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  • Securing Plugin Data in WordPress From Access by Other Plugins?

    - by farinspace
    There probably is some solution to this, whether it involves code running on just the wordpress installation or a combination of a wordpress installation and a master server I am not sure yet, but please remember not to have tunnel vision and consider any and all possible solutions: The scenario is this: A WordPress plugin (plugin-A) that manages some sort of valuable data (something that the admin would not want stolen), lets say, lead data with user's name and email addresses, the plugin uses its own db tables. Other than the obvious (which is the admin installing plugin-B, not knowing its malicious intent), what is to prevent another WordPress plugin (plugin-B) from accessing plugin-A data or hacking plugin-A files to circumvent security.

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  • Best practice to send secure information over e-mail?

    - by Zolomon
    I have to send sensitive information (name, address, social security number etc.) collected from a website, that has been entered by a user, to an e-mail address. What is the best course of action to make the information secure and easy to extract on the receiver side? Edit: I will be using ASP.NET for the website, not sure what it has for capabilities on this matter. Edit: If I decide to store the information in a database and just send a mail when a new entry has been made, would this be better? And create some secure way to dump the information instead.

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  • Is there really a need for encryption to have true wireless security? [closed]

    - by Cawas
    I welcome better key-wording here, both on tags and title. I'm trying to conceive a free, open and secure network environment that would work anywhere, from big enterprises to small home networks of just 1 machine. I think since wireless Access Points are the most, if not only, true weak point of a Local Area Network (let's not consider every other security aspect of having internet) there would be basically two points to consider here: Having an open AP for anyone to use the internet through Leaving the whole LAN also open for guests to be able to easily read (only) files on it, and even a place to drop files on Considering these two aspects, once everything is done properly... What's the most secure option between having that, or having just an encrypted password-protected wifi? Of course "both" would seem "more secure". But it shouldn't actually be anything substantial. That's the question, but I think it may need more elaborating on. If you don't think so, please feel free to skip the next (long) part. Elaborating more on the two aspects ... I've always had the feeling using any kind of the so called "wireless security" methods is actually a bad design. I'm talking mostly about encrypting and pass-phrasing (which are actually two different concepts), since I won't even consider hiding SSID and mac filtering. I understand it's a natural way of thinking. With cable networking nobody can access the network unless they have access to the physical cable, so you're "secure" in the physical way. In a way, encrypting is for wireless what building walls is for the cables. And giving pass-phrases would be adding a door with a key. But the cabling without encryption is also insecure. If someone plugin all the data is right there. So, while I can see the use for encrypting data, I don't think it's a security measure in wireless networks. It's wasting resources for too little gain. I believe we should encrypt only sensitive data regardless of wires. That's already done with HTTPS, so I don't really need to encrypt my torrents, for instance. They're torrents, they are meant to be freely shared! As for using passwords, they should be added to the users, always. Not to wifi. For securing files, truly, best solution is backup. Sure all that doesn't happen that often, but I won't consider the most situations where people just don't care. I think there are enough situations where we actually use passwords on our OS users, so let's go with that in mind. I keep promoting the Fonera concept as an instance. It opens up a free wifi port, if you choose so, and anyone can connect to the internet through that, without having any access to your LAN. It also uses a QoS which will never let your bandwidth drop from that public usage. That's security, and it's open. But it's lacking the second aspect. I'll probably be bashed for promoting the non-usage of WPA 2 with AES or whatever, but I wanted to know from more experienced (super) users out there: what do you think?

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  • The Unintended Consequences of Sound Security Policy

    - by Tanu Sood
    v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} .shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);} Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";} Author: Kevin Moulton, CISSP, CISM Meet the Author: Kevin Moulton, Senior Sales Consulting Manager, Oracle Kevin Moulton, CISSP, CISM, has been in the security space for more than 25 years, and with Oracle for 7 years. He manages the East Enterprise Security Sales Consulting Team. He is also a Distinguished Toastmaster. Follow Kevin on Twitter at twitter.com/kevin_moulton, where he sometimes tweets about security, but might also tweet about running, beer, food, baseball, football, good books, or whatever else grabs his attention. Kevin will be a regular contributor to this blog so stay tuned for more posts from him. When I speak to a room of IT administrators, I like to begin by asking them if they have implemented a complex password policy. Generally, they all nod their heads enthusiastically. I ask them if that password policy requires long passwords. More nodding. I ask if that policy requires upper and lower case letters – faster nodding – numbers – even faster – special characters – enthusiastic nodding all around! I then ask them if their policy also includes a requirement for users to regularly change their passwords. Now we have smiles with the nodding! I ask them if the users have different IDs and passwords on the many systems that they have access to. Of course! I then ask them if, when they walk around the building, they see something like this: Thanks to Jake Ludington for the nice example. Can these administrators be faulted for their policies? Probably not but, in the end, end-users will find a way to get their job done efficiently. Post-It Notes to the rescue! I was visiting a business in New York City one day which was a perfect example of this problem. First I walked up to the security desk and told them where I was headed. They asked me if they should call upstairs to have someone escort me. Is that my call? Is that policy? I said that I knew where I was going, so they let me go. Having the conference room number handy, I wandered around the place in a search of my destination. As I walked around, unescorted, I noticed the post-it note problem in abundance. Had I been so inclined, I could have logged in on almost any machine and into any number of systems. When I reached my intended conference room, I mentioned my post-it note observation to the two gentlemen with whom I was meeting. One of them said, “You mean like this,” and he produced a post it note full of login IDs and passwords from his breast pocket! I gave him kudos for not hanging the list on his monitor. We then talked for the rest of the meeting about the difficulties faced by the employees due to the security policies. These policies, although well-intended, made life very difficult for the end-users. Most users had access to 8 to 12 systems, and the passwords for each expired at a different times. The post-it note solution was understandable. Who could remember even half of them? What could this customer have done differently? I am a fan of using a provisioning system, such as Oracle Identity Manager, to manage all of the target systems. With OIM, and email could be automatically sent to all users when it was time to change their password. The end-users would follow a link to change their password on a web page, and then OIM would propagate that password out to all of the systems that the user had access to, even if the login IDs were different. Another option would be an Enterprise Single-Sign On Solution. With Oracle eSSO, all of a user’s credentials would be stored in a central, encrypted credential store. The end-user would only have to login to their machine each morning and then, as they moved to each new system, Oracle eSSO would supply the credentials. Good-bye post-it notes! 3M may be disappointed, but your end users will thank you. I hear people say that this post-it note problem is not a big deal, because the only people who would see the passwords are fellow employees. Do you really know who is walking around your building? What are the password policies in your business? How do the end-users respond?

