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  • Cisco 800 series won't forward port

    - by sam
    Hello ServerFault, I am trying to forward port 444 from my cisco router to my Web Server (192.168.0.2). As far as I can tell, my port forwarding is configured correctly, yet no traffic will pass through on port 444. Here is my config: ! version 12.3 service config no service pad service tcp-keepalives-in service tcp-keepalives-out service timestamps debug uptime service timestamps log uptime service password-encryption no service dhcp ! hostname QUESTMOUNT ! logging buffered 16386 informational logging rate-limit 100 except warnings no logging console no logging monitor enable secret 5 -removed- ! username administrator secret 5 -removed- username manager secret 5 -removed- clock timezone NZST 12 clock summer-time NZDT recurring 1 Sun Oct 2:00 3 Sun Mar 3:00 aaa new-model ! ! aaa authentication login default local aaa authentication login userlist local aaa authentication ppp default local aaa authorization network grouplist local aaa session-id common ip subnet-zero no ip source-route no ip domain lookup ip domain name quest.local ! ! no ip bootp server ip inspect name firewall tcp ip inspect name firewall udp ip inspect name firewall cuseeme ip inspect name firewall h323 ip inspect name firewall rcmd ip inspect name firewall realaudio ip inspect name firewall streamworks ip inspect name firewall vdolive ip inspect name firewall sqlnet ip inspect name firewall tftp ip inspect name firewall ftp ip inspect name firewall icmp ip inspect name firewall sip ip inspect name firewall fragment maximum 256 timeout 1 ip inspect name firewall netshow ip inspect name firewall rtsp ip inspect name firewall skinny ip inspect name firewall http ip audit notify log ip audit po max-events 100 ip audit name intrusion info list 3 action alarm ip audit name intrusion attack list 3 action alarm drop reset no ftp-server write-enable ! ! ! ! crypto isakmp policy 1 authentication pre-share ! crypto isakmp policy 2 encr 3des authentication pre-share group 2 ! crypto isakmp client configuration group staff key 0 qS;,sc:q<skro1^, domain quest.local pool vpnclients acl 106 ! ! crypto ipsec transform-set tr-null-sha esp-null esp-sha-hmac crypto ipsec transform-set tr-des-md5 esp-des esp-md5-hmac crypto ipsec transform-set tr-des-sha esp-des esp-sha-hmac crypto ipsec transform-set tr-3des-sha esp-3des esp-sha-hmac ! crypto dynamic-map vpnusers 1 description Client to Site VPN Users set transform-set tr-des-md5 ! ! crypto map cm-cryptomap client authentication list userlist crypto map cm-cryptomap isakmp authorization list grouplist crypto map cm-cryptomap client configuration address respond crypto map cm-cryptomap 65000 ipsec-isakmp dynamic vpnusers ! ! ! ! interface Ethernet0 ip address 192.168.0.254 255.255.255.0 ip access-group 102 in ip nat inside hold-queue 100 out ! interface ATM0 no ip address no atm ilmi-keepalive dsl operating-mode auto ! interface ATM0.1 point-to-point pvc 0/100 encapsulation aal5mux ppp dialer dialer pool-member 1 ! ! interface Dialer0 bandwidth 640 ip address negotiated ip access-group 101 in no ip redirects no ip unreachables ip nat outside ip inspect firewall out ip audit intrusion in encapsulation ppp no ip route-cache no ip mroute-cache dialer pool 1 dialer-group 1 no cdp enable ppp pap sent-username -removed- password 7 -removed- ppp ipcp dns request crypto map cm-cryptomap ! ip local pool vpnclients 192.168.99.1 192.168.99.254 ip nat inside source list 105 interface Dialer0 overload ip nat inside source static tcp 192.168.0.2 444 interface Dialer0 444 ip nat inside source static tcp 192.168.0.51 9000 interface Dialer0 9000 ip nat inside source static udp 192.168.0.2 1433 interface Dialer0 1433 ip nat inside source static tcp 192.168.0.2 1433 interface Dialer0 1433 ip nat inside source static tcp 192.168.0.2 25 interface Dialer0 25 ip classless ip route 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 Dialer0 ip http server no ip http secure-server ! ip access-list logging interval 10 logging 192.168.0.2 access-list 1 remark The local LAN. access-list 1 permit 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 2 permit 192.168.0.0 access-list 2 remark Where management can be done from. access-list 2 permit 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 3 remark Traffic not to check for intrustion detection. access-list 3 deny 192.168.99.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 3 permit any access-list 101 remark Traffic allowed to enter the router from the Internet access-list 101 permit ip 192.168.99.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 101 deny ip 0.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 169.254.0.0 0.0.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 198.18.0.0 0.1.