Search Results

Search found 1485 results on 60 pages for 'encrypted'.

Page 48/60 | < Previous Page | 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55  | Next Page >

• Picking encryption cipher for mcrypt

  - by Autolycus

  I have few questions about this code: <?php $iv_size = mcrypt_get_iv_size(MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_256, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB); $iv = mcrypt_create_iv($iv_size, MCRYPT_RAND); $key = "This is a very secret key"; $text = file_get_contents('path/to/your/file'); echo strlen($text) . "\n"; $crypttext = mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_256, $key, $text, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB, $iv); file_put_contents('path/to/your/file', $crypttext); ?> It encrypts the file just fine, however it adds additional nulls at the end, so if I encrypt: a test string is this one and here is a new line once decrypted becomes: a test string is this one and here is a new line 000000000000000 What's going on? Second, is MCRYPT_RIJNDAEL_256 compatible with AES-128? Finally, how would I let another party decrypt a file I've encrypted? They would need to know which encryption was used and I am not sure what to tell them.

  Read the article

• Toorcon 15 (2013)

  - by danx

  The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

  Read the article

• Sixeyed.Caching available now on NuGet and GitHub!

  - by Elton Stoneman

  Originally posted on: http://geekswithblogs.net/EltonStoneman/archive/2013/10/22/sixeyed.caching-available-now-on-nuget-and-github.aspxThe good guys at Pluralsight have okayed me to publish my caching framework (as seen in Caching in the .NET Stack: Inside-Out) as an open-source library, and it’s out now. You can get it here: Sixeyed.Caching source code on GitHub, and here: Sixeyed.Caching package v1.0.0 on NuGet. If you haven’t seen the course, there’s a preview here on YouTube: In-Process and Out-of-Process Caches, which gives a good flavour. The library is a wrapper around various cache providers, including the .NET MemoryCache, AppFabric cache, and  memcached*. All the wrappers inherit from a base class which gives you a set of common functionality against all the cache implementations: •    inherits OutputCacheProvider, so you can use your chosen cache provider as an ASP.NET output cache; •    serialization and encryption, so you can configure whether you want your cache items serialized (XML, JSON or binary) and encrypted; •    instrumentation, you can optionally use performance counters to monitor cache attempts and hits, at a low level. The framework wraps up different caches into an ICache interface, and it lets you use a provider directly like this: Cache.Memory.Get<RefData>(refDataKey); - or with configuration to use the default cache provider: Cache.Default.Get<RefData>(refDataKey); The library uses Unity’s interception framework to implement AOP caching, which you can use by flagging methods with the [Cache] attribute: [Cache] public RefData GetItem(string refDataKey) - and you can be more specific on the required cache behaviour: [Cache(CacheType=CacheType.Memory, Days=1] public RefData GetItem(string refDataKey) - or really specific: [Cache(CacheType=CacheType.Disk, SerializationFormat=SerializationFormat.Json, Hours=2, Minutes=59)] public RefData GetItem(string refDataKey) Provided you get instances of classes with cacheable methods from the container, the attributed method results will be cached, and repeated calls will be fetched from the cache. You can also set a bunch of cache defaults in application config, like whether to use encryption and instrumentation, and whether the cache system is enabled at all: <sixeyed.caching enabled="true"> <performanceCounters instrumentCacheTotalCounts="true" instrumentCacheTargetCounts="true" categoryNamePrefix ="Sixeyed.Caching.Tests"/> <encryption enabled="true" key="1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef" iv="1234567890abcdef"/> <!-- key must be 32 characters, IV must be 16 characters--> </sixeyed.caching> For AOP and methods flagged with the cache attribute, you can override the compile-time cache settings at runtime with more config (keyed by the class and method name): <sixeyed.caching enabled="true"> <targets> <target keyPrefix="MethodLevelCachingStub.GetRandomIntCacheConfiguredInternal" enabled="false"/> <target keyPrefix="MethodLevelCachingStub.GetRandomIntCacheExpiresConfiguredInternal" seconds="1"/> </targets> It’s released under the MIT license, so you can use it freely in your own apps and modify as required. I’ll be adding more content to the GitHub wiki, which will be the main source of documentation, but for now there’s an FAQ to get you started. * - in the course the framework library also wraps NCache Express, but there's no public redistributable library that I can find, so it's not in Sixeyed.Caching.

  Read the article

• Compare those hard-to-reach servers with SQL Snapper

  - by Michelle Taylor

  If you’ve got an environment which is at the end of an unreliable or slow network connection, or isn’t connected to your network at all, and you want to do a deployment to that environment – then pointing SQL Compare at it directly is difficult or impossible. While you could run SQL Compare locally on that environment, if it’s a server – especially if it’s a locked-down server – you probably don’t want to go through the hassle of using another activation on it. Or possibly you’re not allowed to install software at all, because you don’t have admin rights – but you can run user-mode software. SQL Snapper is a standalone, licensing-free program which takes SQL Compare snapshots of a database. It can create a snapshot within the context of that environment which can then be moved to your working environment to run SQL Compare against, allowing you to create a deployment script for environments you can’t get SQL Compare into. Where can I find it? You can find RedGate.SQLSnapper.exe in your SQL Compare installation directory – if you haven’t changed it, that will be something like C:\Program Files (x86)\Red Gate\SQL Compare 10 (or 11 if you’re using our SQL Server 2014 support beta). As well as copying the executable, you’ll also currently need to copy the System.Threading.dll and RedGate.SOCCompareInterface.dll files from the same directory alongside it. How do I use it? SQL Snapper’s UI is just a cut-down version of the snapshot creation UI in SQL Compare – just fill in the boxes and create your snapshot, then bring it back to the place you use SQL Compare to compare against your difficult-to-reach environment. SQL Snapper also has a command-line mode if you can’t run the UI in your target environment – just specify the server, database and output location with the /server, /database and /mksnap arguments, and optionally the username and password if you’re using SQL security, e.g.: RedGate.SQLSnapper.exe /database:yourdatabase /server:yourservername /username:youruser /password:yourpassword /mksnap:filename.snp What’s the catch? There are a few limitations of SQL Snapper in its current form – notably, it can’t read encrypted objects, and you’ll also currently need to copy the System.Threading.dll and RedGate.SOCCompareInterface.dll files alongside it, which we recognise is a little awkward in some environments. If you use SQL Snapper and want to share your experiences, or help us work on improving the experience in future, please comment here or leave a request on the SQL Compare UserVoice at https://redgate.uservoice.com/forums/141379-sql-compare.

