sinan Samet

  I get this error: Inconsistent security for stakeholdergame.com - DS found at parent, but no DNSKEY found at child. On http://dnscheck.pingdom.com/?domain=stakeholdergame.com People can't access my site with google public DNS because of this. How do I solve this problem? dig @ns1.haveabyte.nl stakeholdergame.com DS shows me this ; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> @ns1.haveabyte.nl stakeholdergame.com DS ; (1 server found) ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 42223 ;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 0 ;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;stakeholdergame.com. IN DS ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: stakeholdergame.com. 14400 IN SOA ns1.haveabyte.nl. hostmaster.stakeholdergame.com. 2014030300 14400 3600 1209600 86400 ;; Query time: 21 msec ;; SERVER: 79.170.93.174#53(79.170.93.174) ;; WHEN: Tue Jun 10 11:20:41 2014 ;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 100

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• how to prepare windows 2003 domain name server for 5th of may / deployment of dns sec on root name s

  - by pQd

  hi, what to do not to be surprised by 5th of may when you have to [ for some reason ] use windows 2003 as a name server? thanks a lot!

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• DNS Server on Fedora 11

  - by Funky Si

  I recently upgraded my Fedora 10 server to Fedora 11 and am getting the following error in my DNS/named config. named[27685]: not insecure resolving 'fedoraproject.org/A/IN: 212.104.130.65#53 This only shows for certain addresses some are resolved fine and I can ping and browse to them fine, while others produce the error above. This is my named.conf file acl trusted-servers { 192.168.1.10; }; options { directory "/var/named"; forwarders {212.104.130.9 ; 212.104.130.65; }; forward only; allow-transfer { 127.0.0.1; }; # dnssec-enable yes; # dnssec-validation yes; # dnssec-lookaside . trust-anchor dlv.isc.org.; }; # Forward Zone for hughes.lan domain zone "funkygoth" IN { type master; file "funkygoth.zone"; allow-transfer { trusted-servers; }; }; # Reverse Zone for hughes.lan domain zone "1.168.192.in-addr.arpa" IN { type master; file "1.168.192.zone"; }; include "/etc/named.dnssec.keys"; include "/etc/pki/dnssec-keys/dlv/dlv.isc.org.conf"; include "/etc/pki/dnssec-keys//named.dnssec.keys"; include "/etc/pki/dnssec-keys//dlv/dlv.isc.org.conf"; Anyone know what I have set wrong here?

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