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip 224.0.0.0 0.15.255.255 any access-list 101 deny ip any host 255.255.255.255 access-list 101 permit tcp 67.228.209.128 0.0.0.15 any eq 1433 access-list 101 permit tcp host 120.136.2.22 any eq 1433 access-list 101 permit tcp host 123.100.90.58 any eq 1433 access-list 101 permit udp 67.228.209.128 0.0.0.15 any eq 1433 access-list 101 permit udp host 120.136.2.22 any eq 1433 access-list 101 permit udp host 123.100.90.58 any eq 1433 access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq 444 access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq 9000 access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq smtp access-list 101 permit udp any any eq non500-isakmp access-list 101 permit udp any any eq isakmp access-list 101 permit esp any any access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq 1723 access-list 101 permit gre any any access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq 22 access-list 101 permit tcp any any eq telnet access-list 102 remark Traffic allowed to enter the router from the Ethernet access-list 102 permit ip any host 192.168.0.254 access-list 102 deny ip any host 192.168.0.255 access-list 102 deny udp any any eq tftp log access-list 102 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.99.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 102 deny ip any 0.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 169.254.0.0 0.0.255.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 log access-list 102 deny ip any 198.18.0.0 0.1.255.255 log access-list 102 deny udp any any eq 135 log access-list 102 deny tcp any any eq 135 log access-list 102 deny udp any any eq netbios-ns log access-list 102 deny udp any any eq netbios-dgm log access-list 102 deny tcp any any eq 445 log access-list 102 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 any access-list 102 permit ip any host 255.255.255.255 access-list 102 deny ip any any log access-list 105 remark Traffic to NAT access-list 105 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.99.0 0.0.0.255 access-list 105 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 any access-list 106 remark User to Site VPN Clients access-list 106 permit ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.0.255 any dialer-list 1 protocol ip permit ! line con 0 no modem enable line aux 0 line vty 0 4 access-class 2 in transport input telnet ssh transport output none ! scheduler max-task-time 5000 ! end any ideas? :)

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • simplifying templates

    - by Lodle
    I have a bunch of templates that are used for rpc and was wondering if there is a way to simplify them down as it repeats it self allot. I know varags for templates is coming in the next standard but can you do default values for templates? Also is there a way to handle void functions as normal functions? Atm i have to separate them and treat them as two different things every where. template <typename R> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* c, const char* name) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = c->callFunction( name, false ); return handleReturn<R>(r); } template <typename R, typename A> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a)); return handleReturn<R>(r); } template <typename R, typename A, typename B> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b) ); return handleReturn<R>(r); } template <typename R, typename A, typename B, typename C> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c) ); return handleReturn<R>(r); } template <typename R, typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d) ); return handleReturn<R>(r); } template <typename R, typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D, typename E> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d, E e) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d), IPC::getParameter(e) ); return handleReturn<R>(r); } template <typename R, typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D, typename E, typename F> R functionCall(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d, E e, F f) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d), IPC::getParameter(e), IPC::getParameter(f) ); return handleReturn<R>(r); } inline void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A> void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a)); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B> void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C> void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D> void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D, typename E> void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d, E e) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d), IPC::getParameter(e) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D, typename E, typename F> void functionCallV(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d, E e, F f) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, false, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d), IPC::getParameter(e), IPC::getParameter(f) ); handleReturnV(r); } inline