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  • How to customize email FROM header with an email from a different domain ?

    - by user40763
    How can I customize the mail FROM header in our Email Marketing Application , to enable our customers to specify their OWN email ( from their domain ) . Currently the customer specify his own domain and we use it at the Reply-To mail's header. CURRENTLY From: [email protected] Reply-To: customer_email@customer_domain.com Return-Path: [email protected] WHAT WE NEED From: customer_email@customer_domain.com Reply-To: customer_email@customer_domain.com Return-Path: [email protected] We do it this way to avoid getting blacklisted because Mail Servers like Gmail or Hotmail would considers it as a MAIL'S HEADER FORGERY ATTEMPT. But our customers keeps asking us to make the FROM HEADER customizable. Can someone help us ?

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  • Top 25 security issues for developers of web sites

    - by BizTalk Visionary
    Sourced from: CWE This is a brief listing of the Top 25 items, using the general ranking. NOTE: 16 other weaknesses were considered for inclusion in the Top 25, but their general scores were not high enough. They are listed in the On the Cusp focus profile. Rank Score ID Name [1] 346 CWE-79 Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ('Cross-site Scripting') [2] 330 CWE-89 Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') [3] 273 CWE-120 Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow') [4] 261 CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [5] 219 CWE-285 Improper Access Control (Authorization) [6] 202 CWE-807 Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision [7] 197 CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') [8] 194 CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type [9] 188 CWE-78 Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') [10] 188 CWE-311 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data [11] 176 CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials [12] 158 CWE-805 Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value [13] 157 CWE-98 Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP File Inclusion') [14] 156 CWE-129 Improper Validation of Array Index [15] 155 CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions [16] 154 CWE-209 Information Exposure Through an Error Message [17] 154 CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound [18] 153 CWE-131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size [19] 147 CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function [20] 146 CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check [21] 145 CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource [22] 145 CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling [23] 142 CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect') [24] 141 CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm [25] 138 CWE-362 Race Condition Cross-site scripting and SQL injection are the 1-2 punch of security weaknesses in 2010. Even when a software package doesn't primarily run on the web, there's a good chance that it has a web-based management interface or HTML-based output formats that allow cross-site scripting. For data-rich software applications, SQL injection is the means to steal the keys to the kingdom. The classic buffer overflow comes in third, while more complex buffer overflow variants are sprinkled in the rest of the Top 25.

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  • Does Firefox Phishing Protection / Safebrowsing have any privacy implications?

    - by Nowo
    The current google results are outdated. What is the current status? I was on www.mozilla.org/en-US/legal/privacy/firefox.html and saw "Protection Against Suspected Forgery and Attack Sites Features". Can you translate please more to human speak? First they download a list and compare local... Ok... Here it gets messy "If there is a match, Firefox will check with its third party provider to ensure that the website is still on the blacklist. The information sent between Firefox and its third party provider(s) are hashed URLs. In fact, multiple hashed URLs are sent with the real hash so that the third party provider(s) will not know what site you are visiting." - If that hash were send to mozilla, they would knew which site were accessed? "In order to safeguard your privacy, Firefox will not transmit the complete URL of web pages that you visit to anyone other than Mozilla and its service providers." - In other words, Mozilla and its service providers get all complete URLs (of sites, which were in blacklist)? "While it is possible that a third party service provider may determine the actual URL from the hashed URL sent, Mozilla’s policy is to require [...]" - Privacy is depends on policy rather than technology?

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  • ASP.NET MVC Validation of ViewState MAC failed

    - by Kevin Pang
    After publishing a new build of my ASP.NET MVC web application, I often see this exception thrown when browsing to the site: System.Web.Mvc.HttpAntiForgeryException: A required anti-forgery token was not supplied or was invalid. --- System.Web.HttpException: Validation of viewstate MAC failed. If this application is hosted by a Web Farm or cluster, ensure that configuration specifies the same validationKey and validation algorithm. AutoGenerate cannot be used in a cluster. --- System.Web.UI.ViewStateException: Invalid viewstate. This exception will continue to occur on each page I visit in my web application until I close out of Firefox. After reopening Firefox, the site works perfectly. Any idea what's going on? Additional notes: I am not using any ASP.NET web controls (there are no instances of runat="server" in my application) If I take out the <%= Html.AntiForgeryToken % from my pages, this problem seems to go away

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  • GWT RPC - Does it do enough to protect against CSRF ?

