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• Configuring Oracle iPlanet WebServer / Oracle Traffic Director to use crypto accelerators on T4-1 servers

  - by mv

  Configuring Oracle iPlanet Web Server / Oracle Traffic Director to use crypto accelerators on T4-1 servers Jyri had written a technical article on Configuring Solaris Cryptographic Framework and Sun Java System Web Server 7 on Systems With UltraSPARC T1 Processors. I tried to find out what has changed since then in T4. I have used a T4-1 SPARC system with Solaris 10. Results slightly vary for Solaris 11.  For Solaris 11, the T4 optimization was implemented in libsoftcrypto.so while it was in pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so for Solaris 10. Overview of T4 processors is here in this blog. Many thanx to Chi-Chang Lin and Julien for their help. 1. Install Oracle iPlanet Web Server / Oracle Traffic Director.  Go to instance/config directory.  # cd /opt/oracle/webserver7/https-hostname.fqdn/config 2. List default PKCS#11 Modules # ../../bin/modutil -dbdir . -listListing of PKCS #11 Modules-----------------------------------------------------------1. NSS Internal PKCS #11 Moduleslots: 2 slots attachedstatus: loadedslot: NSS Internal Cryptographic Servicestoken: NSS Generic Crypto Servicesslot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Servicestoken: NSS Certificate DB2. Root Certslibrary name: libnssckbi.soslots: 1 slot attachedstatus: loadedslot: NSS Builtin Objectstoken: Builtin Object Token----------------------------------------------------------- 3. Initialize the soft token data store in the $HOME/.sunw/pkcs11_softtoken/ directory # pktool setpin keystore=pkcs11Enter token passphrase: olderpasswordCreate new passphrase: passwordRe-enter new passphrase: passwordPassphrase changed. 4. Offload crypto operations to Solaris Crypto Framework on T4 $ ../../bin/modutil -dbdir . -nocertdb -add SCF -libfile /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so -mechanisms RSA:AES:SHA1:MD5 Module "SCF" added to database. Note that -nocertdb means modutil won't try to open the NSS softoken key database. It doesn't even have to be present. PKCS#11 library used is /usr/lib/libpkcs11.so. If the server is running in 64 bit mode, we have to use /usr/lib/64/libpkcs11.so Unlike T1 and T2, in T4 we do not have to disable mechanisms in softtoken provider using cryptoadm. 5. List again to check that a new module SCF is added # ../../bin/modutil -dbdir . -list Listing of PKCS #11 Modules-----------------------------------------------------------1. NSS Internal PKCS #11 Moduleslots: 2 slots attachedstatus: loadedslot: NSS Internal Cryptographic Servicestoken: NSS Generic Crypto Servicesslot: NSS User Private Key and Certificate Servicestoken: NSS Certificate DB2. SCFlibrary name: /usr/lib/libpkcs11.soslots: 2 slots attachedstatus: loadedslot: Sun Metaslottoken: Sun Metaslotslot: n2rng/0 SUNW_N2_Random_Number_Generator token: n2rng/0 SUNW_N2_RNG 3. Root Certs library name: libnssckbi.so slots: 1 slot attached status: loaded slot: NSS Builtin Objects token: Builtin Object Token----------------------------------------------------------- 6.  Create certificate in “Sun Metaslot” : I have used certutil, but you must use Admin Server CLI / GUI # ../../bin/certutil -S -x -n "Server-Cert" -t "CT,CT,CT" -s "CN=*.fqdn" -d . -h "Sun Metaslot"Enter Password or Pin for "Sun Metaslot": password 7. Verify that the certificate is created properly in “Sun Metslaot” # ../../bin/certutil -L -d . -h "Sun Metaslot"Certificate Nickname Trust AttributesSSL,S/MIME,JAR/XPIEnter Password or Pin for "Sun Metaslot": passwordSun Metaslot:Server-Cert CTu,Cu,Cu# 8. Associate this newly created certificate to http listener using Admin CLI/GUI. After that server.xml should have <http-listener> ...    <ssl>        <server-cert-nickname>Sun Metaslot:Server-Cert</server-cert-nicknamer>    </ssl> Note the prefix "Sun Metaslot" 9. Disable PKCS#11 bypass To use the accelerated AES algorithm, turn off PKCS#11 bypass, and configure modutil to have the AES mechanism go to the Metaslot. After you disable PKCS#11 bypasss using Admin GUI/CLI,  check that server.xml should have <server> ....    <pkcs11>         <enabled>1</enabled>         <allow-bypass>0</allow-bypass>     </pkcs11> With PKCS#11 bypass enabled, Oracle iPlanet Web Server will only use the RSA capability of the T4, provided certificate and key are stored in the T4 slot (Metaslot). Actually, the RSA op is never bypassed in NSS, it's always done with PKCS#11 calls. So the bypass settings won't affect the behavior of the probes for RSA at all. The only thing that matters if where the RSA key and certificate live, ie. which PKCS#11 token, and thus which PKCS#11 module gets called to do the work. If your certificate/key are in the NSS certificate/key db, you will see libsoftokn3/libfreebl libraries doing the RSA work. If they are in the Sun Metaslot, it should be the Solaris code. 10. Start the server instance # ../bin/startserv Oracle iPlanet Web Server 7.0.16 B09/14/2012 03:33Please enter the PIN for the "Sun Metaslot" token: password...info: HTTP3072: http-listener-1: https://hostname.fqdn:80 ready to accept requestsinfo: CORE3274: successful server startup 11. Figure out which process to run this DTrace script on # ps -eaf | grep webservd | grep -v dogwebservd 18224 18223 0 13:17:25 ? 0:07 webservd -d /opt/oracle/webserver7/https-hostname.fqdn/config -r /opt/root 18225 18224 0 13:17:25 ? 0:00 webservd -d /opt/oracle/webserver7/https-hostname.fqdn/config -r /opt/ (For Oracle Traffic Director look for process named "trafficd") We see that the child process id is “18225” 12. Clients for testing : You can use any browser. I used NSS tool tstclnt for testing $cat > req.txtGET /index.html HTTP/1.0 For checking both RSA and AES, I used cipher “:0035” which is TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA $./tstclnt -h hostname -p 80 -d . -T -f -o -v -c “:0035” < req.txt 13. How do I make sure that crypto accelerator is being used 13.1 Create DTrace script The following D script should be able to uncover whether T4-specific crypto routine are being called or not. It also displays stats per second. # cat > t4crypto.d#!/usr/sbin/dtrace -spid$target::*rsa*:entry,pid$target::*yf*:entry{    @ops[probemod, probefunc] = count();}tick-1sec{    printa(@ops);    trunc(@ops);} Invoke with './t4crypto.d -p <pid> ' 13.2 EXPECTED PROBES FOR Solaris 10 : If offloading to T4 HW are correctly set up, the expected DTrace output would have these probes and libraries library Operations PROBES pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so RSA soft_decrypt_rsa_pkcs_decode, soft_encrypt_rsa_pkcs_encode soft_rsa_crypt_init_common soft_rsa_decrypt, soft_rsa_encrypt soft_rsa_decrypt_common, soft_rsa_encrypt_common AES yf_aes_instructions_present yf_aes_expand256, yf_aes256_cbc_decrypt, yf_aes256_cbc_encrypt, yf_aes256_load_keys_for_decrypt, yf_aes256_load_keys_for_encrypt, Note that these are for 256, same for 128, 192... these are for cbc, same for ecb, ctr, cfb128... DES yf_des_expand, yf_des_instructions_present yf_des_encrypt libmd_psr.so MD5 yf_md5_multiblock, yf_md5_instruction_present SHA1 yf_sha1_instruction_present, yf_sha1_multibloc 13.3 SAMPLE OUTPUT FOR CIPHER TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035) ON T4 SPARC SOLARIS 10 WITHOUT PKCS#11 BYPASS # ./t4crypto.d -p 18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_decrypt_rsa_pkcs_decode    1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_rsa_crypt_init_common      