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  • Run a script as root from apache

    - by Lord Loh.
    I would like to update my hosts file and restart dnsmasq from a web interface (php/apache2). I tried playing around with suid bits (the demonstaration). I have both apache and dnsmasq running on an EC2 instance. I understand that Linux ignores the setuid bit on text scripts, but works on binary files. (Have I got something wrong?). I added exec("whoami"); to the example C program in Wikipedia. Although the effective UID of the C program is 0, whoami does not return root :-( I would thoroughly like to avoid echo password | sudo service dnsmasq restart or adding apache to the sudoers without password! Is there a way out? How does webmin do such things?

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  • Is there good FAT driver for FUSE? (Lightweight, not mountlo)

    - by Vi.
    FUSE filesystem list show some FuseFat and FatFuse. Both are old, FatFuse is read-only , FuseFat is non-buildable and probably depends on glib. Now I'm using mountlo for the task (mounting USB drives in generic way without root access or suid things (except of fusermount itself)), but it looks too big for such task. Using FUSE to mount external storage devices is good both for security and for flexibility reason: the kernel sees only block reads and writes while actual code that deals with filesystem details runs with user privileges, allowing user to use custom filesystems and preventing from kernel filesystem exploits. Is there good vfat FUSE driver?

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  • After restoring a SQL Server database from another server - get login fails

    - by Renso
    Issue: After you have restored a sql server database from another server, lets say from production to a Q/A environment, you get the "Login Fails" message for your service account. Reason: User logon information is stored in the syslogins table in the master database. By changing servers, or by altering this information by rebuilding or restoring an old version of the master database, the information may be different from when the user database dump was created. If logons do not exist for the users, they will receive an error indicating "Login failed" while attempting to log on to the server. If the user logons do exist, but the SUID values (for 6.x) or SID values (for 7.0) in master..syslogins and the sysusers table in the user database differ, the users may have different permissions than expected in the user database. Solution: Links a user entry in the sys.database_principals system catalog view in the current database to a SQL Server login of the same name. If a login with the same name does not exist, one will be created. Examine the result from the Auto_Fix statement to confirm that the correct link is in fact made. Avoid using Auto_Fix in security-sensitive situations. When you use Auto_Fix, you must specify user and password if the login does not already exist, otherwise you must specify user but password will be ignored. login must be NULL. user must be a valid user in the current database. The login cannot have another user mapped to it. execute the following stored procedure, in this example the login user name is "MyUser" exec sp_change_users_login 'Auto_Fix', 'MyUser'   NOTE: sp_change_users_login cannot be used with a SQL Server login created from a Windows principal or with a user created by using CREATE USER WITHOUT LOGIN.

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  • kismet on BCM43227

    - by Uttam Baroi
    I am trying to monitor wireless on Broadcom BCM43227, I used sudo airmon-ng to run the monitoring, i get command not found. I installed kismet, when i run, i get this *uttam@UT:~$ sudo kismet Launching kismet_server: //usr/bin/kismet_server Suid priv-dropping disabled. This may not be secure. No specific sources given to be enabled, all will be enabled. Non-RFMon VAPs will be destroyed on multi-vap interfaces (ie, madwifi-ng) Enabling channel hopping. Enabling channel splitting. NOTICE: Disabling channel hopping, no enabled sources are able to change channel. Source 0 (addme): Opening none source interface none... FATAL: Please configure at least one packet source. Kismet will not function if no packet sources are defined in kismet.conf or on the command line. Please read the README for more information about configuring Kismet. Kismet exiting. Done. uttam@UT:~$* I did check a blog about kismet on Broadcom that says about some binary drivers not allowing to do it... I used iwconfig and it says no extension : what is that well I need to give a hand on air monitoring............ help, how to do it

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  • PECL install fails

    - by James
    Hey! I have browsed every Google result, read all the forum posts about this error, but I cannot solve it. When using PECL install for anything, I always end up getting this error: checking whether the C compiler works... configure: error: cannot run C compiled programs. Everything else succeeds up to that point them bam! I'm using CentOS 4.3, PEAR is the latest stable version, GCC is a stable and recent version. Everything is working as it should, but the C compiler always seems to error. I've tried to make tmp have the right privilages for the operation by temporarily enabling it using: mount -o remount,exec,suid /tmp But that doesn't work. I've literally tried everything that has been suggested by to no avail. Any ideas?

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  • What are the default mount settings for mount / fstab?

    - by John Craick
    What are the default mounting options for a non root partition ? The man entry for mount says ... defaults - use default options: rw, suid, dev, exec, auto, nouser, and async. ... so that might be what we expect to see. But, unless I'm missing something, that's not what happens. I have an ext3 partition labelled "NewHome20G" which is seen as /dev/sdc6 by the system. This we can see from ... root@john-pc1204:~# blkid | grep NewHome20G /dev/sdc6: LABEL="NewHome20G" UUID="d024bad5-906c-46c0-b7d4-812daf2c9628" TYPE="ext3" I have an entry in fstab as follows ... root@john-pc1204:~# cat /etc/fstab | grep NewHome LABEL=NewHome20G /media/NewHome20G ext3 rw,nosuid,nodev,exec,users 0 2 Note the option settings that are specified in that fstab line. Now I look at how the partition is actually mounted after boot up ... root@john-pc1204:~# mount -l | grep sdc6 /dev/sdc6 on /media/NewHome20G type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev) [NewHome20G] ... so, when the filesystem gets mounted the exec & users options I specified seem to have been ignored. Just to be sure, I unmount sdc6, remount it and look at the mount options again ... root@john-pc1204:~# umount /dev/sdc6 root@john-pc1204:~# mount /dev/sdc6 root@john-pc1204:~# mount -l | grep sdc6 /dev/sdc6 on /media/NewHome20G type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev) [NewHome20G] .... same result Now I unmount the partition again, remount it specifying the exec option and look at the result ... root@john-pc1204:~# umount /dev/sdc6 root@john-pc1204:~# mount /dev/sdc6 -o exec root@john-pc1204:~# mount -l | grep sdc6 /dev/sdc6 on /media/NewHome20G type ext3 (rw,nosuid,nodev) [NewHome20G] ... and here the exec option has finally taken effect and the noexec setting has vanished. Just for interest, I re-mount the partition with the defaults option root@john-pc1204:~# umount /dev/sdc6 root@john-pc1204:~# mount /dev/sdc6 -o defaults root@john-pc1204:~# mount -l | grep sdc6 /dev/sdc6 on /media/NewHome20G type ext3 (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev) [NewHome20G] The noexec is back, so it looks very like rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev are the default options which is NOT what man says. Why does this matter ? I have a folder full of useful scripts stored on a data disk. Because that disk is mounted noexec those scripts won't run, even though they have all been set with chmod 777. I can work round this in several ways but it's disappointing that the man entry seems to be wrong. Have I missed something obvious here or have the default options in Ubuntu changed from what they were a few versions ago ?

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  • How does the fstab 'defaults' option work? Is relatime recommended?

