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  • How to add a Web Reference to a SSL web service?

    - by Matt W
    Hi, I have a web service in a C#/3.5 project which has been running fine. This is until I set the "SSL port" in IIS to 443 and set the "IIS - Directory Security - Secure Communications - Require secure channel (SSL)" option to true. Now, the web reference cannot be updated and I cannot add a new web reference to the web service in that site. When I try to view the service in a browse using just HTTP I get the "This page must be viewed over a secure channel" and when viewed with HTTPS on the front I get "This web page not available." Could someone tell me how to get a Web Reference added using Visual Studio to this secure web service, please? Thanks, Matt.

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  • [Zend YouTubeAPP] failed to upgrade a token

    - by kwokwai
    Hi all, I was testing Zend Gdata 1.10.1 in my localhost. I downloaded Zend Gdate from this link: http://framework.zend.com/download/webservices Inside the Zend Gdata zip file, there was a folder called demos. I extracted it and used the YouTudeVideoApp to upload a sample video to Youtube. But every time after I logged into Youtube, before it redirected me to my localhost, I received a warning message like this warning message: localhost: This website is registered with Google to make authorization requests, but has not been configured to send requests securely. We recommend that you continue the process only if you trust the following destination: localhost:8080/youtube/operations.php So I googled on how to resolve the problem of getting this warning message when I saw some people suggesed changing the value of $secure to True in operation.php. Here is the script mentioned: function generateAuthSubRequestLink($nextUrl = null) { $scope = 'http://gdata.youtube.com'; $secure = true; $session = true; if (!$nextUrl) { generateUrlInformation(); $nextUrl = $_SESSION['operationsUrl']; } $url = Zend_Gdata_AuthSub::getAuthSubTokenUri($nextUrl, $scope, $secure, $session); echo '<a href="' . $url . '"><strong>Click here to authenticate with YouTube</strong></a>'; } After I altered the value of $secure to True, I found that the warning message changed to this: localhost: Registered, secure. This website is registered with Google to make authorization requests The new warning message is somehow shorter and looks better than the previous warning message. But once I pressed the Allow Access button, it turned out to be this: ERROR - Token upgrade for CI3M6_Q3EOGkxoL-___wEYjffToQQ failed : Token upgrade failed. Reason: Invalid AuthSub header. Error 401 ERROR - Unknown search type - '' I don't know why this happened. Could you help me solve the problem please?

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  • Any book on building a complete web service?

    - by webservicesbuilder
    Hi All, Is there any book that can guide me building secure webservices. Adding xsds to WSDL Adding WS security policies to WSDL Any book that can describe how to put together a secure web service. the language shouldn't matter, but it should explain the concepts and help the reader to put together all the pieces required for building a secure web service. Thanks

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  • changing src reference based upon https

    - by spody
    I'm adding a facebook comment widget to a website. I'm placing this widget in a file that is included on everypage. The navigation is relatively linked so it switches back and forth from http and https. But for some reason the comment widget only shows up if both the src linked file and webpage is secure or both the src linked file and webpage is NOT secure. The widget does not display of the src file is secure and the webpage is not secure. So... I've tried this but doesn't work. if (window.location.protocol == 'https:') script.setAttribute('src', 'https://ssl.connect.facebook.com/js/api_lib/v0.4/FeatureLoader.js.php'); } else { script.setAttribute('src', 'http://static.ak.connect.facebook.com/connect.php/en_US') }

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  • Spring security @notation for IS_AUTHENTICATED_FULLY?

    - by wuntee
    I am simply trying to allow a user access to a method if they are authenticated, but nothing I am doing seems to work. Is there a way to just check if the user has been authenticated? The following still denies the user even when authenticated... Is there a built in role for an authenticated user? @RequestMapping("/secure") @PreAuthorize("hasRole('IS_AUTHENTICATED_FULLY')") public String secure(ModelMap map){ return("secure"); }

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  • Understanding CGI and SQL security from the ground up

    - by Steve
    This question is for learning purposes. Suppose I am writing a simple SQL admin console using CGI and Python. At http://something.com/admin, this admin console should allow me to modify a SQL database (i.e., create and modify tables, and create and modify records) using an ordinary form. In the least secure case, anybody can access http://something.com/admin and modify the database. You can password protect http://something.com/admin. But once you start using the admin console, information is still transmitted in plain text. So then you use HTTPS to secure the transmitted data. Questions: To describe to a learner, how would you incrementally add security to the least secure environment in order to make it most secure? How would you modify/augment my three (possibly erroneous) steps above? What basic tools in Python make your steps possible? Optional: Now that I understand the process, how do sophisticated libraries and frameworks inherently achieve this level of security?

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  • Cross-Application User Authentication

    - by Chris Lieb
    We have a webapp written in .NET that uses NTLM for SSO. We are writing a new webapp in Java that will tightly integrate with the original application. Unfortunately, Java has no support for performing the server portion of NTLM authentication and the only library that I can find requires too much setup to be allowed by IT. To work around this, I came up with a remote authentication scheme to work across applications and would like your opinions on it. It does not need to be extremely secure, but at the same time not easily be broken. User is authenticated into .NET application using NTLM User clicks link that leaves .NET application .NET application generates random number and stores it in the user table along with the user's full username (domain\username) Insecure token is formed as random number:username Insecure token is run through secure cipher (likely AES-256) using pre-shared key stored within the application to produce a secure token The secure token is passed as part of the query string to the Java application The Java application decrypts the secure key using the same pre-shared key stored within its own code to get the insecure token The random number and username are split apart The username is used to retrieve the user's information from the user table and the stored random number is checked against the one pulled from the insecure token If the numbers match, the username is put into the session for the user and they are now authenticated If the numbers do not match, the user is redirected to the .NET application's home page The random number is removed from the database

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  • Are WCF Services encrypted automatically if they go over SSL?

    - by michael
    Basically, if I have a plain WCF Service over HTTPS is it automatically secure? [ServiceContract] public interface ICalc { [OperationContract] int add(int a, int b); } public class Calculator : ICalc { public int add(int a, int b) { return a + b; } } I figure the actual SOAP message isn't encrypted here, but is it still secure if I use https? Basically, if I use a basichttpbinding with no security settings in my config over https://www.myserver.com/services/Calc.svc is that secure?