    - by sri
    GWT's RPC mechanism does the following things on every HTTP Request - Sets two custom request headers - X-GWT-Permutation and X-GWT-Module-Base Sets the content-type as text/x-gwt-rpc; charset=utf-8 The HTTP request is always a POST, and on server side GET methods throw an exception (method not supported). Also, if these headers are not set or have the wrong value, the server fails processing with an exception "possibly CSRF?" or something to that effect. Question is : Is this sufficient to prevent CSRF? Is there a way to set custom headers and change content type in a pure cross-site request forgery method?

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  • How to catch HttpAntiForgeryException in ASP.NET MVC

    - by megalonychidae
    I'm using the AntiForgeryToken in my ASP.NET MVC forms. If I deactivate cookies in my browser and send the from, I'd get following error message: A required anti-forgery token was not supplied or was invalid. How can I prevent this message from showing? I would prefer redirecting the user to another page. I've activated customErrors and included this HandleError in my controller: [HandleError(ExceptionType=typeof(HttpAntiForgeryException), View="Index")] public class MyController : Controller { ... } The HandleError is ignored. Has anyone got a solution?

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  • How can i supply an AntiForgeryToken when posting JSON data using $.ajax ?

    - by HerbalMart
    I am using the code as below of this post: First i will an fill array variable with the correct values for the controller action. Using the code below i think it should be very straigtforward by just adding the following line to the javascript: data["__RequestVerificationToken"] = $('[name=__RequestVerificationToken]').val(); The <%= Html.AntiForgeryToken() %> is at his right place and the action has a [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] But my controller action keeps saying: "Invalid forgery token" What am i doing wrong here? Code data["fiscalyear"] = fiscalyear; data["subgeography"] = $(list).parent().find('input[name=subGeography]').val(); data["territories"] = new Array(); $(items).each(function() { data["territories"].push($(this).find('input[name=territory]').val()); }); if (url != null) { $.ajax( { dataType: 'JSON', contentType: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', url: url, type: 'POST', context: document.body, data: JSON.stringify(data), success: function() { refresh(); } }); }

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  • What XSS/CSRF attacks (if any) to be aware of when allowing video embeds?

    - by fireeyedboy
    I've been assigned a project for a website where users will be allowed to upload video's (using a YouTube API) but more importantly (for me) they will also be allowed to submit video embed codes (from numerous video sites, YouTube, Vimeo, etc. etc.). Having no experience with allowing users to embed video: How can I best protect against cross site scripting and/or cross site request forgery attacks specifically for video embedding? What are some of the common pitfalls to watch for? At a minumum I would think to strip all tags except <object> and <embed>. But I have a feeling this will not be enough, will it? If it is of importance, the environment will be: PHP/Zend Framework MySQL Bonuspoints: Is there a common minimum golden rule/code template for video embed codes that are valid across all video sites that I could use to filter the input?

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  • How do you protect against specific CSRF attack

    - by Saif Bechan
    I am going trough the OWASP Top 10 list of 2007 and 2010. I stumbled upon Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) this is often called session riding as you let the user usee his session to fulfill your wishes. Now a solution to this is adding a token to every url and this token is checked for every link. For example to vote on product x the url would be: 'http://mysite.com?token=HVBKJNKL' This looks like a solid solution to because a hacker can not guess the token. But I was thinking of the following scenario(I do not know if it is possible): You create a website with an hidden iFrame or div. After that you can load my website in it either using just the normal iFrame or ajax. When you have my website loaded hidden inside your website, and the user has a stored session, the following can be done. You can retrieve the token from the URLS, and still do all the actions needed. Is it possible to do something like this. Or is it not possible to do this cross domain.

