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  • Intent resolution in Android

    - by Saksham
    Hello community, If I want to create custom address book (which overrides my phone's default address book), and if I want it to be used by all applications, what should be my intent filter? Does Android allow me to do such a thing considering the fact that such a third-party app could potentially be malicious?! And, if I want to have yet another address book application, I suppose the second app also has same intent-filter, isn't it? How does the framework decide which app to pick if I click on Contacts button when making a call? In other words, how does the framework resolve intents in case there is a conflict between multiple intent-filters? I'm new to android, so please excuse me if this question is stupid. I would like to get some feedback in any case! Thanks in advance, Saksham

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • Oracle is Sponsoring LinuxCon Europe 2012

    - by Zeynep Koch
    Architecture is amazing in Barcelona but you will also be impressed with Oracle Linux sessions in LinuxCon Europe as well.  Oracle is one of the key sponsors in LinuxCon Europe and we have great sessions to show you why Oracle Linux is best for your "IT architecture"! We also have a booth where you can pick up latest Oracle Linux and Oracle VM DVD Kit and Virtualization for Dummies booklet. Don't forget to visit us at technology showcase Booth #19. Oracle Sessions at LinuxCon Europe 2012:  1. OCFS2: Status and Overview - Lenz Grimmer, Oracle Wednesday November 7, 2012 10:40am - 11:25am Venue: Diamant OCFS2, Oracle's general-purpose shared-disk cluster file system for Linux has come a long way since its development started in 2003. Distributed under the GPL and part of the mainline Linux Kernel, it is also included in Oracle Linux and plays a vital role in products like Oracle VM, Oracle RAC or E-Business Suite. This presentation will provide a general technical overview as well as an update on the latest developments. Attendees will learn about the features and improvements that set OCFS2 apart from other Linux-based cluster file systems, including: Heartbeat implementation: global vs. local heartbeats Storage optimizations: Extent-based Allocations, Hole punching, Reflinks 2. Status of Linux Tracing - Elena Zannoni, Oracle Wednesday November 7, 2012 11:35am - 12:20am Venue: Diamant There have been many developments recently in the Linux tracing area. The tracing infrastructure in the kernel is getting more robust, with  the recent introduction of uprobes to allow the implementation of user  space tracing, and new features of perf. There are many tracing tools to choose from, including the newest kid on the block, DTrace for Linux.  This talk will take the audience through the main tracing facilities  available today whether more tightly integrated with the kernel code, or maintained stand alone. 3. MySQL Security Model and Pluggable Authentication - Kristofer Pettersson, Oracle Wednesday November 7, 2012 1:50pm - 2:35pm Venue: Diamant With an increasing security awareness among web and cloud developers, knowing how to secure your database from unauthorized or malicious access has become important. This talk explains the MySQL security model, pluggable authentication, new auditing features and rounds off with some pointers on how to securely integrate your database into your Linux web stack. We look forward to seeing you in Barcelona, Spain on November 5-9, 2012. Register today 

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  • Are we ready for the Cloud computing era?

    - by andrewkatumba
    Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0in; mso-para-margin-right:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0in; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;} "Elite?" developer circles are abuzz with the notion of Cloud computing . The increasing bandwidth, the desire for faster and leaner operations and ofcourse the need for outsourcing non core it related business requirements e.g wordprocessing, spreadsheets, data backups. In strolls Chrome OS (am sure other similar OSes will join with their own wagons for us to jump on), offering just that, internet based services(more like a repository of), quick efficient and "reliable" and for the most part cheap and often time even free! And we all go rhapsodic!  It boils down to the age old dilemma, "if the cops are so busy protecting us then who will protect them" (even the folks back at Hollywood keep us reminded)! Who is going to ensure that these internet based services do not go down(either intentionally or by some malicious third party) leading to a multinational colossal disaster .At the risk of sounding pessimistic,  IT IS NOT AN ISSUE OF TRUST, this is but a mere case of Murphy's Law!  What then? Should the "cloud" be trusted to this extent at this time?  This is an era where challenges are rapidly solved with lightning promptness to "beat the competition", my hope is that our solutions are not just creating problems that we may not be able to solve!  Keeping my ear on the Ground.