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  • Data Source Security Part 5

    - by Steve Felts
    If you read through the first four parts of this series on data source security, you should be an expert on this focus area.  There is one more small topic to cover related to WebLogic Resource permissions.  After that comes the test, I mean example, to see with a real set of configuration parameters what the results are with some concrete values. WebLogic Resource Permissions All of the discussion so far has been about database credentials that are (eventually) used on the database side.  WLS has resource credentials to control what WLS users are allowed to access JDBC resources.  These can be defined on the Policies tab on the Security tab associated with the data source.  There are four permissions: “reserve” (get a new connection), “admin”, “shrink”, and reset (plus the all-inclusive “ALL”); we will focus on “reserve” here because we are talking about getting connections.  By default, JDBC resource permissions are completely open – anyone can do anything.  As soon as you add one policy for a permission, then all other users are restricted.  For example, if I add a policy so that “weblogic” can reserve a connection, then all other users will fail to reserve connections unless they are also explicitly added.  The validation is done for WLS user credentials only, not database user credentials.  Configuration of resources in general is described at “Create policies for resource instances” http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E24329_01/apirefs.1211/e24401/taskhelp/security/CreatePoliciesForResourceInstances.html.  This feature can be very useful to restrict what code and users can get to your database. There are the three use cases: API Use database credentials User for permission checking getConnection() True or false Current WLS user getConnection(user,password) False User/password from API getConnection(user,password) True Current WLS user If a simple getConnection() is used or database credentials are enabled, the current user that is authenticated to the WLS system is checked. If database credentials are not enabled, then the user and password on the API are used. Example The following is an actual example of the interactions between identity-based-connection-pooling-enabled, oracle-proxy-session, and use-database-credentials. On the database side, the following objects are configured.- Database users scott; jdbcqa; jdbcqa3- Permission for proxy: alter user jdbcqa3 grant connect through jdbcqa;- Permission for proxy: alter user jdbcqa grant connect through jdbcqa; The following WebLogic Data Source objects are configured.- Users weblogic, wluser- Credential mapping “weblogic” to “scott”- Credential mapping "wluser" to "jdbcqa3"- Data source descriptor configured with user “jdbcqa”- All tests are run with Set Client ID set to true (more about that below).- All tests are run with oracle-proxy-session set to false (more about that below). The test program:- Runs in servlet- Authenticates to WLS as user “weblogic” Use DB Credentials Identity based getConnection(scott,***) getConnection(weblogic,***) getConnection(jdbcqa3,***) getConnection()  true  true Identity scottClient weblogicProxy null weblogic fails - not a db user User jdbcqa3Client weblogicProxy null Default user jdbcqaClient weblogicProxy null  false  true scott fails - not a WLS user User scottClient scottProxy null jdbcqa3 fails - not a WLS user User scottClient scottProxy null  true  false Proxy for scott fails weblogic fails - not a db user User jdbcqa3Client weblogicProxy jdbcqa Default user jdbcqaClient weblogicProxy null  false  false scott fails - not a WLS user Default user jdbcqaClient scottProxy null jdbcqa3 fails - not a WLS user Default user jdbcqaClient scottProxy null If Set Client ID is set to false, all cases would have Client set to null. If this was not an Oracle thin driver, the one case with the non-null Proxy in the above table would throw an exception because proxy session is only supported, implicitly or explicitly, with the Oracle thin driver. When oracle-proxy-session is set to true, the only cases that will pass (with a proxy of "jdbcqa") are the following.1. Setting use-database-credentials to true and doing getConnection(jdbcqa3,…) or getConnection().2. Setting use-database-credentials to false and doing getConnection(wluser, …) or getConnection(). Summary There are many options to choose from for data source security.  Considerations include the number and volatility of WLS and Database users, the granularity of data access, the depth of the security identity (property on the connection or a real user), performance, coordination of various components in the software stack, and driver capabilities.  Now that you have the big picture (remember that table in part 1), you can make a more informed choice.

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  • Data Source Security Part 2