1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_rsa_decrypt                1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   big_mp_mul_yf                   2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   mpm_yf_mpmul                    2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   mpmul_arr_yf                    2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   rijndael_key_setup_enc_yf       2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_rsa_decrypt_common         2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_aes_expand256                2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_aes256_cbc_decrypt           3 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_aes256_load_keys_for_decrypt 3 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   big_mont_mul_yf                 6 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   mm_yf_montmul                   6 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_des_instructions_present     6 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_aes256_cbc_encrypt           8 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_aes256_load_keys_for_encrypt 8 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_mpmul_present                8 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_aes_instructions_present    13 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_des_encrypt                 18 libmd_psr.so.1                yf_md5_multiblock              41 libmd_psr.so.1                yf_md5_instruction_present     72 libmd_psr.so.1                yf_sha1_instruction_present    82 libmd_psr.so.1                yf_sha1_multiblock             82 This indicates that both RSA and AES ops are done in Solaris Crypto Framework. 13.4 SAMPLE OUTPUT FOR CIPHER TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035) ON T4 SPARC SOLARIS 10 WITH PKCS#11 BYPASS # ./t4crypto.d -p 18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_decrypt_rsa_pkcs_decode 1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_rsa_crypt_init_common   1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_rsa_decrypt             1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   soft_rsa_decrypt_common      1 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   big_mp_mul_yf                2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   mpm_yf_mpmul                 2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   mpmul_arr_yf                 2 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   big_mont_mul_yf              6 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   mm_yf_montmul                6 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1   yf_mpmul_present             8 For this cipher, when I enable PKCS#11 bypass, Only RSA probes are being hit AES probes are not being hit. 13.5 ustack() for RSA operations / probefunc == "soft_rsa_decrypt" / Shows that libnss3.so is calling C_* functions of libpkcs11.so which is calling functions of pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so for both cases with and without bypass. When PKCS#11 bypass is disabled (allow-bypass is 0) pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`soft_rsa_decrypt pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`soft_rsa_decrypt_common+0x94 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`soft_unwrapkey+0x258 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`C_UnwrapKey+0x1ec libpkcs11.so.1`meta_unwrap_key+0x17c libpkcs11.so.1`meta_UnwrapKey+0xc4 libpkcs11.so.1`C_UnwrapKey+0xfc libnss3.so`pk11_AnyUnwrapKey+0x6b8 libnss3.so`PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey+0x8c libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange+0x1a0 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange+0x154 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage+0x440 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleHandshake+0x11c libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleRecord+0x5e8 libssl3.so`ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake+0x5c libssl3.so`ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake+0x30 libssl3.so`ssl_Do1stHandshake+0xec libssl3.so`ssl_SecureRecv+0x1c8 libssl3.so`ssl_Recv+0x9c libns-httpd40.so`__1cNDaemonSessionDrun6M_v_+0x2dc When PKCS#11 bypass is enabled (allow-bypass is 1) pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`soft_rsa_decrypt pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`soft_rsa_decrypt_common+0x94 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`C_Decrypt+0x164 libpkcs11.so.1`meta_do_operation+0x27c libpkcs11.so.1`meta_Decrypt+0x4c libpkcs11.so.1`C_Decrypt+0xcc libnss3.so`PK11_PrivDecryptPKCS1+0x1ac libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange+0xe4 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleClientKeyExchange+0x154 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage+0x440 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleHandshake+0x11c libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleRecord+0x5e8 libssl3.so`ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake+0x5c libssl3.so`ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake+0x30 libssl3.so`ssl_Do1stHandshake+0xec libssl3.so`ssl_SecureRecv+0x1c8 libssl3.so`ssl_Recv+0x9c libns-httpd40.so`__1cNDaemonSessionDrun6M_v_+0x2dc libnsprwrap.so`ThreadMain+0x1c libnspr4.so`_pt_root+0xe8 13.6 ustack() FOR AES operations / probefunc == "yf_aes256_cbc_encrypt" / When PKCS#11 bypass is disabled (allow-bypass is 0) pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`yf_aes256_cbc_encrypt pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`aes_block_process_contiguous_whole_blocks+0xb4 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`aes_crypt_contiguous_blocks+0x1cc pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`soft_aes_encrypt_common+0x22c pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1`C_EncryptUpdate+0x10c libpkcs11.so.1`meta_do_operation+0x1fc libpkcs11.so.1`meta_EncryptUpdate+0x4c libpkcs11.so.1`C_EncryptUpdate+0xcc libnss3.so`PK11_CipherOp+0x1a0 libssl3.so`ssl3_CompressMACEncryptRecord+0x264 libssl3.so`ssl3_SendRecord+0x300 libssl3.so`ssl3_FlushHandshake+0x54 libssl3.so`ssl3_SendFinished+0x1fc libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleFinished+0x314 libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleHandshakeMessage+0x4ac libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleHandshake+0x11c libssl3.so`ssl3_HandleRecord+0x5e8 libssl3.so`ssl3_GatherCompleteHandshake+0x5c libssl3.so`ssl_GatherRecord1stHandshake+0x30 libssl3.so`ssl_Do1stHandshake+0xec Shows that libnss3.so is calling C_* functions of libpkcs11.so which is calling functions of pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so However when PKCS#11 bypass is disabled (allow-bypass is 1) this stack isn't getting called. 14. LIST OF ALL THE PROBES MATCHED BY D SCRIPT FOR REFERENCE # ./t4crypto.d -p 18225 -l ID PROVIDER MODULE FUNCTION NAME ... 