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  • Still prompted for a password after adding SSH public key to a server

    - by Nathan Arthur
    I'm attempting to setup a git repository on my Dreamhost web server by following the "Setup: For the Impatient" instructions here. I'm having difficulty setting up public key access to the server. After successfully creating my public key, I ran the following command: cat ~/.ssh/[MY KEY].pub | ssh [USER]@[MACHINE] "mkdir ~/.ssh; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" ...replacing the appropriate placeholders with the correct values. Everything seemed to go through fine. The server asked for my password, and, as far as I can tell, executed the command. There is indeed a ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file on the server. The problem: When I try to SSH into the server, it still asks for my password. My understanding is that it shouldn't be asking for my password anymore. What am I missing? EDIT: SSH -v Log: Macbook:~ michaeleckert$ ssh -v [USER]@[SERVER URL] OpenSSH_6.2p2, OSSLShim 0.9.8r 8 Dec 2011 debug1: Reading configuration data /etc/ssh_config debug1: /etc/ssh_config line 20: Applying options for * debug1: /etc/ssh_config line 53: Applying options for * debug1: Connecting to [SERVER URL] [[SERVER IP]] port 22. debug1: Connection established. debug1: identity file /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/id_rsa type -1 debug1: identity file /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/id_rsa-cert type -1 debug1: identity file /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/id_dsa type -1 debug1: identity file /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/id_dsa-cert type -1 debug1: Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0 debug1: Local version string SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_6.2 debug1: Remote protocol version 2.0, remote software version OpenSSH_5.5p1 Debian-6+squeeze3 debug1: match: OpenSSH_5.5p1 Debian-6+squeeze3 pat OpenSSH_5* debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received debug1: kex: server->client aes128-ctr hmac-md5 none debug1: kex: client->server aes128-ctr hmac-md5 none debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(1024<1024<8192) sent debug1: expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP debug1: SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent debug1: expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY debug1: Server host key: RSA [STRING OF NUMBERS AND LETTERS SEPARATED BY SEMI-COLONS] debug1: Host ‘[SERVER URL]' is known and matches the RSA host key. debug1: Found key in /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/known_hosts:2 debug1: ssh_rsa_verify: signature correct debug1: SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent debug1: expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS debug1: SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received debug1: Roaming not allowed by server debug1: SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent debug1: SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received debug1: Authentications that can continue: publickey,password debug1: Next authentication method: publickey debug1: Trying private key: /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/id_rsa debug1: Trying private key: /Users/michaeleckert/.ssh/id_dsa debug1: Next authentication method: password [USER]@[SERVER URL]'s password: debug1: Authentication succeeded (password). Authenticated to [SERVER URL] ([[SERVER IP]]:22). debug1: channel 0: new [client-session] debug1: Requesting [email protected] debug1: Entering interactive session. debug1: Sending environment. debug1: Sending env LANG = en_US.UTF-8 Welcome to [SERVER URL] Any malicious and/or unauthorized activity is strictly forbidden. All activity may be logged by DreamHost Web Hosting. Last login: Sun Nov 3 12:04:21 2013 from [MY IP] [[SERVER NAME]]$

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  • Security Alert for CVE-2012-4681 Released

