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  • Bruteforcing Blackberry PersistentStore?

    - by Haoest
    Hello, I am experimenting with Blackberry's Persistent Store, but I have gotten nowhere so far, which is good, I guess. So I have written a a short program that attempts iterator through 0 to a specific upper bound to search for persisted objects. Blackberry seems to intentionally slow the loop. Check this out: String result = "result: \n"; int ub = 3000; Date start = Calendar.getInstance().getTime(); for(int i=0; i<ub; i++){ PersistentObject o = PersistentStore.getPersistentObject(i); if (o.getContents() != null){ result += (String) o.getContents() + "\n"; } } result += "end result\n"; result += "from 0 to " + ub + " took " + (Calendar.getInstance().getTime().getTime() - start.getTime()) / 1000 + " seconds"; From 0 to 3000 took 20 seconds. Is this enough to conclude that brute-forcing is not a practical method to breach the Blackberry? In general, how secure is BB Persistent Store?

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  • How to prevent a specific directory from running Php, Html, and Javascript languages?

    - by Emily
    Hi, Let's say i have an image uploader script, i want to prevent the upload directory from executing Php or even html by only showing it as plain text, i've seen this trick in many websites but i don't know how they do it. Briefly, if i upload evil.php to that directory, and i try to access it i will only see a plain text source , No html or php is executed. ( but i still want the images to appear normally ofcourse) I know i can do like that by header("content-type:text/plain"); but that's will not be helpful, because what i want, is to set the content-type:text/plain automatically by the server for every thing outputed from the upload directory except images. Note: i'm running php 5.3.2/Cent OS and the latest cPanel. Thanks

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  • How to control access to third party HTML pages

    - by Wylie
    Hello, We have a Learning Management System (LMS) that runs on its own server (IIS/Server 2003). Students must login with Forms authentication to gain access to the content. We want to offer access to third party flash and audio that is embedded in HTML pages hosted on the third party server (IIS/Server 2003). Currently we use a frame in a pop-up window that is populated via a simple URL to the third party HTML pages. How can the third party control access to their content, so that only students who launch the pop-up windows from our site can access their content? Since the content is mostly video and flash, we would prefer not to stream all of their content through our server to the Student. We have a programming staff, so we could maybe... - either post or get for our HTTP request to the third party server - we could use SSL - we could programmatically assign a global NT user account to all of our users and then do some kind of Active Directory login from the LMS server to the third party server - could the third party content be hosted at Amazon S3? Would this allow for secure access/download? These are just ideas. We really have no idea. Any suggestions would be greatly appreciated. TIA, Wylie

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  • Why can't we just use a hash of passphrase as the encryption key (and IV) with symmetric encryption algorithms?

    - by TX_
    Inspired by my previous question, now I have a very interesting idea: Do you really ever need to use Rfc2898DeriveBytes or similar classes to "securely derive" the encryption key and initialization vector from the passphrase string, or will just a simple hash of that string work equally well as a key/IV, when encrypting the data with symmetric algorithm (e.g. AES, DES, etc.)? I see tons of AES encryption code snippets, where Rfc2898DeriveBytes class is used to derive the encryption key and initialization vector (IV) from the password string. It is assumed that one should use a random salt and a shitload of iterations to derive secure enough key/IV for the encryption. While deriving bytes from password string using this method is quite useful in some scenarios, I think that's not applicable when encrypting data with symmetric algorithms! Here is why: using salt makes sense when there is a possibility to build precalculated rainbow tables, and when attacker gets his hands on hash he looks up the original password as a result. But... with symmetric data encryption, I think this is not required, as the hash of password string, or the encryption key, is never stored anywhere. So, if we just get the SHA1 hash of password, and use it as the encryption key/IV, isn't that going to be equally secure? What is the purpose of using Rfc2898DeriveBytes class to generate key/IV from password string (which is a very very performance-intensive operation), when we could just use a SHA1 (or any other) hash of that password? Hash would result in random bit distribution in a key (as opposed to using string bytes directly). And attacker would have to brute-force the whole range of key (e.g. if key length is 256bit he would have to try 2^256 combinations) anyway. So either I'm wrong in a dangerous way, or all those samples of AES encryption (including many upvoted answers here at SO), etc. that use Rfc2898DeriveBytes method to generate encryption key and IV are just wrong.