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  • New Big Data Appliance Security Features

    - by mgubar
    The Oracle Big Data Appliance (BDA) is an engineered system for big data processing.  It greatly simplifies the deployment of an optimized Hadoop Cluster – whether that cluster is used for batch or real-time processing.  The vast majority of BDA customers are integrating the appliance with their Oracle Databases and they have certain expectations – especially around security.  Oracle Database customers have benefited from a rich set of security features:  encryption, redaction, data masking, database firewall, label based access control – and much, much more.  They want similar capabilities with their Hadoop cluster.    Unfortunately, Hadoop wasn’t developed with security in mind.  By default, a Hadoop cluster is insecure – the antithesis of an Oracle Database.  Some critical security features have been implemented – but even those capabilities are arduous to setup and configure.  Oracle believes that a key element of an optimized appliance is that its data should be secure.  Therefore, by default the BDA delivers the “AAA of security”: authentication, authorization and auditing. Security Starts at Authentication A successful security strategy is predicated on strong authentication – for both users and software services.  Consider the default configuration for a newly installed Oracle Database; it’s been a long time since you had a legitimate chance at accessing the database using the credentials “system/manager” or “scott/tiger”.  The default Oracle Database policy is to lock accounts thereby restricting access; administrators must consciously grant access to users. Default Authentication in Hadoop By default, a Hadoop cluster fails the authentication test. For example, it is easy for a malicious user to masquerade as any other user on the system.  Consider the following scenario that illustrates how a user can access any data on a Hadoop cluster by masquerading as a more privileged user.  In our scenario, the Hadoop cluster contains sensitive salary information in the file /user/hrdata/salaries.txt.  When logged in as the hr user, you can see the following files.  Notice, we’re using the Hadoop command line utilities for accessing the data: $ hadoop fs -ls /user/hrdataFound 1 items-rw-r--r--   1 oracle supergroup         70 2013-10-31 10:38 /user/hrdata/salaries.txt$ hadoop fs -cat /user/hrdata/salaries.txtTom Brady,11000000Tom Hanks,5000000Bob Smith,250000Oprah,300000000 User DrEvil has access to the cluster – and can see that there is an interesting folder called “hrdata”.  $ hadoop fs -ls /user Found 1 items drwx------   - hr supergroup          0 2013-10-31 10:38 /user/hrdata However, DrEvil cannot view the contents of the folder due to lack of access privileges: $ hadoop fs -ls /user/hrdata ls: Permission denied: user=drevil, access=READ_EXECUTE, inode="/user/hrdata":oracle:supergroup:drwx------ Accessing this data will not be a problem for DrEvil. He knows that the hr user owns the data by looking at the folder’s ACLs. To overcome this challenge, he will simply masquerade as the hr user. On his local machine, he adds the hr user, assigns that user a password, and then accesses the data on the Hadoop cluster: $ sudo useradd hr $ sudo passwd $ su hr $ hadoop fs -cat /user/hrdata/salaries.txt Tom Brady,11000000 Tom Hanks,5000000 Bob Smith,250000 Oprah,300000000 Hadoop has not authenticated the user; it trusts that the identity that has been presented is indeed the hr user. Therefore, sensitive data has been easily compromised. Clearly, the default security policy is inappropriate and dangerous to many organizations storing critical data in HDFS. Big Data Appliance Provides Secure Authentication The BDA provides secure authentication to the Hadoop cluster by default – preventing the type of masquerading described above. It accomplishes this thru Kerberos integration. Figure 1: Kerberos Integration The Key Distribution Center (KDC) is a server that has two components: an authentication server and a ticket granting service. The authentication server validates the identity of the user and service. Once authenticated, a client must request a ticket from the ticket granting service – allowing it to access the BDA’s NameNode, JobTracker, etc. At installation, you simply point the BDA to an external KDC or automatically install a highly available KDC on the BDA itself. Kerberos will then provide strong authentication for not just the end user – but also for important Hadoop services running on the appliance. You can now guarantee that users are who they claim to be – and rogue services (like fake data nodes) are not added to the system. It is common for organizations to want to leverage existing LDAP servers for common user and group management. Kerberos integrates with LDAP servers – allowing the principals and encryption keys to be stored in the common repository. This simplifies the deployment and administration of the secure environment. Authorize Access to Sensitive Data Kerberos-based authentication ensures secure access to the system and the establishment of a trusted identity – a prerequisite for any authorization scheme. Once this identity is established, you need to authorize access to the data. HDFS will authorize access to files using ACLs with the authorization specification applied using classic Linux-style commands like chmod and chown (e.g. hadoop fs -chown oracle:oracle /user/hrdata changes the ownership of the /user/hrdata folder to oracle). Authorization is applied at the user or group level – utilizing group membership found in the Linux environment (i.e. /etc/group) or in the LDAP server. For SQL-based data stores – like Hive and Impala – finer grained access control is required. Access to databases, tables, columns, etc. must be controlled. And, you want to leverage roles to facilitate administration. Apache Sentry is a new project that delivers fine grained access control; both Cloudera and Oracle are the project’s founding members. Sentry satisfies the following three authorization requirements: Secure Authorization:  the ability to control access to data and/or privileges on data for authenticated users. Fine-Grained Authorization:  the ability to give users access to a subset of the data (e.g. column) in a database Role-Based Authorization:  the ability to create/apply template-based privileges based on functional roles. With Sentry, “all”, “select” or “insert” privileges are granted to an object. The descendants of that object automatically inherit that privilege. A collection of privileges across many objects may be aggregated into a role – and users/groups are then assigned that role. This leads to simplified administration of security across the system. Figure 2: Object Hierarchy – granting a privilege on the database object will be inherited by its tables and views. Sentry is currently used by both Hive and Impala – but it is a framework that other data sources can leverage when offering fine-grained authorization. For example, one can expect Sentry to deliver authorization capabilities to Cloudera Search in the near future. Audit Hadoop Cluster Activity Auditing is a critical component to a secure system and is oftentimes required for SOX, PCI and other regulations. The BDA integrates with Oracle Audit Vault and Database Firewall – tracking different types of activity taking place on the cluster: Figure 3: Monitored Hadoop services. At the lowest level, every operation that accesses data in HDFS is captured. The HDFS audit log identifies the user who accessed the file, the time that file was accessed, the type of access (read, write, delete, list, etc.) and whether or not that file access was successful. The other auditing features include: MapReduce:  correlate the MapReduce job that accessed the file Oozie:  describes who ran what as part of a workflow Hive:  captures changes were made to the Hive metadata The audit data is captured in the Audit Vault Server – which integrates audit activity from a variety of sources, adding databases (Oracle, DB2, SQL Server) and operating systems to activity from the BDA. Figure 4: Consolidated audit data across the enterprise.  Once the data is in the Audit Vault server, you can leverage a rich set of prebuilt and custom reports to monitor all the activity in the enterprise. In addition, alerts may be defined to trigger violations of audit policies. Conclusion Security cannot be considered an afterthought in big data deployments. Across most organizations, Hadoop is managing sensitive data that must be protected; it is not simply crunching publicly available information used for search applications. The BDA provides a strong security foundation – ensuring users are only allowed to view authorized data and that data access is audited in a consolidated framework.