    - by Eric P. Maurice
    Hi, this is Eric Maurice again! Oracle has just released Security Alert CVE-2012-4681 to address 3 distinct but related vulnerabilities and one security-in-depth issue affecting Java running in desktop browsers.  These vulnerabilities are: CVE-2012-4681, CVE-2012-1682, CVE-2012-3136, and CVE-2012-0547.  These vulnerabilities are not applicable to standalone Java desktop applications or Java running on servers, i.e. these vulnerabilities do not affect any Oracle server based software. Vulnerabilities CVE-2012-4681, CVE-2012-1682, and CVE-2012-3136 have each received a CVSS Base Score of 10.0.  This score assumes that the affected users have administrative privileges, as is typical in Windows XP.  Vulnerability CVE-20120-0547 has received a CVSS Base Score of 0.0 because this vulnerability is not directly exploitable in typical user deployments, but Oracle has issued a security-in-depth fix for this issue as it can be used in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to significantly increase the overall impact of a successful exploit. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities can provide a malicious attacker the ability to plant discretionary binaries onto the compromised system, e.g. the vulnerabilities can be exploited to install malware, including Trojans, onto the targeted system.  Note that this malware may in some instances be detected by current antivirus signatures upon its installation.  Due to the high severity of these vulnerabilities, Oracle recommends that customers apply this Security Alert as soon as possible.  Furthermore, note that the technical details of these vulnerabilities are widely available on the Internet and Oracle has received external reports that these vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild.    Developers should download the latest release at http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/downloads/index.html   Java users should download the latest release of JRE at http://java.com, and of course   Windows users can take advantage of the Java Automatic Update to get the latest release. For more information: The Advisory for Security Alert CVE-2012-4681 is located at http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alert-cve-2012-4681-1835715.html  Users can verify that they’re running the most recent version of Java by visiting: http://java.com/en/download/installed.jsp    Instructions on removing older (and less secure) versions of Java can be found at http://java.com/en/download/faq/remove_olderversions.xml   

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  • How to set up an rsync backup to Ubuntu securely?

    - by ws_e_c421
    I have been following various other tutorials and blog posts on setting up a Ubuntu machine as a backup "server" (I'll call it a server, but it's just running Ubuntu desktop) that I push new files to with rsync. Right now, I am able to connect to the server from my laptop using rsync and ssh with an RSA key that I created and no password prompt when my laptop is connected to my home router that the server is also connected to. I would like to be able to send files from my laptop when I am away from home. Some of the tutorials I have looked at had some brief suggestions about security, but they didn't focus on them. What do I need to do to let my laptop with send files to the server without making it too easy for someone else to hack into the server? Here is what I have done so far: Ran ssh-keygen and ssh-copy-id to create a key pair for my laptop and server. Created a script on the server to write its public ip address to a file, encrypt the file, and upload to an ftp server I have access to (I know I could sign up for a free dynamic DNS account for this part, but since I have the ftp account and don't really need to make the ip publicly accessible I thought this might be better). Here are the things I have seen suggested: Port forwarding: I know I need to assign the server a fixed ip address on the router and then tell the router to forward a port or ports to it. Should I just use port 22 or choose a random port and use that? Turn on the firewall (ufw). Will this do anything, or will my router already block everything except the port I want? Run fail2ban. Are all of those things worth doing? Should I do anything else? Could I set up the server to allow connections with the RSA key only (and not with a password), or will fail2ban provide enough protection against malicious connection attempts? Is it possible to limit the kinds of connections the server allows (e.g. only ssh)? I hope this isn't too many questions. I am pretty new to Ubuntu (but use the shell and bash scripts on OSX). I don't need to have the absolute most secure set up. I'd like something that is reasonably secure without being so complicated that it could easily break in a way that would be hard for me to fix.

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  • Install a web certificate on an Android device

    - by martani_net
    To gain access to WIFI at university I have to login with my user/pass credentials. The certificate of their website (the local home page that asks for the credentials) is not recognized as a trusted certificate, so we install it separately on our computers. The problem is that I don't take my laptop with me often to university, so I usually want to connect using my HTC Magic, but I have no clue on how to install the certificate separately on Android, it is always rejected. [Edit2] : this is what is stated in their website Need for installation of official certificates CyberTrust validated by the CRU (http://www.cru.fr/wiki/scs/) The certificates contain information certified to generate encryption keys for data exchange, called "sensitive" as the password of a user. By connecting to CanalIP-UPMC, for example, the user must validate the identity of the server accepting the certificate appears on the screen in a "popup window". In reality, the user is unable to validate a certificate knowing, because a simple visual check of the license is impossible. Therefore, the certificates of the certification authority (CRU-Cybertrust Educationnal-ca.ca Cybertrust and-global-root-ca.ca) must be installed prior to the browser for the validity of the certificate server can be controlled automatically. Before you connect to the network-UPMC CanalIP you must register in your browser through the certification authority Cybertrust-Educationnal-ca.ca Download the Cybertrust-Educationnal-ca.ca, depending on your browser and select the link below : With Internet Explorer, click on the link following. With Firefox, click on the link following. With Safari, click the link following. If this procedure is not respected, a real risk is incurred by the user: that of being robbed password LDAP directory UPMC. A malicious server may in fact try very easily attack type "man-in-the-middle" by posing as the legitimate server at UPMC. The theft of a password allows the attacker to steal an identity for transactions over the Internet can engage the responsibility of the user trapped ... This is their website : http://www.canalip.upmc.fr/doc/Default.htm (in French, Google-translate it :)) Anyone knows how to install a web certificate on Android?