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  • ActiveRecordStore ruby

    - by Andy
    I've had two previous questions about active record store that all came down to the same thing. Here's what I want: I want to access the session at any time and see who is online right now and access their session variable from anywhere. I need this because: Users are separated into groups. If one person logs in he receives an api token that I receive from some third party site. If a person from the same group logs in he needs to have that same api token in his session. I cannot regenerate new api tokens on a per call basis. I think active record store is a perfect solution for me, however, I have a problem implementing it!!! InvalidAuthenticityToken keeps getting thrown because I used to use the default cookie store. Thus I made this script to delete cookies but it does not seem to work: In application controller after_filter :delete_cookie def delete_cookie puts "deleting cookies" cookies.to_hash.each_pair do |k, v| puts k cookies.delete(k) end end The only other response I got was to remove protect from forgery. http://stackoverflow.com/questions/2941664/activerecordstore-invalidauthenticitytoken

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  • Am I under risk of CSRF attacks in a POST form that doesn't require the user to be logged in?

    - by Monika Sulik
    I'm probably being a total noob here, but I'm still uncertain about what a CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery) attack is exactly. So lets look at three situations... 1) I have a POST form that I use to edit data on my site. I want this data to be edited only by users that are logged in. 2) I have a site, which can be used by both users who are logged in as well as guests. Parts of the site are for logged in users only, but there are also POST forms that can be used by all users - anonymous and not (for example a standard contact form). Should the contact form be safeguarded against CSRF attacks? 3) I have a site which doesn't have an authentication system at all (well, perhaps that's unrealistic, so lets say it has an admin site which is separate from the rest of it and the admin part is properly safeguarded). The main part of the site is only used by anonymous users. Do the POST forms on it need to be safeguarded? In the case of 1) the answer is clearly yes. But in the case of 2 and 3 I don't know (and is the difference between 2 and 3 even significant?).

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  • Is a GWT app running on Google App Engine protected from CSRF

    - by gerdemb
    I'm developing a GWT app running on the Google App Engine and wondering if I need to worry about Cross-site request forgery or is that automatically taken care of for me? For every RPC request that requires authentication, I have the following code: public class BookServiceImpl extends RemoteServiceServlet implements BookService { public void deleteInventory(Key<Inventory> inventoryKey) throws NotLoggedInException, InvalidStateException, NotFoundException { DAO dao = new DAO(); // This will throw NotLoggedInException if user is not logged in User user = dao.getCurrentUser(); // Do deletion here } } public final class DAO extends DAOBase { public User getCurrentUser() throws NotLoggedInException { currentUser = UserServiceFactory.getUserService().getCurrentUser(); if(currentUser == null) { throw new NotLoggedInException(); } return currentUser; } I couldn't find any documentation on how the UserService checks authentication. Is it enough to rely on the code above or do I need to to more? I'm a beginner at this, but from what I understand to avoid CSRF attacks some of the strategies are: adding an authentication token in the request payload instead of just checking a cookie checking the HTTP Referer header I can see that I have cookies set from Google with what look like SID values, but I can't tell from the serialized Java objects in the payloads if tokens are being passed or not. I also don't know if the Referer header is being used or not. So, am I worrying about a non-issue? If not, what is the best strategy here? This is a common enough problem, that there must be standard solutions out there...

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  • Rails - Seeking a Dry authorization method compatible with various nested resources