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  • SSL certificates and types for securing your websites and applications

    - by Mit Naik
    Need to share few information regarding SSL certificates and there types, which SSL certificates are widely used etc. There are several SSL certificates available in the market today inorder to secure your domains, multiple subdomains, your applications and code too. Few of the details are mentioned below. CheapSSL certificates available today are Standard Rapidssl certificate, Thwate SSL 123 etc certificates which are basic level certificates. Most of these cheap SSL certificates are domain-validated only and don't provide the greatest trust for your customers. This means you shouldn't use cheap SSL certificates on e-commerce stores or other public-facing sites that require people to trust the site. EV certificates I found Geotrust Truebusinessid with EV certificate which is one of the cheapest certificate available in market today, you can also find Thwate, Versign EV version of certificates. Its designed to prevent phishing attacks better than normal SSL certificates. What makes an EV Certificate so special? An SSL Certificate Provider has to do some extensive validation to give you one including: Verifying that your organization is legally registered and active, Verifying the address and phone number of your organization, Verifying that your organization has exclusive right to use the domain specified in the EV Certificate, Verifying that the person ordering the certificate has been authorized by the organization, Verifying that your organization is not on any government blacklists. SSL WILDCARD CERTIFICATES, SSL Wildcard Certificates are big money-savers. An SSL Wildcard Certificate allows you to secure an unlimited number of first-level sub-domains on a single domain name. For example, if you need to secure the following websites: * www.yourdomain.com * secure.yourdomain.com * product.yourdomain.com * info.yourdomain.com * download.yourdomain.com * anything.yourdomain.com and all of these websites are hosted on the multiple server box, you can purchase and install one Wildcard certificate issued to *.yourdomain.com to secure all these sites. SAN CERTIFICATES, are interesting certificates and are helpfull if you want to secure multiple domains by generating single CSR and can install the same certificate on your additional sites without generating new CSRs for all the additional domains. CODE SIGNING CERTIFICATES, A code signing certificate is a file containing a digital signature that can be used to sign executables and scripts in order to verify your identity and ensure that your code has not been tampered with since it was signed. This helps your users to determine whether your software can be trusted. Scroll to the chart below to compare cheap code signing certificates. A code signing certificate allows you to sign code using a private and public key system similar to how an SSL certificate secures a website. When you request a code signing certificate, a public/private key pair is generated. The certificate authority will then issue a code signing certificate that contains the public key. A certificate for code signing needs to be signed by a trusted certificate authority so that the operating system knows that your identity has been validated. You could still use the code signing certificate to sign and distribute malicious software but you will be held legally accountable for it. You can sign many different types of code. The most common types include Windows applications such as .exe, .cab, .dll, .ocx, and .xpi files (using an Authenticode certificate), Apple applications (using an Apple code signing certificate), Microsoft Office VBA objects and macros (using a VBA code signing certificate), .jar files (using a Java code signing certificate), .air or .airi files (using an Adobe AIR certificate), and Windows Vista drivers and other kernel-mode software (using a Vista code certificate). In reality, a code signing certificate can sign almost all types of code as long as you convert the certificate to the correct format first. Also I found the below URL which provides you good suggestion regarding purchasing best SSL certificates for securing your site, as per the Financial institution, Bank, Hosting providers, ISP, Retail Merchants etc. Please vote and provide comments or any additional suggestions regarding SSL certificates.

