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  • How to keep multiple connectionString passwords safe, separate, and easy to deploy?

    - by Funka
    I know there are plenty of questions here already about this topic (I've read through as many as I could find), but I haven't yet been able to figure out how best to satisfy my particular criteria. Here are the goals: The ASP.NET application will run on a few different web servers, including localhost workstations for development. This means encrypting web.config using a machine key is out. The application will decide which connection string to use based on the server name (using a switch statement). For example, "localhost" and "dev.example.com" will use the DevDatabaseConnectionString, "test.example.com" will use the TestDatabaseConnectionString, and "www.example.com" will use the ProdDatabaseConnectionString, for example. Ideally, the exact same executables and web.config should be able to run on any of these environments, without needing to tailor or configure each environment separately every time that we deploy (something that seems like it would be easy to forget/mess up one day during a deployment, which is why we moved away from having just one connectionstring that has to be changed on each target). Deployment is currently accomplished via FTP. We will not have command-line access to the production web server. This means using aspnet_regiis.exe is out. (I could run on localhost, however, if this would still work.) We would prefer to not have to recompile the application whenever a password changes, so using web.config (or db.config or whatever) seems to make the most sense. A developer should not be able to decrypt the production database password. If a developer checks the source code out onto their localhost laptop (which would determine that it should be using the DevDatabaseConnectionString, remember?) and the laptop gets lost or stolen, it should not be possible to get at the other connection strings. Thus, having a single RSA private key to un-encrypt all three passwords cannot be considered. (Contrary to #3 above, it does seem like we'd need to have three separate key files if we went this route; these could be installed once per machine, and should the wrong key file get deployed to the wrong server, the worst that should happen is that the app can't decrypt anything---and not allow the wrong host to access the wrong database!) I know this is probably a subjective question (asking for a "best" way to do something), but given the criteria I've mentioned, I'm hoping that a single best answer will indeed arise. Thank you!

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  • How to lock non-browser clients from submitting a request?

    - by Thomas Kohl
    I want to block non-browser clients from accessing certain pages / successfully making a request. The website content is served to authenticated users. What happens is that our user gives his credentials to our website to 3rd party - it can be another website or a mobile application - that performs requests on his behalf. Say there is a form that the user fills out and sends a message. Can I protect this form so that the server processing the submission can tell whether the user has submitted it directly from the browser or not? I don't want to use CAPTCHA for usability reasons. Can I do it with some javascript?

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  • Prevent Cross-site request forgery - Never Rely on The SessionID Sent to Your Server in The Cookie H

    - by Yan Cheng CHEOK
    I am reading the tutorial at http://code.google.com/p/google-web-toolkit-incubator/wiki/LoginSecurityFAQ It states Remember - you must never rely on the sessionID sent to your server in the cookie header ; look only at the sessionID that your GWT app sends explicitly in the payload of messages to your server. Is it use to prevent http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery#Example_and_characteristics With this mythology, is it sufficient enough to prevent to above attack?

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  • ASP.NET MVC Authorize by Subdomain

    - by Jimmo
    I have what seems like a common issue with SaaS applications, but have not seen this question on here anywhere. I am using ASP.NET MVC with Forms Authentication. I have implemented a custom membership provider to handle logic, but have one issue (perhaps the issue is in my mental picture of the system). As with many SaaS apps, customers create accounts and use the app in a way that looks like they are the only ones present (they only see their items, users, etc.). In reality, there are generic controllers and views presenting data depending on the customer represented in the URL. When calling something like the MembershipProvider.ValidateUser, I have access to the user's customer affiliation in the User object - what I don't have is the context of the request to compare whether it is a data request for the same customer as the user. As an example, One company called ABC goes to abc.mysite.com Another company called XYZ goes to xyz.mysite.com When an ABC user calls http://abc.mysite.com/product/edit/12 I have an [Authorize] attribute on the Edit method in the ProductController to make sure he is signed in and has sufficient permission to do so. If that same ABC user tried to access http://xyz.mysite.com/product/edit/12 I would not want to validate him in the context of that call. In the ValidateUser of the MembershipProvider, I have the information about the user, but not about the request. I can tell that the user is from ABC, but I cannot tell that the request is for XYZ at that point in the code. How should I resolve this?

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  • Is the Keychain suitable for storing general data, such as strings?