55720 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_md5_instruction_present entry 55721 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha256_instruction_present entry 55722 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha512_instruction_present entry 55723 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha1_instruction_present entry 55724 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha256 entry 55725 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha256_multiblock entry 55726 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha512 entry 55727 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha512_multiblock entry 55728 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha1 entry 55729 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_sha1_multiblock entry 55730 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_md5 entry 55731 pid18225 libmd_psr.so.1 yf_md5_multiblock entry 55732 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_instructions_present entry 55733 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 rijndael_key_setup_enc_yf entry 55734 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_expand128 entry 55735 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_encrypt128 entry 55736 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_decrypt128 entry 55737 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_expand192 entry 55738 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_encrypt192 entry 55739 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_decrypt192 entry 55740 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_expand256 entry 55741 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_encrypt256 entry 55742 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes_decrypt256 entry 55743 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_load_keys_for_encrypt entry 55744 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_load_keys_for_encrypt entry 55745 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_load_keys_for_encrypt entry 55746 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_ecb_encrypt entry 55747 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_ecb_encrypt entry 55748 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_ecb_encrypt entry 55749 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_cbc_encrypt entry 55750 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_cbc_encrypt entry 55751 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_cbc_encrypt entry 55752 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_ctr_crypt entry 55753 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_ctr_crypt entry 55754 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_ctr_crypt entry 55755 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_cfb128_encrypt entry 55756 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_cfb128_encrypt entry 55757 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_cfb128_encrypt entry 55758 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_load_keys_for_decrypt entry 55759 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_load_keys_for_decrypt entry 55760 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_load_keys_for_decrypt entry 55761 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_ecb_decrypt entry 55762 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_ecb_decrypt entry 55763 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_ecb_decrypt entry 55764 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_cbc_decrypt entry 55765 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_cbc_decrypt entry 55766 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_cbc_decrypt entry 55767 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes128_cfb128_decrypt entry 55768 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes192_cfb128_decrypt entry 55769 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_aes256_cfb128_decrypt entry 55771 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_des_instructions_present entry 55772 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_des_expand entry 55773 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_des_encrypt entry 55774 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_mpmul_present entry 55775 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 yf_montmul_present entry 55776 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mm_yf_montmul entry 55777 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mm_yf_montsqr entry 55778 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mm_yf_restore_func entry 55779 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mm_yf_ret_from_mont_func entry 55780 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mm_yf_execute_slp entry 55781 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 big_modexp_ncp_yf entry 55782 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 big_mont_mul_yf entry 55783 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mpmul_arr_yf entry 55784 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 big_mp_mul_yf entry 55785 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 mpm_yf_mpmul entry 55786 pid18225 libns-httpd40.so nsapi_rsa_set_priv_fn entry ... 55795 pid18225 libnss3.so prepare_rsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1 entry 55796 pid18225 libresolv.so.2 sunw_dst_rsaref_init entry 55797 pid18225 libnssutil3.so NSS_Get_SEC_UniversalStringTemplate entry ... 55813 pid18225 libsoftokn3.so prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1 entry 55814 pid18225 libsoftokn3.so rsa_FormatOneBlock entry 55815 pid18225 libsoftokn3.so rsa_FormatBlock entry 55816 pid18225 libnssdbm3.so lg_prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1 entry 55817 pid18225 libfreebl_32fpu_3.so rsa_build_from_primes entry 55818 pid18225 libfreebl_32fpu_3.so rsa_is_prime entry 55819 pid18225 libfreebl_32fpu_3.so rsa_get_primes_from_exponents entry 55820 pid18225 libfreebl_32fpu_3.so rsa_PrivateKeyOpNoCRT entry 55821 pid18225 libfreebl_32fpu_3.so rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTNoCheck entry 55822 pid18225 libfreebl_32fpu_3.so rsa_PrivateKeyOpCRTCheckedPubKey entry 55823 pid18225 pkcs11_kernel.so.1 key_gen_rsa_by_value entry 55824 pid18225 pkcs11_kernel.so.1 get_rsa_private_key entry 55825 pid18225 pkcs11_kernel.so.1 get_rsa_public_key entry 55826 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_encrypt entry 55827 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_decrypt entry 55828 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_crypt_init_common entry 55829 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_encrypt_common entry 55830 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_decrypt_common entry 55831 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_sign_verify_init_common entry 55832 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_sign_common entry 55833 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_verify_common entry 55834 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 generate_rsa_key entry 55835 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_genkey_pair entry 55836 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 get_rsa_sha1_prefix entry 55837 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_digest_sign_common entry 55838 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_digest_verify_common entry 55839 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_rsa_verify_recover entry 55840 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 rsa_pri_to_asn1 entry 55841 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 asn1_to_rsa_pri entry 55842 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_encrypt_rsa_pkcs_encode entry 55843 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_decrypt_rsa_pkcs_decode entry 55844 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_sign_rsa_pkcs_encode entry 55845 pid18225 pkcs11_softtoken_extra.so.1 soft_verify_rsa_pkcs_decode entry 55770 profile tick-1sec