    - by hushs
    I know the fstab defaults option means this: rw,suid,dev,exec,auto,nouser,async. But what if I want to add one more option, for example relatime, should I still add defaults too or they are applied anyway? Is it needed to add at least one option? Some examples: 1. UUID=bfb42838-d866-4233-9679-96e7536356df /media/data ext3 defaults 0 2 2. UUID=bfb42838-d866-4233-9679-96e7536356df /media/data ext3 0 2 3. UUID=bfb42838-d866-4233-9679-96e7536356df /media/data ext3 defaults,relatime 0 2 4. UUID=bfb42838-d866-4233-9679-96e7536356df /media/data ext3 relatime 0 2 Is the (2) correct(no option at all)? Are the (1) and (2) the same? Are the (3) and (4) the same? Furthermore, I read in the Ubuntu Community Documentation that in Ubuntu 8.04 relatime was used as default for linux native file systems. Is it still true for 12.04? If yes, then why do I see this if I use the mount command: /dev/sda2 on / type ext4 (rw,errors=remount-ro) If no, why not? It isn't recommended to use relatime now? I just wanted to apply it to my non system partitions, it is a good idea? EDIT: I found an other command to list the mounted partitions and their options: cat /proc/mounts This is the result of a partition mounted with the defaults option in fstab: /dev/sdb2 /media/adat ext3 rw,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=1,data=ordered 0 0 This is the output of mount for the same partition: /dev/sdb2 on /media/adat type ext3 (rw) And here is both result if the same partition mounted from Nautilus as a non-root user: /dev/sdb2 /media/adat ext3 rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=1,data=ordered 0 0 /dev/sdb2 on /media/adat type ext3 (rw,nosuid,nodev,uhelper=udisks) So it looks like relatime is used if we mount an ext partition in 12.04. So it is unneeded to add it manually. So my problem is broadly solved. But I still can't see why the options that should be in the defaults are not listed even with the cat /proc/mounts. Maybe there is a third and even better method to list the partition mount options :)

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  • PostgreSQL user authentication against PAM

    - by elmuerte
    I am trying to set up authentication via PAM for PostgreSQL 9.3. I already managed to get this working on an Ubuntu 12.04 server, but I am unable to get this working on a Centos-6 install. The relevant pg_hba.conf line: host all all 0.0.0.0/0 pam pamservice=postgresql93 The pam.d/postgressql93 is the default config shipped with the official postgresql 9.3 package: #%PAM-1.0 auth include password-auth account include password-auth When a user tries to authenticate the following is reported in secure log: hostname unix_chkpwd[31807]: check pass; user unknown hostname unix_chkpwd[31808]: check pass; user unknown hostname unix_chkpwd[31808]: password check failed for user (myuser) hostname postgres 10.1.0.1(61459) authentication: pam_unix(postgresql93:auth): authentication failure; logname= uid=26 euid=26 tty= ruser= rhost= user=myuser The relevant content of password-auth config is: auth required pam_env.so auth sufficient pam_unix.so nullok try_first_pass auth requisite pam_succeed_if.so uid >= 500 quiet auth required pam_deny.so account required pam_unix.so account sufficient pam_localuser.so account sufficient pam_succeed_if.so uid < 500 quiet account required pam_permit.so The problem is with the pam_unix.so. It is unable to validate the password, and unable to retrieve the user info (when I remove the auth entry of pam_unix.so). The Centos-6 install is only 5 days old, so it does not have a lot of baggage. The unix_chkpwd is suid and has execute rights for everybody, so it should be able to check the shadow file (which has no privileges at all?).

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  • SELinux - Allow multiple services access to same /home/dir

    - by Mike Purcell
    I currently have SELinux enabled and have been able to configure apache to allow access to /home/src/web with a chcon command granting the 'httpd_sys_content_t' type. But now I am trying to serve the rsyslogd.conf file from the same directory, but every time I start rsyslogd I see an entry in my audit log saying that rsyslogd was denied access. My question is, is it possible to grant two applications the ability to access the same directory, while still keeping SELinux enabled? Current perms on /home/src: drwxr-xr-x. src src unconfined_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t:s0 src Audit log message: type=AVC msg=audit(1349113476.272:1154): avc: denied { search } for pid=9975 comm="rsyslogd" name="/" dev=dm-2 ino=2 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:syslogd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:home_root_t:s0 tclass=dir type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1349113476.272:1154): arch=c000003e syscall=2 success=no exit=-13 a0=7f9ef0c027f5 a1=0 a2=1b6 a3=0 items=0 ppid=9974 pid=9975 auid=500 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=30 comm="rsyslogd" exe="/sbin/rsyslogd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:syslogd_t:s0 key=(null) -- Edit -- Came across this post, which is sort of what I am trying to accomplish. However when I viewed the list of allowed sebool params, the only relating to syslog was: syslogd_disable_trans (SELinux Service Protection), seems like I can maintain the current SELinux 'type' on the /home/src/ dir, but set the bool on syslogd_disable_trans to false. I wonder if there is a better approach?

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  • How to allow users to transfer files to other users on linux

    - by Jon Bringhurst
    We have an environment of a few thousand users running applications on about 40 clusters ranging in size from 20 compute nodes to 98,000 compute nodes. Users on these systems generate massive files (sometimes 1PB) controlled by traditional unix permissions (ACLs usually aren't available or practical due to the specialized nature of the filesystem). We currently have a program called "give", which is a suid-root program that allows a user to "give" a file to another user when group permissions are insufficient. So, a user would type something like the following to give a file to another user: > give username-to-give-to filename-to-give ... The receiving user can then use a command called "take" (part of the give program) to receive the file: > take filename-to-receive The permissions of the file are then effectively transferred over to the receiving user. This program has been around for years and we'd like to revisit things from a security and functional point of view. Our current plan of action is to remove the bit rot in our current implementation of "give" and package it up as an open source app before we redeploy it into production. Does anyone have another method they use to transfer extremely large files between users when only traditional unix permissions are available?

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  • Audit file removal (auditctl)

    - by user1513039
    For some reason, some script or program is removing a pid file for the service on the linux server (centos5.4 / 2.6.18-308.4.1.el5xen). I suspect a faulty cron script, but manual investigation did not lead me to it. And i still want to track it down. Have been using auditctl rule: auditctl -w /var/run/some_service.pid -p w Which helped me to see something, but not quite exactly what i wanted: type=PATH msg=audit(11/12/2013 09:07:43.199:432577) : item=1 name=/var/run/some_service.pid inode=12419227 dev=fd:00 mode=file,644 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/12/2013 09:07:43.199:432577) : arch=x86_64 syscall=unlink success=yes exit=0 a0=7fff7dd46dd0 a1=1 a2=2 a3=127feb90 items=2 ppid=3454 pid=6227 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=pts0 ses=38138 comm=rm exe=/bin/rm key=(null) Problem here is that i see ppid of the script that removed the file, but at the analysis time the (p)pids are already invalid as probably scripts/programs have been shutdown. Imagine a cron script deleting the file. So i need some way to expand/add audit rule(s) to be able to trace the parents of the /bin/rm at the time of removal. I have been thinking to add some rule to monitor all process creation, something like: auditctl -a task,always But this happen to be very resource intensive. So i need help or advice how to combine these rules, or how to expand any of the rules to help track the script/program. Thanks.