    - by Steve Felts
    In Part 1, I introduced the default security behavior and listed the various options available to change that behavior.  One of the key topics to understand is the difference between directly using database user and password values versus mapping from WLS user and password to the associated database values.   The direct use of database credentials is relatively new to WLS, based on customer feedback.  Some of the trade-offs are covered in this article. Credential Mapping vs. Database Credentials Each WLS data source has a credential map that is a mechanism used to map a key, in this case a WLS user, to security credentials (user and password).  By default, when a user and password are specified when getting a connection, they are treated as credentials for a WLS user, validated, and are converted to a database user and password using a credential map associated with the data source.  If a matching entry is not found in the credential map for the data source, then the user and password associated with the data source definition are used.  Because of this defaulting mechanism, you should be careful what permissions are granted to the default user.  Alternatively, you can define an invalid default user to ensure that no one can accidentally get through (in this case, you would need to set the initial capacity for the pool to zero so that the pool is populated only by valid users). To create an entry in the credential map: 1) First create a WLS user.  In the administration console, go to Security realms, select your realm (e.g., myrealm), select Users, and select New.  2) Second, create the mapping.  In the administration console, go to Services, select Data sources, select your data source name, select Security, select Credentials, and select New.  See http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E24329_01/apirefs.1211/e24401/taskhelp/jdbc/jdbc_datasources/ConfigureCredentialMappingForADataSource.html for more information. The advantages of using the credential mapping are that: 1) You don’t hard-code the database user/password into a program or need to prompt for it in addition to the WLS user/password and 2) It provides a layer of abstraction between WLS security and database settings such that many WLS identities can be mapped to a smaller set of DB identities, thereby only requiring middle-tier configuration updates when WLS users are added/removed. You can cut down the number of users that have access to a data source to reduce the user maintenance overhead.  For example, suppose that a servlet has the one pre-defined, special WLS user/password for data source access, hard-wired in its code in a getConnection(user, password) call.  Every WebLogic user can reap the specific DBMS access coded into the servlet, but none has to have general access to the data source.  For instance, there may be a ‘Sales’ DBMS which needs to be protected from unauthorized eyes, but it contains some day-to-day data that everyone needs. The Sales data source is configured with restricted access and a servlet is built that hard-wires the specific data source access credentials in its connection request.  It uses that connection to deliver only the generally needed day-to-day information to any caller. The servlet cannot reveal any other data, and no WebLogic user can get any other access to the data source.  This is the approach that many large applications take and is the reasoning behind the default mapping behavior in WLS. The disadvantages of using the credential map are that: 1) It is difficult to manage (create, update, delete) with a large number of users; it is possible to use WLST scripts or a custom JMX client utility to manage credential map entries. 2) You can’t share a credential map between data sources so they must be duplicated. Some applications prefer not to use the credential map.  Instead, the credentials passed to getConnection(user, password) should be treated as database credentials and used to authenticate with the database for the connection, avoiding going through the credential map.  This is enabled by setting the “use-database-credentials” to true.  See http://docs.oracle.com/cd/E24329_01/apirefs.1211/e24401/taskhelp/jdbc/jdbc_datasources/ConfigureOracleParameters.html "Configure Oracle parameters" in Oracle WebLogic Server Administration Console Help. Use Database Credentials is not currently supported for Multi Data Source configurations.  When enabled, it turns off credential mapping on Generic and Active GridLink data sources for the following attributes: 1. identity-based-connection-pooling-enabled (this interaction is available by patch in 10.3.6.0). 2. oracle-proxy-session (this interaction is first available in 10.3.6.0). 3. set client identifier (this interaction is available by patch in 10.3.6.0).  Note that in the data source schema, the set client identifier feature is poorly named “credential-mapping-enabled”.  The documentation and the console refer to it as Set Client Identifier. To review the behavior of credential mapping and using database credentials: - If using the credential map, there needs to be a mapping for each WLS user to database user for those users that will have access to the database; otherwise the default user for the data source will be used.  If you always specify a user/password when getting a connection, you only need credential map entries for those specific users. - If using database credentials without specifying a user/password, the default user and password in the data source descriptor are always used.  If you specify a user/password when getting a connection, that user will be used for the credentials.  WLS users are not involved at all in the data source connection process.

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  • Which is more secure GET or POST sending parameters with cURL at PHP

    - by Steve
    I want to connect in a secure way with an API and I am using cURL to do it using HTTPS and SSL. Now, i was wondering what is better in terms of security, sending the data through GET or POST: $ch = curl_init("http://api.website.com/connect.php?user=xxx&pass=xxxx); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, FALSE); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 2); $result = curl_exec($ch); curl_close($ch); Or $param['user'] = 'xxxx'; $param['pass'] = 'xxxx'; $ch = curl_init("http://api.website.com/connect.php); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $Parameters); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, FALSE); curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 2); $result = curl_exec($ch); curl_close($ch); I also realized that POST is much more slower retrieving the data.

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  • How can I edit local security policy from a batch file?

    - by Stephen Jennings
    I am trying to write a utility as a batch file that, among other things, adds a user to the "Deny logon locally" local security policy. This batch file will be used on hundreds of independent computers (not on a domain and aren't even on the same network). I assumed one of the following were my options, but perhaps there's one I haven't thought of. A command line utility similar to net.exe which can modify local security policy. A VBScript sample to do the same. Write my own using some WMI or Win32 calls. I'd rather not do this one if I don't have to.

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  • How to make security group in one forest show up in another forest?

    - by Jake
    I have two Win2k8 forests which I do maintenance on. The two forests have full 2 way external, non transitive trust with each other. I have a folder in forest X, domain countryX.mycompany.com accessible ONLY by the global security group named $group. In forest Y, domain countryY.mycompany.com, countryY\user1, countryY\user2 etc needs to have access to the folder. The natural instinct is to put user1, user2 etc into the $group. However, none of the methods for adding user to group works as it appears that the AD cannot find the groups in the other forest. Question: 1.How to make forests see each other's security groups and be able to add? 2.In practice, what is the recommended way to achieve the user access to the folders/files in another forest?

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  • What resources are best for staying current about information security?

    - by dr.pooter
    What types of sites do you visit, on a regular basis, to stay current on information security issues? Some examples from my list include: http://isc.sans.org/ http://www.kaspersky.com/viruswatch3 http://www.schneier.com/blog/ http://blog.fireeye.com/research/ As well as following the security heavyweights on twitter. I'm curious to hear what resources you recommend for daily monitoring. Anything specific to particular operating systems or other software. Are mailing lists still considered valuable. My goal would be to trim the cruft of all the things I'm currently subscribed to and focus on the essentials.

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  • what are security implications of running Ubuntu inside Windows 7?

    - by EndangeringSpecies
    I am thinking of switching to Ubuntu as a way of making web browsing more secure. So, suppose I will go the easy route and run Ubuntu as an app inside Windows and then run Firefox inside of that. What will this do to the security given the current threat environment? E.g. do most online threats nowadays target the browser and flash (which presumably would be safely sandboxed inside easy to wipe Ubuntu environment) or do they target the Windows TCP-IP stack where Ubuntu would give no protection? Well, most likely the above question does not come near to covering all the security implications of this setup :-), so please do discuss whatever other issues that may be relevant here.

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  • Is WEP used in conjunction with a wireless access list adequate security?

    - by LeopardSkinPillBoxHat
    I use a Netgear wireless router, with various wireless devices connecting to it. One of my wireless devices doesn't support WPA2 security, so I had to downgrade the security on the router to WEP. We all know WEP is broken, so as an added measure I enabled a wireless access list on the router so that only devices with specified MAC addresses which are in my access list are permitted to connect to the router. I know it is possible to spoof a MAC address from a device for the purposes of accessing a secure network like this. But is it easy? Is using WEP and a wireless access list good enough to prevent most hacking attacks? Or should I do whatever I can to ensure all devices support WPA2 in the future?

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  • Ubuntu server security; Is this enough?

