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  • How to use separat block caches for secure and unsecure shop access in Magento?

    - by Uwe Mesecke
    I use the Magento block cache for the top navigation block. The problem is the block has to generate some urls for files in the skin directory that cannot be put into css files as the file names depend on category model data. Now when I open magento using a secure connection (https://) the navigation block is fetched from the cache and is sent to the browser but with the http:// urls resulting in a warning in most browsers about unsecure elements on the page. I'd like the have separat caches for secure and unsecure connections. The navigation block extends the class Mage_Catalog_Block_Navigation and therefore has the following cache configuration: $this->addData(array( 'cache_lifetime' => false, 'cache_tags' => array(Mage_Catalog_Model_Category::CACHE_TAG, Mage_Core_Model_Store_Group::CACHE_TAG), ));

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  • Secure way to run other people code (sandbox) on my server?

    - by amikazmi
    I want to make a web service that run other people code locally... Naturally, I want to limit their code access to certain "sandbox" directory, and that they wont be able to connect to other parts of my server (DB, main webserver, etc) Whats the best way to do it? Run VMware/Virtualbox: (+) I guess it's as secure as it gets.. even if someone manage to "hack".. they only hack the guest machine (+) can limit the cpu & memory the process uses (+) easy to setup.. just create the VM (-) harder to "connect" the sandbox directory from the host to the guest (-) wasting extra memory and cpu for managing the VM Run underprivileged user: (+) doesnt waste extra resources (+) sandbox directory is just a plain directory (?) cant limit cpu and memory? (?) dont know if it's secure enough... Any other way? Server running Fedora Core 8, the "other" codes written in Java & C++

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  • iPhone / ios development - best way to check if password is secure enough?

    - by Pranoy C
    what is the best way to check the strength of a password in iOS development? I came across this post: What is the best way to check the strength of a password? but this is not iOS specific. My question is - Does Apple or third party libraries provide any libraries by default which I can use to check if the user entered a secure password? If not, then as the above post says, is using regular expressions the best way? Does Apple have any requirements which our app needs to implement to make sure user has a secure password? I am planning on using the keychain to store the password.

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  • How can I provide secure web content to mobile devices that can't access an intranet?

    - by evanmcd
    I'm working with a client on development web content for their intranet. We want users to be able to access a version of the content on their mobile devices, but most of them don't have the VPN capability to get on to their intranet. I'm wondering if anyone has had experience with this and can recommend a solution. One other thing to consider is that the content is not mission critically secure. If someone outside the company gained access to it, it would not represent a major issue, only a minor annoyance. Thanks for any advice.

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  • How to secure Firefox traffic (+DNS) through SOCKS proxy under Ubuntu 10.04?

    - by Maarx
    I'm using Ubuntu 10.04, and starting a SOCKS proxy with 'ssh -D', and setting Ubuntu to use it with "System - Preferences - Network Proxy". Firefox uses the proxy, and the proxy's IP appears when I visit a site like http://www.whatismyip.com/. My question is, is Firefox resolving DNS requests through this proxy? Is my web-browsing truly secure? (That is, until I exit the other end of the proxy. I know it's insecure after that.) (And I've verified the keys, I'm not being man-in-the-middled) (And--screw it. You know what I mean. Is it resolving DNS requests through the proxy?) I don't know how I would go about verifying such a thing for myself. Using additional hardware such as another debugging proxy is not an option. If Firefox isn't resolving my DNS requests through the SOCKS proxy, how do I go about fixing it?

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  • How to secure both root domain and wildcard subdomains with one SSL cert?

    - by Question Overflow
    I am trying to generate a self-signed SSL certificate to secure both example.com and *.example.com. Looking at the answers to this and this questions, there seems to be an equal number of people agreeing and disagreeing whether this could be done. However, the website from a certification authority seems to suggest that it could be done. Currently, these are the changes added to my openssl configuration file: [req] req_extensions = v3_req [req_distinguished_name] commonName = example.com [v3_req] subjectAltName = @alt_names [alt_names] DNS.1 = example.com DNS.2 = *.example.com I tried the above configuration and generated a certificate. When navigating to https://example.com, it produces the usual warning that the cert is "self-signed". After acceptance, I navigate to https://abc.example.com and an additional warning is produced, saying that the certificate is only valid for example.com. The certificate details only listed example.com in the certificate hierarchy with no signs of any wildcard subdomain being present. I am not sure whether this is due to a misconfiguration or that the common name should have a wildcard or that this could not be done.