    - by adam
    Consensus is you shouldn't nest resources deeper than 1 level. So if I have 3 models like this (below is just a hypothetical situation) User has_many Houses has_many Tenants and to abide by the above i do map.resources :users, :has_many => :houses map.resorces :houses, :has_many => :tenants Now I want the user to be able edit both their houses and their tenants details but I want to prevent them from trying to edit another users houses and tenants by forging the user_id part of the urls. So I create a before_filter like this def prevent_user_acting_as_other_user if User.find_by_id(params[:user_id]) != current_user() @current_user_session.destroy flash[:error] = "Stop screwing around wiseguy" redirect_to login_url() return end end for houses that's easy because the user_id is passed via edit_user_house_path(@user, @house) but in the tenents case tenant house_tenent_path(@house) no user id is passed. But I can get the user id by doing @house.user.id but then id have to change the code above to this. def prevent_user_acting_as_other_user if params[:user_id] @user = User.find(params[:user_id] elsif params[:house_id] @user = House.find(params[:house_id]).user end if @user != current_user() #kick em out end end It does the job, but I'm wondering if there is a more elegant way. Every time I add a new resource that needs protecting from user forgery Ill have to keep adding conditionals. I don't think there will be many cases but would like to know a better approach if one exists.

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  • How can I secure my $_GETs in PHP?

    - by ggfan
    My profile.php displays all the user's postings,comments,pictures. If the user wants to delete, it sends the posting's id to the remove.php so it's like remove.php?action=removeposting&posting_id=2. If they want to remove a picture, it's remove.php?action=removepicture&picture_id=1. Using the get data, I do a query to the database to display the info they want to delete and if they want to delete it, they click "yes". So the data is deleted via $POST NOT $GET to prevent cross-site request forgery. My question is how do I make sure the GETs are not some javascript code, sql injection that will mess me up. here is my remove.php //how do I make $action safe? //should I use mysqli_real_escape_string? //use strip_tags()? $action=trim($_GET['action']); if (($action != 'removeposting') && ($action != 'removefriend') && ($action != 'removecomment')) { echo "please don't change the action. go back and refresh"; header("Location: index.php"); exit(); } if ($action == 'removeposting') { //get the info and display it in a form. if user clicks "yes", deletes } if ($action =='removepicture') { //remove pic } I know I can't be 100% safe, but what are some common defenses I can use. EDIT Do this to prevent xss $action=trim($_GET['action']); htmlspecialchars(strip_tags($action)); Then when I am 'recalling' the data back via POST, I would use $posting_id = mysqli_real_escape_string($dbc, trim($_POST['posting_id']));

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  • How do I solve an AntiForgeryToken exception that occurs after an iisreset in my ASP.Net MVC app?

    - by Colin Newell
    I’m having problems with the AntiForgeryToken in ASP.Net MVC. If I do an iisreset on my web server and a user continues with their session they get bounced to a login page. Not terrible but then the AntiForgery token blows up and the only way to get going again is to blow away the cookie on the browser. With the beta version of version 1 it used to go wrong when reading the cookie back in for me so I used to scrub it before asking for a validation token but that was fixed when it was released. For now I think I’ll roll back to my code that fixed the beta problem but I can’t help but think I’m missing something. Is there a simpler solution, heck should I just drop their helper and create a new one from scratch? I get the feeling that a lot of the problem is the fact that it’s tied so deeply into the old ASP.Net pipeline and is trying to kludge it into doing something it wasn’t really designed to do. I had a look in the source code for the ASP.Net MVC 2 RC and it doesn't look like the code has changed much so while I haven't tried it, I don't think there are any answers there. Here is the relevant part of the stack trace of the exception. Edit: I just realised I didn't mention that this is just trying to insert the token on the GET request. This isn't the validation that occurs when you do a POST kicking off. System.Web.Mvc.HttpAntiForgeryException: A required anti-forgery token was not supplied or was invalid. ---> System.Web.HttpException: Validation of viewstate MAC failed. If this application is hosted by a Web Farm or cluster, ensure that <machineKey> configuration specifies the same validationKey and validation algorithm. AutoGenerate cannot be used in a cluster. ---> System.Web.UI.ViewStateException: Invalid viewstate. Client IP: 127.0.0.1 Port: 4991 User-Agent: scrubbed ViewState: scrubbed Referer: blah Path: /oursite/Account/Login ---> System.Security.Cryptography.CryptographicException: Padding is invalid and cannot be removed. at System.Security.Cryptography.RijndaelManagedTransform.DecryptData(Byte[] inputBuffer, Int32 inputOffset, Int32 inputCount, Byte[]& outputBuffer, Int32 outputOffset, PaddingMode paddingMode, Boolean fLast) at System.Security.Cryptography.RijndaelManagedTransform.TransformFinalBlock(Byte[] inputBuffer, Int32 inputOffset, Int32 inputCount) at System.Security.Cryptography.CryptoStream.FlushFinalBlock() at System.Web.Configuration.MachineKeySection.EncryptOrDecryptData(Boolean fEncrypt, Byte[] buf, Byte[] modifier, Int32 start, Int32 length, IVType ivType, Boolean useValidationSymAlgo) at System.Web.UI.ObjectStateFormatter.Deserialize(String inputString) --- End of inner exception stack trace --- --- End of inner exception stack trace --- at System.Web.UI.ViewStateException.ThrowError(Exception inner, String persistedState, String errorPageMessage, Boolean macValidationError) at System.Web.UI.ViewStateException.ThrowMacValidationError(Exception inner, String persistedState) at System.Web.UI.ObjectStateFormatter.Deserialize(String inputString) at System.Web.UI.ObjectStateFormatter.System.Web.UI.IStateFormatter.Deserialize(String serializedState) at System.Web.Mvc.AntiForgeryDataSerializer.Deserialize(String serializedToken) --- End of inner exception stack trace --- at System.Web.Mvc.AntiForgeryDataSerializer.Deserialize(String serializedToken) at System.Web.Mvc.HtmlHelper.GetAntiForgeryTokenAndSetCookie(String salt, String domain, String path) at System.Web.Mvc.HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken(String salt, String domain, String path)