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• Security of logging people in automatically from another app?

  - by Simon

  I have 2 apps. They both have accounts, and each account has users. These apps are going to share the same users and accounts and they will always be in sync. I want to be able to login automatically from one app to the other. So my solution is to generate a login_key, for example: 2sa7439e-a570-ac21-a2ao-z1qia9ca6g25 once a day. And provide a automated login link to the other app... for example if the user clicks on: https://account_name.securityhole.io/login/2sa7439e-a570-ac21-a2ao-z1qia9ca6g25/user/123 They are logged in automatically, session created. So here we have 3 things that a intruder has to get right in order to gain access; account name, login key, and the user id. Bad idea? Or should I can down the path of making one app an oauth provider? Or is there a better way?

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• Is There A Security Risk With Users That Are Also Groups?

  - by Rob P.

  I know a little about users and groups; in the past I might have had a group like 'DBAS' or 'ADMINS' and I'd add individual users to each group... But I was surprised to learn I could add users to other users - as if they were groups. For example if my /etc/group contained the following: user1:x:12501: user2:x:12502:user1 admin:x:123:user2,jim,bob Since user2 is a member of the admin group, and user1 is a member of user2 - is user1 effectively an admin? If the admin group is in the sudoers file, can user1 use it as well? I've tried to simulate this and I haven't been able to do so as user1...but I'm not sure it's impossible. EDIT: SORRY - updated error in question.

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• Is this Java 7 security thread an issue if you have Java 7 installed but not as the default?