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  • Is there anyway I can secure my connection when I try to log in to my router remotely?

    - by HardwareMuch
    I'm trying to configure my desktop to be accessed remotely. Here's what I've done so far: enabled wake on lan / remote wake up on all interfaces. I'm using logmein as my remote desktop application. setup DDNS so that I can log in to my router. When I try to remotely log in to my router it says that it is not encrypted there anyone can see my log in information. What can I do to make this a more secure setup? Any other suggestions or different methods will be greatly appreciated.

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  • Is there anyway I can secure my connection when I try to log in to my router from remotely?

    - by HardwareMuch
    I'm trying to configure my desktop to be accessed remotely. Here's what I've done so far: enabled wake on lan / remote wake up on all interfaces. I'm using logmein as my remote desktop application. setup DDNS so that I can log in to my router. When I try to remotely log in to my router it says that it is not encrypted there anyone can see my log in information. What can I do to make this a more secure setup? Any other suggestions or different methods will be greatly appreciated.

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  • Is visiting HTTPS websites on a public hotspot secure?

    - by Calmarius
    It's often said that HTTPS SSL/TLS connections are encrypted and said to be secure because the communication between the server and me is encrypted (also provides server authentication) so if someone sniffs my packets, they will need zillions of years to decrypt if using brute force in theory. Let's assume I'm on a public wifi and there is a malicious user on the same wifi who sniffs every packet. Now let's assume I'm trying to access my gmail account using this wifi. My browser does a SSL/TLS handshake with the server and gets the keys to use for encryption and decryption. If that malicious user sniffed all my incoming and outgoing packets. Can he calculate the same keys and read my encrypted traffic too or even send encrypted messages to the server in my name?

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  • File/folder Write/Delete wise, is my server secure?

    - by acidzombie24
    I wanted to know if someone got access to my server by using a nonroot account, how much damage can he do? After i su someuser I used this command to find all files and folders that are writeable. find / -writable >> list.txt Here is the result. Its most /dev/something and /proc/something and these /var/lock /var/run/mysqld/mysqld.sock /var/tmp /var/lib/php5 Is my system secure? /var/tmp makes sense but i am unsure why this user has write access to those folders. Should i change them? stat /var/lib/php5 gives me 1733 which is odd. Why write access? why no read? is this some kind of weird use of a temp file?

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  • Reasonably Secure Alternative to Poptop PPTP Server for Ubuntu server and Windows clients?

    - by wag2639
    I have a poptp server running on a old Fedora server but I'm upgrading to an Ubuntu 10.04 server. I was wondering if there are any good, reasonable secure alternatives to poptop that in can install on our new Ubuntu server as a way to get VPN access from Windows clients (XP and 7) to get remote access into our Intranet. We only use the VPN to access files located inside the network; we do not need to use it as a proxy/gateway. I've looked into openVPN but it seemed way too complicated and I would prefer something built into Windows. A Windows 7 only solution is OK.

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  • Is it necessary to change the default users and groups in VMware esxi 4.0 in order to have a secure

    - by Teevus
    By default esxi creates a number of users and groups including: daemon nfsnobody root nobody vimuser dcui How secure is this default security setup? Besides changing the root password, is it advisable to modify the default users and groups? E.g. does esxi use default passwords for the accounts or anything else that could be exploited by malicious users? My scenario is very basic and I don't require any custom users or groups as only sysadmins will ever need to administer the virtual infrastructure, and they can do so using the root account. Thanks

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  • What is the most secure way to set up a mysql user for Wordpress?