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  • MVC 2 AntiForgeryToken - Why symmetric encryption + IPrinciple?

    - by Brad R
    We recently updated our solution to MVC 2, and this has updated the way that the AntiForgeryToken works. Unfortunately this does not fit with our AJAX framework any more. The problem is that MVC 2 now uses symmetric encryption to encode some properties about the user, including the user's Name property (from IPrincipal). We are able to securely register a new user using AJAX, after which subsequent AJAX calls will be invalid as the anti forgery token will change when the user has been granted a new principal. There are also other cases when this may happen, such as a user updating their name etc. My main question is why does MVC 2 even bother using symmetric encryption? Any then why does it care about the user name property on the principal? If my understanding is correct then any random shared secret will do. The basic principle is that the user will be sent a cookie with some specific data (HttpOnly!). This cookie is then required to match a form variable sent back with each request that may have side effects (POST's usually). Since this is only meant to protect from cross site attacks it is easy to craft up a response that would easily pass the test, but only if you had full access to the cookie. Since a cross site attacker is not going to have access to your user cookies you are protected. By using symmetric encryption, what is the advantage in checking the contents of the cookie? That is, if I already have sent an HttpOnly cookie the attacker cannot override it (unless a browser has a major security issue), so why do I then need to check it again? After having a think about it it appears to be one of those 'added layer of security' cases - but if your first line of defence has fallen (HttpOnly) then the attacker is going to get past the second layer anyway as they have full access to the users cookie collection, and could just impersonate them directly, instead of using an indirect XSS/CSRF attack. Of course I could be missing a major issue, but I haven't found it yet. If there are some obvious or subtle issues at play here then I would like to be aware of them.

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  • Securing an ASP.NET MVC 2 Application