  Read the article

• How do I get my blacked out ttys back?

  - by con-f-use

  Original Question: After I replaced my Ubuntu 10.10 with 11.04 all I get when I Strg+Alt+F1-6 into a tty is a black screen. Also when I boot there's a while of black screen after grub2 menu is displayed. Then until just before gnome starts it stays black. I have an Nvida Geforce Quadro FX 770M on my HP EliteBook 8530w. How do I get my ttys (aka 'virtual terminals') to work again? My effords in chronological order: So grub and gfx-payload seems to be the problem, I figured. I went along with this guide for higher tty resolution. Which led to the grub2 menu displaying in my native resolution rather than 800x600. The black screen problem remains. I googlehit some bugreports on other nvidia crads having that problem. I tried uninstalling the nvidia driver. No effect. Also tried different resolutions With an older version of the kernel it works. Though not perfectly. The ttys are usable, black screen between grub2 menu and gnome start remains. Not really a solution. Tried so much, that I lost track. Reinstalled grub2 and linux-image-2.6.38-8-generic. Then did this to my /etc/default/grub in accordance with the aforementioned guide (/etc/grub.d/00_header edited as well): GRUB_DEFAULT=0 GRUB_HIDDEN_TIMEOUT=0 #GRUB_HIDDEN_TIMEOUT_QUIET=true GRUB_TIMEOUT=3 GRUB_DISTRIBUTOR=`lsb_release -i -s 2> /dev/null || echo Debian` #GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="quiet splash" GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="" GRUB_GFXMODE=1680x1050x32 To my surprise I can now use my ttys in native resolution. Black screen between grub2 menu and gnome login screen is still there though. That is annoying since I also use an encrypted disk thus having to enter my passphrase in total dark... Still looking for a solution but urgency is low. Downloaded and installed a later version of nvidia driver. No difference to last edit. Tried GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="vga="-parameter. No effect. nomodeset has no effect. not even in combination with vga=... Tried echo FRAMEBUFFER=y > /etc/initramfs-tools/conf.d/splash no effect (see comment) On the verge of resignation... Bounty period soon to end.

  Read the article

• Securing User Account Details with MySQL

  - by Antoinette O'Sullivan

  Keeping user account details secure is always at the forefront of a Database Administrator's mind. However, users want to get up and running as soon as possible without complex login procedures. You can learn more about this and many other topics in the MySQL for Database Administrator course. For example, MySQL 5.6.6 introduced a new utility: mysql_config_editor, which makes secure access via MySQL client applications much easier to establish, while still providing a good measure of security. The mysql_config_editor stores a user's authentication details in an encrypted login file called mylogin.cnf. This login file is readable and writable for the user who invokes the utility, and invisible to everyone else. You can use it to collect all your hard-to-remember server locations and paswords safe in the knowledge that your passwords are never invoked using clear text. The MySQL for Database Administrators course is a 5-day instructor-led course which is available as a: Training-on-Demand: Start training within 24 hours of registration, following lecture material at your own pace through streaming video and booking time on a lab environment to suit your schedule. Live-Virtual Event: Attend a live event from your own desk, choosing from a selection of events on the schedule to suit different timezones. In-Class Event: Travel to an education center to attend this course. Below is a selection of the events already on the schedule. Location  Date  Delivery Language  Brisbane, Australia  18 August 2014  English  Brussels, Belgium  25 August 2014  English  Sao Paulo, Brazil  2 June 2014  Brazilian Portuguese  Cairo, Egypt  28 September 2014  Arabic  London, England  14 July 2014  English  Belfast, Ireland  15 September 2014  English  Dublin, Ireland  29 September 2014  English  Rome, Italy  16 June 2014  Italian  Seoul, Korea  9 June 2014  Korean  Petaling Jaya, Malaysia  16 June 2014  English  Utrecht, Netherlands  25 August 2014  English  Edinburgh, Scotland  26 June 2014  English  Madrid, Spain  6 October 2014  Spanish  Tunis, Tunisia  27 October 2014  French  Istanbul, Turkey  14 July 2014  Turkish To register for an event, request an additional event or learn more about the authentic MySQL curriculum, go to http://education.oracle.com/mysql. To read more about MySQL security, consult the MySQL Reference Manual - http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.6/en/security.html.

  Read the article

• IRM and Consumerization

  - by martin.abrahams

  As the season of rampant consumerism draws to its official close on 12th Night, it seems a fitting time to discuss consumerization - whereby technologies from the consumer market, such as the Android and iPad, are adopted by business organizations. I expect many of you will have received a shiny new mobile gadget for Christmas - and will be expecting to use it for work as well as leisure in 2011. In my case, I'm just getting to grips with my first Android phone. This trend developed so much during 2010 that a number of my customers have officially changed their stance on consumer devices - accepting consumerization as something to embrace rather than resist. Clearly, consumerization has significant implications for information control, as corporate data is distributed to consumer devices whether the organization is aware of it or not. I daresay that some DLP solutions can limit distribution to some extent, but this creates a conflict between accepting consumerization and frustrating it. So what does Oracle IRM have to offer the consumerized enterprise? First and foremost, consumerization does not automatically represent great additional risk - if an enterprise seals its sensitive information. Sealed files are encrypted, and that fundamental protection is not affected by copying files to consumer devices. A device might be lost or stolen, and the user might not think to report the loss of a personally owned device, but the data and the enterprise that owns it are protected. Indeed, the consumerization trend is another strong reason for enterprises to deploy IRM - to protect against this expansion of channels by which data might be accidentally exposed. It also enables encryption requirements to be met even though the enterprise does not own the device and cannot enforce device encryption. Moving on to the usage of sealed content on such devices, some of our customers are using virtual desktop solutions such that, in truth, the sealed content is being opened and used on a PC in the normal way, and the user is simply using their device for display purposes. This has several advantages: The sensitive documents are not actually on the devices, so device loss and theft are even less of a worry The enterprise has another layer of control over how and where content is used, as access to the virtual solution involves another layer of authentication and authorization - defence in depth It is a generic solution that means the enterprise does not need to actively support the ever expanding variety of consumer devices - the enterprise just manages some virtual access to traditional systems using something like Citrix or Remote Desktop services. It is a tried and tested way of accessing sealed documents. People have being using Oracle IRM in conjunction with Citrix and Remote Desktop for several years. For some scenarios, we also have the "IRM wrapper" option that provides a simple app for sealing and unsealing content on a range of operating systems. We are busy working on other ways to support the explosion of consumer devices, but this blog is not a proper forum for talking about them at this time. If you are an Oracle IRM customer, we will be pleased to discuss our plans and your requirements with you directly on request. You can be sure that the blog will cover the new capabilities as soon as possible.