    - by cannyboy
    The Keychain seems to be used a lot for usernames and passwords, but is it a good idea to use it for other sensitive stuff (bank details, ID numbers etc), but with no password? What kind of encryption does the keychain use? The scenario I'm concerned about is a thief acquiring an iPhone (which is screen-locked) and being able to access the file system to get this info. Also, would using the Keychain involve export restrictions due to the use of encryption?

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  • Is a GWT app running on Google App Engine protected from CSRF

    - by gerdemb
    I'm developing a GWT app running on the Google App Engine and wondering if I need to worry about Cross-site request forgery or is that automatically taken care of for me? For every RPC request that requires authentication, I have the following code: public class BookServiceImpl extends RemoteServiceServlet implements BookService { public void deleteInventory(Key<Inventory> inventoryKey) throws NotLoggedInException, InvalidStateException, NotFoundException { DAO dao = new DAO(); // This will throw NotLoggedInException if user is not logged in User user = dao.getCurrentUser(); // Do deletion here } } public final class DAO extends DAOBase { public User getCurrentUser() throws NotLoggedInException { currentUser = UserServiceFactory.getUserService().getCurrentUser(); if(currentUser == null) { throw new NotLoggedInException(); } return currentUser; } I couldn't find any documentation on how the UserService checks authentication. Is it enough to rely on the code above or do I need to to more? I'm a beginner at this, but from what I understand to avoid CSRF attacks some of the strategies are: adding an authentication token in the request payload instead of just checking a cookie checking the HTTP Referer header I can see that I have cookies set from Google with what look like SID values, but I can't tell from the serialized Java objects in the payloads if tokens are being passed or not. I also don't know if the Referer header is being used or not. So, am I worrying about a non-issue? If not, what is the best strategy here? This is a common enough problem, that there must be standard solutions out there...

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  • How can I prevent users from overriding the total cost in a shopping cart, when submitted as a hidde

    - by Gobi
    I'm having serious problems with accepting payments. I'm passing the total amount in a hidden field <input type="hidden" name="checkout-flow-support.merchant-checkout-flow-support.shipping-methods.flat-rate-shipping-1.price" value="129.00"/> Some of the users changed this value to 2 using firebug and submitted the form. Instead of getting $129, we only received $2. I have no idea how to proceed this anyone help me quick .

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  • Password reset by email without a database table

    - by jpatokal
    The normal flow for resetting a user's password by mail is this: Generate a random string and store it in a database table Email string to user User clicks on link containing string String is validated against database; if it matches, user's pw is reset However, maintaining a table and expiring old strings etc seems like a bit of an unnecessary hassle. Are there any obvious flaws in this alternative approach? Generate a MD5 hash of the user's existing password Email hash string to user User clicks on link containing string String is validated by hashing existing pw again; if it matches, user's pw is reset Note that the user's password is already stored in a hashed and salted form, and I'm just hashing it once more to get a unique but repeatable string. And yes, there is one obvious "flaw": the reset link thus generated will not expire until the user changes their password (clicks the link). I don't really see why this would be a problem though -- if the mailbox is compromised, the user is screwed anyway.

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  • Is it inmoral to put a captcha on a login form?

    - by azkotoki
    In a recent project I put a captcha test on a login form, in order to stop possible brute force attacks. The inmediate reaction of other coworkers was a request to remove it, saying that it was innapropiate for that purpose, and that it was quite exotic to see a captcha in that place. I've seen captcha images on signup, contact, password recovery forms, etc. So I personally don't see innapropiate to put a captcha also on a place like that. Well, it obviously burns down usability a little bit, but it's a matter of time and getting used to it. With the lack of a captcha test, one would have to put some sort of blacklist / account locking mechanism, which also has some drawbacks. Is it a good choice for you? Am I getting somewhat captcha-aholic and need some sort of group therapy? Thanks in advance.

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  • Optimal password salt length

    - by Juliusz Gonera
    I tried to find the answer to this question on Stack Overflow without any success. Let's say I store passwords using SHA-1 hash (so it's 160 bits) and let's assume that SHA-1 is enough for my application. How long should be the salt used to generated password's hash? The only answer I found was that there's no point in making it longer than the hash itself (160 bits in this case) which sounds logical, but should I make it that long? E.g. Ubuntu uses 8-byte salt with SHA-512 (I guess), so would 8 bytes be enough for SHA-1 too or maybe it would be too much?

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  • How would I access the Windows Login (Authentication) API from a C++ Service Application?