  - by user1361315

  I have a MBP with osx mountain lion installed, and I believe from what I read Mac's only ship with Java 6 by default. I'm not at my computer at the moment, but I am pretty sure I have installed Java 7 but it isn't my default java version (I think I installed it and I have to explicitly reference it to use it). Does this mean I am safe from this particular thread? Reference: http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/261748/researchers_find_critical_vulnerability_in_java_7_patch_hours_after_release.html

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• Problem with Remember Me Service in Spring Security

  - by Gearóid

  Hi, I'm trying to implement a "remember me" functionality in my website using Spring. The cookie and entry in the persistent_logins table are getting created correctly. Additionally, I can see that the correct user is being restored as the username is displayed at the top of the page. However, once I try to access any information for this user when they return after they were "remembered", I get a NullPointerException. It looks as though the user isn't being set in the session again. My applicationContext-security.xml contains the following: <remember-me data-source-ref="dataSource" user-service-ref="userService"/> ... <authentication-provider user-service-ref="userService" /> <jdbc-user-service id="userService" data-source-ref="dataSource" role-prefix="ROLE_" users-by-username-query="select email as username, password, 1 as ENABLED from user where email=?" authorities-by-username-query="select user.id as id, upper(role.name) as authority from user, role, users_roles where users_roles.user_fk=id and users_roles.role_fk=role.name and user.email=?"/> I thought it may have had something to do with users-by-username query but surely login wouldn't work correctly if this query was incorrect? Any help on this would be greatly appreciated. Thanks, gearoid.

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• Authlogic, logout, credential capture and security

  - by Paddy

  Ok this is something weird. I got authlogic-oid installed in my rails app today. Everything works perfectly fine but for one small nuisance. This is what i did: I first register with my google openid. Successful login, redirection and my email, along with my correct openid is stored in my database. I am happy that everything worked fine! Now when i logout, my rails app as usual destroys the session and redirects me back to my root url where i can login again. Now if i try to login it still remembers my last login id. Not a big issue as i can always "Sign in as a different user" but i am wondering if there is anyway to not only logout from my app but also logout from google. I noticed the same with stack overflow's openid authentication system. Why am i so bothered about this, you may ask. But is it not a bad idea if your web apps end user, who happens to be in a cyber cafe, thinks he has logged out from your app and hence from his google account only to realize later that his google account had got hacked by some unworthy loser who just happened to notice that the one before him had not logged out from google and say.. changed his password!! Should i be paranoid? Isn't this a major security lapse while implementing the openid spec? Probably today someone can give me a workaround for this issue and the question is solved for me. But what about the others who have implemented openid in their apps and not implemented a workaround?

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• WCF Double Hop questions about Security and Binding.

  - by Ken Maglio

  Background information: .Net Website which calls a service (aka external service) facade on an app server in the DMZ. This external service then calls the internal service which is on our internal app server. From there that internal service calls a stored procedure (Linq to SQL Classes), and passes the serialized data back though to the external service, and from there back to the website. We've done this so any communication goes through an external layer (our external app server) and allows interoperability; we access our data just like our clients consuming our services. We've gotten to the point in our development where we have completed the system and it all works, the double hop acts as it should. However now we are working on securing the entire process. We are looking at using TransportWithMessageCredentials. We want to have WS2007HttpBinding for the external for interoperability, but then netTCPBinding for the bridge through the firewall for security and speed. Questions: If we choose WS2007HttpBinding as the external services binding, and netTCPBinding for the internal service is this possible? I know WS-* supports this as does netTCP, however do they play nice when passing credential information like user/pass? If we go to Kerberos, will this impact anything? We may want to do impersonation in the future. If you can when you answer post any reference links about why you're answering the way you are, that would be very helpful to us. Thanks!

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• Cross-platform game development: ease of development vs security

  - by alcuadrado

  Hi, I'm a member and contributor of the Argentum Online (AO) community, the first MMORPG from Argentina, which is Free Software; which, although it's not 3D, it's really addictive and has some dozens of thousands of users. Really unluckily AO was developed in Visual Basic (yes, you can laugh) but the former community, so imagine, the code not only sucks, it has zero portability. I'm planning, with some friends to rewrite the client, and as a GNU/Linux frantic, want to do it cross-platform. Some other people is doing the same with the server in Java. So my biggest problem is that we would like to use a rapid development language (like Java, Ruby or Python) but the client would be pretty insecure. Ruby/Python version would have all it's code available, and the Java one would be easily decompilable (yes, we have some crackers in the community) We have consider the option to implement the security module in C/C++ as a dynamic library, but it can be replaced with a custom one, so it's not really secure. We are also considering the option of doing the core application in C++ and the GUI in Ruby/Python. But haven't analysed all it's implications yet. But we really don't want to code the entire game in C/C++ as it doesn't need that much performance (the game is played at 18fps on average) and we want to develop it as fast as possible. So what would you choose in my case? Thank you!

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• Where are the real risks in network security?

  - by Barry Brown

  Anytime a username/password authentication is used, the common wisdom is to protect the transport of that data using encryption (SSL, HTTPS, etc). But that leaves the end points potentially vulnerable. Realistically, which is at greater risk of intrusion? Transport layer: Compromised via wireless packet sniffing, malicious wiretapping, etc. Transport devices: Risks include ISPs and Internet backbone operators sniffing data. End-user device: Vulnerable to spyware, key loggers, shoulder surfing, and so forth. Remote server: Many uncontrollable vulnerabilities including malicious operators, break-ins resulting in stolen data, physically heisting servers, backups kept in insecure places, and much more. My gut reaction is that although the transport layer is relatively easy to protect via SSL, the risks in the other areas are much, much greater, especially at the end points. For example, at home my computer connects directly to my router; from there it goes straight to my ISPs routers and onto the Internet. I would estimate the risks at the transport level (both software and hardware) at low to non-existant. But what security does the server I'm connected to have? Have they been hacked into? Is the operator collecting usernames and passwords, knowing that most people use the same information at other websites? Likewise, has my computer been compromised by malware? Those seem like much greater risks. What do you think?