void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A> void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true, IPC::getParameter(a)); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B> void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C> void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D> void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D, typename E> void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d, E e) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d), IPC::getParameter(e) ); handleReturnV(r); } template <typename A, typename B, typename C, typename D, typename E, typename F> void functionCallAsync(IPC::IPCClass* cl, const char* name, A a, B b, C c, D d, E e, F f) { IPC::IPCParameterI* r = cl->callFunction( name, true, IPC::getParameter(a), IPC::getParameter(b), IPC::getParameter(c), IPC::getParameter(d), IPC::getParameter(e), IPC::getParameter(f) ); handleReturnV(r); }

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  • Sendmail Failing to Forward Locally Addressed Mail to Exchange Server

    - by DomainSoil
    I've recently gained employment as a web developer with a small company. What they neglected to tell me upon hire was that I would be administrating the server along with my other daily duties. Now, truth be told, I'm not clueless when it comes to these things, but this is my first rodeo working with a rack server/console.. However, I'm confident that I will be able to work through any solutions you provide. Short Description: When a customer places an order via our (Magento CE 1.8.1.0) website, a copy of said order is supposed to be BCC'd to our sales manager. I say supposed because this was a working feature before the old administrator left. Long Description: Shortly after I started, we had a server crash which required a server restart. After restart, we noticed a few features on our site weren't working, but all those have been cleaned up except this one. I had to create an account on our server for root access. When a customer places an order, our sites software (Magento CE 1.8.1.0) is configured to BCC the customers order email to our sales manager. We use a Microsoft Exchange 2007 Server for our mail, which is hosted on a different machine (in-house) that I don't have access to ATM, but I'm sure I could if needed. As far as I can tell, all other external emails work.. Only INTERNAL email addresses fail to deliver. I know this because I've also tested my own internal address via our website. I set up an account with an internal email, made a test order, and never received the email. I changed my email for the account to an external GMail account, and received emails as expected. Let's dive into the logs and config's. For privacy/security reasons, names have been changed to the following: domain.com = Our Top Level Domain. email.local = Our Exchange Server. example.com = ANY other TLD. OLDadmin = Our previous Server Administrator. NEWadmin = Me. SALES@ = Our Sales Manager. Customer# = A Customer. Here's a list of the programs and config files used that hold relevant for this issue: Server: > [root@www ~]# cat /etc/centos-release CentOS release 6.3 (final) Sendmail: > [root@www ~]# sendmail -d0.1 -bt < /dev/null Version 8.14.4 ========SYSTEM IDENTITY (after readcf)======== (short domain name) $w = domain (canonical domain name) $j = domain.com (subdomain name) $m = com (node name) $k = www.domain.com > [root@www ~]# rpm -qa | grep -i sendmail sendmail-cf-8.14.4-8.e16.noarch sendmail-8.14-4-8.e16.x86_64 nslookup: > [root@www ~]# nslookup email.local Name: email.local Address: 192.168.1.50 hostname: > [root@www ~]# hostname www.domain.com /etc/mail/access: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/access Connect:localhost.localdomain RELAY Connect:localhost RELAY Connect:127.0.0.1 RELAY /etc/mail/domaintable: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/domaintable # /etc/mail/local-host-names: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/local-host-names # /etc/mail/mailertable: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/mailertable # /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/sendmail.cf ###################################################################### ##### ##### DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE! Only edit the source .mc file. ##### ###################################################################### ###################################################################### ##### $Id: cfhead.m4,v 8.120 2009/01/23 22:39:21 ca Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: cf.m4,v 8.32 1999/02/07 07:26:14 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### setup for linux ##### ##### $Id: linux.m4,v 8.13 2000/09/17 17:30:00 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: local_procmail.m4,v 8.22 2002/11/17 04:24:19 