    - by Camran
    I have a classifieds website, which uses php5 and mysql, and also java (solr). I am new to linux and VPS... I have installed SSH, and I have installed IPtables, and also I have PuTTY which I use as a terminal. Also, Filezilla is installed on my computer, and whenever I connect to my VPS, the "host" field in Filezilla says "Sftp://ip-adress" so I am guessing it is a safe connection. I used this command to find out if I had SSHD installed: whereis sshd and it returned some places where it actually was installed. So I havent actually installed it. Now, my Q is, is this enough? What other security measures should I take? Any good articles about security and how to set it up on a VPS? Remember, I have a windows xp OS on my laptop, but the OS for my VPS is Ubuntu 9.10. Also, I have apache2 installed... Thanks

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  • Oracle IRM video demonstration of seperating duties of document security

    - by Simon Thorpe
    One thing an Information Rights Management technology should do well is separate out three main areas of responsibility.The business process of defining and controlling the classifications to which content is secured and the definition of the roles employees, customers, partners and contractors have when accessing secured content. Allow IT to manage the server and perform the role of authorizing the creation of new classifications to meet business needs but yet once the classification has been created and handed off to the business, IT no longer plays a role on the ongoing management. Empower the business to take ownership of classifications to which their own content is secured. For example an employee who is leading an acquisition project should be responsible for defining who has access to confidential project documents. This person should be able to manage the rights users have in the classification and also be the point of contact for those wishing to gain rights. Oracle IRM has since it's creation in the late 1990's had this core model at the heart of its design. Due in part to the important seperation of rights from the documents themselves, Oracle IRM places the right functionality within the right parts of the business. For example some IRM technologies allow the end user to make decisions about what users can print, edit or save a secured document. This in practice results in a wide variety of content secured with a plethora of options that don't conform to any policy. With Oracle IRM users choose from a list of classifications to which they have been given the ability to secure information against. Their role in the classification was given to them by the business owner of the classification, yet the definition of the role resides within the realm of corporate security who own the overall business classification policies. It is this type of design and philosophy in Oracle IRM that makes it an enterprise solution that works beyond a few users and a few secured documents to hundreds of thousands of users and millions of documents. This following video shows how Oracle IRM 11g, the market leading document security solution, lets the security organization manage and create classifications whilst the business owns and manages them. If you want to experience using Oracle IRM secured content and the effects of different roles users have, why not sign up for our free demonstration.

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  • Issue 55 - Skin Object Tokens, Optimized Control Panel, OWS Validation and Security, RAD

    April 2010 Welcome to Issue 55 of DNN Creative Magazine In this issue we focus on the new Skin Object token method introduced in DotNetNuke 5 for adding tokens into a DotNetNuke skin. A Skin Object Token is a web user control which covers skin elements such as the logo, menu, search, login links, date, copyright, languages, links, banners, privacy, terms of use, etc. Following this we demonstrate how to install and use two Advanced DotNetNuke Admin Control Panels which are available for free from Oliver Hine. These control panels provide an optimized version of the admin control panel to improve performance and page load times, as well as a ribbon bar control panel which adds additional features. Next, we continue the Open Web Studio tutorials, this month we demonstrate some very advanced techniques for building a car parts application in Open Web Studio. Throughout the tutorial we cover form input, validation, how to use dependant drop down lists, populating checkbox lists and introduce a new concept of data level security. Data level security allows you to control which data a user can access within a module. To finish, we have part five of the "How to Build a News Application with DotNetMushroom Rapid Application Developer (RAD)" article, where we demonstrate how to implement paging. This issue comes complete with 14 videos. Skinning: Skin Object Tokens for DotNetNuke 5 (8 videos - 64mins) Free Module: Advanced Optimized Control Panel by Oliver Hine (1 video - 11mins) Module Development Series: Form Validation, Dependant Drop Downs and Data Level Security in OWS (5 videos - 44mins) How to Implement Paging with DotNetMushroom RAD View issue 55 to download all of the videos in one zip file DNN Creative Magazine for DotNetNuke Web Designers Covering DotNetNuke module video reviews, video tutorials, mp3 interviews, resources and web design tips for working with DotNetNuke. In 55 issues we have created 563 videos!Did you know that DotNetSlackers also publishes .net articles written by top known .net Authors? We already have over 80 articles in several categories including Silverlight. Take a look: here.

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  • SQL Azure Security: DoS

    - by Herve Roggero
    Since I decided to understand in more depth how SQL Azure works I started to dig into its performance characteristics. So I decided to write an application that allows me to put SQL Azure to the test and compare results with a local SQL Server database. One of the options I added is the ability to issue the same command on multiple threads to get certain performance metrics. That's when I stumbled on an interesting security feature of SQL Azure: its Denial of Service (DoS) detection engine. What this security feature does is that it performs a check on the number of connections being established, and if the rate of connection is too high, SQL Azure blocks all communication from that machine. I am still trying to learn more about this specific feature, but it appears that going to the SQL Azure portal and testing the connection from the portal "resets" the feature and you are allowed to connect again... until you reach the login threashold. In the specific test I was performing, all the logins were successful. I haven't tried to login with an invalid account or password... that will be for next time. On my Linked In group (SQL Server and SQL Azure Security: http://www.linkedin.com/groups?gid=2569994&trk=hb_side_g) Chip Andrews (www.sqlsecurity.com) pointed out that this feature in itself could present an internal threat. In theory, a rogue application could be issuing many login requests from a NATed network, which could potentially prevent any production system from connecting to SQL Azure within the same network. My initial response was that this could indeed be the case. However, while the TCP protocol contains the latest NATed IP address of a machine (which masks the origin of the machine making the SQL request), the TDS protocol itself contains the IP Address of the machine making the initial request; so technically there would be a way for SQL Azure to block only the internal IP address making the rogue requests.  So this warrants further investigation... stay tuned...