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  • Stange stream of HTTP GET requests in apache logs, from amazon ec2 instances

    - by Alexandre Boeglin
    I just had a look at my apache logs, and I see a lot of very similar requests: GET / HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: curl/7.24.0 (i386-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.24.0 \ NSS/3.13.5.0 zlib/1.2.5 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.2.2 Host: [my_domain].org Accept: */* there's a steady stream of those, about 2 or 3 per minute; they all request the same domain and resource (there are slight variations in user agent version numbers); they come form a lot of different IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, in blocs that belong to amazon ec2 (in Singapore, Japan, Ireland and the USA). I tried to look for an explanation online, or even just similar stories, but couldn't find any. Has anyone got a clue as to what this is? It doesn't look malicious per say, but it's just annoying me, and I couldn't find any more information about it. I first suspected it could be a bot checking if my server is still up, but: I don't remember subscribing to such a service; why would it need to check my site twice every minute; why doesn't it use a clearly identifying fqdn. Or, should I send this question to amazon, via their abuse contact? Thanks!

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  • What is Apache Synapse?

    - by Aren B
    My website keeps getting hit by odd requests with the following user-agent string: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; Synapse) Using our friendly tool Google I was able to determine this is the hallmark calling-card of our friendly neighborhood Apache Synapse. A 'Lightweight ESB (Enterprise Service Bus)'. Now, based on this information I was able to gather, I still have no clue what this tool is used for. All I can tell is that is has something to do with Web-Services, and supports a variety of protocols. The Info page only leads me to conclude it has something to do with proxies, and web-services. The problem I've run into is that while normally I wouldn't care, we're getting hit quite a bit by Russian IPs (not that russian's are bad, but our site is pretty regionally specific), and when they do they're shoving wierd (not xss/malicious at least not yet) values into our query string parameters. Things like &PageNum=-1 or &Brand=25/5/2010 9:04:52 PM. Before I go ahead and block these ips/useragent from our site, I'd like some help understanding just what is going on. Any help would be greatly appreciated :)

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  • How to know if your computer is hit by a dnschanger virus?

    - by kira
    The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is on the final stage of its Operation Ghost Click, which strikes against the menace of the DNSChanger virus and trojan. Infected PCs running the DNSChanger malware at unawares are in the danger of going offline on this coming Monday (July 9) when the FBI plans to pull down the online servers that communicate with the virus on host computers. After gaining access to a host PC, the DNSChanger virus tries to modify the DNS (Domain Name Server) settings, which are essential for Internet access, to send traffic to malicious servers. These poisoned web addresses in turn point traffic generated through infected PCs to fake or unsafe websites, most of them running online scams. There are also reports that the DNSChanger virus also acts as a trojan, allowing perpetrators of the hack attack to gain access to infected PCs. Google issued a general advisory for netizens in May earlier this year to detect and remove DNSChanger from infected PCs. According to our report, some 5 lakh PCs were still infected by the DNSChanger virus in May 2012. The first report of the DNSChanger virus and its affiliation with an international group of hackers first came to light towards the end of last year, and the FBI has been chasing them down ever since. The group behind the DNSChanger virus is estimated to have infected close to 4 million PCs around the world in 2011, until the FBI shut them down in November. In the last stage of Operation Ghost Click, the FBI plans to pull the plug and bring down the temporary rogue DNS servers on Monday, July 9, according to an official announcement. As a result, PCs still infected by the DNSChanger virus will be unable to access the Internet. How do you know if your PC has the DNSChanger virus? Don’t worry. Google has explained the hack attack and tools to remove the malware on its official blog. Trend Micro also has extensive step-by-step instructions to check if your Windows PC or Mac is infected by the virus. The article is found at http://www.thinkdigit.com/Internet/Google-warns-users-about-DNSChanger-malware_9665.html How to check if my computer is one of those affected?