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• how to retrive pK using spring security

  - by aditya

  i implement this method of the UserDetailService interface, public UserDetails loadUserByUsername(final String username) throws UsernameNotFoundException, DataAccessException { final EmailCredential userDetails = persistentEmailCredential .getUniqueEmailCredential(username); if (userDetails == null) { throw new UsernameNotFoundException(username + "is not registered"); } final HashSet<GrantedAuthority> authorities = new HashSet<GrantedAuthority>(); authorities.add(new GrantedAuthorityImpl("ROLE_USER")); for (UserRole role:userDetails.getAccount().getRoles()) { authorities.add(new GrantedAuthorityImpl(role.getRole())); } return new User(userDetails.getEmailAddress(), userDetails .getPassword(), true, true, true, true, authorities); } in the security context i do some thing like this <!-- Login Info --> <form-login default-target-url='/dashboard.htm' login-page="/login.htm" authentication-failure-url="/login.htm?authfailed=true" always-use-default-target='false' /> <logout logout-success-url="/login.htm" invalidate-session="true" /> <remember-me user-service-ref="emailAccountService" key="fuellingsport" /> <session-management> <concurrency-control max-sessions="1" /> </session-management> </http> now i want to pop out the Pk of the logged in user, how can i show it in my jsp pages, any idea thanks in advance

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• Problem with Spring security's logout

  - by uther-lightbringer

  Hello, I've got a problem logging out in Spring framework. First when I want j_spring_security_logout to handle it for me i get 404 j_spring_security_logout not found: sample-security.xml: <http> <intercept-url pattern="/messageList.htm*" access="ROLE_USER,ROLE_GUEST" /> <intercept-url pattern="/messagePost.htm*" access="ROLE_USER" /> <intercept-url pattern="/messageDelete.htm*" access="ROLE_ADMIN" /> <form-login login-page="/login.jsp" default-target-url="/messageList.htm" authentication-failure-url="/login.jsp?error=true" /> <logout/> </http> Sample url link to logout in JSP page: <a href="<c:url value="/j_spring_security_logout" />">Logout</a> When i try to use a custom JSP page i.e. I use login form for this purpose then I get better result at least it gets to login page, but another problem is that you dont't get logged off as you can diretcly type url that should be guarded buy you get past it anyway. Slightly modified from previous listings: <http> <intercept-url pattern="/messageList.htm*" access="ROLE_USER,ROLE_GUEST" /> <intercept-url pattern="/messagePost.htm*" access="ROLE_USER" /> <intercept-url pattern="/messageDelete.htm*" access="ROLE_ADMIN" /> <form-login login-page="/login.jsp" default-target-url="/messageList.htm" authentication-failure-url="/login.jsp?error=true" /> <logout logout-success-url="/login.jsp" /> </http> <a href="<c:url value="/login.jsp" />">Logout</a> Thank you for help

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• security deleting a mysql row with jQuery $.post

  - by FFish

  I want to delete a row in my database and found an example on how to do this with jQuery's $.post() Now I am wondering about security though.. Can someone send a POST request to my delete-row.php script from another website? JS function deleterow(id) { // alert(typeof(id)); // number if (confirm('Are you sure want to delete?')) { $.post('delete-row.php', {album_id:+id, ajax:'true'}, function() { $("#row_"+id).fadeOut("slow"); }); } } PHP: delete-row.php <?php require_once("../db.php"); mysql_connect(DB_SERVER, DB_USER, DB_PASSWORD) or die("could not connect to database " . mysql_error()); mysql_select_db(DB_NAME) or die("could not select database " . mysql_error()); if (isset($_POST['album_id'])) { $query = "DELETE FROM albums WHERE album_id = " . $_POST['album_id']; $result = mysql_query($query); if (!$result) die('Invalid query: ' . mysql_error()); echo "album deleted!"; } ?>

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• E-Commerce Security: Only Credit Card Fields Encrypted?!

  - by bizarreunprofessionalanddangerous

  I'd like your opinions on how a major bricks-and-mortar company is running the security for its shopping Web site. After a recent update, when you are logged into your shopping account, the session is now not secured. No 'https', no browser 'lock'. All the personal contact info, shopping history -- and if I'm not mistaken submit and change password -- are being sent unencrypted. There is a small frame around the credit card fields that is https. There's a little notice: "Our website is secure. Our website uses frames and because of this the secure icon will not appear in your browser" On top of this the most prominent login fields for the site are broken, and haven't gotten fixed for a week or longer (giving the distinct impression they have no clue what's going on and can't be trusted with anything). Now is it just me -- or is this simply incomprehensible for a billion dollar company, significant shopping site, in the year 2010. No lock. "We use frames" (maybe they forget "Best viewed in IE4"). Customers complaining, as you can see from their FAQ "explaining" why you aren't seeing https. I'm getting nowhere trying to convince customer service that they REALLY need to do something about this, and am about to head for the CEO. But I just want to make sure this is as BIZARRE and unprofessional and dangerous a situation as I think it is. (I'm trying to visualize what their Web technical team consists of. I'm getting A) some customer service reps who were given a 3 hour training course on Web site maintenance, B) a 14 year old boy in his bedroom masquerading as a major technical services company, C) a guy in a hut in a jungle with an e-commerce book from 1996.)