ca Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: no_default_msa.m4,v 8.2 2001/02/14 05:03:22 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: smrsh.m4,v 8.14 1999/11/18 05:06:23 ca Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: mailertable.m4,v 8.25 2002/06/27 23:23:57 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: virtusertable.m4,v 8.23 2002/06/27 23:23:57 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: redirect.m4,v 8.15 1999/08/06 01:47:36 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: always_add_domain.m4,v 8.11 2000/09/12 22:00:53 ca Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: use_cw_file.m4,v 8.11 2001/08/26 20:58:57 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: use_ct_file.m4,v 8.11 2001/08/26 20:58:57 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: local_procmail.m4,v 8.22 2002/11/17 04:24:19 ca Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: access_db.m4,v 8.27 2006/07/06 21:10:10 ca Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: blacklist_recipients.m4,v 8.13 1999/04/02 02:25:13 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: accept_unresolvable_domains.m4,v 8.10 1999/02/07 07:26:07 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: masquerade_envelope.m4,v 8.9 1999/02/07 07:26:10 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: masquerade_entire_domain.m4,v 8.9 1999/02/07 07:26:10 gshapiro Exp $ ##### ##### $Id: proto.m4,v 8.741 2009/12/11 00:04:53 ca Exp $ ##### # level 10 config file format V10/Berkeley # override file safeties - setting this option compromises system security, # addressing the actual file configuration problem is preferred # need to set this before any file actions are encountered in the cf file #O DontBlameSendmail=safe # default LDAP map specification # need to set this now before any LDAP maps are defined #O LDAPDefaultSpec=-h localhost ################## # local info # ################## # my LDAP cluster # need to set this before any LDAP lookups are done (including classes) #D{sendmailMTACluster}$m Cwlocalhost # file containing names of hosts for which we receive email Fw/etc/mail/local-host-names # my official domain name # ... define this only if sendmail cannot automatically determine your domain #Dj$w.Foo.COM # host/domain names ending with a token in class P are canonical CP. # "Smart" relay host (may be null) DSemail.local # operators that cannot be in local usernames (i.e., network indicators) CO @ % ! # a class with just dot (for identifying canonical names) C.. # a class with just a left bracket (for identifying domain literals) C[[ # access_db acceptance class C{Accept}OK RELAY C{ResOk}OKR # Hosts for which relaying is permitted ($=R) FR-o /etc/mail/relay-domains # arithmetic map Karith arith # macro storage map Kmacro macro # possible values for TLS_connection in access map C{Tls}VERIFY ENCR # who I send unqualified names to if FEATURE(stickyhost) is used # (null means deliver locally) DRemail.local. # who gets all local email traffic # ($R has precedence for unqualified names if FEATURE(stickyhost) is used) DHemail.local. # dequoting map Kdequote dequote # class E: names that should be exposed as from this host, even if we masquerade # class L: names that should be delivered locally, even if we have a relay # class M: domains that should be converted to $M # class N: domains that should not be converted to $M #CL root C{E}root C{w}localhost.localdomain C{M}domain.com # who I masquerade as (null for no masquerading) (see also $=M) DMdomain.com # my name for error messages DnMAILER-DAEMON # Mailer table (overriding domains) Kmailertable hash -o /etc/mail/mailertable.db # Virtual user table (maps incoming users) Kvirtuser hash -o /etc/mail/virtusertable.db CPREDIRECT # Access list database (for spam stomping) Kaccess hash -T<TMPF> -o /etc/mail/access.db # Configuration version number DZ8.14.4 /etc/mail/sendmail.mc: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/sendmail.mc divert(-1)dnl dnl # dnl # This is the sendmail macro config file for m4. If you make changes to dnl # /etc/mail/sendmail.mc, you will need to regenerate the dnl # /etc/mail/sendmail.cf file by confirming that the sendmail-cf package is dnl # installed and then performing a dnl # dnl # /etc/mail/make dnl # include(`/usr/share/sendmail-cf/m4/cf.m4')dnl VERSIONID(`setup for linux')dnl OSTYPE(`linux')dnl dnl # dnl # Do not advertize sendmail version. dnl # dnl define(`confSMTP_LOGIN_MSG', `$j Sendmail; $b')dnl dnl # dnl # default logging level is 9, you might want to set it higher to dnl # debug the configuration dnl # dnl define(`confLOG_LEVEL', `9')dnl dnl # dnl # Uncomment and edit the following line if your outgoing mail needs to dnl # be sent out through an external mail server: dnl # define(`SMART_HOST', `email.local')dnl dnl # define(`confDEF_USER_ID', ``8:12'')dnl dnl define(`confAUTO_REBUILD')dnl define(`confTO_CONNECT', `1m')dnl define(`confTRY_NULL_MX_LIST', `True')dnl