  Read the article

• Failed 12.04 installation

  - by Rob Sayer

  I tried installing Ubuntu 12.04 today. Not an upgrade, a new installation. It didn't work. My computer specs: Computer: Compaq presario CQ-104CA OS: Windows 7 Home 64 bit CPU: AMD V140 BIOS: latest Graphics: amd m880g with ati mobility radeon hd 4250 Wireless: atheros ar9285 Internal HD:SATA I wasn't connected to the internet at the time ... I know of a number of people who have installed ubuntu unconnected and just updated later. It seemed to go normally until I got to the part where I chose to install dual boot linux/windows. Then, the screen went black and the following test appeared (I left out the [OK]'s): checking battery state starting crash report submission daemon stating cpu interrupts balancing daemon stopping system V runlevel compatibility starting configure network device security stopping configure network device security stopping cold plug devices stopping log initial device creation starting enable remaining boot-time encrypting devices starting configure network device security starting save udev log and update rules stopping save udev log and update rules stopping enable remaining boot-time encrypted block devices checking for running unattended-upgrades acpid: exiting speech-dispatcher disabled: edit /etc/default/speech-disorder At this point, the CD is ejected. Then nothing. If I press the return key, it boots Windows. I don't think that's what's supposed to happen. Thinking the cd media or dvd drive may have been faulty, I downloaded the .iso again and made a bootable USB stick, as per your instructions. This time there was no cryptic crash screen. It just booted windows. I can't find any log files it may have left. Thinking the amd64 version may have been the wrong one, I tried downloading the x86 version. Same thing, both from cd and usb drive. Note I downloaded both files twice. I doubt it was a corrupted d/l. This is supposed to be a simple, transparent install. I went to the time and trouble of looking up my devices and drivers re ubuntu beforehand, and was prepared to do some configuration, though I know someone who has the same wireless device and his worked righted out of the box. But I spent over 3 hours trying to install it with only the above to show for it.

  Read the article

• Where I missed boot.properties.?

  - by Dyade, Shailesh M

  Today one of my customer was trying to start the WebLogic Server ( Production Instance) , though he was trying to start the server in a standard way, but it was failing due to below error :   ####<Oct 22, 2012 12:14:43 PM BST> <Warning> <Security> <BanifB1> <> <main> <> <> <> <1350904483998> <BEA-090066> <Problem handling boot identity. The following exception was generated: weblogic.security.internal.encryption.EncryptionServiceException: weblogic.security.internal.encryption.EncryptionServiceException: [Security:090219]Error decrypting Secret Key java.security.ProviderException: setSeed() failed> And it started failing into below causes. ####<Oct 22, 2012 12:16:45 PM BST> <Critical> <WebLogicServer> <BanifB1> <AdminServer> <main> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1350904605837> <BEA-000386> <Server subsystem failed. Reason: java.lang.AssertionError: java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException java.lang.AssertionError: java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException weblogic.security.internal.encryption.EncryptionServiceException: weblogic.security.internal.encryption.EncryptionServiceException: [Security:090219]Error decrypting Secret Key java.security.ProviderException: setSeed() failed weblogic.security.internal.encryption.EncryptionServiceException: [Security:090219]Error decrypting Secret Key java.security.ProviderException: setSeed() failed at weblogic.security.internal.encryption.JSafeSecretKeyEncryptor.decryptSecretKey(JSafeSecretKeyEncryptor.java:121) Customer was facing this issue without any changes in the system, it was stable suddenly started seeing this issue last night. When we checked, customer was manually entering the username and password, config.xml had the entries encrypted However when verified, customer had the boot.properties at the Servers/AdminServer/security folder and DomainName/security didn't have this file. Adding boot.properies fixed the issue. Regards Shailesh Dyade 

  Read the article

• Using the @ in SQL Azure Connections

  - by BuckWoody

  The other day I was working with a client on an application they were changing to a hybrid architecture – some data on-premise and other data in SQL Azure and Windows Azure Blob storage. I had them make a couple of corrections - the first was that all communications to SQL Azure need to be encrypted. It’s a simple addition to the connection string, depending on the library you use. Which brought up another interesting point. They had been using something that looked like this, using the .NET provider: Server=tcp:[serverName].database.windows.net;Database=myDataBase; User ID=LoginName;Password=myPassword; Trusted_Connection=False;Encrypt=True; This includes most of the formatting needed for SQL Azure. It specifies TCP as the transport mechanism, the database name is included, Trusted_Connection is off, and encryption is on. But it needed one more change: Server=tcp:[serverName].database.windows.net;Database=myDataBase; User ID=[LoginName]@[serverName];Password=myPassword; Trusted_Connection=False;Encrypt=True; Notice the difference? It’s the User ID parameter. It includes the @ symbol and the name of the server – not the whole DNS name, just the server name itself. The developers were a bit surprised, since it had been working with the first format that just used the user name. Why did both work, and why is one better than the other? It has to do with the connection library you use. For most libraries, the user name is enough. But for some libraries (subject to change so I don’t list them here) the server name parameter isn’t sent in the way the load balancer understands, so you need to include the server name right in the login, so the system can parse it correctly. Keep in mind, the string limit for that is 128 characters – so take the @ symbol and the server name into consideration for user names. The user connection info is detailed here: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee336268.aspx Upshot? Include the @servername on your connection string just to be safe. And plan for that extra space…  