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  • Toorcon14

    - by danx
    Toorcon 2012 Information Security Conference San Diego, CA, http://www.toorcon.org/ Dan Anderson, October 2012 It's almost Halloween, and we all know what that means—yes, of course, it's time for another Toorcon Conference! Toorcon is an annual conference for people interested in computer security. This includes the whole range of hackers, computer hobbyists, professionals, security consultants, press, law enforcement, prosecutors, FBI, etc. We're at Toorcon 14—see earlier blogs for some of the previous Toorcon's I've attended (back to 2003). This year's "con" was held at the Westin on Broadway in downtown San Diego, California. The following are not necessarily my views—I'm just the messenger—although I could have misquoted or misparaphrased the speakers. Also, I only reviewed some of the talks, below, which I attended and interested me. MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections, Aditya K. Sood Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata, Rebecca "bx" Shapiro Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules?, Valkyrie Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI, Dan Griffin You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program, Boris Sverdlik What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking, Dave Maas & Jason Leopold Accessibility and Security, Anna Shubina Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance, Adam Brand McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend, Jay James & Shane MacDougall MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections Aditya K. Sood, IOActive, Michigan State PhD candidate Aditya talked about Android smartphone malware. There's a lot of old Android software out there—over 50% Gingerbread (2.3.x)—and most have unpatched vulnerabilities. Of 9 Android vulnerabilities, 8 have known exploits (such as the old Gingerbread Global Object Table exploit). Android protection includes sandboxing, security scanner, app permissions, and screened Android app market. The Android permission checker has fine-grain resource control, policy enforcement. Android static analysis also includes a static analysis app checker (bouncer), and a vulnerablity checker. What security problems does Android have? User-centric security, which depends on the user to grant permission and make smart decisions. But users don't care or think about malware (the're not aware, not paranoid). All they want is functionality, extensibility, mobility Android had no "proper" encryption before Android 3.0 No built-in protection against social engineering and web tricks Alternative Android app markets are unsafe. Simply visiting some markets can infect Android Aditya classified Android Malware types as: Type A—Apps. These interact with the Android app framework. For example, a fake Netflix app. Or Android Gold Dream (game), which uploads user files stealthy manner to a remote location. Type K—Kernel. Exploits underlying Linux libraries or kernel Type H—Hybrid. These use multiple layers (app framework, libraries, kernel). These are most commonly used by Android botnets, which are popular with Chinese botnet authors What are the threats from Android malware? These incude leak info (contacts), banking fraud, corporate network attacks, malware advertising, malware "Hackivism" (the promotion of social causes. For example, promiting specific leaders of the Tunisian or Iranian revolutions. Android malware is frequently "masquerated". That is, repackaged inside a legit app with malware. To avoid detection, the hidden malware is not unwrapped until runtime. The malware payload can be hidden in, for example, PNG files. Less common are Android bootkits—there's not many around. What they do is hijack the Android init framework—alteering system programs and daemons, then deletes itself. For example, the DKF Bootkit (China). Android App Problems: no code signing! all self-signed native code execution permission sandbox — all or none alternate market places no robust Android malware detection at network level delayed patch process Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata Rebecca "bx" Shapiro, Dartmouth College, NH https://github.com/bx/elf-bf-tools @bxsays on twitter Definitions. "ELF" is an executable file format used in linking and loading executables (on UNIX/Linux-class machines). "Weird machine" uses undocumented computation sources (I think of them as unintended virtual machines). Some examples of "weird machines" are those that: return to weird location, does SQL injection, corrupts the heap. Bx then talked about using ELF metadata as (an uintended) "weird machine". Some ELF background: A compiler takes source code and generates a ELF object file (hello.o). A static linker makes an ELF executable from the object file. A runtime linker and loader takes ELF executable and loads and relocates it in memory. The ELF file has symbols to relocate functions and variables. ELF has two relocation tables—one at link time and another one at loading time: .rela.dyn (link time) and .dynsym (dynamic table). GOT: Global Offset Table of addresses for dynamically-linked functions. PLT: Procedure Linkage Tables—works with GOT. The memory layout of a process (not the ELF file) is, in order: program (+ heap), dynamic libraries, libc, ld.so, stack (which includes the dynamic table loaded into memory) For ELF, the "weird machine" is found and exploited in the loader. ELF can be crafted for executing viruses, by tricking runtime into executing interpreted "code" in the ELF symbol table. One can inject parasitic "code" without modifying the actual ELF code portions. Think of the ELF symbol table as an "assembly language" interpreter. It has these elements: instructions: Add, move, jump if not 0 (jnz) Think of symbol table entries as "registers" symbol table value is "contents" immediate values are constants direct values are addresses (e.g., 0xdeadbeef) move instruction: is a relocation table entry add instruction: relocation table "addend" entry jnz instruction: takes multiple relocation table entries The ELF weird machine exploits the loader by relocating relocation table entries. The loader will go on forever until told to stop. It stores state on stack at "end" and uses IFUNC table entries (containing function pointer address). The ELF weird machine, called "Brainfu*k" (BF) has: 8 instructions: pointer inc, dec, inc indirect, dec indirect, jump forward, jump backward, print. Three registers - 3 registers Bx showed example BF source code that implemented a Turing machine printing "hello, world". More interesting was the next demo, where bx modified ping. Ping runs suid as root, but quickly drops privilege. BF modified the loader to disable the library function call dropping privilege, so it remained as root. Then BF modified the ping -t argument to execute the -t filename as root. It's best to show what this modified ping does with an example: $ whoami bx $ ping localhost -t backdoor.sh # executes backdoor $ whoami root $ The modified code increased from 285948 bytes to 290209 bytes. A BF tool compiles "executable" by modifying the symbol table in an existing ELF executable. The tool modifies .dynsym and .rela.dyn table, but not code or data. Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules? "Valkyrie" (Christie Dudley, Santa Clara Law JD candidate) Valkyrie talked about mobile handset privacy. Some background: Senator Franken (also a comedian) became alarmed about CarrierIQ, where the carriers track their customers. Franken asked the FCC to find out what obligations carriers think they have to protect privacy. The carriers' response was that they are doing just fine with self-regulation—no worries! Carriers need to collect data, such as missed calls, to maintain network quality. But carriers also sell data for marketing. Verizon sells customer data and enables this with a narrow privacy policy (only 1 month to opt out, with difficulties). The data sold is not individually identifiable and is aggregated. But Verizon recommends, as an aggregation workaround to "recollate" data to other databases to identify customers indirectly. The FCC has regulated telephone privacy since 1934 and mobile network privacy since 2007. Also, the carriers say mobile phone privacy is a FTC responsibility (not FCC). FTC is trying to improve mobile app privacy, but FTC has no authority over carrier / customer relationships. As a side note, Apple iPhones are unique as carriers have extra control over iPhones they don't have with other smartphones. As a result iPhones may be more regulated. Who are the consumer advocates? Everyone knows EFF, but EPIC (Electrnic Privacy Info Center), although more obsecure, is more relevant. What to do? Carriers must be accountable. Opt-in and opt-out at any time. Carriers need incentive to grant users control for those who want it, by holding them liable and responsible for breeches on their clock. Location information should be added current CPNI privacy protection, and require "Pen/trap" judicial order to obtain (and would still be a lower standard than 4th Amendment). Politics are on a pro-privacy swing now, with many senators and the Whitehouse. There will probably be new regulation soon, and enforcement will be a problem, but consumers will still have some benefit. Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI Dan Griffin, JWSecure, Inc., Seattle, @JWSdan Dan talked about hacking measured UEFI boot. First some terms: UEFI is a boot technology that is replacing BIOS (has whitelisting and blacklisting). UEFI protects devices against rootkits. TPM - hardware security device to store hashs and hardware-protected keys "secure boot" can control at firmware level what boot images can boot "measured boot" OS feature that tracks hashes (from BIOS, boot loader, krnel, early drivers). "remote attestation" allows remote validation and control based on policy on a remote attestation server. Microsoft pushing TPM (Windows 8 required), but Google is not. Intel TianoCore is the only open source for UEFI. Dan has Measured Boot Tool at http://mbt.codeplex.com/ with a demo where you can also view TPM data. TPM support already on enterprise-class machines. UEFI Weaknesses. UEFI toolkits are evolving rapidly, but UEFI has weaknesses: assume user is an ally trust TPM implicitly, and attached to computer hibernate file is unprotected (disk encryption protects against this) protection migrating from hardware to firmware delays in patching and whitelist updates will UEFI really be adopted by the mainstream (smartphone hardware support, bank support, apathetic consumer support) You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program Boris Sverdlik, ISDPodcast.com co-host Boris talked about problems typical with current security audits. "IT Security" is an oxymoron—IT exists to enable buiness, uptime, utilization, reporting, but don't care about security—IT has conflict of interest. There's no Magic Bullet ("blinky box"), no one-size-fits-all solution (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)). Regulations don't make you secure. The cloud is not secure (because of shared data and admin access). Defense and pen testing is not sexy. Auditors are not solution (security not a checklist)—what's needed is experience and adaptability—need soft skills. Step 1: First thing is to Google and learn the company end-to-end before you start. Get to know the management team (not IT team), meet as many people as you can. Don't use arbitrary values such as CISSP scores. Quantitive risk assessment is a myth (e.g. AV*EF-SLE). Learn different Business Units, legal/regulatory obligations, learn the business and where the money is made, verify company is protected from script kiddies (easy), learn sensitive information (IP, internal use only), and start with low-hanging fruit (customer service reps and social engineering). Step 2: Policies. Keep policies short and relevant. Generic SANS "security" boilerplate policies don't make sense and are not followed. Focus on acceptable use, data usage, communications, physical security. Step 3: Implementation: keep it simple stupid. Open source, although useful, is not free (implementation cost). Access controls with authentication & authorization for local and remote access. MS Windows has it, otherwise use OpenLDAP, OpenIAM, etc. Application security Everyone tries to reinvent the wheel—use existing static analysis tools. Review high-risk apps and major revisions. Don't run different risk level apps on same system. Assume host/client compromised and use app-level security control. Network security VLAN != segregated because there's too many workarounds. Use explicit firwall rules, active and passive network monitoring (snort is free), disallow end user access to production environment, have a proxy instead of direct Internet access. Also, SSL certificates are not good two-factor auth and SSL does not mean "safe." Operational Controls Have change, patch, asset, & vulnerability management (OSSI is free). For change management, always review code before pushing to production For logging, have centralized security logging for business-critical systems, separate security logging from administrative/IT logging, and lock down log (as it has everything). Monitor with OSSIM (open source). Use intrusion detection, but not just to fulfill a checkbox: build rules from a whitelist perspective (snort). OSSEC has 95% of what you need. Vulnerability management is a QA function when done right: OpenVas and Seccubus are free. Security awareness The reality is users will always click everything. Build real awareness, not compliance driven checkbox, and have it integrated into the culture. Pen test by crowd sourcing—test with logging COSSP http://www.cossp.org/ - Comprehensive Open Source Security Project What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking Dave Maas, San Diego CityBeat Jason Leopold, Truthout.org The difference between hackers and investigative journalists: For hackers, the motivation varies, but method is same, technological specialties. For investigative journalists, it's about one thing—The Story, and they need broad info-gathering skills. J-School in 60 Seconds: Generic formula: Person or issue of pubic interest, new info, or angle. Generic criteria: proximity, prominence, timeliness, human interest, oddity, or consequence. Media awareness of hackers and trends: journalists becoming extremely aware of hackers with congressional debates (privacy, data breaches), demand for data-mining Journalists, use of coding and web development for Journalists, and Journalists busted for hacking (Murdock). Info gathering by investigative journalists include Public records laws. Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is good, but slow. California Public Records Act is a lot stronger. FOIA takes forever because of foot-dragging—it helps to be specific. Often need to sue (especially FBI). CPRA is faster, and requests can be vague. Dumps and leaks (a la Wikileaks) Journalists want: leads, protecting ourselves, our sources, and adapting tools for news gathering (Google hacking). Anonomity is important to whistleblowers. They want no digital footprint left behind (e.g., email, web log). They don't trust encryption, want to feel safe and secure. Whistleblower laws are very weak—there's no upside for whistleblowers—they have to be very passionate to do it. Accessibility and Security or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Halting Problem Anna Shubina, Dartmouth College Anna talked about how accessibility and security are related. Accessibility of digital content (not real world accessibility). mostly refers to blind users and screenreaders, for our purpose. Accessibility is about parsing documents, as are many security issues. "Rich" executable content causes accessibility to fail, and often causes security to fail. For example MS Word has executable format—it's not a document exchange format—more dangerous than PDF or HTML. Accessibility is often the first and maybe only sanity check with parsing. They have no choice because someone may want to read what you write. Google, for example, is very particular about web browser you use and are bad at supporting other browsers. Uses JavaScript instead of links, often requiring mouseover to display content. PDF is a security nightmare. Executible format, embedded flash, JavaScript, etc. 15 million lines of code. Google Chrome doesn't handle PDF correctly, causing several security bugs. PDF has an accessibility checker and PDF tagging, to help with accessibility. But no PDF checker checks for incorrect tags, untagged content, or validates lists or tables. None check executable content at all. The "Halting Problem" is: can one decide whether a program will ever stop? The answer, in general, is no (Rice's theorem). The same holds true for accessibility checkers. Language-theoretic Security says complicated data formats are hard to parse and cannot be solved due to the Halting Problem. W3C Web Accessibility Guidelines: "Perceivable, Operable, Understandable, Robust" Not much help though, except for "Robust", but here's some gems: * all information should be parsable (paraphrasing) * if not parsable, cannot be converted to alternate formats * maximize compatibility in new document formats Executible webpages are bad for security and accessibility. They say it's for a better web experience. But is it necessary to stuff web pages with JavaScript for a better experience? A good example is The Drudge Report—it has hand-written HTML with no JavaScript, yet drives a lot of web traffic due to good content. A bad example is Google News—hidden scrollbars, guessing user input. Solutions: Accessibility and security problems come from same source Expose "better user experience" myth Keep your corner of Internet parsable Remember "Halting Problem"—recognize false solutions (checking and verifying tools) Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance Adam Brand, protiviti @adamrbrand, http://www.picfun.com/ Adam talked about PCI compliance for retail sales. Take an example: for PCI compliance, 50% of Brian's time (a IT guy), 960 hours/year was spent patching POSs in 850 restaurants. Often applying some patches make no sense (like fixing a browser vulnerability on a server). "Scanner worship" is overuse of vulnerability scanners—it gives a warm and fuzzy and it's simple (red or green results—fix reds). Scanners give a false sense of security. In reality, breeches from missing patches are uncommon—more common problems are: default passwords, cleartext authentication, misconfiguration (firewall ports open). Patching Myths: Myth 1: install within 30 days of patch release (but PCI §6.1 allows a "risk-based approach" instead). Myth 2: vendor decides what's critical (also PCI §6.1). But §6.2 requires user ranking of vulnerabilities instead. Myth 3: scan and rescan until it passes. But PCI §11.2.1b says this applies only to high-risk vulnerabilities. Adam says good recommendations come from NIST 800-40. Instead use sane patching and focus on what's really important. From NIST 800-40: Proactive: Use a proactive vulnerability management process: use change control, configuration management, monitor file integrity. Monitor: start with NVD and other vulnerability alerts, not scanner results. Evaluate: public-facing system? workstation? internal server? (risk rank) Decide:on action and timeline Test: pre-test patches (stability, functionality, rollback) for change control Install: notify, change control, tickets McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend Jay James, Shane MacDougall, Tactical Intelligence Inc., Canada "McAfee Secure Trustmark" is a website seal marketed by McAfee. A website gets this badge if they pass their remote scanning. The problem is a removal of trustmarks act as flags that you're vulnerable. Easy to view status change by viewing McAfee list on website or on Google. "Secure TrustGuard" is similar to McAfee. Jay and Shane wrote Perl scripts to gather sites from McAfee and search engines. If their certification image changes to a 1x1 pixel image, then they are longer certified. Their scripts take deltas of scans to see what changed daily. The bottom line is change in TrustGuard status is a flag for hackers to attack your site. Entire idea of seals is silly—you're raising a flag saying if you're vulnerable.