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  • Security Alert for CVE-2010-0886 and CVE-2010-0887 Released

    - by eric.maurice
    Hi, this is Eric Maurice again! Oracle just released a Security Alert to announce the availability of fixes for two vulnerabilities (CVE-2010-0886 and CVE-2010-0887) affecting Oracle Java SE and Oracle Java For Business. Both vulnerabilities only affect Java when running in a 32-bit web browser. These vulnerabilities are not present in Java running on servers or standalone Java desktop applications and do not impact any Oracle server based software. The first vulnerability (CVE-2010-0886) affects the Java Deployment Toolkit (version 6 update 10 through 19) on Windows only. The second vulnerability (CVE-2010-0887) affects the Java Plug-in (version 6 update 18 and 19) on Windows, Solaris and Linux. Both vulnerabilities may allow an attacker to run commands on the user's system with the privileges of the user, whose system may have become compromised by visiting a malicious web site. Oracle rated the severity of both vulnerabilities with a CVSS Base Score of 10.0 because many Windows users grant themselves administrative privileges. However, on other platforms, or for Windows users with limited privileges, the CVSS Base Score is only 7.5, because a successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities cannot result in a full compromise of the affected system. Users can quickly determine if they are running vulnerable versions of Java by pointing their browser to http://www.java.com/en/download/help/testvm.xml. Java SE users can visit http://www.java.com and download the most recent release of Java SE to address these vulnerabilities. Because of the criticality of these vulnerabilities, and the publicity they received as a result of their disclosure before the availability of a fix, Oracle recommends that all customers and Java users update their Java installation to the most recent version (6 update 20). For More Information: The advisory for the Security Alert for CVE-2010-0886 and CVE-2010-0887 is located at http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/alerts/alert-cve-2010-0886.html

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  • Wer kennt Oracle Label Security?

    - by Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry (DBA Community)
    Oracle Label Security (OLS) ist eine Option der Enterprise Edition der Datenbank seit der Datenbankversion 9.0.1. Es handelt sich bei OLS um eine fertige Anwendung, die vollständig auf Oracle Virtual Private Database (VPD) aufgebaut ist. Obwohl es sich also bei OLS um ein 'gestandenes' Oracle Produkt handelt, ist es vielen Kunden unbekannt. Oder vielleicht sollte man präziser sagen: Kaum ein Kunde redet über OLS. Das liegt sicherlich in erster Linie daran, dass Kunden, die sensibel für Security Fragen sind, sowieso nicht gerne Auskunft geben über die Massnahmen, die sie selbst ergriffen haben, sich zu schützen. Wenn man dann noch bedenkt, dass die Kunden, die OLS einsetzen, häufig aus Bereichen stammen, die für ihre Diskretion bekannt sind - Dienste, Polizei, Militär, Banken - hat man einen weiteren Grund dafür gefunden, warum so wenige über OLS reden. Das ist allerdings bedauerlich, denn besonders in dieser Zeit steigenden Security Bewusstseins, verdient OLS auf jeden Fall mehr Aufmerksamkeit. Dieser Tipp möchte deshalb dazu beitragen, OLS bekannter zu machen. Dazu werden zunächst einige einführende Informationen zu OLS gegeben. Danach wird anhand eines kleinen Beispiels gezeigt, wie man mit OLS arbeitet. Ergänzend sei hier noch erwähnt, dass der Einsatz von OLS keinerlei Veränderungen an vorhandenen Anwendungen erfordert. In der Oracle Terminologie heisst das: OLS ist transparent für Anwender und Anwendungen. Zum vollständigen Artikel geht es hier.

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  • Thunderbird: "Could not initialize the application's security component" [closed]

    - by user unknown
    In Thunderbird, on startup, I get the error message: "Could not initialize the application's security component" The message continues to check permissions of the profile, and free disk space. df -h shows, that I have 19G free disk space. find . -not -perm -644 -not -perm -600 -ls shows: No file without rw-permissions for me. Before the error occured, thunderbird worked well. But I changed my main mail-account. I had two, let's call them A and B, and used mainly A, but now I wanted to deaktivate it, and receive and send automatically via the second. I Had problems moving the filters from inbox A to inbox B (missing copy-functionality). In the web, I found (mollazine) hints, to move key3.db, cert8.db and secmode.db out of the way, but it didn't work for me. Another hint was to uninstall Quickcam(?. sic!), but I don't have Quickcam. A third to recreate the profile, but I have subdirectories, filters, addressbook, groups - mails back to the year 2003. I don't want to risk the loss of data. The whole errormessage is: Could not initialize the application's security component. The most likely cause is problems with files in your application's profile directory. Please check that this directory has no read/write restrictions and your hard disk is not full or close to full. It is recommended that you exit the application and fix the problem. If you continue to use this session, you might see incorrect application behaviour when accessing security features. When I open the error-console, it is empty.

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  • SQL SERVER – Securing TRUNCATE Permissions in SQL Server