define(`confDONT_PROBE_INTERFACES', `True')dnl define(`PROCMAIL_MAILER_PATH', `/usr/bin/procmail')dnl define(`ALIAS_FILE', `/etc/aliases')dnl define(`STATUS_FILE', `/var/log/mail/statistics')dnl define(`UUCP_MAILER_MAX', `2000000')dnl define(`confUSERDB_SPEC', `/etc/mail/userdb.db')dnl define(`confPRIVACY_FLAGS', `authwarnings,novrfy,noexpn,restrictqrun')dnl define(`confAUTH_OPTIONS', `A')dnl dnl # dnl # The following allows relaying if the user authenticates, and disallows dnl # plaintext authentication (PLAIN/LOGIN) on non-TLS links dnl # dnl define(`confAUTH_OPTIONS', `A p')dnl dnl # dnl # PLAIN is the preferred plaintext authentication method and used by dnl # Mozilla Mail and Evolution, though Outlook Express and other MUAs do dnl # use LOGIN. Other mechanisms should be used if the connection is not dnl # guaranteed secure. dnl # Please remember that saslauthd needs to be running for AUTH. dnl # dnl TRUST_AUTH_MECH(`EXTERNAL DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5 LOGIN PLAIN')dnl dnl define(`confAUTH_MECHANISMS', `EXTERNAL GSSAPI DIGEST-MD5 CRAM-MD5 LOGIN PLAIN')dnl dnl # dnl # Rudimentary information on creating certificates for sendmail TLS: dnl # cd /etc/pki/tls/certs; make sendmail.pem dnl # Complete usage: dnl # make -C /etc/pki/tls/certs usage dnl # dnl define(`confCACERT_PATH', `/etc/pki/tls/certs')dnl dnl define(`confCACERT', `/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt')dnl dnl define(`confSERVER_CERT', `/etc/pki/tls/certs/sendmail.pem')dnl dnl define(`confSERVER_KEY', `/etc/pki/tls/certs/sendmail.pem')dnl dnl # dnl # This allows sendmail to use a keyfile that is shared with OpenLDAP's dnl # slapd, which requires the file to be readble by group ldap dnl # dnl define(`confDONT_BLAME_SENDMAIL', `groupreadablekeyfile')dnl dnl # dnl define(`confTO_QUEUEWARN', `4h')dnl dnl define(`confTO_QUEUERETURN', `5d')dnl dnl define(`confQUEUE_LA', `12')dnl dnl define(`confREFUSE_LA', `18')dnl define(`confTO_IDENT', `0')dnl dnl FEATURE(delay_checks)dnl FEATURE(`no_default_msa', `dnl')dnl FEATURE(`smrsh', `/usr/sbin/smrsh')dnl FEATURE(`mailertable', `hash -o /etc/mail/mailertable.db')dnl FEATURE(`virtusertable', `hash -o /etc/mail/virtusertable.db')dnl FEATURE(redirect)dnl FEATURE(always_add_domain)dnl FEATURE(use_cw_file)dnl FEATURE(use_ct_file)dnl dnl # dnl # The following limits the number of processes sendmail can fork to accept dnl # incoming messages or process its message queues to 20.) sendmail refuses dnl # to accept connections once it has reached its quota of child processes. dnl # dnl define(`confMAX_DAEMON_CHILDREN', `20')dnl dnl # dnl # Limits the number of new connections per second. This caps the overhead dnl # incurred due to forking new sendmail processes. May be useful against dnl # DoS attacks or barrages of spam. (As mentioned below, a per-IP address dnl # limit would be useful but is not available as an option at this writing.) dnl # dnl define(`confCONNECTION_RATE_THROTTLE', `3')dnl dnl # dnl # The -t option will retry delivery if e.g. the user runs over his quota. dnl # FEATURE(local_procmail, `', `procmail -t -Y -a $h -d $u')dnl FEATURE(`access_db', `hash -T<TMPF> -o /etc/mail/access.db')dnl FEATURE(`blacklist_recipients')dnl EXPOSED_USER(`root')dnl dnl # dnl # For using Cyrus-IMAPd as POP3/IMAP server through LMTP delivery uncomment dnl # the following 2 definitions and activate below in the MAILER section the dnl # cyrusv2 mailer. dnl # dnl define(`confLOCAL_MAILER', `cyrusv2')dnl dnl define(`CYRUSV2_MAILER_ARGS', `FILE /var/lib/imap/socket/lmtp')dnl dnl # dnl # The following causes sendmail to only listen on the IPv4 loopback address dnl # 127.0.0.1 and not on any other network devices. Remove the loopback dnl # address restriction to accept email from the internet or intranet. dnl # DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=smtp,Addr=127.0.0.1, Name=MTA')dnl dnl # dnl # The following causes sendmail to additionally listen to port 587 for dnl # mail from MUAs that authenticate. Roaming users who can't reach their dnl # preferred sendmail daemon due to port 25 being blocked or redirected find dnl # this useful. dnl # dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=submission, Name=MSA, M=Ea')dnl dnl # dnl # The following causes sendmail to additionally listen to port 465, but dnl # starting immediately in TLS mode upon connecting. Port 25 or 587 followed dnl # by STARTTLS is preferred, but roaming clients using Outlook Express can't dnl # do STARTTLS on ports other than 25. Mozilla Mail can ONLY use STARTTLS dnl # and doesn't support the deprecated smtps; Evolution <1.1.1 uses smtps dnl # when SSL is enabled-- STARTTLS support is available in version 1.1.1. dnl # dnl # For this to work your OpenSSL certificates must be configured. dnl # dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Port=smtps, Name=TLSMTA, M=s')dnl dnl # dnl # The following causes sendmail to additionally listen on the IPv6 loopback