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• What is the best prctice for using security in JAX-WS

  - by kislo_metal

  Here is scenario : I have some web services (JAX-WS) that need to be secured. Currently for authentication needs I providing addition SecurityWService that give authorized user some userid & sessionid that is need to be described in request to other services. It would be more better to use some java security. We have many of them but could not defined what is better to use. Q1 : It is understand that I should use SSL in transport layer, but what should I use for user authorization. Is there is better way to establishing session, validating user etc. ? Here is some key description : Most web services clents is php based. I am using jax-ws implementation as a Stateless session EJB. Deploying to glassfish v3. Q2: what is the best framework / technology for user authorization / authentication in case of using JSF 2.0 and ejb3.1 technologies ( Realms? WSIT? )? Thank You!

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• Lack of security in many PHP applications?

  - by John

  Over the past year of freelancing, I inherited two web projects, both of them built in PHP, both of them with sensitive information like credit card info, bank info, etc... In one application, when I typed http://thecompany.com/admin/, and without being asked for a username and password, I saw every user's sensitive information, including credit card numbers, bank account numbers etc... In another application, I was able to bypass the login screen by simply typing http://the2ndcompany.com/customer.php?user_id=777, and again, without any prompts for username and password, i was able to see user 777's credit card info. I cycled through a few more user_ids (any integer) and saw each person's credit card info. Is something wrong here? Or is this the quality of work that the "average" programmer produces? Because if this is what the average programmer produces, does that means I'm an...gasp...elite programmer?? No..that can't be right....something doesn't make sense. So my question is, is it just coincidence that I inherited two applications both of which are dangerously lacking in security? Or are there are a lot of bad PHP programmers out there?

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• How to manually set an authenticated user in Spring Security / SpringMVC

  - by David Parks

  After a new user submits a 'New account' form, I want to manually log that user in so they don't have to login on the subsequent page. The normal form login page going through the spring security interceptor works just fine. In the new-account-form controller I am creating a UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken and setting it in the SecurityContext manually: SecurityContextHolder.getContext().setAuthentication(authentication); On that same page I later check that the user is logged in with: SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication().getAuthorities(); This returns the authorities I set earlier in the authentication. All is well. But when this same code is called on the very next page I load, the authentication token is just UserAnonymous. I'm not clear why it did not keep the authentication I set on the previous request. Any thoughts? Could it have to do with session ID's not being set up correctly? Is there something that is possibly overwriting my authentication somehow? Perhaps I just need another step to save the authentication? Or is there something I need to do to declare the authentication across the whole session rather than a single request somehow? Just looking for some thoughts that might help me see what's happening here.

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• Struts 2 security

  - by Dewfy

  Does Struts 2 has complete solution for simple login task? I have simple declaration in struts.xml: <package namespace="/protected" name="manager" extends="struts-default" > <interceptors> <interceptor-stack name="secure"> <interceptor-ref name="roles"> <param name="allowedRoles">registered</param> </interceptor-ref> </interceptor-stack> </interceptors> <default-action-ref name="pindex"/> <action name="pindex" > <interceptor-ref name="completeStack"/> <interceptor-ref name="secure"/> <result>protected/index.html</result> </action> </package> Accessing to this resource shows only (Forbidden 403). So what should I do on the next step to: Add login page (standart Tomcat declaration on web.xml with <login-config> not works) ? Provide security round trip. Do I need write my own servlet or exists struts2 solutions? Thanks in advance!

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• DWR and Spring Security - User is deauthenticated in few seconds

  - by Vojtech

  I am trying to implement user authentication via DWR as follows: public class PublicRemote { @Autowired @Qualifier("authenticationManager") private AuthenticationManager authenticationManager; public Map<String, Object> userLogin(String username, String password, boolean stay) { Map<String, Object> map = new HashMap<>(); UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken authRequest = new UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken(username, password); try { Authentication authentication = authenticationManager.authenticate(authRequest); SecurityContextHolder.getContext().setAuthentication(authentication); map.put("success", "true"); } catch (Exception e) { map.put("success", "false"); } return map; } public Map<String, Object> getUserState() { Map<String, Object> map = new HashMap<>(); Authentication authentication = SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication(); boolean authenticated = authentication != null && authentication.isAuthenticated(); map.put("authenticated", authenticated); if (authenticated) { map.put("authorities", authentication.getAuthorities()); } return map; } } The authentication works correctly and by calling getUserState() I can see that the user is successfully logged in. The problem is that this state will stay only for few seconds. In probably 5 seconds, the getAuthentication() starts returning null. Is there some problem with session in DWR or is it some misconfiguration of Spring Security?