  Read the article

• New ZFS Encryption features in Solaris 11.1

  - by darrenm

  Solaris 11.1 brings a few small but significant improvements to ZFS dataset encryption.  There is a new readonly property 'keychangedate' that shows that date and time of the last wrapping key change (basically the last time 'zfs key -c' was run on the dataset), this is similar to the 'rekeydate' property that shows the last time we added a new data encryption key. $ zfs get creation,keychangedate,rekeydate rpool/export/home/bob NAME PROPERTY VALUE SOURCE rpool/export/home/bob creation Mon Mar 21 11:05 2011 - rpool/export/home/bob keychangedate Fri Oct 26 11:50 2012 local rpool/export/home/bob rekeydate Tue Oct 30 9:53 2012 local The above example shows that we have changed both the wrapping key and added new data encryption keys since the filesystem was initially created.  If we haven't changed a wrapping key then it will be the same as the creation date.  It should be obvious but for filesystems that were created prior to Solaris 11.1 we don't have this data so it will be displayed as '-' instead. Another change that I made was to relax the restriction that the size of the wrapping key needed to match the size of the data encryption key (ie the size given in the encryption property).  In Solaris 11 Express and Solaris 11 if you set encryption=aes-256-ccm we required that the wrapping key be 256 bits in length.  This restriction was unnecessary and made it impossible to select encryption property values with key lengths 128 and 192 when the wrapping key was stored in the Oracle Key Manager.  This is because currently the Oracle Key Manager stores AES 256 bit keys only.  Now with Solaris 11.1 this restriciton has been removed. There is still one case were the wrapping key size and data encryption key size will always match and that is where they keysource property sets the format to be 'passphrase', since this is a key generated internally to libzfs and to preseve compatibility on upgrade from older releases the code will always generate a wrapping key (using PKCS#5 PBKDF2 as before) that matches the key length size of the encryption property. The pam_zfs_key module has been updated so that it allows you to specify encryption=off. There were also some bugs fixed including not attempting to load keys for datasets that are delegated to zones and some other fixes to error paths to ensure that we could support Zones On Shared Storage where all the datasets in the ZFS pool were encrypted that I discussed in my previous blog entry. If there are features you would like to see for ZFS encryption please let me know (direct email or comments on this blog are fine, or if you have a support contract having your support rep log an enhancement request).

  Read the article

• S11 launched

  - by unixman

  Now that Oracle Solaris 11 is out, its time to do 2 things -- 1) Its time to see what's in it, what's new and why its important, and then assess why it might make sense to begin evaluating it for your needs and 2) Its time to acknowledge, give thanks to and congratulate all the R&D personnel, architects, engineers, designers and testers who've put in so much effort and energy into helping make Solaris 11 (and SunOS 5.11) what it has become -- starting way back circa 2004 and, more importantly, culminating in the recent years and months -- staying focused on the execution, unwavering in the face of various challenges. For #1 above, here are a few good things to get going with - Watch the product launch replay - Visit the Solaris 11 Spotlight section on oracle.com - Get comfortable through introductory videos and detailed "how-to" guides (ex: how to create and publish IPS packages), white papers on the new default root file system, ZFS, and reap the benefits brought on by the fundamental shift in easing the administration experience - Look at the next level of software lifecycle management that is enabled by technologies such as Automated Installer and Image Packaging System -- that dramatically address patch management-related challenges - Understand how we continue to innovate in areas of service intelligence, reliability and availability - Start to evaluate enhancements in virtualization capabilities -- whether influenced by the need to consolidate or motivated by the need to have increased service mobility across physical systems, leveraging hardware-level abstractions - Gain more control over your network-centric services through enhancements in network resource management, observability and I/O performance - Look beyond your existing infrastructure with confidence that you can re-host and transition to newer systems with the use of Solaris 10 zones running on top of Solaris 11 - Relish in the fact that you can do all this, get your data to be secure and encrypted and more, on both, SPARC and x86-based systems. - Stay informed by keeping an eye on relevant blogs, which we've begun turning up recently. - Go through a hands-on lab - Sign up to take a class or just opt to watch various videos to begin to raise your comfort level with these technologies For #2 above -- There are many ways to do that. One way is to just say "thanks" with an email, a post, or a simple card,  similar to this one seen at a Barnes and Noble store recently.  The front of the card is followed by what's inside... and as the saying goes, now more then ever "it's what's inside that counts" And here's the inside of the card: So, what are you waiting for ? Go download and try it out, and please let us know what you think of it!

  Read the article

• Oracle Linux Hands-on Lab from your Home? Yes You Can Do That!

  - by Zeynep Koch

  We're taking the very popular OTN Sysadmin Days and going virtual! We have two days to choose from: Americas - Tuesday January 15th, 2013 9:00 a.m – 1:00 p.m. PT / 12:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m. ET / 1:00 p.m. - 5:00 p.m. BRT EMEA -  Tuesday January 29th, 2013 - 9:00 a.m – 13:00 p.m GMT / 10:00 a.m – 14:00 p,m CET / 12:00 p.m – 16:00 p.m AST / 13:00 p.m – 17:00 p,m MSK / 14:30 p.m – 18:30 p.m IST You'll be able to perform real-world tasks with Oracle Linux and if you have questions you can ask for help from the Oracle experts through chat window. There's one caveat: you'll have to do a little homework ahead of time. Load the virtual images onto your laptop, find the instructions, and make sure everything is working properly. This wiki https://wikis.oracle.com/display/virtualsysadminday/Home explains what you need to do. If you have questions, ask them as comments to the wiki:https://wikis.oracle.com/display/virtualsysadminday/Home.  Oracle Linux Track  1. Oracle Linux Technology Overview - In this session we will go over the latest Oracle Linux features including tools for Linux administration such as the Unbreakable Linux Network (ULN) and public yum. We will also show you a demo of Ksplice zero downtime kernel updates, only available to Oracle Linux customers. You will see how easy it is to switch from Red Hat support to Oracle Linux support by using ULN. Last but not least, we’ll introduce the 3 hands-on labs that will follow this session in the Linux track. 2. HOL: Package Management -  In this lab session you will use the package management on Oracle Linux using RPM and yum. Some of the tasks that you will experience include listing installed packages, obtaining additional information about packages, searching for packages and installing/updating them as well as verifying package integrity and removing software. We’ll also review Linux services and run levels, how to start and stop them, checking the status of a particular service and enabling a service to be started automatically at system boot. 3. HOL: Storage Management - In this hands-on lab session, you will learn about storage management with LVM2, the Linux Logical Volume Manager, preparing block devices, creating physical and logical volumes, creating file systems on top of logical volumes, and resizing file systems dynamically. You will also practice setting up software RAID devices, configuring encrypted block devices.Btrfs File System - In this hands-on lab session, we will introduce you to Btrfs file system. You will be able to create and mount a Btrfs file system and learn to setup a mirrored/striped file system across multiple block devices. You’ll also learn how to add and remove block devices, and create file system snapshots. Register for this FREE event.