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  • Quick guide to Oracle IRM 11g: Classification design

    - by Simon Thorpe
    Quick guide to Oracle IRM 11g indexThis is the final article in the quick guide to Oracle IRM. If you've followed everything prior you will now have a fully functional and tested Information Rights Management service. It doesn't matter if you've been following the 10g or 11g guide as this next article is common to both. ContentsWhy this is the most important part... Understanding the classification and standard rights model Identifying business use cases Creating an effective IRM classification modelOne single classification across the entire businessA context for each and every possible granular use caseWhat makes a good context? Deciding on the use of roles in the context Reviewing the features and security for context roles Summary Why this is the most important part...Now the real work begins, installing and getting an IRM system running is as simple as following instructions. However to actually have an IRM technology easily protecting your most sensitive information without interfering with your users existing daily work flows and be able to scale IRM across the entire business, requires thought into how confidential documents are created, used and distributed. This article is going to give you the information you need to ask the business the right questions so that you can deploy your IRM service successfully. The IRM team here at Oracle have over 10 years of experience in helping customers and it is important you understand the following to be successful in securing access to your most confidential information. Whatever you are trying to secure, be it mergers and acquisitions information, engineering intellectual property, health care documentation or financial reports. No matter what type of user is going to access the information, be they employees, contractors or customers, there are common goals you are always trying to achieve.Securing the content at the earliest point possible and do it automatically. Removing the dependency on the user to decide to secure the content reduces the risk of mistakes significantly and therefore results a more secure deployment. K.I.S.S. (Keep It Simple Stupid) Reduce complexity in the rights/classification model. Oracle IRM lets you make changes to access to documents even after they are secured which allows you to start with a simple model and then introduce complexity once you've understood how the technology is going to be used in the business. After an initial learning period you can review your implementation and start to make informed decisions based on user feedback and administration experience. Clearly communicate to the user, when appropriate, any changes to their existing work practice. You must make every effort to make the transition to sealed content as simple as possible. For external users you must help them understand why you are securing the documents and inform them the value of the technology to both your business and them. Before getting into the detail, I must pay homage to Martin White, Vice President of client services in SealedMedia, the company Oracle acquired and who created Oracle IRM. In the SealedMedia years Martin was involved with every single customer and was key to the design of certain aspects of the IRM technology, specifically the context model we will be discussing here. Listening carefully to customers and understanding the flexibility of the IRM technology, Martin taught me all the skills of helping customers build scalable, effective and simple to use IRM deployments. No matter how well the engineering department designed the software, badly designed and poorly executed projects can result in difficult to use and manage, and ultimately insecure solutions. The advice and information that follows was born with Martin and he's still delivering IRM consulting with customers and can be found at www.thinkers.co.uk. It is from Martin and others that Oracle not only has the most advanced, scalable and usable document security solution on the market, but Oracle and their partners have the most experience in delivering successful document security solutions. Understanding the classification and standard rights model The goal of any successful IRM deployment is to balance the increase in security the technology brings without over complicating the way people use secured content and avoid a significant increase in administration and maintenance. With Oracle it is possible to automate the protection of content, deploy the desktop software transparently and use authentication methods such that users can open newly secured content initially unaware the document is any different to an insecure one. That is until of course they attempt to do something for which they don't have any rights, such as copy and paste to an insecure application or try and print. Central to achieving this objective is creating a classification model that is simple to understand and use but also provides the right level of complexity to meet the business needs. In Oracle IRM the term used for each classification is a "context". A context defines the relationship between.A group of related documents The people that use the documents The roles that these people perform The rights that these people need to perform their role The context is the key to the success of Oracle IRM. It provides the separation of the role and rights of a user from the content itself. Documents are sealed to contexts but none of the rights, user or group information is stored within the content itself. Sealing only places information about the location of the IRM server that sealed it, the context applied to the document and a few other pieces of metadata that pertain only to the document. This important separation of rights from content means that millions of documents can be secured against a single classification and a user needs only one right assigned to be able to access all documents. If you have followed all the previous articles in this guide, you will be ready to start defining contexts to which your sensitive information will be protected. But before you even start with IRM, you need to understand how your own business uses and creates sensitive documents and emails. Identifying business use cases Oracle is able to support multiple classification systems, but usually there is one single initial need for the technology which drives a deployment. This need might be to protect sensitive mergers and acquisitions information, engineering intellectual property, financial documents. For this and every subsequent use case you must understand how users create and work with documents, to who they are distributed and how the recipients should interact with them. A successful IRM deployment should start with one well identified use case (we go through some examples towards the end of this article) and then after letting this use case play out in the business, you learn how your users work with content, how well your communication to the business worked and if the classification system you deployed delivered the right balance. It is at this point you can start rolling the technology out further. Creating an effective IRM classification model Once you have selected the initial use case you will address with IRM, you need to design a classification model that defines the access to secured documents within the use case. In Oracle IRM there is an inbuilt classification system called the "context" model. In Oracle IRM 11g it is possible to extend the server to support any rights classification model, but the majority of users who are not using an application integration (such as Oracle IRM within Oracle Beehive) are likely to be starting out with the built in context model. Before looking at creating a classification system with IRM, it is worth reviewing some recognized standards and methods for creating and implementing security policy. A very useful set of documents are the ISO 17799 guidelines and the SANS security policy templates. First task is to create a context against which documents are to be secured. A context consists of a group of related documents (all top secret engineering research), a list of roles (contributors and readers) which define how users can access documents and a list of users (research engineers) who have been given a role allowing them to interact with sealed content. Before even creating the first context it is wise to decide on a philosophy which will dictate the level of granularity, the question is, where do you start? At a department level? By project? By technology? First consider the two ends of the spectrum... One single classification across the entire business Imagine that instead of having separate contexts, one for engineering intellectual property, one for your financial data, one for human resources personally identifiable information, you create one context for all documents across the entire business. Whilst you may have immediate objections, there are some significant benefits in thinking about considering this. Document security classification decisions are simple. You only have one context to chose from! User provisioning is simple, just make sure everyone has a role in the only context in the business. Administration is very low, if you assign rights to groups from the business user repository you probably never have to touch IRM administration again. There are however some obvious downsides to this model.All users in have access to all IRM secured content. So potentially a sales person could access sensitive mergers and acquisition documents, if they can get their hands on a copy that is. You cannot delegate control of different documents to different parts of the business, this may not satisfy your regulatory requirements for the separation and delegation of duties. Changing a users role affects every single document ever secured. Even though it is very unlikely a business would ever use one single context to secure all their sensitive information, thinking about this scenario raises one very important point. Just having one single context and securing all confidential documents to it, whilst incurring some of the problems detailed above, has one huge value. Once secured, IRM protected content can ONLY be accessed by authorized users. Just think of all the sensitive documents in your business today, imagine if you could ensure that only everyone you trust could open them. Even if an employee lost a laptop or someone accidentally sent an email to the wrong recipient, only the right people could open that file. A context for each and every possible granular use case Now let's think about the total opposite of a single context design. What if you created a context for each and every single defined business need and created multiple contexts within this for each level of granularity? Let's take a use case where we need to protect engineering intellectual property. Imagine we have 6 different engineering groups, and in each we have a research department, a design department and manufacturing. The company information security policy defines 3 levels of information sensitivity... restricted, confidential and top secret. Then let's say that each group and department needs to define access to information from both internal and external users. Finally add into the mix that they want to review the rights model for each context every financial quarter. This would result in a huge amount of contexts. For example, lets just look at the resulting contexts for one engineering group. Q1FY2010 Restricted Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Research Q1FY2010 Restricted Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Design Q1FY2010 Restricted Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Manufacturing Q1FY2010 Restricted External- Engineering Group 1 - Research Q1FY2010 Restricted External - Engineering Group 1 - Design Q1FY2010 Restricted External - Engineering Group 1 - Manufacturing Q1FY2010 Confidential Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Research Q1FY2010 Confidential Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Design Q1FY2010 Confidential Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Manufacturing Q1FY2010 Confidential External - Engineering Group 1 - Research Q1FY2010 Confidential External - Engineering Group 1 - Design Q1FY2010 Confidential External - Engineering Group 1 - Manufacturing Q1FY2010 Top Secret Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Research Q1FY2010 Top Secret Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Design Q1FY2010 Top Secret Internal - Engineering Group 1 - Manufacturing Q1FY2010 Top Secret External - Engineering Group 1 - Research Q1FY2010 Top Secret External - Engineering Group 1 - Design Q1FY2010 Top Secret External - Engineering Group 1 - Manufacturing Now multiply the above by 6 for each engineering group, 18 contexts. You are then creating/reviewing another 18 every 3 months. After a year you've got 72 contexts. What would be the advantages of such a complex classification model? You can satisfy very granular rights requirements, for example only an authorized engineering group 1 researcher can create a top secret report for access internally, and his role will be reviewed on a very frequent basis. Your business may have very complex rights requirements and mapping this directly to IRM may be an obvious exercise. The disadvantages of such a classification model are significant...Huge administrative overhead. Someone in the business must manage, review and administrate each of these contexts. If the engineering group had a single administrator, they would have 72 classifications to reside over each year. From an end users perspective life will be very confusing. Imagine if a user has rights in just 6 of these contexts. They may be able to print content from one but not another, be able to edit content in 2 contexts but not the other 4. Such confusion at the end user level causes frustration and resistance to the use of the technology. Increased synchronization complexity. Imagine a user who after 3 years in the company ends up with over 300 rights in many different contexts across the business. This would result in long synchronization times as the client software updates all your offline rights. Hard to understand who can do what with what. Imagine being the VP of engineering and as part of an internal security audit you are asked the question, "What rights to researchers have to our top secret information?". In this complex model the answer is not simple, it would depend on many roles in many contexts. Of course this example is extreme, but it highlights that trying to build many barriers in your business can result in a nightmare of administration and confusion amongst users. In the real world what we need is a balance of the two. We need to seek an optimum number of contexts. Too many contexts are unmanageable and too few contexts does not give fine enough granularity. What makes a good context? Good context design derives mainly from how well you understand your business requirements to secure access to confidential information. Some customers I have worked with can tell me exactly the documents they wish to secure and know exactly who should be opening them. However there are some customers who know only of the government regulation that requires them to control access to certain types of information, they don't actually know where the documents are, how they are created or understand exactly who should have access. Therefore you need to know how to ask the business the right questions that lead to information which help you define a context. First ask these questions about a set of documentsWhat is the topic? Who are legitimate contributors on this topic? Who are the authorized readership? If the answer to any one of these is significantly different, then it probably merits a separate context. Remember that sealed documents are inherently secure and as such they cannot leak to your competitors, therefore it is better sealed to a broad context than not sealed at all. Simplicity is key here. Always revert to the first extreme example of a single classification, then work towards essential complexity. If there is any doubt, always prefer fewer contexts. Remember, Oracle IRM allows you to change your mind later on. You can implement a design now and continue to change and refine as you learn how the technology is used. It is easy to go from a simple model to a more complex one, it is much harder to take a complex model that is already embedded in the work practice of users and try to simplify it. It is also wise to take a single use case and address this first with the business. Don't try and tackle many different problems from the outset. Do one, learn from the process, refine it and then take what you have learned into the next use case, refine and continue. Once you have a good grasp of the technology and understand how your business will use it, you can then start rolling out the technology wider across the business. Deciding on the use of roles in the context Once you have decided on that first initial use case and a context to create let's look at the details you need to decide upon. For each context, identify; Administrative rolesBusiness owner, the person who makes decisions about who may or may not see content in this context. This is often the person who wanted to use IRM and drove the business purchase. They are the usually the person with the most at risk when sensitive information is lost. Point of contact, the person who will handle requests for access to content. Sometimes the same as the business owner, sometimes a trusted secretary or administrator. Context administrator, the person who will enact the decisions of the Business Owner. Sometimes the point of contact, sometimes a trusted IT person. Document related rolesContributors, the people who create and edit documents in this context. Reviewers, the people who are involved in reviewing documents but are not trusted to secure information to this classification. This role is not always necessary. (See later discussion on Published-work and Work-in-Progress) Readers, the people who read documents from this context. Some people may have several of the roles above, which is fine. What you are trying to do is understand and define how the business interacts with your sensitive information. These roles obviously map directly to roles available in Oracle IRM. Reviewing the features and security for context roles At this point we have decided on a classification of information, understand what roles people in the business will play when administrating this classification and how they will interact with content. The final piece of the puzzle in getting the information for our first context is to look at the permissions people will have to sealed documents. First think why are you protecting the documents in the first place? It is to prevent the loss of leaking of information to the wrong people. To control the information, making sure that people only access the latest versions of documents. You are not using Oracle IRM to prevent unauthorized people from doing legitimate work. This is an important point, with IRM you can erect many barriers to prevent access to content yet too many restrictions and authorized users will often find ways to circumvent using the technology and end up distributing unprotected originals. Because IRM is a security technology, it is easy to get carried away restricting different groups. However I would highly recommend starting with a simple solution with few restrictions. Ensure that everyone who reasonably needs to read documents can do so from the outset. Remember that with Oracle IRM you can change rights to content whenever you wish and tighten security. Always return to the fact that the greatest value IRM brings is that ONLY authorized users can access secured content, remember that simple "one context for the entire business" model. At the start of the deployment you really need to aim for user acceptance and therefore a simple model is more likely to succeed. As time passes and users understand how IRM works you can start to introduce more restrictions and complexity. Another key aspect to focus on is handling exceptions. If you decide on a context model where engineering can only access engineering information, and sales can only access sales data. Act quickly when a sales manager needs legitimate access to a set of engineering documents. Having a quick and effective process for permitting other people with legitimate needs to obtain appropriate access will be rewarded with acceptance from the user community. These use cases can often be satisfied by integrating IRM with a good Identity & Access Management technology which simplifies the process of assigning users the correct business roles. The big print issue... Printing is often an issue of contention, users love to print but the business wants to ensure sensitive information remains in the controlled digital world. There are many cases of physical document loss causing a business pain, it is often overlooked that IRM can help with this issue by limiting the ability to generate physical copies of digital content. However it can be hard to maintain a balance between security and usability when it comes to printing. Consider the following points when deciding about whether to give print rights. Oracle IRM sealed documents can contain watermarks that expose information about the user, time and location of access and the classification of the document. This information would reside in the printed copy making it easier to trace who printed it. Printed documents are slower to distribute in comparison to their digital counterparts, so time sensitive information in printed format may present a lower risk. Print activity is audited, therefore you can monitor and react to users abusing print rights. Summary In summary it is important to think carefully about the way you create your context model. As you ask the business these questions you may get a variety of different requirements. There may be special projects that require a context just for sensitive information created during the lifetime of the project. There may be a department that requires all information in the group is secured and you might have a few senior executives who wish to use IRM to exchange a small number of highly sensitive documents with a very small number of people. Oracle IRM, with its very flexible context classification system, can support all of these use cases. The trick is to introducing the complexity to deliver them at the right level. In another article i'm working on I will go through some examples of how Oracle IRM might map to existing business use cases. But for now, this article covers all the important questions you need to get your IRM service deployed and successfully protecting your most sensitive information.