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  • Why do I have untrusted certificates for Google, Yahoo, Mozilla and others?

    - by jackweirdy
    In the HTTPS/SSL section of chrome://chrome/settings, I see the following: What does this mean, and is there something wrong? I have a basic understanding of SSL/TLS - I'm not claiming to be completely familiar, but I'm fairly confident I know my way around it - but I don't understand why I have certificates installed on my machine specifically for these sites. From my understanding, I should have the certificates for Certificate Authorities, and any site I visit and use SSL/TLS should have a certificate signed by one of these trusted CAs for me to trust the site. My worry is that if someone has maliciously installed a certificate for these sites on my machine, they could perform a DNS spoofing attack (or a number of other attacks) to hijack my connection to my email account without me knowing, and as they've got the private counterpart to the certificate on my machine, decrypt the communication. NB: I'm also aware that CA certificates aren't just within Chromium and are used system wide as part of libssl - they're stored in /etc/ssl/certs. What I'd like to know is: Is this correct? - The big red boxes make me think no Is this malicious or benign? What can I do to resolve this problem? (If indeed it is a problem) Thanks :)

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  • Getting Server 2008 R2 to ignore all traffic from Internet-facing NIC, leaving it to a VM

    - by Wolvenmoon
    I got in to Server 2008 R2 via Dreamspark and would like to start learning on it. I don't have much option but to put it on a system sitting between the Internet and my home LAN due to electricity bills and the fact that 3 computers in an 11x11 space in 102 degree weather is pretty stygian. Currently I use a ClearOS gateway to manage everything, what I'd like to do is take my server 2008 R2 box, which has two NICs, and drop it at the head of my network. I'd want Server 2008 R2 to ignore all traffic on the external facing NIC and pass it to a virtual ClearOS gateway, and to put all its Internet traffic through its other NIC - which will face the rest of my network and be the default gateway for it. The theory is to keep the potentially vulnerable Server 2008 R2 install as tucked behind a Linux box as possible, without sacrificing too much performance. This is a home network that occasionally hosts dedicated game servers and voice chat servers, so most malicious activity is in the form of drive by non-targeted attacks, however, I don't trust Windows Server because I don't know the OS well enough, yet. So, three questions: How do I do this, am I going to be reasonably more secure doing this than if I just let the Server 2008 R2 rig handle all the network traffic and DHCP (not an option), and should I virtualize the Server 2008 R2 rig instead and if so in what? (Core 2 Duo e6600 w/ 5 gigs usable RAM)

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  • After update, suddenly lost ability to access Windows Server 2008 R2 shares from Windows XP clients

    - by Knute Knudsen
    Today I lost the ability to see my Windows Server 2008 R2 shares from any of my 3 Windows XP machines in my small office. The 5 Win7 machines haven't been affected (they are still able to browse/access the 2008 server), but none of my WinXP machines can access the 2008R2 server anymore. Yesterday (and for the previous year) everything was working fine. I do not have a domain setup. I can still access Win7 shares from WinXP clients. Browsing the server logs, I see that the following update was installed last night: > Installation Ready: The following updates are downloaded and ready for > installation. This computer is currently scheduled to install these > updates on ?Thursday, ?November ?15, ?2012 at 3:00 AM: > - Security Update for Windows Server 2008 R2 x64 Edition (KB2761226) > - Security Update for Microsoft .NET Framework 3.5.1 on Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 for x64-based Systems (KB2729452) > - Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool x64 - November 2012 (KB890830) > - Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer 9 for Windows Server 2008 R2 x64 Edition (KB2761451) It seems likely that something was changed in last night's update, but so far I haven't seen anything on microsoft.com to prove it. I did hear that XP is reaching the end of the road soon. Any ideas?