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  • java serialization problems with different JVMs

    - by Alberto
    I am having trouble using serialization in Java. I've searched the web for a solution but haven't found an answer yet. The problem is this - I have a Java library (I have the code and I export it to an archive prior to executing the code) which I need to use with two differents JVMs. One JVM is on the server (Ubuntu, running Java(TM) JRE SE Runtime Environment (build 1.7.0_09-b05)) and the other on Android 2.3.3. I compiled the library in Java 1.6. Now, I am trying to import to the client, an object exported from the server, but I receive this error: java.io.InvalidClassException: [Lweka.classifiers.functions.MultilayerPerceptron$NeuralEnd;; Incompatible class (SUID): [Lweka.classifiers.functions.MultilayerPerceptron$NeuralEnd;: static final long serialVersionUID =-359311387972759020L; but expected [Lweka.classifiers.functions.MultilayerPerceptron$NeuralEnd;: static final long serialVersionUID =1920571045915494592L; I do have an explicit serial version UID declared on the class MultilayerPerceptron$NeuralEnd, like this: protected class NeuralEnd extends NeuralConnection { private static final long serialVersionUID = 7305185603191183338L; } Where NeuralConnection implements the java.io.Serializable interface. If I do a serialver on MultilayerPerceptron$NeuralEnd I receive the serialVersionUID which I declared. So, why have both JVMs changed this value? Can you help me? Thanks, Alberto

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  • how to setup kismet.conf on Ubuntu

    - by Registered User
    I installed Kismet on my Ubuntu 10.04 machine as apt-get install kismet every thing seems to work fine. but when I launch it I see following error kismet Launching kismet_server: //usr/bin/kismet_server Suid priv-dropping disabled. This may not be secure. No specific sources given to be enabled, all will be enabled. Non-RFMon VAPs will be destroyed on multi-vap interfaces (ie, madwifi-ng) Enabling channel hopping. Enabling channel splitting. NOTICE: Disabling channel hopping, no enabled sources are able to change channel. Source 0 (addme): Opening none source interface none... FATAL: Please configure at least one packet source. Kismet will not function if no packet sources are defined in kismet.conf or on the command line. Please read the README for more information about configuring Kismet. Kismet exiting. Done. I followed this guide http://www.ubuntugeek.com/kismet-an-802-11-wireless-network-detector-sniffer-and-intrusion-detection-system.html#more-1776 how ever in kismet.conf I am not clear with following line source=none,none,addme as to what should I change this to. lspci -vnn shows 0c:00.0 Network controller [0280]: Broadcom Corporation BCM4312 802.11b/g [14e4:4315] (rev 01) Subsystem: Dell Device [1028:000c] Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 17 Memory at f69fc000 (64-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=16K] Capabilities: [40] Power Management version 3 Capabilities: [58] Vendor Specific Information <?> Capabilities: [e8] Message Signalled Interrupts: Mask- 64bit+ Queue=0/0 Enable- Capabilities: [d0] Express Endpoint, MSI 00 Capabilities: [100] Advanced Error Reporting <?> Capabilities: [13c] Virtual Channel <?> Capabilities: [160] Device Serial Number Capabilities: [16c] Power Budgeting <?> Kernel driver in use: wl Kernel modules: wl, ssb and iwconfig shows lo no wireless extensions. eth0 no wireless extensions. eth1 IEEE 802.11bg ESSID:"WIKUCD" Mode:Managed Frequency:2.462 GHz Access Point: <00:43:92:21:H5:09> Bit Rate=11 Mb/s Tx-Power:24 dBm Retry min limit:7 RTS thr:off Fragment thr:off Encryption key:off Power Managementmode:All packets received Link Quality=1/5 Signal level=-81 dBm Noise level=-90 dBm Rx invalid nwid:0 Rx invalid crypt:0 Rx invalid frag:0 Tx excessive retries:169 Invalid misc:0 Missed beacon:0 So what should I be putting in place of source=none,none,addme with output I mentioned above ?

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  • No device file for partition on logical volume (Linux LVM)

    - by Brian
    I created a logical volume (scandata) containing a single ext3 partition. It is the only logical volume in its volume group (case4t). Said volume group is comprised by 3 physical volumes, which are three primary partitions on a single block device (/dev/sdb). When I created it, I could mount the partition via the block device /dev/mapper/case4t-scandatap1. Since last reboot the aforementioned block device file has disappeared. It may be of note -- I'm not sure -- that my superior (a college professor) had prompted this reboot by running sudo chmod -R [his name] /usr/bin, which obliterated all suid in its path, preventing the both of us from sudo-ing. That issue has been (temporarily) rectified via this operation. Now I'll cut the chatter and get started with the terminal dumps: $ sudo pvs; sudo vgs; sudo lvs Logging initialised at Sat Jan 8 11:42:34 2011 Set umask to 0077 Scanning for physical volume names PV VG Fmt Attr PSize PFree /dev/sdb1 case4t lvm2 a- 819.32G 0 /dev/sdb2 case4t lvm2 a- 866.40G 0 /dev/sdb3 case4t lvm2 a- 47.09G 0 Wiping internal VG cache Logging initialised at Sat Jan 8 11:42:34 2011 Set umask to 0077 Finding all volume groups Finding volume group "case4t" VG #PV #LV #SN Attr VSize VFree case4t 3 1 0 wz--n- 1.69T 0 Wiping internal VG cache Logging initialised at Sat Jan 8 11:42:34 2011 Set umask to 0077 Finding all logical volumes LV VG Attr LSize Origin Snap% Move Log Copy% Convert scandata case4t -wi-a- 1.69T Wiping internal VG cache $ sudo vgchange -a y Logging initialised at Sat Jan 8 11:43:14 2011 Set umask to 0077 Finding all volume groups Finding volume group "case4t" 1 logical volume(s) in volume group "case4t" already active 1 existing logical volume(s) in volume group "case4t" monitored Found volume group "case4t" Activated logical volumes in volume group "case4t" 1 logical volume(s) in volume group "case4t" now active Wiping internal VG cache $ ls /dev | grep case4t case4t $ ls /dev/mapper case4t-scandata control $ sudo fdisk -l /dev/case4t/scandata Disk /dev/case4t/scandata: 1860.5 GB, 1860584865792 bytes 255 heads, 63 sectors/track, 226203 cylinders Units = cylinders of 16065 * 512 = 8225280 bytes Disk identifier: 0x00049bf5 Device Boot Start End Blocks Id System /dev/case4t/scandata1 1 226203 1816975566 83 Linux $ sudo parted /dev/case4t/scandata print Model: Linux device-mapper (linear) (dm) Disk /dev/mapper/case4t-scandata: 1861GB Sector size (logical/physical): 512B/512B Partition Table: msdos Number Start End Size Type File system Flags 1 32.3kB 1861GB 1861GB primary ext3 $ sudo fdisk -l /dev/sdb Disk /dev/sdb: 1860.5 GB, 1860593254400 bytes 255 heads, 63 sectors/track, 226204 cylinders Units = cylinders of 16065 * 512 = 8225280 bytes Disk identifier: 0x00000081 Device Boot Start End Blocks Id System /dev/sdb1 1 106955 859116006 83 Linux /dev/sdb2 113103 226204 908491815 83 Linux /dev/sdb3 106956 113102 49375777+ 83 Linux Partition table entries are not in disk order $ sudo parted /dev/sdb print Model: DELL PERC 6/i (scsi) Disk /dev/sdb: 1861GB Sector size (logical/physical): 512B/512B Partition Table: msdos Number Start End Size Type File system Flags 1 32.3kB 880GB 880GB primary reiserfs 3 880GB 930GB 50.6GB primary 2 930GB 1861GB 930GB primary I find it a bit strange that partition one above is said to be reiserfs, or if it matters -- it was previously reiserfs, but LVM recognizes it as a PV. To reiterate, neither /dev/mapper/case4t-scandatap1 (which I had used previously) nor /dev/case4t/scandata1 (as printed by fdisk) exists. And /dev/case4t/scandata (no partition number) cannot be mounted: $sudo mount -t ext3 /dev/case4t/scandata /mnt/new mount: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/mapper/case4t-scandata, missing codepage or helper program, or other error In some cases useful info is found in syslog - try dmesg | tail or so All I get on syslog is: [170059.538137] VFS: Can't find ext3 filesystem on dev dm-0. Thanks in advance for any help you can offer, Brian P.S. I am on Ubuntu GNU/Linux 2.6.28-11-server (Jaunty) (out of date, I know -- that's on the laundry list).