    - by rajbk
    This post attempts to look at some of the methods that can be used to secure an ASP.NET MVC 2 Application called Northwind Traders Human Resources.  The sample code for the project is attached at the bottom of this post. We are going to use a slightly modified Northwind database. The screen capture from SQL server management studio shows the change. I added a new column called Salary, inserted some random salaries for the employees and then turned off AllowNulls.   The reporting relationship for Northwind Employees is shown below.   The requirements for our application are as follows: Employees can see their LastName, FirstName, Title, Address and Salary Employees are allowed to edit only their Address information Employees can see the LastName, FirstName, Title, Address and Salary of their immediate reports Employees cannot see records of non immediate reports.  Employees are allowed to edit only the Salary and Title information of their immediate reports. Employees are not allowed to edit the Address of an immediate report Employees should be authenticated into the system. Employees by default get the “Employee” role. If a user has direct reports, they will also get assigned a “Manager” role. We use a very basic empId/pwd scheme of EmployeeID (1-9) and password test$1. You should never do this in an actual application. The application should protect from Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF). For example, Michael could trick Steven, who is already logged on to the HR website, to load a page which contains a malicious request. where without Steven’s knowledge, a form on the site posts information back to the Northwind HR website using Steven’s credentials. Michael could use this technique to give himself a raise :-) UI Notes The layout of our app looks like so: When Nancy (EmpID 1) signs on, she sees the default page with her details and is allowed to edit her address. If Nancy attempts to view the record of employee Andrew who has an employeeID of 2 (Employees/Edit/2), she will get a “Not Authorized” error page. When Andrew (EmpID 2) signs on, he can edit the address field of his record and change the title and salary of employees that directly report to him. Implementation Notes All controllers inherit from a BaseController. The BaseController currently only has error handling code. When a user signs on, we check to see if they are in a Manager role. We then create a FormsAuthenticationTicket, encrypt it (including the roles that the employee belongs to) and add it to a cookie. private void SetAuthenticationCookie(int employeeID, List<string> roles) { HttpCookiesSection cookieSection = (HttpCookiesSection) ConfigurationManager.GetSection("system.web/httpCookies"); AuthenticationSection authenticationSection = (AuthenticationSection) ConfigurationManager.GetSection("system.web/authentication"); FormsAuthenticationTicket authTicket = new FormsAuthenticationTicket( 1, employeeID.ToString(), DateTime.Now, DateTime.Now.AddMinutes(authenticationSection.Forms.Timeout.TotalMinutes), false, string.Join("|", roles.ToArray())); String encryptedTicket = FormsAuthentication.Encrypt(authTicket); HttpCookie authCookie = new HttpCookie(FormsAuthentication.FormsCookieName, encryptedTicket); if (cookieSection.RequireSSL || authenticationSection.Forms.RequireSSL) { authCookie.Secure = true; } HttpContext.Current.Response.Cookies.Add(authCookie); } We read this cookie back in Global.asax and set the Context.User to be a new GenericPrincipal with the roles we assigned earlier. protected void Application_AuthenticateRequest(Object sender, EventArgs e){ if (Context.User != null) { string cookieName = FormsAuthentication.FormsCookieName; HttpCookie authCookie = Context.Request.Cookies[cookieName]; if (authCookie == null) return; FormsAuthenticationTicket authTicket = FormsAuthentication.Decrypt(authCookie.Value); string[] roles = authTicket.UserData.Split(new char[] { '|' }); FormsIdentity