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  • email dropbox between two mutually untrusted sites

    - by user52874
    I've an interesting problem that I thought was straightforward, but turns out I think I'm whistling down the wrong path. It has to do with (shudder) email. I thought I was done with needing to know about email guts ten years ago; I was wrong. Anyway. Simply put, I need to figure out how to relay outgoing email that is not targetted in our domain from our domain into a 'dropbox' in a DMZ, and the Other Guys can retrieve that email from their side of the DMZ and distribute it accordingly, even out to the public internet if need be. There will be no [un-established] traffic coming back to Our side from anywhere; any attempts to do so are dropped with malicious prejudice. Our side is postfix running on scilinux6.1. The DMZ boxes are redhat5.4. The Other Guys are M$ Exchange. The firewalls are set up such that data can go from Our Side downsec to the DMZ, but not upsec from the DMZ into Our Side. Same for the Other Guys. My first thinking was simply to set up postfix on a box in the DMZ and tell them to set up fetchmail or whatever the M$ equivalent is, but then I started remembering that postfix wants to actively relay email onwards, rather than hold it and wait for someone to 'reach in' and retrieve it. I'm not sure I've explained this well, but hopefully it's clear enough that someone can point me in the right direction. I seem to remember having done this before, but it was a looong time ago. thanks!

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  • Is something infecting my Google searches?

    - by hippietrail
    I starting doing some experimentation toward making a browser userscript for Google searches and when opening the JavaScript console noticed something that strikes me as very fishy: The page at https://www.google.com.au/search?oq=XYZ&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8&q=XYZ displayed insecure content from http://50.116.62.47/js/chromeServerV45.js. The page at about:blank displayed insecure content from http://96.126.107.154/amz/google.php?callback=a&q=XYZ&country=US. (XYZ is a placeholder for whatever the search terms really was.) Is it likely that I've picked something like a drive-by browser infection? I've tried all kinds of searches for these URLs and other keywords but I've had no luck finding anything conclusive about whether they're malicious or what they are: 50.116.62.47 chromeServerV45.js 96.126.107.154 amz/google.php The only extensions I have installed are either widely used or written by myself. But something else is strange and I'm not sure if it's just a coincidence. I updated my Windows Chrome browser today to version 23.0.1271.64 m and now my Extensions tab as well as my settings tab are blank, so I can't try disabling my extesions. Here's some discussion I've been able to find so far but not really understand and make sense of: for 96.126.107.154 : "anomalous-javascript-pt2"

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  • SCM8014 to FVS338

    - by Jack
    I have a SMC8014 Router/Modem that Comcast provided me with their business class service. It was not filtering malicious traffic as aggressively as I had hoped, so I purchased a NetGear ProSafe FVS338, and put this behind the SMC8014, and all my machines behind that. After some brief configuration, all machines can see out to the internet. I also have a single web server, and I have not been able to configure things so that incoming requests can reach it. This is where I need help! I would like to have the FVS339 do NAT, so that I can assign a 192.168 address to my webserver. I've tried everything I know of, and I can't get things going. I set the SMC8014 to have a LAN facing IP of 10.0.0.1, and I assigned the FVS339 a WAN facing IP of 10.0.0.2. I would like to be able to tell the SMC8014 to just forward all traffic to 10.0.0.2, but I haven't had any success. In my (unfortunately limited) understanding, what I probably want here is a static route, but I don't know how to cofigure one, or if this is really what I want. The SMC8014 wants a Destination IP, a Subnet Mask and a Gateway IP. Any help would be appreciated.

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  • Running multiple sites on a LAMP with secure isolation

    - by David C.
    Hi everybody, I have been administering a few LAMP servers with 2-5 sites on each of them. These are basically owned by the same user/client so there are no security issues except from attacks through vulnerable deamons or scripts. I am builing my own server and would like to start hosting multiple sites. My first concern is... ISOLATION. How can I avoid that a c99 script could deface all the virtual hosts? Also, should I prevent that c99 to be able to write/read the other sites' directories? (It is easy to "cat" a config.php from another site and then get into the mysql database) My server is a VPS with 512M burstable to 1G. Among the free hosting managers, is there any small one which works for my VPS? (which maybe is compatible with the security approach I would like to have) Currently I am not planning to host over 10 sites but I would not accept that a client/hacker could navigate into unwanted directories or, worse, run malicious scripts. FTP management would be fine. I don't want to complicate things with SSH isolation. What is the best practice in this case? Basically, what do hosting companies do to sleep well? :) Thanks very much! David