  Read the article

• Oracle Brings Java to iOS Devices (and Android too)

  - by Shay Shmeltzer

  Java developer, did you ever wish that you can take your Java skills and apply them to building applications for iOS mobile devices? Well, now you can! With the new Oracle ADF Mobile solution, Oracle has created a unique technology that allows developers to use the Java language and develop applications that install and run on both iOS and Android mobile devices. The solution is based on a thin native container that installs as part of your application. The container is able to run the same application you develop unchanged on both Android and iOS devices. One part of the container is a headless lightweight JVM based on the Java ME CDC technology. This allows the execution of Java code on your mobile device. Java is used for building business logic, accessing local SQLite encrypted database, and invoking and interacting with remote services. Java concept on the UI too To further help transition Java developers to mobile developers, ADF Mobile borrows familiar concepts from the world of JSF to make the UI development experience simpler. The user interface layer of Oracle ADF Mobile is rendered with HTML5 which delivers native user experience on the devices, including animations and gesture support. Using a set of rich components, developers can create mobile pages without needing to write low level HTML5 and JavaScript code. The components cover everything from simple controls such as text fields, date pickers, buttons and links, to advanced data visualization components such as graphs, gauges and maps, and including unique mobile UI patterns such as lists, and toggle selectors. Want to see the components in action? Access this demo instance from your mobile device. Need to further customize the look and feel? You can use CSS3 to achieve this. A controller layer - similar in functionality to the JSF controller - allows developer to simplify the way they build navigation between pages. The logic behind the pages is written in managed beans with various scopes – again similar to the JSF approach. Need to interact with device features like camera, SMS, Contacts etc? Oracle conveniently packaged access to these services in a set of services that you can just drag and drop into your pages as buttons and links, or code into your managed beans Java calls to activate. Underneath the covers this layer is implemented using the open source phonegap solution. With the new Oracle ADF Mobile solution, transferring your Java skills into the Mobile world has become much easier. Check out this development experience demo. And then go and download JDeveloper and the ADF Mobile extension and try it out on your own. For more on ADF Mobile, see the ADF Mobile OTN page.

  Read the article

• High CPU load for 1:30 minutes when mounting ext4-raid partition

  - by sirion

  I have a raid 5 (software) with 5x2TB drives. I encrypted the raid with cryptsetup and put an ext4-partition on top. In the beginning opening and mounting the raid took less than 10 seconds, now (for a few weeks) mounting alone takes 1:30 minutes and the cpu stays around 93% the whole time: The output of "time sudo mount /dev/mapper/8000 /media/8000" is: real 1m31.952s user 0m0.008s sys 1m25.229s At the same time only one line is added to /var/log/syslog: kernel: [ 2240.921381] EXT4-fs (dm-1): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null) My Ubuntu-version is "12.04.1 LTS" and no updates are pending. I checked the partition with fsck, but it says that all is ok. The "cryptsetup luksOpen" command only takes a few seconds. I also tried changing the raid-bitmap (as it was suggested in some forum) but it did not change the behaviour. sudo mdadm --grow /dev/md0 -b internal and sudo mdadm --grow /dev/md0 -b none I had the idea that it might be the hardware being slow, but a read test with "sudo hdparm -t /dev/md0" spit out values between 62 and 159 MB/sec: Timing buffered disk reads: 382 MB in 3.00 seconds = 127.14 MB/sec Timing buffered disk reads: 482 MB in 3.02 seconds = 159.62 MB/sec Timing buffered disk reads: 190 MB in 3.03 seconds = 62.65 MB/sec Timing buffered disk reads: 474 MB in 3.02 seconds = 157.12 MB/sec Although I think it is strange that the read rate jumps by more than 100% - could that mean something? The speed test when reading from the mapped (decrypted) device shows similar behavior, although it is of course much slower. "sudo hdparm -t /dev/mapper/8000": Timing buffered disk reads: 56 MB in 3.02 seconds = 18.54 MB/sec Timing buffered disk reads: 122 MB in 3.09 seconds = 39.43 MB/sec Timing buffered disk reads: 134 MB in 3.02 seconds = 44.35 MB/sec The output of a verbose mount "mount -vvv /dev/mapper/8000 /media/8000" does not help much: mount: fstab path: "/etc/fstab" mount: mtab path: "/etc/mtab" mount: lock path: "/etc/mtab~" mount: temp path: "/etc/mtab.tmp" mount: UID: 0 mount: eUID: 0 mount: spec: "/dev/mapper/8000" mount: node: "/media/8000" mount: types: "(null)" mount: opts: "(null)" mount: you didn't specify a filesystem type for /dev/mapper/8000 I will try type ext4 mount: mount(2) syscall: source: "/dev/mapper/8000", target: "/media/8000", filesystemtype: "ext4", mountflags: -1058209792, data: (null) Any idea where I could find additional information on why mounting takes so long, or what additional tests I could run?