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• Protecting my apps security from deassembling

  - by sandis

  So I recently tested deassembling one of my android apps, and to my horror I discovered that the code was quite readable. Even worse, all my variable names where intact! I thought that those would be compressed to something unreadable at compile time. The app is triggered to expire after a certain time. However, now it was trivial for me to find my function named checkIfExpired() and find the variable "expired". Is there any good way of making it harder for a potential hacker messing with my app? Before someone states the obvious: Yes, it is security through obscurity. But obviously this is my only option since the user always will have access to all my code. This is the same for all apps. The details of my deactivation-thingy is unimportant, the point is that I dont want deassembler to understand some of the things I do. side questions: Why are the variable names not compressed? Could it be the case that my program would run faster if I stopped using really long variable names, as are my habit?

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• Security of Flex for payment website

  - by Mario

  So, it's been about 3 years since I wrote and went live with my company's main internet facing website. Originally written in php, I've since just been making minor changes here and there to progress the site as we've needed to. I've wanted to rewrite it from the ground up in the last year or so and now, we want to add some major features so this is a perfect time. The website in question is as close to a banking website as you'd get (without being a bank; sorry for the obscurity, but the less info I can give out, the better). For the rewrite, I want to separate the presentation layer from the processing layer as much as I can. I want the end user to be stuck in a box and not be able to get out so to speak (this is all because of PCI complacency, being PEN tested every 3 months, etc...) So, being probed every 3 months has increasingly made me nervous. We haven't failed yet and there hasen't been a breach yet, but I want to make sure I continue to pass (as much as I can anyways) So, I'm considering rewriting the presentation layer in Adobe Flex and do all the processing in PHP (effectively IMO, separating presentation from processing) - I would do all my normal form validation in flex (as opposed to javascript or php) and do my reads and writes to the db via php. My questions are: I know Flash has something like 99% market penetration - do people find this to be true? Has anyone seen on their own sites being in flash that someone couldn't access it? Flash in general has come under alot of attacks about security and the like - i know this. I would use a swf encryptor - disable debugging (which i got snagged on once on a different application), continue to use https and any other means i can think of. At the end of the day, everyone knows if someone wants in to the data bad enough, their going to find a ways in; i just wanna make it as difficult for them as i can. Any thoughts are appreciated. -Mario

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• UDP security and identifying incoming data.

  - by Charles

  I have been creating an application using UDP for transmitting and receiving information. The problem I am running into is security. Right now I am using the IP/socketid in determining what data belongs to whom. However, I have been reading about how people could simply spoof their IP, then just send data as a specific IP. So this seems to be the wrong way to do it (insecure). So how else am I suppose to identify what data belongs to what users? For instance you have 10 users connected, all have specific data. The server would need to match the user data to this data we received. The only way I can see to do this is to use some sort of client/server key system and encrypt the data. I am curious as to how other applications (or games, since that's what this application is) make sure their data is genuine. Also there is the fact that encryption takes much longer to process than unencrypted. Although I am not sure by how much it will affect performance. Any information would be appreciated. Thanks.

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• Security strategies for storing password on disk

  - by Mike

  I am building a suite of batch jobs that require regular access to a database, running on a Solaris 10 machine. Because of (unchangable) design constraints, we are required use a certain program to connect to it. Said interface requires us to pass a plain-text password over a command line to connect to the database. This is a terrible security practice, but we are stuck with it. I am trying to make sure things are properly secured on our end. Since the processing is automated (ie, we can't prompt for a password), and I can't store anything outside the disk, I need a strategy for storing our password securely. Here are some basic rules The system has multiple users. We can assume that our permissions are properly enforced (ie, if a file with a is chmod'd to 600, it won't be publically readable) I don't mind anyone with superuser access looking at our stored password Here is what i've got so far Store password in password.txt $chmod 600 password.txt Process reads from password.txt when it's needed Buffer overwritten with zeros when it's no longer needed Although I'm sure there is a better way.

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• How to strengthen Mysql database server Security?

  - by i need help

  If we were to use server1 for all files (file server), server2 for mysql database (database server). In order for websites in server1 to access to the database in server2, isn't it needed to connect to to ip address of second (mysql server) ? In this case, is remote mysql connection. However, I seen from some people comment on the security issue. remote access to MySQL is not very secure. When your remote computer first connects to your MySQL database, the password is encrypted before being transmitted over the Internet. But after that, all data is passed as unencrypted "plain text". If someone was able to view your connection data (such as a "hacker" capturing data from an unencrypted WiFi connection you're using), that person would be able to view part or all of your database. So I just wondering ways to secure it? Allow remote mysql access from server1 by allowing the static ip adress allow remote access from server 1 by setting port allowed to connect to 3306 change 3306 to other port? Any advice?

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• How to generate a certificate signature on the iPhone?

  - by futureelite7

  Hi, If I had a private certificate file and a string on the iPhone, how do I use them to generate a signed string that can be verified by a server with the matching public key? What library should I use on the iPhone?

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• what is the difference between digital signature and digital certificate?

  - by Bugzy bug

  Hey guys, i've been google'ing the difference between digital signature and digital certificate (asymmetric encryption) seems like they are the same. I would like to clarify if they are the same or not? many thanks!!!

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