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  • Screen -X exec commands not working until manually attached

    - by James Watt
    I have a batch script that starts a java server application inside of a screen. The command looks like this: cd /dir/ && screen -A -m -d -S javascreen java -Xms640M -Xmx1024M -jar javaserverapp.jar nogui After I run the batch script, it starts the server and puts it inside the correct screen. If I list my screens after, I see something like this: user@gtwy /dir $ screen -list There is a screen on: 16180.javascreen (Detached) 1 Socket in /var/run/screen/S-user. However, I have a second batch script that sends automated commands to this server and runs on a different crontab interval. Because of the way the application works, I send commands to it like this (this command tells it to alert connected users "testing 123"): screen -X exec .\!\! echo say testing 123 I've also tried: screen -R -X exec .\!\! echo say testing 123 screen -S javascreen -X exec .\!\! echo say testing 123 Unfortunately, these commands DO NOT WORK. They don't even give me an error message, they just do nothing. HOWEVER - If I manually attach to the screen first (with the below command) and then detach, now I can run any of the above commands flawlessly. I can demonstrate this with a video, if I wasn't clear enough here. screen -r -d Thanks in advance. Update: here is the important parts of /etc/screenrc. It should be totally vanilla, I've never edited this file. # VARIABLES # =============================================================== # No annoying audible bell, using "visual bell" # vbell on # default: off # vbell_msg " -- Bell,Bell!! -- " # default: "Wuff,Wuff!!" # Automatically detach on hangup. autodetach on # default: on # Don't display the copyright page startup_message off # default: on # Uses nethack-style messages # nethack on # default: off # Affects the copying of text regions crlf off # default: off # Enable/disable multiuser mode. Standard screen operation is singleuser. # In multiuser mode the commands acladd, aclchg, aclgrp and acldel can be used # to enable (and disable) other user accessing this screen session. # Requires suid-root. multiuser off # Change default scrollback value for new windows defscrollback 1000 # default: 100 # Define the time that all windows monitored for silence should # wait before displaying a message. Default 30 seconds. silencewait 15 # default: 30 # bufferfile: The file to use for commands # "readbuf" ('<') and "writebuf" ('>'): bufferfile $HOME/.screen_exchange # # hardcopydir: The directory which contains all hardcopies. # hardcopydir ~/.hardcopy # hardcopydir ~/.screen # # shell: Default process started in screen's windows. # Makes it possible to use a different shell inside screen # than is set as the default login shell. # If begins with a '-' character, the shell will be started as a login shell. # shell zsh # shell bash # shell ksh shell -$SHELL # shellaka '> |tcsh' # shelltitle '$ |bash' # emulate .logout message pow_detach_msg "Screen session of \$LOGNAME \$:cr:\$:nl:ended." # caption always " %w --- %c:%s" # caption always "%3n %t%? @%u%?%? [%h]%?%=%c" # advertise hardstatus support to $TERMCAP # termcapinfo * '' 'hs:ts=\E_:fs=\E\\:ds=\E_\E\\' # set every new windows hardstatus line to somenthing descriptive # defhstatus "screen: ^En (^Et)" # don't kill window after the process died # zombie "^["