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  • Real benefits of tcp TIME-WAIT and implications in production environment

    - by user64204
    SOME THEORY I've been doing some reading on tcp TIME-WAIT (here and there) and what I read is that it's a value set to 2 x MSL (maximum segment life) which keeps a connection in the "connection table" for a while to guarantee that, "before your allowed to create a connection with the same tuple, all the packets belonging to previous incarnations of that tuple will be dead". Since segments received (apart from SYN under specific circumstances) while a connection is either in TIME-WAIT or no longer existing would be discarded, why not close the connection right away? Q1: Is it because there is less processing involved in dealing with segments from old connections and less processing to create a new connection on the same tuple when in TIME-WAIT (i.e. are there performance benefits)? If the above explanation doesn't stand, the only reason I see the TIME-WAIT being useful would be if a client sends a SYN for a connection before it sends remaining segments for an old connection on the same tuple in which case the receiver would re-open the connection but then get bad segments and and would have to terminate it. Q2: Is this analysis correct? Q3: Are there other benefits to using TIME-WAIT? SOME PRACTICE I've been looking at the munin graphs on a production server that I administrate. Here is one: As you can see there are more connections in TIME-WAIT than ESTABLISHED, around twice as many most of the time, on some occasions four times as many. Q4: Does this have an impact on performance? Q5: If so, is it wise/recommended to reduce the TIME-WAIT value (and what to)? Q6: Is this ratio of TIME-WAIT / ESTABLISHED connections normal? Could this be related to malicious connection attempts?

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  • How to disable irritating Office File Validation security alert?

    - by Rabarberski
    I have Microsoft Office 2007 running on Windows 7. Yesterday I updated Office to the latest service pack, i.e. SP3. This morning, when opening an MS Word document (.doc format, and a document I created myself some months ago) I was greeted with a new dialog box saying: Security Alert - Office File Validation WARNING: Office File Validation detected a problem while trying to open this file. Opening this is probably dangerous, and may allow a malicious user to take over your computer. Contact the sender and ask them to re-save and re-send the file. For more security, verify in person or via the phone that they sent the file. Including two links to some microsoft blabla webpage. Obviously the document is safe as I created it myself some months ago. How to disable this irritating dialog box? (On a sidenote, a rethorical question: Will Microsoft never learn? I consider myself a power user in Word, but I have no clue what could be wrong with my document so that it is considered dangerous. Let alone more basic users of Word. Sigh....)

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  • Creating Routes using the second NIC in the box

    - by Aditya Sehgal
    OS: Linux I need some advice on how to set up the routing table. I have a box with two physical NIC cards eth0 & eth1 with two associated IPs IP1 & IP2 (both of the same subnet). I need to setup a route which will force all messages from IP1 towards IP3 (of the same subnet) to go via IP2. I have a raw socket capture program listening on IP2 (This is not for malicious use). I have set up the routing table as Destination Gateway Genmask Flags Metric Ref Use Iface IP3 IP2 255.255.255.255 UGH 0 0 0 eth1 If I try to specify eth0 while adding the above rule, I get an error "SIOCADDRT: Network is unreachable". I understand from the manpage of route that if the GW specified is a local interface, then that would be use as the outgoing interface. After setting up this rule, if i do a traceroute (-i eth0), the packet goes first to the default gateway and then to IP3. How do I force the packet originating from eth0 towards IP3 to first come to IP2. I cannot make changes to the routing table of the gateway. Please suggest.