dnl # device. Remove the loopback address restriction listen to the network. dnl # dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`port=smtp,Addr=::1, Name=MTA-v6, Family=inet6')dnl dnl # dnl # enable both ipv6 and ipv4 in sendmail: dnl # dnl DAEMON_OPTIONS(`Name=MTA-v4, Family=inet, Name=MTA-v6, Family=inet6') dnl # dnl # We strongly recommend not accepting unresolvable domains if you want to dnl # protect yourself from spam. However, the laptop and users on computers dnl # that do not have 24x7 DNS do need this. dnl # FEATURE(`accept_unresolvable_domains')dnl dnl # dnl FEATURE(`relay_based_on_MX')dnl dnl # dnl # Also accept email sent to "localhost.localdomain" as local email. dnl # LOCAL_DOMAIN(`localhost.localdomain')dnl dnl # dnl # The following example makes mail from this host and any additional dnl # specified domains appear to be sent from mydomain.com dnl # MASQUERADE_AS(`domain.com')dnl dnl # dnl # masquerade not just the headers, but the envelope as well dnl FEATURE(masquerade_envelope)dnl dnl # dnl # masquerade not just @mydomainalias.com, but @*.mydomainalias.com as well dnl # FEATURE(masquerade_entire_domain)dnl dnl # MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(domain.com)dnl dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(localhost.localdomain)dnl dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(mydomainalias.com)dnl dnl MASQUERADE_DOMAIN(mydomain.lan)dnl MAILER(smtp)dnl MAILER(procmail)dnl dnl MAILER(cyrusv2)dnl /etc/mail/trusted-users: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/trusted-users # /etc/mail/virtusertable: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/mail/virtusertable [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] /etc/hosts: > [root@www ~]# vi /etc/hosts 127.0.0.1 localhost.localdomain localhost ::1 localhost6.localdomain6 localhost6 192.168.1.50 email.local I've only included the "local info" part of sendmail.cf, to save space. If there are any files that I've missed, please advise so I may produce them. Now that that's out of the way, lets look at some entries from /var/log/maillog. The first entry is from an order BEFORE the crash, when the site was working as expected. ##Order 200005374 Aug 5, 2014 7:06:38 AM## Aug 5 07:06:39 www sendmail[26149]: s75C6dqB026149: from=OLDadmin, size=11091, class=0, nrcpts=2, msgid=<[email protected]>, relay=OLDadmin@localhost Aug 5 07:06:39 www sendmail[26150]: s75C6dXe026150: from=<[email protected]>, size=11257, class=0, nrcpts=2, msgid=<[email protected]>, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1] Aug 5 07:06:39 www sendmail[26149]: s75C6dqB026149: [email protected],=?utf-8?B?dGhvbWFzICBHaWxsZXNwaWU=?= <[email protected]>, ctladdr=OLDadmin (501/501), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=71091, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (s75C6dXe026150 Message accepted for delivery) Aug 5 07:06:40 www sendmail[26152]: s75C6dXe026150: to=<[email protected]>,<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:01, xdelay=00:00:01, mailer=relay, pri=161257, relay=email.local. [192.168.1.50], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent ( <[email protected]> Queued mail for delivery) This next entry from maillog is from an order AFTER the crash. ##Order 200005375 Aug 5, 2014 9:45:25 AM## Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4O030021: from=OLDadmin, size=11344, class=0, nrcpts=2, msgid=<[email protected]>, relay=OLDadmin@localhost Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30022]: s75EjQm1030022: <[email protected]>... User unknown Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4O030021: [email protected], ctladdr=OLDadmin (501/501), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=71344, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=5.1.1, stat=User unknown Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30022]: s75EjQm1030022: from=<[email protected]>, size=11500, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1] Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4O030021: to==?utf-8?B?S2VubmV0aCBCaWViZXI=?= <[email protected]>, ctladdr=OLDadmin (501/501), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=71344, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (s75EjQm1030022 Message accepted for delivery) Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4O030021: s75EjQ4P030021: DSN: User unknown Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30022]: s75EjQm3030022: <[email protected]>... User unknown Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4P030021: to=OLDadmin, delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=42368, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=5.1.1, stat=User unknown Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30022]: s75EjQm3030022: from=<>, size=12368, class=0, nrcpts=0, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1] Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4P030021: s75EjQ4Q030021: return to sender: User unknown Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30022]: s75EjQm5030022: from=<>, size=14845, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1] Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30021]: s75EjQ4Q030021: to=postmaster, delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=43392, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (s75EjQm5030022 Message accepted for delivery) Aug 5 09:45:26 www sendmail[30025]: s75EjQm5030022: to=root, delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=local, pri=45053, dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent Aug 5 09:45:27 www sendmail[30024]: s75EjQm1030022: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:01, xdelay=00:00:01, mailer=relay, pri=131500, relay=email.local. [192.168.1.50], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent ( <[email protected]> Queued mail for delivery) To add a little more, I think I've pinpointed the actual crash event. ##THE CRASH## Aug 5 09:39:46 www sendmail[3251]: restarting /usr/sbin/sendmail due to signal Aug 5 09:39:46 www sm-msp-queue[3260]: restarting /usr/sbin/sendmail due to signal Aug 5 09:39:46 www sm-msp-queue[29370]: starting daemon (8.14.4): queueing@01:00:00 Aug 5 09:39:47 www sendmail[29372]: starting daemon (8.14.4): SMTP+queueing@01:00:00 Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29465]: s75Ee2vT029465: Authentication-Warning: www.domain.com: OLDadmin set sender to root using -f Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29464]: s75Ee2IF029464: Authentication-Warning: www.domain.com: OLDadmin set sender to root using -f Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29465]: s75Ee2vT029465: from=root, size=1426, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, relay=OLDadmin@localhost Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29464]: s75Ee2IF029464: from=root, size=1426, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, relay=OLDadmin@localhost Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29466]: s75Ee23t029466: from=<[email protected]>, size=1784, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1] Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29466]: s75Ee23t029466: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:00, mailer=local, pri=31784, dsn=4.4.3, stat=queued Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29467]: s75Ee2wh029467: from=<[email protected]>, size=1784, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<[email protected]>, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1] Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29467]: s75Ee2wh029467: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:00, mailer=local, pri=31784, dsn=4.4.3, stat=queued Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29464]: s75Ee2IF029464: to=OLDadmin, ctladdr=root (0/0), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=31426, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (s75Ee23t029466 Message accepted for delivery) Aug 5 09:40:02 www sendmail[29465]: s75Ee2vT029465: to=OLDadmin, ctladdr=root (0/0), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=31426, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (s75Ee2wh029467 Message accepted for delivery) Aug 5 09:40:06 www sm-msp-queue[29370]: restarting /usr/sbin/sendmail due to signal Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29372]: restarting /usr/sbin/sendmail due to signal Aug 5 09:40:06 www sm-msp-queue[29888]: starting daemon (8.14.4): queueing@01:00:00 Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29890]: starting daemon (8.14.4): SMTP+queueing@01:00:00 Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29891]: s75Ee23t029466: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:04, mailer=local, pri=121784, dsn=5.1.1, stat=User unknown Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29891]: s75Ee23t029466: s75Ee6xY029891: DSN: User unknown Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29891]: s75Ee6xY029891: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=local, pri=33035, dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29891]: s75Ee2wh029467: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:04, mailer=local, pri=121784, dsn=5.1.1, stat=User unknown Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29891]: s75Ee2wh029467: s75Ee6xZ029891: DSN: User unknown Aug 5 09:40:06 www sendmail[29891]: s75Ee6xZ029891: to=<[email protected]>, delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=local, pri=33035, dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent Something to note about the maillog's: Before the crash, the msgid included localhost.localdomain; after the crash it's been domain.com. Thanks to all who take the time to read and look into this issue. I appreciate it and look forward to tackling this issue together.

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