    - by Gabriel
    Let us imagine for a moment that I have a piece of hardware that can act as an authentication for a user on a given system. I want to write an application in C++ to run as a service, look for this device and if found log the appropriate user in. I believe I have found the API's I would need to use to perform the hardware and service portions of the application but am having a hard time nailing down a way to create a "real" user login. Is this possible? If so where would I look to find resources on accomplishing this? I think of it as being an analog to fingerprint scanner login type devices.

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  • XSS as attack vector even if XSS data not stored?

    - by Klaas van Schelven
    I have a question about XSS Can forms be used as a vector for XSS even if the data is not stored in the database and used at a later point? i.e. in php the code would be this: <form input="text" value="<?= @$_POST['my_field'] ?>" name='my_field'> Showing an alert box (demonstrate that JS can be run) on your own browser is trivial with the code above. But is this exploitable across browsers as well? The only scenario I see is where you trick someone into visiting a certain page, i.e. a combination of CSRF and XSS. "Stored in a database and used at a later point": the scenario I understand about CSS is where you're able to post data to a site that runs JavaScript and is shown on a page in a browser that has greater/different privileges than your own. But, to be clear, this is not wat I'm talking about above.

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  • 2008 Datacenter Word Automation issue

    - by Brad
    We have an application that uses word automation. It works fine under Windows XP, but does not work on our Windows Server 2008 64-bit virtual machine running on VMware ESX unless it is running as the domain administrator. Under any other account (including a local admin), Word starts, uses a lot of CPU for 40 seconds when opening a document, and then just hangs. Our application does not access anything not on the local machine, and this machine is not being used for anything else (not a domain controller, etc). I know others have posted similar issues, with the solution of creating a Desktop folder somewhere under the windows directory. We did this, and it did not solve the problem (Word did not get as far as it did before we did this though). Please don't turn this into a thread about why I am trying to do this, whether I should do this, or whether I need to. For argument sake, I don't need to do this, but understanding what privilege a local admin does not have that is needed to do this is a legitimate concern.

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  • What is a dictionary attack?

    - by Chris
    When we say dictionary attack, we don't really mean a real dictionary, do we? My guess is we mean a hacker's dictionary i.e. rainbow tables, right? My point is we're not talking about someone keying different passwords into the login box, we're talking about someone who has full access to your database (which has hashed passwords, not plain passwords) and this person is reversing the hashes, right?

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  • How to securely pass credit card information between pages in PHP

    - by Alex
    How do you securely pass credit card information between pages in PHP? I am building an ecommerce application and I would like to have the users to go through the checkout like this: Enter Information - Review - Finalize Order Problem is that I am not sure on how to safely pass credit information from when the user inputs them to when I process it (at the Finalize Order step). I heard using sessions is insecure, even with encryption. Any help would be appreciated!

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  • How secure is my website?

    - by Doug
    As a beginning web developer, I try my best to clean up all the user inputs through checks and what not. However, today, I found out my website was hacked (I'll share their website on request) and it really made my wonder how did they do it. I'm in the process of getting my website back together. What should I do to prevent these things? Is there people I should talk to and ask how secure my website is? What can I do to to keep my website safe?

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  • Implementing password hashing/salting algorithm from crackstation.net

    - by Mason240
    I am trying to implement a password hashing/salting algorithm from crackstation.net, but I am unsure how implement it. Storing the password upon user registration seems to be as simple as passing the password into create_hash(). $password = create_hash($_POST['Password']; I'm not following how to validate upon user login. validate_password($password, $good_hash) returns either true or false, and takes $password as parameter, so it seems like a no brainer except for the second parameter $good_hash. Where does this param come from? It is my understanding that password is turned into a hash value every time its used, and that the hash value is what is stored and compared. So why would I have both the $password and $good_hash values? Quick overview of the functions: function create_hash($password){ calls pbkdf2() } function validate_password($password, $good_hash){ calls pbkdf2() calls slow_equals() } function slow_equals($a, $b){ } function pbkdf2($algorithm, $password, $salt, $count, $key_length, $raw_output = false){ } Of course a different, better method for this would also be just as helpful. Thank you

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  • How should I protect against hard link attacks?

    - by Thomas
    I want to append data to a file in /tmp. If the file doesn't exist I want to create it I don't care if someone else owns the file. The data is not secret. I do not want someone to be able to race-condition this into writing somewhere else, or to another file. What is the best way to do this? Here's my thought: fd = open("/tmp/some-benchmark-data.txt", O_APPEND | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW | O_WRONLY, 0644); fstat(fd, &st); if (st.st_nlink != 1) { HARD LINK ATTACK! } What's the right way? Besides not using a world-writable directory.

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