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  • Security implications of adding www-data to /etc/sudoers to run php-cgi as a different user

    - by BMiner
    What I really want to do is allow the 'www-data' user to have the ability to launch php-cgi as another user. I just want to make sure that I fully understand the security implications. The server should support a shared hosting environment where various (possibly untrusted) users have chroot'ed FTP access to the server to store their HTML and PHP files. Then, since PHP scripts can be malicious and read/write others' files, I'd like to ensure that each users' PHP scripts run with the same user permissions for that user (instead of running as www-data). Long story short, I have added the following line to my /etc/sudoers file, and I wanted to run it past the community as a sanity check: www-data ALL = (%www-data) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/php-cgi This line should only allow www-data to run a command like this (without a password prompt): sudo -u some_user /usr/bin/php-cgi ...where some_user is a user in the group www-data. What are the security implications of this? This should then allow me to modify my Lighttpd configuration like this: fastcgi.server += ( ".php" => (( "bin-path" => "sudo -u some_user /usr/bin/php-cgi", "socket" => "/tmp/php.socket", "max-procs" => 1, "bin-environment" => ( "PHP_FCGI_CHILDREN" => "4", "PHP_FCGI_MAX_REQUESTS" => "10000" ), "bin-copy-environment" => ( "PATH", "SHELL", "USER" ), "broken-scriptfilename" => "enable" )) ) ...allowing me to spawn new FastCGI server instances for each user.

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  • Does the same lame settings (--alt-preset standard) have differrent names?

    - by erikric
    I've always used windows, and therefore EAC to rip my CDs, but since I've started using Ubuntu more often, I decided to try to rip some albums there. I ended up using k3b (since I found it in the Ubuntu Software center. Tried to install RubyRipper first, but when 'sudo apt-get install ' or UDC fails, a Windows user like me is lost) The real question here is about the settings for the lame encoder. I'm used to just writing --alt-preset standard, and everything works like a charm, but the default in k3b look like this: lame -r --bitwidth 16 --little-endian -s 44.1 -h --tt %t --ta %a --tl %m --ty %y --tc %c --tn %n - %f I assume these are some sensible lame settings, and not a malicious perl script (although it looks like it). It seems to me like some of these ought to be there, and that I can not overwrite the whole thing with my good ol' --alt-preset. So, the question is do I need to replace anything, or is -h the same as old --alt-preset? Is it a difference between '--preset standard' and '--alt-preset standard'? And are those the same as -V 2?

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  • Running Visual Studio 2010 in a University Campus

    - by Woondows
    We have just installed Windows 7 Enterprise x64 in one of our computer labs being used by students for programming. However, when we installed Visual Studio 2010 Ultimate on the machines, we found that to even launch the application (devenv.exe), required the student to enter the administrator password (the usual UAC prompt). Of course, we could just turn off UAC, but that would defeat the purpose of having it in Windows 7. On the other hand, we cannot really give the students local administrator privilege, as we are concerned that they will do some malicious stuff on the computers. Previously when we used Windows XP Professional running Visual Studio 2005, we had no problems. Kindly advise if there's any workaround for this. EDIT: Thanks for the answer guys. Mayank, your links may work for Visual Studio .Net, but it doesn't seem to work for Visual Studio 2010. Ryan, Tieson, I'm intrigued that you guys managed to get it working easily. FYI I don't manage the Group Policies, but I can get them changed if necessary. Any particular GP that I should be looking at? Suggestions to how to troubleshoot further why UAC is being invoked? At least now I know for sure that this is not supposed to be the default behaviour for Visual Studio 2010 so I'm going to keep digging for a solution. Will try running Procmon and see if i can find something..

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  • UAC being turned off every time Windows 7 starts

    - by Mehper C. Palavuzlar
    I have strange problem on my HP laptop. This began to happen recently. Whenever I start my machine, Windows 7 Action Center displays the following warning: You need to restart your computer for UAC to be turned off. I never disable UAC, but obviously some process or virus (I'm not sure, only guessing) causes this. As soon as I get this warning, I head for the UAC settings, and re-enable UAC to dismiss this warning. This is a bothersome situation as I really don't know what causes the problem. I have run a full scan on the computer for any probable virus activity, but TrendMicro OfficeScan said that no viruses have been found. Malwarebytes' Anti-malware could not find any malicious items either. There are no other strange incidents on the machine. Everthing works fine except this bizarre incident. How can I learn what process is trying to turn off UAC? What way should I follow to overcome this problem?

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