    - by Sinthia V
    I am setting up Subdomain based MU on my domain.Everything is hosted by me running on one CentOS/Webmin VPS. Will I be better off setting the MySQL user's domain as localhost, 127.0.0.1 or with a wildcard %.mydomain.com? Which is more secure? Is localhost === 127.0.0.1? If not what is the difference? Also, what is my domain from MySQL's or Wordpress' pov when I am connected by ssh terminal? How about When I connect by Webmin or Usermin? Does MySQL see me as Webmin or my Unix user?

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • TLS/SSL and .NET Framework 4.0

    The Secure Socket Layer is now essential for the secure exchange of digital data, and is most generally used within the HTTPS protocol. .NET now provides the Windows Communication Foundation (WCF) to implement secure communications directly. Matteo explains the TLS/SSL protocol, and takes a hands-on approach to investigate the SslStream class to show how to implement a secure communication channel

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  • OpenLDAP, howto allow both secure (TLS) and unsecure (normal) connections?

    - by Mikael Roos
    Installed OpenLDAP 2.4 on FreeBSD 8.1. It works for ordinary connections OR for TLS connections. I can change it by (un)commenting the following lines in slapd.conf. # Enable TLS #security ssf=128 # Disable TLS security ssf=0 Is there a way to allow the clients to connect using TLS OR no-TLS? Can the ldap-server be configured to support both TLS connections and no-TLS connections? Tried to find the information in the manual, but failed: http://www.openldap.org/doc/admin24/access-control.html#Granting%20and%20Denying%20access%20based%20on%20security%20strength%20factors%20(ssf) http://www.openldap.org/doc/admin24/tls.html#Server%20Configuration Tried to read up on 'security' in manualpage for ldap.conf, didn't find the info there either. I guess I need to configure the 'secure' with some negotiation mechanism, "try to use TLS if client has it, otherwise continue using no-TLS". Connecting with a client (when slapd.conf is configure to use TLS): gm# ldapsearch -x -b '' -s base '(objectclass=*)' namingContexts ldap_bind: Confidentiality required (13) additional info: TLS confidentiality required gm# ldapsearch -Z -x -b '' -s base '(objectclass=*)' namingContexts (this works, -Z makes a TLS connection) So, can I have my ldap-server supporting client connections using TLS and ordinary (no-TLS) connections? Thanx in advance.

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  • What is the optimum way to secure a company wide wiki?

    - by Mark Robinson
    We have a wiki which is used by over half our company. Generally it has been very positively received. However, there is a concern over security - not letting confidential information fall into the wrong hands (i.e. competitors). The default answer is to create a complicated security matrix defining who can read what document (wiki page) based on who created it. Personally I think this mainly solves the wrong problem because it creates barriers within the company instead of a barrier to the external world. But some are concerned that people at a customer site might share information with a customer which then goes to the competitor. The administration of such a matrix is a nightmare because (1) the matrix is based on department and not projects (this is a matrix organisation), and (2) because in a wiki all pages are by definition dynamic so what is confidential today might not be confidential tomorrow (but the history is always readable!). Apart from the security matrix, we've considered restricting content on the wiki to non super secret stuff, but off course that needs to be monitored. Another solution (the current) is to monitor views and report anything suspicious (e.g. one person at a customer site having 2000 views in two days was reported). Again - this is not ideal because this does not directly imply a wrong motive. Does anyone have a better solution? How can a company wide wiki be made secure and yet keep its low threshold USP? BTW we use MediaWiki with Lockdown to exclude some administrative staff.

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  • How to set up simple VPN for secure Internet connections over unencrypted Wi-Fi on Windows?

    - by Senseful
    I'm looking for a solution similar to the one in this question, except that I don't have a linux computer. I have windows computers that could be set up to accept VPN connections. Preferably I want to set this up on either Windows Server 2003 or Windows XP. I'd like to connect different devices (e.g. iPhone, iPad, laptops, etc.) that are on open unsecure wireless networks (e.g. the one's you see at places like Starbucks) to this VPN to ensure that all my data is secure. I found an article that shows that you can enable VPN connections on Windows XP. After following those steps, though, I'm not sure what to do. Which ports do I open on my firewall? Which VPN settings do I use on my devices such as the iPhone? Do I use L2TP, PPTP, or IPSec? What's the difference between these? Are there any other steps missing in that tutorial? I'm hoping that since Windows has this built in feature, that it will be much simpler to set up rather than having to deal with setting up something such as OpenVPN. If I follow those settings and enable port forwarding on port 1723, and then use the following settings on the iPhone: PPTP (IP Address) RSA SecurID: Off Encryption Level: Auto Send All Traffic: On Proxy: Off It shows "Connecting..." then "Disconnecting..." and the following error message: VPN Configuration A connection could not be established to the PPP server. Try reconnecting. If the problem continues, verify your settings and contact your Administrator. I'm using a user account that I enabled privileges to in the VPN settings on the Windows machine.