fi = (FormsIdentity)(Context.User.Identity); Context.User = new System.Security.Principal.GenericPrincipal(fi, roles); }} We ensure that a user has permissions to view a record by creating a custom attribute AuthorizeToViewID that inherits from ActionFilterAttribute. public class AuthorizeToViewIDAttribute : ActionFilterAttribute{ IEmployeeRepository employeeRepository = new EmployeeRepository(); public override void OnActionExecuting(ActionExecutingContext filterContext) { if (filterContext.ActionParameters.ContainsKey("id") && filterContext.ActionParameters["id"] != null) { if (employeeRepository.IsAuthorizedToView((int)filterContext.ActionParameters["id"])) { return; } } throw new UnauthorizedAccessException("The record does not exist or you do not have permission to access it"); }} We add the AuthorizeToView attribute to any Action method that requires authorization. [HttpPost][Authorize(Order = 1)]//To prevent CSRF[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Globals.EditSalt, Order = 2)]//See AuthorizeToViewIDAttribute class[AuthorizeToViewID(Order = 3)] [ActionName("Edit")]public ActionResult Update(int id){ var employeeToEdit = employeeRepository.GetEmployee(id); if (employeeToEdit != null) { //Employees can edit only their address //A manager can edit the title and salary of their subordinate string[] whiteList = (employeeToEdit.IsSubordinate) ? new string[] { "Title", "Salary" } : new string[] { "Address" }; if (TryUpdateModel(employeeToEdit, whiteList)) { employeeRepository.Save(employeeToEdit); return RedirectToAction("Details", new { id = id }); } else { ModelState.AddModelError("", "Please correct the following errors."); } } return View(employeeToEdit);} The Authorize attribute is added to ensure that only authorized users can execute that Action. We use the TryUpdateModel with a white list to ensure that (a) an employee is able to edit only their Address and (b) that a manager is able to edit only the Title and Salary of a subordinate. This works in conjunction with the AuthorizeToViewIDAttribute. The ValidateAntiForgeryToken attribute is added (with a salt) to avoid CSRF. The Order on the attributes specify the order in which the attributes are executed. The Edit View uses the AntiForgeryToken helper to render the hidden token: ......<% using (Html.BeginForm()) {%><%=Html.AntiForgeryToken(NorthwindHR.Models.Globals.EditSalt)%><%= Html.ValidationSummary(true, "Please correct the errors and try again.") %><div class="editor-label"> <%= Html.LabelFor(model => model.LastName) %></div><div class="editor-field">...... The application uses View specific models for ease of model binding. public class EmployeeViewModel{ public int EmployeeID; [Required] [DisplayName("Last Name")] public string LastName { get; set; } [Required] [DisplayName("First Name")] public string FirstName { get; set; } [Required] [DisplayName("Title")] public string Title { get; set; } [Required] [DisplayName("Address")] public string Address { get; set; } [Required] [DisplayName("Salary")] [Range(500, double.MaxValue)] public decimal Salary { get; set; } public bool IsSubordinate { get; set; }} To help with displaying readonly/editable fields, we use a helper method. //Simple extension method to display a TextboxFor or DisplayFor based on the isEditable variablepublic static MvcHtmlString TextBoxOrLabelFor<TModel, TProperty>(this HtmlHelper<TModel> htmlHelper, Expression<Func<TModel, TProperty>> expression, bool isEditable){ if (isEditable) { return htmlHelper.TextBoxFor(expression); } else { return htmlHelper.DisplayFor(expression); }} The helper method is used in the view like so: <%=Html.TextBoxOrLabelFor(model => model.Title, Model.IsSubordinate)%> As mentioned in this post, there is a much easier way to update properties on an object. Download Demo Project VS 2008, ASP.NET MVC 2 RTM Remember to change the connectionString to point to your Northwind DB NorthwindHR.zip Feedback and bugs are always welcome :-)