    - by pinaldave
    Download the Script of this article from here. On December 11, 2010, Vinod Kumar, a Databases & BI technology evangelist from Microsoft Corporation, graced Ahmedabad by spending some time with the Community during the Community Tech Days (CTD) event. As he was running through a few demos, Vinod asked the audience one of the most fundamental and common interview questions – “What is the difference between a DELETE and TRUNCATE?“ Ahmedabad SQL Server User Group Expert Nakul Vachhrajani has come up with excellent solutions of the same. I must congratulate Nakul for this excellent solution and as a encouragement to User Group member, I am publishing the same article over here. Nakul Vachhrajani is a Software Specialist and systems development professional with Patni Computer Systems Limited. He has functional experience spanning legacy code deprecation, system design, documentation, development, implementation, testing, maintenance and support of complex systems, providing business intelligence solutions, database administration, performance tuning, optimization, product management, release engineering, process definition and implementation. He has comprehensive grasp on Database Administration, Development and Implementation with MS SQL Server and C, C++, Visual C++/C#. He has about 6 years of total experience in information technology. Nakul is an member of the Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar SQL Server User Groups, and actively contributes to the community by actively participating in multiple forums and websites like SQLAuthority.com, BeyondRelational.com, SQLServerCentral.com and many others. Please note: The opinions expressed herein are Nakul own personal opinions and do not represent his employer’s view in anyway. All data from everywhere here on Earth go through a series of  four distinct operations, identified by the words: CREATE, READ, UPDATE and DELETE, or simply, CRUD. Putting in Microsoft SQL Server terms, is the process goes like this: INSERT, SELECT, UPDATE and DELETE/TRUNCATE. Quite a few interesting responses were received and evaluated live during the session. To summarize them, the most important similarity that came out was that both DELETE and TRUNCATE participate in transactions. The major differences (not all) that came out of the exercise were: DELETE: DELETE supports a WHERE clause DELETE removes rows from a table, row-by-row Because DELETE moves row-by-row, it acquires a row-level lock Depending upon the recovery model of the database, DELETE is a fully-logged operation. Because DELETE moves row-by-row, it can fire off triggers TRUNCATE: TRUNCATE does not support a WHERE clause TRUNCATE works by directly removing the individual data pages of a table TRUNCATE directly occupies a table-level lock. (Because a lock is acquired, and because TRUNCATE can also participate in a transaction, it has to be a logged operation) TRUNCATE is, therefore, a minimally-logged operation; again, this depends upon the recovery model of the database Triggers are not fired when TRUNCATE is used (because individual row deletions are not logged) Finally, Vinod popped the big homework question that must be critically analyzed: “We know that we can restrict a DELETE operation to a particular user, but how can we restrict the TRUNCATE operation to a particular user?” After returning home and having a nice cup of coffee, I noticed that my gray cells immediately started to work. Below was the result of my research. As what is always said, the devil is in the details. Upon looking at the Permissions section for the TRUNCATE statement in Books On Line, the following jumps right out: “The minimum permission required is ALTER on table_name. TRUNCATE TABLE permissions default to the table owner, members of the sysadmin fixed server role, and the db_owner and db_ddladmin fixed database roles, and are not transferable. However, you can incorporate the TRUNCATE TABLE statement within a module, such as a stored procedure, and grant appropriate permissions to the module using the EXECUTE AS clause.“ Now, what does this mean? Unlike DELETE, one cannot directly assign permissions to a user/set of users allowing or revoking TRUNCATE rights. However, there is a way to circumvent this. It is important to recall that in Microsoft SQL Server, database engine security surrounds the concept of a “securable”, which is any object like a table, stored procedure, trigger, etc. Rights are assigned to a principal on a securable. Refer to the image below (taken from the SQL Server Books On Line). urable”, which is any object like a table, stored procedure, trigger, etc. Rights are assigned to a principal on a securable. Refer to the image below (taken from the SQL Server Books On Line). SETTING UP THE ENVIRONMENT – (01A_Truncate Table Permissions.sql) Script Provided at the end of the article. By the end of this demo, one will be able to do all the CRUD operations, except the TRUNCATE, and the other will only be able to execute the TRUNCATE. All you will need for this test is any edition of SQL Server 2008. (With minor changes, these scripts can be made to work with SQL 2005.) We begin by creating the following: 1.       A test database 2.        Two database roles: associated logins and users 3.       Switch over to the test database and create a test table. Then, add some data into it. I am using row constructors, which is new to SQL 2008. Creating the modules that will be used to enforce permissions 1.       We have already created one of the modules that we will be assigning permissions to. That module is the table: TruncatePermissionsTest 2.       We will now create two stored procedures; one is for the DELETE operation and the other for the TRUNCATE operation. Please note that for all practical purposes, the end result is the same – all data from the table TruncatePermissionsTest is removed Assigning the permissions Now comes the most important part of the demonstration – assigning permissions. A permissions matrix can be worked out as under: To apply the security rights, we use the GRANT and DENY clauses, as under: That’s it! We are now ready for our big test! THE TEST (01B_Truncate Table Test Queries.sql) Script Provided at the end of the article. I will now need two separate SSMS connections, one with the login AllowedTruncate and the other with the login RestrictedTruncate. Running the test is simple; all that’s required is to run through the script – 01B_Truncate Table Test Queries.sql. What I will demonstrate here via screen-shots is the behavior of SQL Server when logged in as the AllowedTruncate user. There are a few other combinations than what are highlighted here. I will leave the reader the right to explore the behavior of the RestrictedTruncate user and these additional scenarios, as a form of self-study. 1.       Testing SELECT permissions 2.       Testing TRUNCATE permissions (Remember, “deny by default”?) 3.       Trying to circumvent security by trying to TRUNCATE the table using the stored procedure Hence, we have now proved that a user can indeed be assigned permissions to specifically assign TRUNCATE permissions. I also hope that the above has sparked curiosity towards putting some security around the probably “destructive” operations of DELETE and TRUNCATE. I would like to wish each and every one of the readers a very happy and secure time with Microsoft SQL Server. (Please find the scripts – 01A_Truncate Table Permissions.sql and 01B_Truncate Table Test Queries.sql that have been used in this demonstration. Please note that these scripts contain purely test-level code only. These scripts must not, at any cost, be used in the reader’s production environments). 