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  • What steps should I take to secure Tomcat 6.x?

    - by PAS
    I am in the process of setting up an new Tomcat deployment, and want it to be as secure as possible. I have created a 'jakarta' user and have jsvc running Tomcat as a daemon. Any tips on directory permissions and such to limit access to Tomcat's files? I know I will need to remove the default webapps - docs, examples, etc... are there any best practices I should be using here? What about all the config XML files? Any tips there? Is it worth enabling the Security manager so that webapps run in a sandbox? Has anyone had experience setting this up? I have seen examples of people running two instances of Tomcat behind Apache. It seems this can be done using mod_jk or with mod_proxy... any pros/cons of either? Is it worth the trouble? In case it matters, the OS is Debian lenny. I am not using apt-get because lenny only offers tomcat 5.5 and we require 6.x. Thanks!

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  • AIX Grid Control 10.2.0.5 Communication and Monitoring Issue since 31-DEC-2010

    - by jayatheertha.rao(at)oracle.com
    Detailed symptoms for Oracle Management Server (OMS) 10.2.0.5 on AIX Oracle Management Service 10.2.0.5 instances on AIX 5L remain active and functional, but the OMS instances fail to communicate with the Grid Control Management Agents.An SSLPeerUnverified exception will be reported in the file $ORACLE_HOME/sysman/log/emoms.trc when OMS attempts to connect with an Agent:Javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not authenticatedat com.sun.net.ssl.internal.ssl.SSLSessionImpl.getPeerCertificateChain(DashoA12275)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.authenticateHTTPConnection(EMDClient.java:2002)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.getConnection(EMDClient.java:1877)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.getConnection(EMDClient.java:1810)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.verifyHttpConnection(EMDClient.java:2540)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.getResponseForRequest(EMDClient.java:2323)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.getUploadManagerStatus(EMDClient.java:4853)at oracle.sysman.eml.admin.rep.emdConfig.EmdConfigTargetsData.getEmdUploadData(EmdConfigTargetsData.java:1640)at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)This error may be reported when:- Accessing the Agent home page in Grid Control- Setting preferred credentials for a target monitored by the Agent- Managing metrics for a target monitored by the Agent The jobs scheduled to be run by Agents can become non-responsiveThe OMS log file $ORACLE_HOME/sysman/log/emoms.trc can show:2010-12-31 00:06:58,204 [JobWorker 430:Thread-34] DEBUG emSDK.comm getStreamResponse.4015 - oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.CommException: java.io.IOException: javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not authenticatedoracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.CommException: java.io.IOException: javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not authenticatedat oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.getStreamResponse_(EMDClient.java:4088)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.getStreamResponse(EMDClient.java:4009)at oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.EMDClient.remoteOperation(EMDClient.java:3404)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.CommandManager.requestRemoteCommand(CommandManager.java:765)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.commands.RemoteOp.executeCommand(RemoteOp.java:434)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.commands.RemoteOp.executeCommand(RemoteOp.java:491)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.BaseJobWorker.runStep(BaseJobWorker.java:614)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.BaseJobWorker.doOneOperation(BaseJobWorker.java:738)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.JobWorker.doOneOperation(JobWorker.java:306)at oracle.sysman.emdrep.jobs.JobWorker.run(JobWorker.java:288)at oracle.sysman.util.threadPoolManager.WorkerThread.run(Worker.java:261) Detailed symptoms for Grid Control Management Agent 10.2.0.5 on AIX Beginning 31-DEC-2010 00:00:00, 10.2.0.5 Management Agents running on the AIX 5L operating system will fail to monitor Oracle Application Server targets. As a result, the Availability