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  • Globally Handling Request Validation In ASP.NET MVC

    - by imran_ku07
       Introduction:           Cross Site Scripting(XSS) and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks are one of dangerous attacks on web.  They are among the most famous security issues affecting web applications. OWASP regards XSS is the number one security issue on the Web. Both ASP.NET Web Forms and ASP.NET MVC paid very much attention to make applications build with ASP.NET as secure as possible. So by default they will throw an exception 'A potentially dangerous XXX value was detected from the client', when they see, < followed by an exclamation(like <!) or < followed by the letters a through z(like <s) or & followed by a pound sign(like &#123) as a part of querystring, posted form and cookie collection. This is good for lot of applications. But this is not always the case. Many applications need to allow users to enter html tags, for example applications which uses  Rich Text Editor. You can allow user to enter these tags by just setting validateRequest="false" in your Web.config application configuration file inside <pages> element if you are using Web Form. This will globally disable request validation. But in ASP.NET MVC request handling is different than ASP.NET Web Form. Therefore for disabling request validation globally in ASP.NET MVC you have to put ValidateInputAttribute in your every controller. This become pain full for you if you have hundred of controllers. Therefore in this article i will present a very simple way to handle request validation globally through web.config.   Description:           Before starting how to do this it is worth to see why validateRequest in Page directive and web.config not work in ASP.NET MVC. Actually request handling in ASP.NET Web Form and ASP.NET MVC is different. In Web Form mostly the HttpHandler is the page handler which checks the posted form, query string and cookie collection during the Page ProcessRequest method, while in MVC request validation occur when ActionInvoker calling the action. Just see the stack trace of both framework.   ASP.NET MVC Stack Trace:     System.Web.HttpRequest.ValidateString(String s, String valueName, String collectionName) +8723114   System.Web.HttpRequest.ValidateNameValueCollection(NameValueCollection nvc, String collectionName) +111   System.Web.HttpRequest.get_Form() +129   System.Web.HttpRequestWrapper.get_Form() +11   System.Web.Mvc.ValueProviderDictionary.PopulateDictionary() +145   System.Web.Mvc.ValueProviderDictionary..ctor(ControllerContext controllerContext) +74   System.Web.Mvc.ControllerBase.get_ValueProvider() +31   System.Web.Mvc.ControllerActionInvoker.GetParameterValue(ControllerContext controllerContext, ParameterDescriptor parameterDescriptor) +53   System.Web.Mvc.ControllerActionInvoker.GetParameterValues(ControllerContext controllerContext, ActionDescriptor actionDescriptor) +109   System.Web.Mvc.ControllerActionInvoker.InvokeAction(ControllerContext controllerContext, String actionName) +399   System.Web.Mvc.Controller.ExecuteCore() +126   System.Web.Mvc.ControllerBase.Execute(RequestContext requestContext) +27   ASP.NET Web Form Stack Trace:    System.Web.HttpRequest.ValidateString(String s, String valueName, String collectionName) +3213202   System.Web.HttpRequest.ValidateNameValueCollection(NameValueCollection nvc, String collectionName) +108   System.Web.HttpRequest.get_QueryString() +119   System.Web.UI.Page.GetCollectionBasedOnMethod(Boolean dontReturnNull) +2022776   System.Web.UI.Page.DeterminePostBackMode() +60   System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequestMain(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint) +6953   System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequest(Boolean includeStagesBeforeAsyncPoint, Boolean includeStagesAfterAsyncPoint) +154   System.Web.UI.Page.ProcessRequest() +86                        Since the first responder of request in ASP.NET MVC is the controller action therefore it will check the posted values during calling the action. That's why web.config's requestValidate not work in ASP.NET MVC.            So let's see how to handle this globally in ASP.NET MVC. First of all you need to add an appSettings in web.config. <appSettings>    <add key="validateRequest" value="true"/>  </appSettings>              I am using the same key used in disable request validation in Web Form. Next just create a new ControllerFactory by derving the class from DefaultControllerFactory.     public class MyAppControllerFactory : DefaultControllerFactory    {        protected override IController GetControllerInstance(Type controllerType)        {            var controller = base.GetControllerInstance(controllerType);            string validateRequest=System.Configuration.ConfigurationManager.AppSettings["validateRequest"];            bool b;            if (validateRequest != null && bool.TryParse(validateRequest,out b))                ((ControllerBase)controller).ValidateRequest = bool.Parse(validateRequest);            return controller;        }    }                         Next just register your controller factory in global.asax.        protected void Application_Start()        {            //............................................................................................            ControllerBuilder.Current.SetControllerFactory(new MyAppControllerFactory());        }              This will prevent the above exception to occur in the context of ASP.NET MVC. But if you are using the Default WebFormViewEngine then you need also to set validateRequest="false" in your web.config file inside <pages> element            Now when you run your application you see the effect of validateRequest appsetting. One thing also note that the ValidateInputAttribute placed inside action or controller will always override this setting.    Summary:          Request validation is great security feature in ASP.NET but some times there is a need to disable this entirely. So in this article i just showed you how to disable this globally in ASP.NET MVC. I also explained the difference between request validation in Web Form and ASP.NET MVC. Hopefully you will enjoy this.

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