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  • Setting up an SSL Certificate in Apache

    When the HTTP protocol was designed, it was assumed that data transmission would be secure. Times have changed and network security has become much more important to us, especially for certain tasks. Sukrit Dhandhania shows you how to set up Secure Sockets Layer.

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  • What is the story behind Java Vulnerabilities?

    - by Maryam
    I always appreciated the Java language. It is known as a very secure platform and many banks use it in their web applications. I wanted to build a project for my school and I discussed the options with some developers. However, one of them said we should ignore Java ecause of vulnerabilities appreared recently in it. For this reason I want to make sure, what is the story behind this and does that mean that Java today considered not much secure as it was previously?

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  • How To - Securing a JAX-WS with OWSM Message Protection Policy in JDeveloper - 11g

    - by Prakash Yamuna
    As promised in this post, here is a How-To that describes how to secure a simple HelloWorld JAX-WS with OWSM message protection policy and test it with SOAP UI. The How-To reuses the picture I posted earlier about the relationship and interplay b/w Keystore, Credential store, jps-config.xml ,etc. One of the other more frequent requests I hear from folks within Oracle and customers is how to test OWSM with SOAP UI. SOAP UI in general works very well as testing tool for web services secure with wss10 policies.

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  • Securing the Oracle Service Bus - Web Services Manager

    - by Naresh Persaud
    As organizations strive for greater productivity and interoperability across applications, the enterprise service bus has become a convenient medium of transferring information. As more content is shared and more applications are added, monitoring and securing data becomes more difficult and important. The short video below discusses how to use Oracle Web Services Manager to secure SOA services. For more information on using identity management to secure your SOA service, download the Kuppinger Cole paper.

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  • Apple Security Isn't a Sure Bet

    <b>Enterprise Networking Planet:</b> "Apple Macs are secure because they don't get computer viruses, and because OS X, the operating system they run, is based on the rock-solid and highly secure BSD UNIX."