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  • How do I validate that my the openid.op_endpoint when a request is completed.

    - by Sam Saffron
    I have an Open ID based authentication system on my site. Occasionally users will have an account registered under [email protected] and they will attempt to login using the google open id provider https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id, in this case I would like to automatically associate the account and log them in. When the process is done I get a payload from somewhere claiming that openid.op_endpoint=https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id. My question: Can I trust openid.op_endpoint to be correct? Can this be spoofed somehow by a malicious openid provider? For illustration, lets say someone types in http://evil.org as their openid provider, can I somehow end up getting a request back that claims openid.op_endpoint is google? Do I need to store extra information against the nonce to validate? The spec is kind of tricky to understand

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  • Login form to an a secured app in tomcat

    - by patricio
    I have a normal HTML page in a normal Apache http server (http://yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy/index.html ), with an authentication form, with that form I need to access with the credentials to an application located in other server with diferent IP , that server have a secured application with tomcat: here is the login form in the apache http server: <form method="POST" id="theForm" action="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:8080/securedapp/j_security_check"> <input name="j_username" type="text" class="tx_form" id="j_username" size="20" /> <input name="j_password" type="password" class="tx_form" id="textfield2" size="20" /> <input name="btn" type="submit" value="login" /> </form> the submit only works random in chrome and dont work in IE and FF. im doing something wrong?

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  • Securing input of private / protected methods?

    - by ts
    Hello, normally, all sane developers are trying to secure input of all public methods (casting to proper types, validating, sanitizing etc.) My question is: are you in your code validating also parameters passed to protected / private methods? In my opinion it is not necessary, if you securize properly parameters of public methods and return values from outside (other classes, db, user input etc...). But I am constantly facing frameworks and apps (ie. prestashop to name one) where validation is often repeated in method call, in method body and once again for securize returned value - which, I think, is creating performace overhead and is also a sign of bad design.

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  • Safari - showing expired .NET Page

    - by Hidayath
    We have a strange problem in Safari. When the user logs out of our Web Application we expire the forms authentication with the following FormsAuthentication.SignOut(); Session.Abandon(); This works fine in IE and Firefox (when the user hits the back button they are presented with a page expired message and are forced to login) but in Safari the last page the user was working on shows up. I tried many of the suggested thinks like setting the Response.Expires but nothing helps , Has anyone faced this problem ? Do u have any suggestion / workarounds ? Thanks

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  • HTTPS-Compliant Sharepoint Web Parts

    - by bporter
    We are planning to create a new sub-site within our company's intranet site. The intranet is built on SharePoint 2007. My question is this: Suppose I want to add a 3rd-party weather web part to the home page of my new intranet site. Since the new site uses HTTPS, do I need to make sure to find an HTTPS-compliant web part? If I use a standard web part, will users get a "This page contains both secure and non-secure items" error message when they load the page? Thanks in advance!

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  • An old flaw in X Window System. How does it work?

    - by Legend
    I was going through an article today when it mentioned the following: "We've found many errors over the years. One of the absolute best was the following in the X Window System: if(getuid() != 0 && geteuid == 0) { ErrorF("Only root"); exit(1); } It allowed any local user to get root access. (The tautological check geteuid == 0 was intended to be geteuid() == 0. In its current form, it compress the address of geteuid to 0; given that the function exists, its address is never 0)." The article explained what was wrong with the code but I would like to know what it means to say that "It allowed any local user to get root access". I am not an expert in C but can someone give me an exact context in which this exploit would work? Specifically, what I mean is, lets say I am the local user, how would I get root access if we assume this code to be present somewhere?

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  • Single Sign On with 3 applications

    - by John H.
    I'm building three web applications in .NET that will all share a users database and login information. Lets pretend that application 1 is the "parent" application and applications "A" and "B" are the "child" applications. All users have to be logged into application 1 to have access to applications A and B. Authorization, Authentication, and MachineKey sections of all web configs are present and work correctly. I have the correct web.config settings in all applications to achieve Single Sign On except one problem remains: what do I put in the "loginUrl" attribute of the forms tag in Applications A and B. Assume that the url for the login to application 1 is "www.johnsapp.com/login.aspx" How can I get applications A and B to send the user back to application 1 for authentication using only settings in web.config?