  Read the article

• Capture a Query Executed By An Application Or User Against a SQL Server Database in Less Than a Minute

  - by Compudicted

  At times a Database Administrator, or even a developer is required to wear a spy’s hat. This necessity oftentimes is dictated by a need to take a glimpse into a black-box application for reasons varying from a performance issue to an unauthorized access to data or resources, or as in my most recent case, a closed source custom application that was abandoned by a deserted contractor without source code. It may not be news or unknown to most IT people that SQL Server has always provided means of back-door access to everything connecting to its database. This indispensible tool is SQL Server Profiler. This “gem” is always quietly sitting in the Start – Programs – SQL Server <product version> – Performance Tools folder (yes, it is for performance analysis mostly, but not limited to) ready to help you! So, to the action, let’s start it up. Once ready click on the File – New Trace button, or using Ctrl-N with your keyboard. The standard connection dialog you have seen in SSMS comes up where you connect the standard way: One side note here, you will be able to connect only if your account belongs to the sysadmin or alter trace fixed server role. Upon a successful connection you must be able to see this initial dialog: At this stage I will give a hint: you will have a wide variety of predefined templates: But to shorten your time to results you would need to opt for using the TSQL_Grouped template. Now you need to set it up. In some cases, you will know the principal’s login name (account) that needs to be monitored in advance, and in some (like in mine), you will not. But it is VERY helpful to monitor just a particular account to minimize the amount of results returned. So if you know it you can already go to the Event Section tab, then click the Column Filters button which would bring a dialog below where you key in the account being monitored without any mask (or whildcard):  If you do not know the principal name then you will need to poke around and look around for things like a config file where (typically!) the connection string is fully exposed. That was the case in my situation, an application had an app.config (XML) file with the connection string in it not encrypted: This made my endeavor very easy. So after I entered the account to monitor I clicked on Run button and also started my black-box application. Voilà, in a under a minute of time I had the SQL statement captured:

  Read the article

• Architecture or Pattern for handling properties with custom setter/getter?

  - by Shelby115

  Current Situation: I'm doing a simple MVC site for keeping journals as a personal project. My concern is I'm trying to keep the interaction between the pages and the classes simplistic. Where I run into issues is the password field. My setter encrypts the password, so the getter retrieves the encrypted password. public class JournalBook { private IEncryptor _encryptor { get; set; } private String _password { get; set; } public Int32 id { get; set; } public String name { get; set; } public String description { get; set; } public String password { get { return this._password; } set { this.setPassword(this._password, value, value); } } public List<Journal> journals { get; set; } public DateTime created { get; set; } public DateTime lastModified { get; set; } public Boolean passwordProtected { get { return this.password != null && this.password != String.Empty; } } ... } I'm currently using model-binding to submit changes or create new JournalBooks (like below). The problem arises that in the code below book.password is always null, I'm pretty sure this is because of the custom setter. [HttpPost] public ActionResult Create(JournalBook book) { // Create the JournalBook if not null. if (book != null) this.JournalBooks.Add(book); return RedirectToAction("Index"); } Question(s): Should I be handling this not in the property's getter/setter? Is there a pattern or architecture that allows for model-binding or another simple method when properties need to have custom getters/setters to manipulate the data? To summarize, how can I handle the password storing with encryption such that I have the following, Robust architecture I don't store the password as plaintext. Submitting a new or modified JournalBook is as easy as default model-binding (or close to it).

  Read the article

• error reading keytab file krb5.keytab

  - by Banjer

  I've noticed these kerberos keytab error messages on both SLES 11.2 and CentOS 6.3: sshd[31442]: pam_krb5[31442]: error reading keytab 'FILE: / etc/ krb5. keytab' /etc/krb5.keytab does not exist on our hosts, and from what I understand of the keytab file, we don't need it. Per this kerberos keytab introduction: A keytab is a file containing pairs of Kerberos principals and encrypted keys (these are derived from the Kerberos password). You can use this file to log into Kerberos without being prompted for a password. The most common personal use of keytab files is to allow scripts to authenticate to Kerberos without human interaction, or store a password in a plaintext file. This sounds like something we do not need and is perhaps better security-wise to not have it. How can I keep this error from popping up in our system logs? Here is my krb5.conf if its useful: banjer@myhost:~> cat /etc/krb5.conf # This file managed by Puppet # [libdefaults] default_tkt_enctypes = RC4-HMAC DES-CBC-MD5 DES-CBC-CRC default_tgs_enctypes = RC4-HMAC DES-CBC-MD5 DES-CBC-CRC preferred_enctypes = RC4-HMAC DES-CBC-MD5 DES-CBC-CRC default_realm = FOO.EXAMPLE.COM dns_lookup_kdc = true clockskew = 300 [logging] default = SYSLOG:NOTICE:DAEMON kdc = FILE:/var/log/kdc.log kadmind = FILE:/var/log/kadmind.log [appdefaults] pam = { ticket_lifetime = 1d renew_lifetime = 1d forwardable = true proxiable = false retain_after_close = false minimum_uid = 0 debug = false banner = "Enter your current" } Let me know if you need to see any other configs. Thanks. EDIT This message shows up in /var/log/secure whenever a non-root user logs in via SSH or the console. It seems to only occur with password-based authentication. If I do a key-based ssh to a server, I don't see the error. If I log in with root, I do not see the error. Our Linux servers authenticate against Active Directory, so its a hearty mix of PAM, samba, kerberos, and winbind that is used to authenticate a user.