Status for the Oracle Application Server targets will be in the "Metric Error" state. NOTE: The 10.2.0.5.0 Agents would experience these errors regardless of the version/platform of the OMS.The following metric error is seen in the console for the Oracle Application Server targets monitored by a Grid Control Management Agent 10.2.0.5 installed on AIX and experiencing a Root Certificate Authority issue:Message oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.fetchlet.FetchletException: oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.fetchlet.FetchletException: oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.fetchlet.FetchletException: oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.CommException: java.io.IOException: javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not authenticated The Grid Control Management Agent log file $ORACLE_HOME/sysman/log/emagentfetchlet.log (or $ORACLE_HOME/hostname/sysman/log/emagentfetchlet.log for a clustered Agent) includes the following errors:2010-12-31 00:01:03,626 [nmefmgr_getJNIFetchlet] ERROR ias.ResponseMetric getResponseMetric.154 - Unable tocompute application server statusoracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.fetchlet.FetchletException: oracle.sysman.emSDK.emd.comm.CommException: java.io.IOException: javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not authenticatedat oracle.sysman.ias.ias.ResponseMetric.getResponseMetric(ResponseMetric.java:108)at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Native Method)at sun.reflect.NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(NativeMethodAccessorImpl.java:79)at sun.reflect.DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.java:43)at java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Method.java:618)at oracle.sysman.emd.fetchlets.JavaWrapperFetchlet.getMetric(JavaWrapperFetchlet.java:217)at oracle.sysman.emd.fetchlets.FetchletWrapper.getMetric(FetchletWrapper.java:382) Beginning 31-DEC-2010, 10.2.0.5 Management Agents on the AIX 5L platform will fail to secure or re-secure with Oracle Management Service (OMS). This failure will cause installation of 10.2.0.5 Agents on the AIX 5L platform to fail.NOTE: The 10.2.0.5.0 Agents would experience these errors regardless of the version/platform of the OMS.The "emctl secure agent" command will fail with the following error, which will be written to the $ORACLE_HOME/sysman/log/secure.log file (or $ORACLE_HOME/hostname/sysman/log/secure.log for a clustered Agent) :2011-01-03 21:06:11,941 [main] ERROR agent.SecureAgentCmd main.207 - Failedto secure the Agent:javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: peer not authenticatedatcom.sun.net.ssl.internal.ssl.SSLSessionImpl.getPeerCertificateChain(DashoA6275)atoracle.sysman.emctl.secure.agent.SecureAgentCmd.checkUpload(SecureAgentCmd.java:478)atoracle.sysman.emctl.secure.agent.SecureAgentCmd.secureAgent(SecureAgentCmd.java:249)atoracle.sysman.emctl.secure.agent.SecureAgentCmd.main(SecureAgentCmd.java:200)  For solution, refer to AIX Grid Control 10.2.0.5 SSL Communication and Monitoring Issue since 31-DEC-2010 (Doc ID 1275070.1)

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  • Is there a C# secure socket other than SSLStream?

    - by AI0867
    .NET 2.0 provides only the System.Net.Security.SslStream class for secure sockets in .NET 2.0 and higher, but this uses the Stream interface, which provides the blocking Read/Write members and asynchronous Begin{Read,Write} members. I'm looking for a class that provides functionality similar to System.Net.Sockets.Socket. Specifically, something resembling Poll/Select, so I can handle multiple sockets in a single thread without blocking. The mentalis security library supplies a SecureSocket class, but is explicitly unsupported for versions greater than .NET 1.1.

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  • How to secure a WCF service using NetNamedPipesBinding so that it can only be called by the current

    - by Samuel Jack
    I'm using a WCF service with the NetNamedPipesBinding to communicate between two AppDomains in my process. How do I secure the service so that it is not accessible to other users on the same machine? I have already taken the precaution of using a GUID in the Endpoint Address, so there's a little security through obscurity, but I'm looking for a way of locking the service down using ACL or something similar.

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