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  • How much effort does it take to spoof an Ip Address in a call to a webservice?

    - by Rory Becker
    I don't want to know how... Just how complicated.... I'm thinking of securing a webservice or 2 based on the incoming client ipaddress of the caller. Is this in any way secure? Surely if the IPaddress was being spoofed then the result would have to be sent back to the address that was being spoofed and therefore not reach the spoofer? Update: Ok so from what I can tell.... I should create a Gettoken() method which checks the IPaddress and passes out a cryptographically significant token with a timeout to any valid IP address. This is then required by any other method before any kind of side effect is allowed. Since an Attacker can't (likely) get the token without having a valid IP, he will be unable to validly call any of my "dangerous" webmethods ?

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  • How to Check Authenticity of an AJAX Request

    - by Alex Reisner
    I am designing a web site in which users solve puzzles as quickly as they can. JavaScript is used to time each puzzle, and the number of milliseconds is sent to the server via AJAX when the puzzle is completed. How can I ensure that the time received by the server was not forged by the user? I don't think a session-based authenticity token (the kind used for forms in Rails) is sufficient because I need to authenticate the source of a value, not just the legitimacy of the request. Is there a way to cryptographically sign the request? I can't think of anything that couldn't be duplicated by a hacker. Is any JavaScript, by its exposed, client-side nature, subject to tampering? Am I going to have to use something that gets compiled, like Flash? (Yikes.) Or is there some way to hide a secret key? Or something else I haven't thought of? Update: To clarify, I don't want to penalize people with slow network connections (and network speed should be considered inconsistent), so the timing needs to be 100% client-side (the timer starts only when we know the user can see the puzzle). Also, there is money involved so no amount of "trusting the user" is acceptable.

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  • How to play music on site preventing direct file download

    - by Hugo Palma
    I'm starting a blog with a hosted wordpress instance and i would like to be able to stream music using a flash player on some posts. The problem is that every player i find uses a simple param to get the file url which makes it very easy for someone to find that url and just download the file. A server side solution can be implemented as i have full access to the server.

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  • How can we store password other than plain text?

    - by Eric
    I've found numerous posts on stackoverflow on how to store user passwords. However, I need to know what is the best way to store a password that my application needs to communicate with another application via the web? Currently, our web app needs to transmit data to a remote website. To upload the data, our web app reads the password from a text file and creates the header with payloads and submits via https. This password in plain text on the file system is the issue. Is there any way to store the password more securely? Thanks!

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  • Customer provider Password Reset client.

    - by ProfK
    I'm looking for guidence on writing a custom password reset UI, but it must fit the Provider 'Pattern', or degrade silently to built-in defaults. E.g. my Reset Control must collect extra information, and perform differently to the standard Password Recovery Control. It must close as possible use the standard MembershipProvider interface for standard functions, and only use an extended interface for the non-standard stuff. I'd like some reading on issues such as, what must I ask the Membership Provider for, and what must I do myself. What must I tell the provider (service?) about what I do? Etc.

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  • Backdoor Strategy- opinion needed.

    - by the Hampster
    I'm creating an application to track publications and grants for a university. Professors will need to put they CV into the system when it is up and running. Yeah, right. The person in charge is planning on hiring someone to input all of the information, but my questions is how? The strategy I'm thinking of is to install a backdoor. The lucky undergrad can log in as any professor using the backdoor. Once all the data is removed, the backdoor can be removed. Doing so would probably be as simple as editing out a comment in the config file. The IT guys would still have access, but since they control the machines, they would have access anyway. Are there any flaws to this strategy?

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  • Preventing dictionary attacks on a web application

    - by Kevin Pang
    What's the best way to prevent a dictionary attack? I've thought up several implementations but they all seem to have some flaw in them: Lock out a user after X failed login attempts. Problem: easy to turn into a denial of service attack, locking out many users in a short amount of time. Incrementally increase response time per failed login attempt on a username. Problem: dictionary attacks might use the same password but different usernames. Incrementally increase response time per failed login attempt from an IP address. Problem: easy to get around by spoofing IP address. Incrementally increase response time per failed login attempt within a session. Problem: easy to get around by creating a dictionary attack that fires up a new session on each attempt.

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