  Read the article

• SSL / HTTP / No Response to Curl

  - by Alex McHale

  I am trying to send commands to a SOAP service, and getting nothing in reply. The SOAP service is at a completely separate site from either server I am testing with. I have written a dummy script with the SOAP XML embedded. When I run it at my local site, on any of three machines -- OSX, Ubuntu, or CentOS 5.3 -- it completes successfully with a good response. I then sent the script to our public host at Slicehost, where I fail to get the response back from the SOAP service. It accepts the TCP socket and proceeds with the SSL handshake. I do not however receive any valid HTTP response. This is the case whether I use my script or curl on the command line. I have rewritten the script using SOAP4R, Net::HTTP and Curb. All of which work at my local site, none of which work at the Slicehost site. I have tried to assemble the CentOS box as closely to match my Slicehost server as possible. I rebuilt the Slice to be a stock CentOS 5.3 and stock CentOS 5.4 with the same results. When I look at a tcpdump of the bad sessions on Slicehost, I see my script or curl send the XML to the remote server, and nothing comes back. When I look at the tcpdump at my local site, I see the response just fine. I have entirely disabled iptables on the Slice. Does anyone have any ideas what could be causing these results? Please let me know what additional information I can furnish. Thank you! Below is a wire trace of a sample session. The IP that starts with 173 is my server while the IP that starts with 12 is the SOAP server's. No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 1 0.000000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP 36872 > https [SYN] Seq=0 Win=5840 Len=0 MSS=1460 TSV=137633469 TSER=0 WS=6 Frame 1 (74 bytes on wire, 74 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 0, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 2 0.040000 12.36.x.x 173.45.x.x TCP https > 36872 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8760 Len=0 MSS=1460 Frame 2 (62 bytes on wire, 62 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1), Dst: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6) Internet Protocol, Src: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x), Dst: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: https (443), Dst Port: 36872 (36872), Seq: 0, Ack: 1, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 3 0.040000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP 36872 > https [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0 Frame 3 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 4 0.050000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x SSLv2 Client Hello Frame 4 (156 bytes on wire, 156 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 102 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 5 0.130000 12.36.x.x 173.45.x.x TCP [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 5 (1434 bytes on wire, 1434 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1), Dst: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6) Internet Protocol, Src: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x), Dst: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: https (443), Dst Port: 36872 (36872), Seq: 1, Ack: 103, Len: 1380 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 6 0.130000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP 36872 > https [ACK] Seq=103 Ack=1381 Win=8280 Len=0 Frame 6 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 103, Ack: 1381, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 7 0.130000 12.36.x.x 173.45.x.x TLSv1 Server Hello, Certificate, Server Hello Done Frame 7 (1280 bytes on wire, 1280 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1), Dst: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6) Internet Protocol, Src: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x), Dst: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: https (443), Dst Port: 36872 (36872), Seq: 1381, Ack: 103, Len: 1226 [Reassembled TCP Segments (2606 bytes): #5(1380), #7(1226)] Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 8 0.130000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP 36872 > https [ACK] Seq=103 Ack=2607 Win=11040 Len=0 Frame 8 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 103, Ack: 2607, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 9 0.130000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TLSv1 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message Frame 9 (236 bytes on wire, 236 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 103, Ack: 2607, Len: 182 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 10 0.190000 12.36.x.x 173.45.x.x TLSv1 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message Frame 10 (97 bytes on wire, 97 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1), Dst: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6) Internet Protocol, Src: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x), Dst: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: https (443), Dst Port: 36872 (36872), Seq: 2607, Ack: 285, Len: 43 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 11 0.190000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TLSv1 Application Data Frame 11 (347 bytes on wire, 347 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 285, Ack: 2650, Len: 293 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 12 0.190000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 12 (1514 bytes on wire, 1514 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 578, Ack: 2650, Len: 1460 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 13 0.450000 12.36.x.x 173.45.x.x TCP https > 36872 [ACK] Seq=2650 Ack=578 Win=64958 Len=0 Frame 13 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1), Dst: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6) Internet Protocol, Src: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x), Dst: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: https (443), Dst Port: 36872 (36872), Seq: 2650, Ack: 578, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 14 0.450000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 14 (206 bytes on wire, 206 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 2038, Ack: 2650, Len: 152 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 15 0.510000 12.36.x.x 173.45.x.x TCP [TCP Dup ACK 13#1] https > 36872 [ACK] Seq=2650 Ack=578 Win=64958 Len=0 Frame 15 (54 bytes on wire, 54 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1), Dst: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6) Internet Protocol, Src: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x), Dst: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: https (443), Dst Port: 36872 (36872), Seq: 2650, Ack: 578, Len: 0 No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 16 0.850000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP [TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 16 (1514 bytes on wire, 1514 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 578, Ack: 2650, Len: 1460 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 17 1.650000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP [TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 17 (1514 bytes on wire, 1514 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 578, Ack: 2650, Len: 1460 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 18 3.250000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP [TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 18 (1514 bytes on wire, 1514 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 578, Ack: 2650, Len: 1460 Secure Socket Layer No. Time Source Destination Protocol Info 19 6.450000 173.45.x.x 12.36.x.x TCP [TCP Retransmission] [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU] Frame 19 (1514 bytes on wire, 1514 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: 40:40:17:3a:f4:e6 (40:40:17:3a:f4:e6), Dst: Dell_fb:49:a1 (00:21:9b:fb:49:a1) Internet Protocol, Src: 173.45.x.x (173.45.x.x), Dst: 12.36.x.x (12.36.x.x) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 36872 (36872), Dst Port: https (443), Seq: 578, Ack: 2650, Len: 1460 Secure Socket Layer

  Read the article

• Extract Key and Certificate from Kemp Loadmaster?

  - by Matt Simmons

  I'm trying very hard to get away from a set of Kemp Loadmasters that I bought years ago to provide HA access to our website. Part of that process is going to be putting the key and certificate in the new solution (HAproxy with nginx doing SSL). Unfortunately, I've come up against a problem... The Kemp has built-in certificate management, and it generates CSR's at the touch of a button. It also supported importing of signed certificates, however it does not, so far as I can tell, allow any kind of export of the key itself. There is a "backup key and certificates" ability, however here's the text from the manual: LoadMaster supports exporting of ALL certificate information. This includes private key, host and intermediate certificates. The export file is designed to be used for import into another LoadMaster and is encrypted. Export and import can be completed using the WUI at Certificates -> Backup/Restore Certs. Please make sure to note the pass phrase used to create the export, it will be required to complete the import. You can selectively resort only Virtual Service certificates including private keys, intermediate certificates or both. Well, that is great, but as for actually DEALING with the certs, I'm apparently out of luck. Of course, I'm not going to give up that easily. I ran "file" on the saved cert bundle and got this: $ file client1.certs.backup client1.certs.backup: gzip compressed data, from Unix Well, awesome, I thought. Maybe it's just a .tar.gz, so I unzipped it, and that went fine, but my attempts to untar it didn't work, and running "file" on it now just gives this: $ file client1.certs.backup client1.certs.backup: data So that's where I'm stuck. Anyone have experience with these?