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  • Google Analytics HTTP vs HTTPS

    - by Pelangi
    I want to use Google Analytics on a website that uses both HTTP and HTTPS that works as explained below: Secure pages accessed through https://mydomain.com/secure/* are always on HTTPS. Any access to these pages through HTTP will be redirected to HTTPS. Any other pages will be accessible through both HTTP and HTTPS I have a Google Analytics profile with URL using HTTPS. Will I cover all traffic? Do I need to create another profile using HTTP and how should I apply the other profile?

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  • Very slow write performance on Debian 6.0 (AMD64) with DMCRYPT/LVM/RAID1

    - by jdelic
    I'm seeing very strange performance characteristics on one of my servers. This server is running a simple two-disk software-RAID1 setup with LVM spanning /dev/md0. One of the logical volumes /dev/vg0/secure is encrypted using dmcrypt with LUKS and mounted with the sync and noatimes flag. Writing to that volume is incredibly slow at 1.8 MB/s and the CPU usage stays near 0%. There are 8 crpyto/1-8 processes running (it's a Intel Quadcore CPU). I hope that someone on serverfault has seen this before :-(. uname -a 2.6.32-5-xen-amd64 #1 SMP Tue Mar 8 00:01:30 UTC 2011 x86_64 GNU/Linux Interestingly, when I read from the device I get good performance numbers: reading without encryption: $ dd if=/dev/vg0/secure of=/dev/null bs=64k count=100000 100000+0 records in 100000+0 records out 6553600000 bytes (6.6 GB) copied, 68.8951 s, 95.1 MB/s reading with encryption: $ dd if=/dev/mapper/secure of=/dev/null bs=64k count=100000 100000+0 records in 100000+0 records out 6553600000 bytes (6.6 GB) copied, 69.7116 s, 94.0 MB/s However, when I try to write to the device: $ dd if=/dev/zero of=./test bs=64k 8809+0 records in 8809+0 records out 577306624 bytes (577 MB) copied, 321.861 s, 1.8 MB/s Also, when I read I see CPU usage, when I write, the CPU stays at almost 0% usage. Here is output of cryptsetup luksDump: LUKS header information for /dev/vg0/secure Version: 1 Cipher name: aes Cipher mode: cbc-essiv:sha256 Hash spec: sha1 Payload offset: 2056 MK bits: 256 MK digest: dd 62 b9 a5 bf 6c ec 23 36 22 92 4c 39 f8 d6 5d c1 3a b7 37 MK salt: cc 2e b3 d9 fb e3 86 a1 bb ab eb 9d 65 df b3 dd d9 6b f4 49 de 8f 85 7d 3b 1c 90 83 5d b2 87 e2 MK iterations: 44500 UUID: a7c9af61-d9f0-4d3f-b422-dddf16250c33 Key Slot 0: ENABLED Iterations: 178282 Salt: 60 24 cb be 5c 51 9f b4 85 64 3d f8 07 22 54 d4 1a 5f 4c bc 4b 82 76 48 d8 a2 d2 6a ee 13 d7 5d Key material offset: 8 AF stripes: 4000 Key Slot 1: DISABLED Key Slot 2: DISABLED Key Slot 3: DISABLED Key Slot 4: DISABLED Key Slot 5: DISABLED Key Slot 6: DISABLED Key Slot 7: DISABLED

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  • Is encryption really needed for having network security? [closed]

    - by Cawas
    I welcome better key-wording here, both on tags and title. I'm trying to conceive a free, open and secure network environment that would work anywhere, from big enterprises to small home networks of just 1 machine. I think since wireless Access Points are the most, if not only, true weak point of a Local Area Network (let's not consider every other security aspect of having internet) there would be basically two points to consider here: Having an open AP for anyone to use the internet through Leaving the whole LAN also open for guests to be able to easily read (only) files on it, and even a place to drop files on Considering these two aspects, once everything is done properly... What's the most secure option between having that, or having just an encrypted password-protected wifi? Of course "both" would seem "more secure". But it shouldn't actually be anything substantial. I've always had the feeling using any kind of the so called "wireless security" methods is actually a bad design. I'm talking mostly about encrypting and pass-phrasing (which are actually two different concepts), since I won't even consider hiding SSID and mac filtering. I understand it's a natural way of thinking. With cable networking nobody can access the network unless they have access to the physical cable, so you're "secure" in the physical way. In a way, encrypting is for wireless what building walls is for the cables. And giving pass-phrases would be adding a door with a key. So, what do you think?

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  • WEP/WPA/WPA2 and wifi sniffing

    - by jcea
    Hi, I know that WEP traffic can be "sniffed" by any user of the WIFI. I know that WPA/WPA2 traffic is encrypted using a different link key for each user, so they can't sniff traffic... unless they capture the initial handshake. If you are using a PSK (preshared key) schema, then you recover the link key trivially from this initial handshake. If you don't know the PSK, you can capture the handshake and try to crack the PSK by bruteforce offline. Is my understanding correct so far?. I know that WPA2 has AES mode and can use "secure" tokens like X.509 certificates and such, and it is said to be secure against sniffing because capturing the handshake doesn't help you. So, is WPA2+AES secure (so far) against sniffing, and how it actually works?. That is, how is the (random) link key negociated?. When using X.509 certificates or a (private and personal) passphrase. Do WPA/WPA2 have other sniffer-secure modes beside WPA2+AES? How is broadcast traffic managed to be received by all the WIFI users, if each has a different link key?. Thanks in advance! :).

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  • I want to use OpenVPN to access the web and email from China. How?

    - by gaoshan88
    My question: How do I use my already existing OpenVPN setup to enable secure, remote web surfing and email checking from open wireless hotspots? Some long winded details: I am running Ubuntu and have OpenVPN up and working fine as a server. My client machine connects fine as well. However, that just gets me a secure connection to my home network. What I want is to be able to access my VPN server and surf the web or check email securely from anywhere with an open wireless connection. I am frequently in China and having secure, unblocked access would be a boon (especially since I like to work from tea houses and coffee shops and I've already had a password sniffed and hacked once). I already know how to tunnel over SSH via a SOCKS proxy using something like: ssh -ND 8887 -p 22 [email protected] but since I have OpenVPN I figure why not try it? So... what are the steps involved in making it so I can connect to my VPN and the surf and check mail to my hearts content (slowly to be sure but at least it wold be secure). Thx!

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  • Changing a set-cookie header using mod_rewrite/mod_proxy

    - by olrehm
    I have a bunch of cgi scripts, which are served using HTTPS. They can only be reached on the intranet, not from the outside. They set a cookie with the attribute 'Secure', so that it can only be send via HTTPS. There is also a reverse proxy to one of these scripts, unfortunately using plain HTTP. When a response comes in from my cgi-script with a secure cookie, it is not being passed on via HTTP (after all, that is what that attribute is for). I need however, an exception to this rule. Is it possible to use mod_rewrite/mod_proxy or something similar, to change the set-cookie header in the response coming from my cgi script and remove the Secure, such that the cookie can be passed back to the user using the unsafe HTTP connection? I understand that this defeats the purpose of the Secure in the first place, but I need this as a temporary work around. I have searched the web and found how to add a set-cookie header using mod_rewrite, and I have also found how to retrieve the value of a cookie coming from the client in a cookie header. What I have not yet found is how to extract the set-cookie header received in the response of a script I am proxying for. Is that possible? How would I do that? Ole

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