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  • Toorcon14

    - by danx
    Toorcon 2012 Information Security Conference San Diego, CA, http://www.toorcon.org/ Dan Anderson, October 2012 It's almost Halloween, and we all know what that means—yes, of course, it's time for another Toorcon Conference! Toorcon is an annual conference for people interested in computer security. This includes the whole range of hackers, computer hobbyists, professionals, security consultants, press, law enforcement, prosecutors, FBI, etc. We're at Toorcon 14—see earlier blogs for some of the previous Toorcon's I've attended (back to 2003). This year's "con" was held at the Westin on Broadway in downtown San Diego, California. The following are not necessarily my views—I'm just the messenger—although I could have misquoted or misparaphrased the speakers. Also, I only reviewed some of the talks, below, which I attended and interested me. MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections, Aditya K. Sood Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata, Rebecca "bx" Shapiro Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules?, Valkyrie Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI, Dan Griffin You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program, Boris Sverdlik What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking, Dave Maas & Jason Leopold Accessibility and Security, Anna Shubina Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance, Adam Brand McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend, Jay James & Shane MacDougall MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections Aditya K. Sood, IOActive, Michigan State PhD candidate Aditya talked about Android smartphone malware. There's a lot of old Android software out there—over 50% Gingerbread (2.3.x)—and most have unpatched vulnerabilities. Of 9 Android vulnerabilities, 8 have known exploits (such as the old Gingerbread Global Object Table exploit). Android protection includes sandboxing, security scanner, app permissions, and screened Android app market. The Android permission checker has fine-grain resource control, policy enforcement. Android static analysis also includes a static analysis app checker (bouncer), and a vulnerablity checker. What security problems does Android have? User-centric security, which depends on the user to grant permission and make smart decisions. But users don't care or think about malware (the're not aware, not paranoid). All they want is functionality, extensibility, mobility Android had no "proper" encryption before Android 3.0 No built-in protection against social engineering and web tricks Alternative Android app markets are unsafe. Simply visiting some markets can infect Android Aditya classified Android Malware types as: Type A—Apps. These interact with the Android app framework. For example, a fake Netflix app. Or Android Gold Dream (game), which uploads user files stealthy manner to a remote location. Type K—Kernel. Exploits underlying Linux libraries or kernel Type H—Hybrid. These use multiple layers (app framework, libraries, kernel). These are most commonly used by Android botnets, which are popular with Chinese botnet authors What are the threats from Android malware? These incude leak info (contacts), banking fraud, corporate network attacks, malware advertising, malware "Hackivism" (the promotion of social causes. For example, promiting specific leaders of the Tunisian or Iranian revolutions. Android malware is frequently "masquerated". That is, repackaged inside a legit app with malware. To avoid detection, the hidden malware is not unwrapped until runtime. The malware payload can be hidden in, for example, PNG files. Less common are Android bootkits—there's not many around. What they do is hijack the Android init framework—alteering system programs and daemons, then deletes itself. For example, the DKF Bootkit (China). Android App Problems: no code signing! all self-signed native code execution permission sandbox — all or none alternate market places no robust Android malware detection at network level delayed patch process Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata Rebecca "bx" Shapiro, Dartmouth College, NH https://github.com/bx/elf-bf-tools @bxsays on twitter Definitions. "ELF" is an executable file format used in linking and loading executables (on UNIX/Linux-class machines). "Weird machine" uses undocumented computation sources (I think of them as unintended virtual machines). Some examples of "weird machines" are those that: return to weird location, does SQL injection, corrupts the heap. Bx then talked about using ELF metadata as (an uintended) "weird machine". Some ELF background: A compiler takes source code and generates a ELF object file (hello.o). A static linker makes an ELF executable from the object file. A runtime linker and loader takes ELF executable and loads and relocates it in memory. The ELF file has symbols to relocate functions and variables. ELF has two relocation tables—one at link time and another one at loading time: .rela.dyn (link time) and .dynsym (dynamic table). GOT: Global Offset Table of addresses for dynamically-linked functions. PLT: Procedure Linkage Tables—works with GOT. The memory layout of a process (not the ELF file) is, in order: program (+ heap), dynamic libraries, libc, ld.so, stack (which includes the dynamic table loaded into memory) For ELF, the "weird machine" is found and exploited in the loader. ELF can be crafted for executing viruses, by tricking runtime into executing interpreted "code" in the ELF symbol table. One can inject parasitic "code" without modifying the actual ELF code portions. Think of the ELF symbol table as an "assembly language" interpreter. It has these elements: instructions: Add, move, jump if not 0 (jnz) Think of symbol table entries as "registers" symbol table value is "contents" immediate values are constants direct values are addresses (e.g., 0xdeadbeef) move instruction: is a relocation table entry add instruction: relocation table "addend" entry jnz instruction: takes multiple relocation table entries The ELF weird machine exploits the loader by relocating relocation table entries. The loader will go on forever until told to stop. It stores state on stack at "end" and uses IFUNC table entries (containing function pointer address). The ELF weird machine, called "Brainfu*k" (BF) has: 8 instructions: pointer inc, dec, inc indirect, dec indirect, jump forward, jump backward, print. Three registers - 3 registers Bx showed example BF source code that implemented a Turing machine printing "hello, world". More interesting was the next demo, where bx modified ping. Ping runs suid as root, but quickly drops privilege. BF modified the loader to disable the library function call dropping privilege, so it remained as root. Then BF modified the ping -t argument to execute the -t filename as root. It's best to show what this modified ping does with an example: $ whoami bx $ ping localhost -t backdoor.sh # executes backdoor $ whoami root $ The modified code increased from 285948 bytes to 290209 bytes. A BF tool compiles "executable" by modifying the symbol table in an existing ELF executable. The tool modifies .dynsym and .rela.dyn table, but not code or data. Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules? "Valkyrie" (Christie Dudley, Santa Clara Law JD candidate) Valkyrie talked about mobile handset privacy. Some background: Senator Franken (also a comedian) became alarmed about CarrierIQ, where the carriers track their customers. Franken asked the FCC to find out what obligations carriers think they have to protect privacy. The carriers' response was that they are doing just fine with self-regulation—no worries! Carriers need to collect data, such as missed calls, to maintain network quality. But carriers also sell data for marketing. Verizon sells customer data and enables this with a narrow privacy policy (only 1 month to opt out, with difficulties). The data sold is not individually identifiable and is aggregated. But Verizon recommends, as an aggregation workaround to "recollate" data to other databases to identify customers indirectly. The FCC has regulated telephone privacy since 1934 and mobile network privacy since 2007. Also, the carriers say mobile phone privacy is a FTC responsibility (not FCC). FTC is trying to improve mobile app privacy, but FTC has no authority over carrier / customer relationships. As a side note, Apple iPhones are unique as carriers have extra control over iPhones they don't have with other smartphones. As a result iPhones may be more regulated. Who are the consumer advocates? Everyone knows EFF, but EPIC (Electrnic Privacy Info Center), although more obsecure, is more relevant. What to do? Carriers must be accountable. Opt-in and opt-out at any time. Carriers need incentive to grant users control for those who want it, by holding them liable and responsible for breeches on their clock. Location information should be added current CPNI privacy protection, and require "Pen/trap" judicial order to obtain (and would still be a lower standard than 4th Amendment). Politics are on a pro-privacy swing now, with many senators and the Whitehouse. There will probably be new regulation soon, and enforcement will be a problem, but consumers will still have some benefit. Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI Dan Griffin, JWSecure, Inc., Seattle, @JWSdan Dan talked about hacking measured UEFI boot. First some terms: UEFI is a boot technology that is replacing BIOS (has whitelisting and blacklisting). UEFI protects devices against rootkits. TPM - hardware security device to store hashs and hardware-protected keys "secure boot" can control at firmware level what boot images can boot "measured boot" OS feature that tracks hashes (from BIOS, boot loader, krnel, early drivers). "remote attestation" allows remote validation and control based on policy on a remote attestation server. Microsoft pushing TPM (Windows 8 required), but Google is not. Intel TianoCore is the only open source for UEFI. Dan has Measured Boot Tool at http://mbt.codeplex.com/ with a demo where you can also view TPM data. TPM support already on enterprise-class machines. UEFI Weaknesses. UEFI toolkits are evolving rapidly, but UEFI has weaknesses: assume user is an ally trust TPM implicitly, and attached to computer hibernate file is unprotected (disk encryption protects against this) protection migrating from hardware to firmware delays in patching and whitelist updates will UEFI really be adopted by the mainstream (smartphone hardware support, bank support, apathetic consumer support) You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program Boris Sverdlik, ISDPodcast.com co-host Boris talked about problems typical with current security audits. "IT Security" is an oxymoron—IT exists to enable buiness, uptime, utilization, reporting, but don't care about security—IT has conflict of interest. There's no Magic Bullet ("blinky box"), no one-size-fits-all solution (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)). Regulations don't make you secure. The cloud is not secure (because of shared data and admin access). Defense and pen testing is not sexy. Auditors are not solution (security not a checklist)—what's needed is experience and adaptability—need soft skills. Step 1: First thing is to Google and learn the company end-to-end before you start. Get to know the management team (not IT team), meet as many people as you can. Don't use arbitrary values such as CISSP scores. Quantitive risk assessment is a myth (e.g. AV*EF-SLE). Learn different Business Units, legal/regulatory obligations, learn the business and where the money is made, verify company is protected from script kiddies (easy), learn sensitive information (IP, internal use only), and start with low-hanging fruit (customer service reps and social engineering). Step 2: Policies. Keep policies short and relevant. Generic SANS "security" boilerplate policies don't make sense and are not followed. Focus on acceptable use, data usage, communications, physical security. Step 3: Implementation: keep it simple stupid. Open source, although useful, is not free (implementation cost). Access controls with authentication & authorization for local and remote access. MS Windows has it, otherwise use OpenLDAP, OpenIAM, etc. Application security Everyone tries to reinvent the wheel—use existing static analysis tools. Review high-risk apps and major revisions. Don't run different risk level apps on same system. Assume host/client compromised and use app-level security control. Network security VLAN != segregated because there's too many workarounds. Use explicit firwall rules, active and passive network monitoring (snort is free), disallow end user access to production environment, have a proxy instead of direct Internet access. Also, SSL certificates are not good two-factor auth and SSL does not mean "safe." Operational Controls Have change, patch, asset, & vulnerability management (OSSI is free). For change management, always review code before pushing to production For logging, have centralized security logging for business-critical systems, separate security logging from administrative/IT logging, and lock down log (as it has everything). Monitor with OSSIM (open source). Use intrusion detection, but not just to fulfill a checkbox: build rules from a whitelist perspective (snort). OSSEC has 95% of what you need. Vulnerability management is a QA function when done right: OpenVas and Seccubus are free. Security awareness The reality is users will always click everything. Build real awareness, not compliance driven checkbox, and have it integrated into the culture. Pen test by crowd sourcing—test with logging COSSP http://www.cossp.org/ - Comprehensive Open Source Security Project What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking Dave Maas, San Diego CityBeat Jason Leopold, Truthout.org The difference between hackers and investigative journalists: For hackers, the motivation varies, but method is same, technological specialties. For investigative journalists, it's about one thing—The Story, and they need broad info-gathering skills. J-School in 60 Seconds: Generic formula: Person or issue of pubic interest, new info, or angle. Generic criteria: proximity, prominence, timeliness, human interest, oddity, or consequence. Media awareness of hackers and trends: journalists becoming extremely aware of hackers with congressional debates (privacy, data breaches), demand for data-mining Journalists, use of coding and web development for Journalists, and Journalists busted for hacking (Murdock). Info gathering by investigative journalists include Public records laws. Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is good, but slow. California Public Records Act is a lot stronger. FOIA takes forever because of foot-dragging—it helps to be specific. Often need to sue (especially FBI). CPRA is faster, and requests can be vague. Dumps and leaks (a la Wikileaks) Journalists want: leads, protecting ourselves, our sources, and adapting tools for news gathering (Google hacking). Anonomity is important to whistleblowers. They want no digital footprint left behind (e.g., email, web log). They don't trust encryption, want to feel safe and secure. Whistleblower laws are very weak—there's no upside for whistleblowers—they have to be very passionate to do it. Accessibility and Security or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Halting Problem Anna Shubina, Dartmouth College Anna talked about how accessibility and security are related. Accessibility of digital content (not real world accessibility). mostly refers to blind users and screenreaders, for our purpose. Accessibility is about parsing documents, as are many security issues. "Rich" executable content causes accessibility to fail, and often causes security to fail. For example MS Word has executable format—it's not a document exchange format—more dangerous than PDF or HTML. Accessibility is often the first and maybe only sanity check with parsing. They have no choice because someone may want to read what you write. Google, for example, is very particular about web browser you use and are bad at supporting other browsers. Uses JavaScript instead of links, often requiring mouseover to display content. PDF is a security nightmare. Executible format, embedded flash, JavaScript, etc. 15 million lines of code. Google Chrome doesn't handle PDF correctly, causing several security bugs. PDF has an accessibility checker and PDF tagging, to help with accessibility. But no PDF checker checks for incorrect tags, untagged content, or validates lists or tables. None check executable content at all. The "Halting Problem" is: can one decide whether a program will ever stop? The answer, in general, is no (Rice's theorem). The same holds true for accessibility checkers. Language-theoretic Security says complicated data formats are hard to parse and cannot be solved due to the Halting Problem. W3C Web Accessibility Guidelines: "Perceivable, Operable, Understandable, Robust" Not much help though, except for "Robust", but here's some gems: * all information should be parsable (paraphrasing) * if not parsable, cannot be converted to alternate formats * maximize compatibility in new document formats Executible webpages are bad for security and accessibility. They say it's for a better web experience. But is it necessary to stuff web pages with JavaScript for a better experience? A good example is The Drudge Report—it has hand-written HTML with no JavaScript, yet drives a lot of web traffic due to good content. A bad example is Google News—hidden scrollbars, guessing user input. Solutions: Accessibility and security problems come from same source Expose "better user experience" myth Keep your corner of Internet parsable Remember "Halting Problem"—recognize false solutions (checking and verifying tools) Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance Adam Brand, protiviti @adamrbrand, http://www.picfun.com/ Adam talked about PCI compliance for retail sales. Take an example: for PCI compliance, 50% of Brian's time (a IT guy), 960 hours/year was spent patching POSs in 850 restaurants. Often applying some patches make no sense (like fixing a browser vulnerability on a server). "Scanner worship" is overuse of vulnerability scanners—it gives a warm and fuzzy and it's simple (red or green results—fix reds). Scanners give a false sense of security. In reality, breeches from missing patches are uncommon—more common problems are: default passwords, cleartext authentication, misconfiguration (firewall ports open). Patching Myths: Myth 1: install within 30 days of patch release (but PCI §6.1 allows a "risk-based approach" instead). Myth 2: vendor decides what's critical (also PCI §6.1). But §6.2 requires user ranking of vulnerabilities instead. Myth 3: scan and rescan until it passes. But PCI §11.2.1b says this applies only to high-risk vulnerabilities. Adam says good recommendations come from NIST 800-40. Instead use sane patching and focus on what's really important. From NIST 800-40: Proactive: Use a proactive vulnerability management process: use change control, configuration management, monitor file integrity. Monitor: start with NVD and other vulnerability alerts, not scanner results. Evaluate: public-facing system? workstation? internal server? (risk rank) Decide:on action and timeline Test: pre-test patches (stability, functionality, rollback) for change control Install: notify, change control, tickets McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend Jay James, Shane MacDougall, Tactical Intelligence Inc., Canada "McAfee Secure Trustmark" is a website seal marketed by McAfee. A website gets this badge if they pass their remote scanning. The problem is a removal of trustmarks act as flags that you're vulnerable. Easy to view status change by viewing McAfee list on website or on Google. "Secure TrustGuard" is similar to McAfee. Jay and Shane wrote Perl scripts to gather sites from McAfee and search engines. If their certification image changes to a 1x1 pixel image, then they are longer certified. Their scripts take deltas of scans to see what changed daily. The bottom line is change in TrustGuard status is a flag for hackers to attack your site. Entire idea of seals is silly—you're raising a flag saying if you're vulnerable.