01A_Truncate Table Permissions.sql /* ***************************************************************************************************************** Developed By          : Nakul Vachhrajani Functionality         : This demo is focused on how to allow only TRUNCATE permissions to a particular user How to Use            : 1. Run through, step-by-step through the sequence till Step 08 to create a test database 2. Switch over to the "Truncate Table Test Queries.sql" and execute it step-by-step in two different SSMS windows, one where you have logged in as 'RestrictedTruncate', and the other as 'AllowedTruncate' 3. Come back to "Truncate Table Permissions.sql" 4. Execute Step 10 to cleanup! Modifications         : December 13, 2010 - NAV - Updated to add a security matrix and improve code readability when applying security December 12, 2010 - NAV - Created ***************************************************************************************************************** */ -- Step 01: Create a new test database CREATE DATABASE TruncateTestDB GO USE TruncateTestDB GO -- Step 02: Add roles and users to demonstrate the security of the Truncate operation -- 2a. Create the new roles CREATE ROLE AllowedTruncateRole; GO CREATE ROLE RestrictedTruncateRole; GO -- 2b. Create new logins CREATE LOGIN AllowedTruncate WITH PASSWORD = 'truncate@2010', CHECK_POLICY = ON GO CREATE LOGIN RestrictedTruncate WITH PASSWORD = 'truncate@2010', CHECK_POLICY = ON GO -- 2c. Create new Users using the roles and logins created aboave CREATE USER TruncateUser FOR LOGIN AllowedTruncate WITH DEFAULT_SCHEMA = dbo GO CREATE USER NoTruncateUser FOR LOGIN RestrictedTruncate WITH DEFAULT_SCHEMA = dbo GO -- 2d. Add the newly created login to the newly created role sp_addrolemember 'AllowedTruncateRole','TruncateUser' GO sp_addrolemember 'RestrictedTruncateRole','NoTruncateUser' GO -- Step 03: Change over to the test database USE TruncateTestDB GO -- Step 04: Create a test table within the test databse CREATE TABLE TruncatePermissionsTest (Id INT IDENTITY(1,1), Name NVARCHAR(50)) GO -- Step 05: Populate the required data INSERT INTO TruncatePermissionsTest VALUES (N'Delhi'), (N'Mumbai'), (N'Ahmedabad') GO -- Step 06: Encapsulate the DELETE within another module CREATE PROCEDURE proc_DeleteMyTable WITH EXECUTE AS SELF AS DELETE FROM TruncateTestDB..TruncatePermissionsTest GO -- Step 07: Encapsulate the TRUNCATE within another module CREATE PROCEDURE proc_TruncateMyTable WITH EXECUTE AS SELF AS TRUNCATE TABLE TruncateTestDB..TruncatePermissionsTest GO -- Step 08: Apply Security /* *****************************SECURITY MATRIX*************************************** =================================================================================== Object                   | Permissions |                 Login |             | AllowedTruncate   |   RestrictedTruncate |             |User:NoTruncateUser|   User:TruncateUser =================================================================================== TruncatePermissionsTest  | SELECT,     |      GRANT        |      (Default) | INSERT,     |                   | | UPDATE,     |                   | | DELETE      |                   | -------------------------+-------------+-------------------+----------------------- TruncatePermissionsTest  | ALTER       |      DENY         |      (Default) -------------------------+-------------+----*/----------------+----------------------- proc_DeleteMyTable | EXECUTE | GRANT | DENY -------------------------+-------------+-------------------+----------------------- proc_TruncateMyTable | EXECUTE | DENY | GRANT -------------------------+-------------+-------------------+----------------------- *****************************SECURITY MATRIX*************************************** */ /* Table: TruncatePermissionsTest*/ GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON TruncateTestDB..TruncatePermissionsTest TO NoTruncateUser GO DENY ALTER ON TruncateTestDB..TruncatePermissionsTest TO NoTruncateUser GO /* Procedure: proc_DeleteMyTable*/ GRANT EXECUTE ON TruncateTestDB..proc_DeleteMyTable TO NoTruncateUser GO DENY EXECUTE ON TruncateTestDB..proc_DeleteMyTable TO TruncateUser GO /* Procedure: proc_TruncateMyTable*/ DENY EXECUTE ON TruncateTestDB..proc_TruncateMyTable TO NoTruncateUser GO GRANT EXECUTE ON TruncateTestDB..proc_TruncateMyTable TO TruncateUser GO -- Step 09: Test --Switch over to the "Truncate Table Test Queries.sql" and execute it step-by-step in two different SSMS windows: --    1. one where you have logged in as 'RestrictedTruncate', and --    2. the other as 'AllowedTruncate' -- Step 10: Cleanup sp_droprolemember 'AllowedTruncateRole','TruncateUser' GO sp_droprolemember 'RestrictedTruncateRole','NoTruncateUser' GO DROP USER TruncateUser GO DROP USER NoTruncateUser GO DROP LOGIN AllowedTruncate GO DROP LOGIN RestrictedTruncate GO DROP ROLE AllowedTruncateRole GO DROP ROLE RestrictedTruncateRole GO USE MASTER GO DROP DATABASE TruncateTestDB GO 01B_Truncate Table Test Queries.sql /* ***************************************************************************************************************** Developed By          : Nakul Vachhrajani Functionality         : This demo is focused on how to allow only TRUNCATE permissions to a particular user How to Use            : 1. Switch over to this from "Truncate Table Permissions.sql", Step #09 2. Execute this step-by-step in two different SSMS windows a. One where you have logged in as 'RestrictedTruncate', and b. The other as 'AllowedTruncate' 3. Return back to "Truncate Table Permissions.sql" 4. Execute Step 10 to cleanup! Modifications         : December 12, 2010 - NAV - Created ***************************************************************************************************************** */ -- Step 09A: Switch to the test database USE TruncateTestDB GO -- Step 09B: Ensure that we have valid data SELECT * FROM TruncatePermissionsTest GO -- (Expected: Following error will occur if logged in as "AllowedTruncate") -- Msg 229, Level 14, State 5, Line 1 -- The SELECT permission was denied on the object 'TruncatePermissionsTest', database 'TruncateTestDB', schema 'dbo'. --Step 09C: Attempt to Truncate Data from the table without using the stored procedure TRUNCATE TABLE TruncatePermissionsTest GO -- (Expected: Following error will occur) --  Msg 1088, Level 16, State 7, Line 2 --  Cannot find the object "TruncatePermissionsTest" because it does not exist or you do not have permissions. -- Step 09D:Regenerate Test Data INSERT INTO TruncatePermissionsTest VALUES (N'London'), (N'Paris'), (N'Berlin') GO -- (Expected: Following error will occur if logged in as "AllowedTruncate") -- Msg 229, Level 14, State 5, Line 1 -- The INSERT permission was denied on the object 'TruncatePermissionsTest', database 'TruncateTestDB', schema 'dbo'. --Step 09E: Attempt to Truncate Data from the table using the stored procedure EXEC proc_TruncateMyTable GO -- (Expected: Will execute successfully with 'AllowedTruncate' user, will error out as under with 'RestrictedTruncate') -- Msg 229, Level 14, State 5, Procedure proc_TruncateMyTable, Line 1 -- The EXECUTE permission was denied on the object 'proc_TruncateMyTable', database 'TruncateTestDB', schema 'dbo'. -- Step 09F:Regenerate Test Data INSERT INTO TruncatePermissionsTest VALUES (N'Madrid'), (N'Rome'), (N'Athens') GO --Step 09G: Attempt to Delete Data from the table without using the stored procedure DELETE FROM TruncatePermissionsTest GO -- (Expected: Following error will occur if logged in as "AllowedTruncate") -- Msg 229, Level 14, State 5, Line 2 -- The DELETE permission was denied on the object 'TruncatePermissionsTest', database 'TruncateTestDB', schema 'dbo'. -- Step 09H:Regenerate Test Data INSERT INTO TruncatePermissionsTest VALUES (N'Spain'), (N'Italy'), (N'Greece') GO --Step 09I: Attempt to Delete Data from the table using the stored procedure EXEC proc_DeleteMyTable GO -- (Expected: Following error will occur if logged in as "AllowedTruncate") -- Msg 229, Level 14, State 5, Procedure proc_DeleteMyTable, Line 1 -- The EXECUTE permission was denied on the object 'proc_DeleteMyTable', database 'TruncateTestDB', schema 'dbo'. --Step 09J: Close this SSMS window and return back to "Truncate Table Permissions.sql" Thank you Nakul to take up the challenge and prove that Ahmedabad and Gandhinagar SQL Server User Group has talent to solve difficult problems. Reference: Pinal Dave (http://blog.SQLAuthority.com) Filed under: Best Practices, Pinal Dave, Readers Contribution, Readers Question, SQL, SQL Authority, SQL Query, SQL Scripts, SQL Security, SQL Server, SQL Tips and Tricks, T SQL, Technology