  Read the article

• Django running on Apache+WSGI and apache SSL proxying

  - by Lessfoe

  Hi all, I'm trying to rewrite all requests for my Django server running on apache+WSGI ( inside my local network) and configured as the WSGI's wiki how to, except that I set a virtualhost for it. The server which from I want to rewrite requests is another apache server listening on port 80. I can manage it to work well if I don't try to enable SSL connection as the required way to connect. But I need all requests to Django server encrypted with SSL so I generally used this directive to achieve this ( on my public webserver ): Alias /dirname "/var/www/dirname" SSLVerifyClient none SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth SSLRequireSSL AuthName "stuff name" AuthType Basic AuthUserFile /etc/httpd/djangoserver.passwd require valid-user # redirect all request to django.test:80 RewriteEngine On RewriteRule (.*)$ http://django.test/$1 [P] This configuration works if I try to load a specific page trough the external server from my browser. It is not working clicking my django application urls ( even tough the url seems correct when I put my mouse over). The url my public server is trying to serve use http ( instead of https ) and the directory "dirname" I specified on my apache configuration disappear, so it says that the page was not found. I think it depends on Django and its WSGI handler . Does anybody went trough my same problem? PS: I have already tried to modify the WSGI script . I'm Using Django 1.0.3, Apache 2.2 on a Fedora10 (inside), Apache 2.2 on the public server. Thanks in advance for your help. Fab

  Read the article

• Can I configure Wndows NDES server to use Triple DES (3DES) algorithm for PKCS#7 answer encryption?

  - by O.Shevchenko

  I am running SCEP client to enroll certificates on NDES server. If OpenSSL is not in FIPS mode - everything works fine. In FIPS mode i get the following error: pkcs7_unwrap():pkcs7.c:708] error decrypting inner PKCS#7 139968442623728:error:060A60A3:digital envelope routines:FIPS_CIPHERINIT:disabled for fips:fips_enc.c:142: 139968442623728:error:21072077:PKCS7 routines:PKCS7_decrypt:decrypt error:pk7_smime.c:557: That's because NDES server uses DES algorithm to encrypt returned PKCS#7 packet. I used the following debug code: /* Copy enveloped data from PKCS#7 */ bytes = BIO_read(pkcs7bio, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); BIO_write(outbio, buffer, bytes); p7enc = d2i_PKCS7_bio(outbio, NULL); /* Get encryption PKCS#7 algorithm */ enc_alg=p7enc->d.enveloped->enc_data->algorithm; evp_cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyobj(enc_alg->algorithm); printf("evp_cipher->nid = %d\n", evp_cipher->nid); The last string always prints: evp_cipher-nid = 31 defined in openssl-1.0.1c/include/openssl/objects.h #define SN_des_cbc "DES-CBC" #define LN_des_cbc "des-cbc" #define NID_des_cbc 31 I use 3DES algorithm for PKCS7 requests encryption in my code (pscep.enc_alg = (EVP_CIPHER *)EVP_des_ede3_cbc()) and NDES server accepts these requests, but it always returns answer encrypted with DES. Can I configure Wndows NDES server to use Triple DES (3DES) algorithm for PKCS#7 answer encryption?

  Read the article

• Cant access Dell BMC IPMI Over IP

  - by Bobb

  I have Dell R210 with iDRAC BMC (new name for old BMC). Which is on-board feature with shared NIC (I believe). Server is on colocation and I didnt set it up before sent there... So I asked for the remote hands to setup IPMI Over IP. They enabled it, set the IP and everything. The IP is different than main box IP. Also the box is cabled to NIC1 and the BMC supposed to share it (am I right?) I can see new IP in the Open Server Administrator (installed on the box). I tried Supermicro IPMI tool and I tried Dell ipmish.exe command like this ipmish -ip xxx -u root -p calvin sysinfo gives BMC is not detected What could be wrong? is there a diagnostics tool I can try? It must be something obvious. I just never used things like that before.... P.S. I read something about encryptions key in the Dell docs. But I understand that is for encrypted IPMI 2.0 and ipmish can use IPMI 1.5 without encryption.

  Read the article

• Apache: https to https redirect

  - by Klaas van Schelven

  I'm trying to get Apache to redirect all http and https traffic to a single endpoint www.example.org. The http part is easy: <VirtualHost *:80> ServerName example.org Redirect permanent / https://www.example.org/ </VirtualHost> # long list of other domains, all redirecting to https://www.example.org/ <VirtualHost *:80> ServerName www.example.org Redirect permanent / https://www.example.org/ </VirtualHost> I'm trying to do something similar for the https. It is my understanding that I need to specify one specific IP address, because the Host directive is also sent encrypted. So the below works: <VirtualHost xx.xx.xx.xx:443> ServerName www.example.org # actual stuff happening here </VirtualHost> However, when I start adding the redirects to the config, like so: <VirtualHost xx.x.xx.xx:443> ServerName example.org Redirect permanent / https://www.example.org/ </VirtualHost> # long list of other domains stuff breaks. $ apache2ctl configtest [warn] VirtualHost xx.xx.xx.xx:443 overlaps with VirtualHost xx.xx.xx.xx:443, the first has precedence, perhaps you need a NameVirtualHost directive If I add a directive like so: NameVirtualHost xx.xx.xx.xx:443 Connecting to the (ssl part of the) server starts to fail. How do I solve this?

  Read the article

• Gmail: security warning icon

  - by Notetaker

  Hello, I just enabled some Gmail Labs programs in my Gmail account, and then I noticed the orange triangle icon with an exclamation mark in it at the end of the address bar of my Google Chrome browser. Clicking on it brought forth a "Security Information' dialog box, with the following messages: "--mail.google.com The identity of website has been verified by Thawlte SGC CA. --Your connection to mail.google.com is encrypted with 128-bit encryption. However, this page includes other resources which are not secure. These resources can be viewed by others while in transit, and can be modified by an attacker to change the look or behavior of the page." I then logged into two of my other Gmail accounts, one of which has no Gmail Labs programs enabled, and the other with 1 program enabled quite some time ago, both with the same result as above (i.e., with the appearance of the orange triangle warning sign in the address bar). I don't remember seeing the orange triangle before, but I'm not sure if it has ever appeared or not. I have "Always use https" enabled for my Gmail accounts. My questions are: Is there a way to identify and remove these un-secure "resources"? (Could enabling Gmail Labs programs have brought these on?) Meanwhile, are my Gmail accounts compromised and unsafe to use? If so, what should I being doing about that now? After this problem is solved, would I need to reset the password to my Gmail accounts, and/or take any other measures to restore their security? Many thanks for answering my questions!

  Read the article

< Previous Page | 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55  | Next Page >