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  • Snow Leopard doesn't repair permissions, despite showing / saying its fixed them?

    - by Jules
    Sometime ago, I used carbon copy as I was replacing my hard drive in my Mac Mini running Snow Leopard. Afterwards, on my new drive I had some permission problems. I've tried several times running a repair permissions / repair disk from disk util. It shows that there are problems and I think it says its correceted the problems. However the problems remain, what can I do to fix them ? It doesn't seem to cause me any problems, that I can tell EDIT Repairing permissions for “Macintosh HD” Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Classes/jconsole.jar", should be -rw-r--r-- , they are lrwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Classes/jconsole.jar". User differs on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Home/lib", should be 95, user is 0. Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Home/lib". User differs on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Libraries", should be 95, user is 0. Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Libraries". Permissions differ on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Deploy.bundle/Contents/Home/lib/security/cacerts", should be -rw-r--r-- , they are lrwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Deploy.bundle/Contents/Home/lib/security/cacerts". Permissions differ on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Deploy.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/deploy.jar", should be -rw-r--r-- , they are lrwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Deploy.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/deploy.jar". Permissions differ on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Deploy.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/libdeploy.jnilib", should be -rwxr-xr-x , they are lrwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/A/Resources/Deploy.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/libdeploy.jnilib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreenLeopard386.app/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreenLeopard386.app/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/zh_TW.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/zh_TW.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/zh_TW.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/zh_TW.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/zh_TW.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/zh_TW.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/zh_CN.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/zh_CN.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/zh_CN.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/zh_CN.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/zh_CN.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/zh_CN.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/ko.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/ko.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/ko.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/ko.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/ko.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/ko.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Dutch.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Dutch.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Dutch.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Dutch.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Dutch.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Dutch.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Italian.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Spanish.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Spanish.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Spanish.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Spanish.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Spanish.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Spanish.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/French.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/French.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/French.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/French.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/French.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/French.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/German.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/German.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/German.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/German.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/German.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/German.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Japanese.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/Japanese.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Japanese.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/Japanese.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Japanese.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/Japanese.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Resources/JavaPluginCocoa.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/deploy.jar", should be -rw-r--r-- , they are lrwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Resources/JavaPluginCocoa.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/deploy.jar". Permissions differ on "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Resources/JavaPluginCocoa.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/libdeploy.jnilib", should be -rwxr-xr-x , they are lrwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/Frameworks/JavaVM.framework/Versions/1.6.0/Resources/JavaPluginCocoa.bundle/Contents/Resources/Java/libdeploy.jnilib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/English.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/Menu Extras/RemoteDesktop.menu/Contents/Resources/English.lproj/RemoteDesktopMenu.nib". Warning: SUID file "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/MacOS/ARDAgent" has been modified and will not be repaired. Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/English.lproj/UIAgent.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Support/Remote Desktop Message.app/Contents/Resources/English.lproj/UIAgent.nib". Permissions differ on "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/English.lproj/MainMenu.nib", should be drwxr-xr-x , they are -rwxr-xr-x . Repaired "System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/AppleVNCServer.bundle/Contents/Support/LockScreen.app/Contents/Resources/English.lproj/MainMenu.nib". Group differs on "private/var/log/kernel.log", should be 80, group is 0. Permissions differ on "private/var/log/kernel.log", should be -rw-r----- , they are -rw-r--r-- . Repaired "private/var/log/kernel.log". Group differs on "private/var/log/secure.log", should be 80, group is 0. Permissions differ on "private/var/log/secure.log", should be -rw-r----- , they are -rw-r--r-- . Repaired "private/var/log/secure.log". Group differs on "private/var/log/system.log", should be 80, group is 0. Permissions differ on "private/var/log/system.log", should be -rw-r----- , they are -rw-r--r-- . Repaired "private/var/log/system.log". Permissions repair complete

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  • Is it possible to run dhcpd3 as non-root user in a chroot jail?