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  • getting "No LoginModules configured" for JAAS login under WebSphere security domain

    - by user1739040
    I have a JAX-RPC web service running on WebSphere V7. It requires a UserNameToken for security. I have a custom login module (MyLoginModule) which extracts the username and password, and that module is defined as a JAAS application login in the websphere admin console. Using IBM RAD 8.0, I have bound the token consumer to the login module using the JAAS config name of the module. This all works fine and happy on my development server. Now I realize, that for deployment to another server, I am required to move the JAAS login from global security to a security domain. When I do that, it breaks my web service. I get this SOAP Fault message: com.ibm.wsspi.wssecurity.SoapSecurityException: WSEC6520E: Construction of the login context failed. The exception is : javax.security.auth.login.LoginException: No LoginModules configured for MyLoginModule According to the IBM docs: The JAAS application logins, the JAAS system logins, and the JAAS J2C authentication data aliases can all be configured at the domain level. By default, all of the applications in the system have access to the JAAS logins configured at the global level. The security runtime first checks for the JAAS logins at the domain level. If it does not find them, it then checks for them in the global security configuration. Configure any of these JAAS logins at a domain only when you need to specify a login that is used exclusively by the applications in the security domain. So I am looking to make sure my application is in the domain, and I have tried everything I can think of. (I have assigned the domain to "all scopes", to the entire cell, etc.) No luck, I keep getting the same error response to my web service client. Any help or hints are appreciated.

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  • Common Areas For Securing Web Services

    The only way to truly keep a web service secure is to host it on a web server and then turn off the server. In real life no web service is 100% secure but there are methodologies for increasing the security around web services. In order for consumers of a web service they must adhere to the service’s Service-Level Agreement (SLA).  An SLA is a digital contract between a web service and its consumer. This contract defines what methods and protocols must be used to access the web service along with the defined data formats for sending and receiving data through the service. If either part does not abide by the contract then the service will not be accessible for consumption. Common areas for securing web services: Universal Discovery Description Integration  (UDDI) Web Service Description Language  (WSDL) Application Level Network Level “UDDI is a specification for maintaining standardized directories of information about web services, recording their capabilities, location and requirements in a universally recognized format.” (UDDI, 2010) WSDL on the other hand is a standardized format for defining a web service. A WSDL describes the allowable methods for accessing the web service along with what operations it performs. Web services in the Application Level can control access to what data is available by implementing its own security through various methodologies but the most common method is to have a consumer pass in a token along with a system identifier so that they system can validate the users access to any data or actions that they may be requesting. Security restrictions can also be applied to the host web server of the service by restricting access to the site by IP address or login credentials. Furthermore, companies can also block access to a service by using firewall rules and only allowing access to specific services on certain ports coming from specific IP addresses. This last methodology may require consumers to obtain a static IP address and then register it with the web service host so that they will be provide access to the information they wish to obtain. It is important to note that these areas can be secured in any combination based on the security level tolerance dictated by the publisher of the web service. This being said, the bare minimum security implantation must be in the Application Level within the web service itself. Typically I create a security layer within a web services exposed Internet that requires a consumer identifier and a consumer token. This information is then used to authenticate the requesting consumer before the actual request is performed. Refernece:UDDI. (2010). Retrieved 11 13, 2011, from LooselyCoupled.com: http://www.looselycoupled.com/glossary/UDDIService-Level Agreement (SLA). (n.d.). Retrieved 11 13, 2011, from SearchITChannel: http://searchitchannel.techtarget.com/definition/service-level-agreement

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  • K-12 and Cloud considerations

    - by user736511
    Much like every other Public Sector organization, school districts in the US and Canada are under tremendous pressure to deliver consistent and modern services while operating with reduced budgets, IT personnel shortages, and staff attrition.  Electronic/remote learning and the need for immediate access to resources such as grades, calendars, curricula etc. are straining IT environments that were already burdened with meeting privacy requirements imposed by both regulators and parents/students.  One area viewed as a solution to at least some of the challenges is the use of "Cloud" in education.  Although the concept of "Cloud" is nothing new in education with many providers supplying educational material over the web, school districts defer previously-in-house-hosted services to established commercial vendors to accommodate document sharing, app hosting, and even e-mail.  Doing so, however, does not reduce an important risk, that of privacy.  As always, Cloud implementations are viewed in a skeptical manner because of the perceived reduction in sensitive data management and protection thereof, although with a careful approach and the right tooling, the benefits realized by Clouds can expand to security and privacy.   Oracle's comprehensive approach to data privacy and identity management ensures that the necessary tools are available to support regulations, operational efficiencies and strong security regardless of where the sensitive data is stored - on premise or a Cloud.  Common management tools, role-based access controls, access policy management and engineered systems provided by Oracle can be the foundational pieces on which school districts can build their Cloud implementations without having to worry about security itself. Their biggest challenge, and it is a positive one, is how to best take advantage of Oracle's DB Security and IDM functionality to reduce operational costs while enabling modern applications and data delivery to those who needs access to it. For more information please refer to http://www.oracle.com/us/products/middleware/identity-management/overview/index.html and http://www.oracle.com/us/products/database/security/overview/index.html.

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