    - by Lenain
    Hi everyone. I would like to run dhcpd3 from a chroot jail on Debian Lenny. At the moment, I can run it as root from my jail. Now I want to do this as non-root user (as "-u blah -t /path/to/jail" Bind option). If I start my process like this : start-stop-daemon --chroot /home/jails/dhcp --chuid dhcp \ --start --pidfile /home/jails/dhcp/var/run/dhcp.pid --exec /usr/sbin/dhcpd3 I get stuck with these errors : Internet Systems Consortium DHCP Server V3.1.1 Copyright 2004-2008 Internet Systems Consortium. All rights reserved. For info, please visit http://www.isc.org/sw/dhcp/ unable to create icmp socket: Operation not permitted Wrote 0 deleted host decls to leases file. Wrote 0 new dynamic host decls to leases file. Wrote 0 leases to leases file. Open a socket for LPF: Operation not permitted strace : brk(0) = 0x911b000 fcntl64(0, F_GETFD) = 0 fcntl64(1, F_GETFD) = 0 fcntl64(2, F_GETFD) = 0 access("/etc/suid-debug", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) access("/etc/ld.so.nohwcap", F_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb775d000 access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R_OK) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/tls/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/tls/i686/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/tls/i686", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/tls/cmov/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/tls/cmov", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/tls/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/tls", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i686/cmov/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i686/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i686", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/cmov/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/cmov", 0xbfc2ac84) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY) = 3 read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\260e\1\0004\0\0\0t"..., 512) = 512 fstat64(3, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0755, st_size=1294572, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb775c000 mmap2(NULL, 1300080, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0) = 0xb761e000 mmap2(0xb7756000, 12288, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 3, 0x138) = 0xb7756000 mmap2(0xb7759000, 9840, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7759000 close(3) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb761d000 set_thread_area({entry_number:-1 - 6, base_addr:0xb761d6b0, limit:1048575, seg_32bit:1, contents:0, read_exec_only:0, limit_in_pages:1, seg_not_present:0, useable:1}) = 0 mprotect(0xb7756000, 4096, PROT_READ) = 0 open("/dev/null", O_RDWR) = 3 close(3) = 0 brk(0) = 0x911b000 brk(0x913c000) = 0x913c000 socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_DGRAM, 0) = 3 fcntl64(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) = 0 connect(3, {sa_family=AF_FILE, path="/dev/log"...}, 110) = 0 time(NULL) = 1284760816 open("/etc/localtime", O_RDONLY) = 4 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb761c000 read(4, "TZif2\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\f\0\0\0\f\0\0\0\0\0"..., 4096) = 2945 _llseek(4, -28, [2917], SEEK_CUR) = 0 read(4, "\nCET-1CEST,M3.5.0,M10.5.0/3\n"..., 4096) = 28 close(4) = 0 munmap(0xb761c000, 4096) = 0 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Intern"..., 73, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 73 write(2, "Internet Systems Consortium DHCP "..., 46Internet Systems Consortium DHCP Server V3.1.1) = 46 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Copyri"..., 75, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 75 write(2, "Copyright 2004-2008 Internet Syst"..., 48Copyright 2004-2008 Internet Systems Consortium.) = 48 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: All ri"..., 47, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 47 write(2, "All rights reserved."..., 20All rights reserved.) = 20 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: For in"..., 77, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 77 write(2, "For info, please visit http://www"..., 50For info, please visit http://www.isc.org/sw/dhcp/) = 50 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM, 0) = 4 fcntl64(4, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK) = 0 connect(4, {sa_family=AF_FILE, path="/var/run/nscd/socket"...}, 110) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) close(4) = 0 socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM, 0) = 4 fcntl64(4, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK) = 0 connect(4, {sa_family=AF_FILE, path="/var/run/nscd/socket"...}, 110) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) close(4) = 0 open("/etc/nsswitch.conf", O_RDONLY) = 4 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=475, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb761c000 read(4, "# /etc/nsswitch.conf\n#\n# Example "..., 4096) = 475 read(4, ""..., 4096) = 0 close(4) = 0 munmap(0xb761c000, 4096) = 0 open("/lib/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/tls/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/tls/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/tls/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/tls/i686", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/tls/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/tls/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/tls/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/tls", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i686", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/i486-linux-gnu/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/lib/i486-linux-gnu", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/i686", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/tls", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/i686", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/cmov/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/cmov", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu/libnss_db.so.2", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) stat64("/usr/lib/i486-linux-gnu", 0xbfc2ad5c) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/libnss_files.so.2", O_RDONLY) = 4 read(4, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\320\30\0\0004\0\0\0\250"..., 512) = 512 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=38408, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 41624, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_DENYWRITE, 4, 0) = 0xb7612000 mmap2(0xb761b000, 8192, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_DENYWRITE, 4, 0x8) = 0xb761b000 close(4) = 0 open("/etc/services", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 4 fcntl64(4, F_GETFD) = 0x1 (flags FD_CLOEXEC) fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=18480, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7611000 read(4, "# Network services, Internet styl"..., 4096) = 4096 read(4, "9/tcp\t\t\t\t# Quick Mail Transfer Pr"..., 4096) = 4096 read(4, "note\t1352/tcp\tlotusnotes\t# Lotus "..., 4096) = 4096 read(4, "tion\nafs3-kaserver\t7004/udp\nafs3-"..., 4096) = 4096 read(4, "backup\t2989/tcp\t\t\t# Afmbackup sys"..., 4096) = 2096 read(4, ""..., 4096) = 0 close(4) = 0 munmap(0xb7611000, 4096) = 0 time(NULL) = 1284760816 open("/etc/protocols", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 4 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2626, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7611000 read(4, "# Internet (IP) protocols\n#\n# Upd"..., 4096) = 2626 close(4) = 0 munmap(0xb7611000, 4096) = 0 socket(PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMP) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: unable"..., 80, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 80 write(2, "unable to create icmp socket: Ope"..., 53unable to create icmp socket: Operation not permitted) = 53 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 open("/etc/dhcp3/dhcpd.conf", O_RDONLY) = 4 lseek(4, 0, SEEK_END) = 1426 lseek(4, 0, SEEK_SET) = 0 read(4, "#----------------------------\n# G"..., 1426) = 1426 close(4) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 401408, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb75b0000 mmap2(NULL, 401408, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb754e000 mmap2(NULL, 401408, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb74ec000 brk(0x916f000) = 0x916f000 close(3) = 0 socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_DGRAM, 0) = 3 fcntl64(3, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) = 0 connect(3, {sa_family=AF_FILE, path="/dev/log"...}, 110) = 0 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Inter"..., 74, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 74 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Copyr"..., 76, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 76 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: All r"..., 48, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 48 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: For i"..., 78, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 78 open("/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases", O_RDONLY) = 4 lseek(4, 0, SEEK_END) = 126 lseek(4, 0, SEEK_SET) = 0 read(4, "# The format of this file is docu"..., 126) = 126 close(4) = 0 open("/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0666) = 4 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=126, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb74eb000 fstat64(4, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=126, ...}) = 0 _llseek(4, 126, [126], SEEK_SET) = 0 time(NULL) = 1284760816 time(NULL) = 1284760816 open("/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases.1284760816", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0664) = 5 fcntl64(5, F_GETFL) = 0x1 (flags O_WRONLY) fstat64(5, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=0, ...}) = 0 mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb74ea000 _llseek(5, 0, [0], SEEK_CUR) = 0 close(4) = 0 munmap(0xb74eb000, 4096) = 0 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Wrote"..., 70, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 70 write(2, "Wrote 0 deleted host decls to lea"..., 42Wrote 0 deleted host decls to leases file.) = 42 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Wrote"..., 74, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 74 write(2, "Wrote 0 new dynamic host decls to"..., 46Wrote 0 new dynamic host decls to leases file.) = 46 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Wrote"..., 58, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 58 write(2, "Wrote 0 leases to leases file."..., 30Wrote 0 leases to leases file.) = 30 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 write(5, "# The format of this file is docu"..., 126) = 126 fsync(5) = 0 unlink("/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases~") = 0 link("/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases", "/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases~") = 0 rename("/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases.1284760816", "/var/lib/dhcp3/dhcpd.leases") = 0 socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP) = 4 ioctl(4, SIOCGIFCONF, {0 - 64, NULL}) = 0 ioctl(4, SIOCGIFCONF, {64, {{"lo", {AF_INET, inet_addr("127.0.0.1")}}, {"eth0", {AF_INET, inet_addr("192.168.0.10")}}}}) = 0 ioctl(4, SIOCGIFFLAGS, {ifr_name="lo", ifr_flags=IFF_UP|IFF_LOOPBACK|IFF_RUNNING}) = 0 ioctl(4, SIOCGIFFLAGS, {ifr_name="eth0", ifr_flags=IFF_UP|IFF_BROADCAST|IFF_RUNNING|IFF_MULTICAST}) = 0 ioctl(4, SIOCGIFHWADDR, {ifr_name="eth0", ifr_hwaddr=00:c0:26:87:55:c0}) = 0 socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, 768) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) time(NULL) = 1284760816 stat64("/etc/localtime", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=2945, ...}) = 0 send(3, "Sep 18 00:00:16 dhcpd: Open "..., 74, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 74 write(2, "Open a socket for LPF: Operation "..., 46Open a socket for LPF: Operation not permitted) = 46 write(2, "\n"..., 1 ) = 1 exit_group(1) = ? I understand that dhcpd wants to create sockets on port 67... but I don't know how to authorize that through the chroot. Any idea?

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