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  • How to display and update data in MVC2

    - by Picflight
    Table Product Product Id Product Name Table ProductSupplier ProductSupplierId ProductId SupplierId Table Supplier SupplierId SupplierName I have the above 3 tables in my database, ProductSupplier is the lookup table. Each Product can have many suppliers. I am using Entity Framework. Using Web Forms it was fairly easy to display a Product on a web page and bind a repeater with the suppliers information. Also, with Web Forms it was easy to Add new Product and suppliers, the linkage seemed easy. How do you do this sort of functionality in MVC? In the Create View below, I want to be able to Add the Supplier as well. Is there a better approach that I might be missing here? This is how I did it with Web Forms. Beyond the code below I am totally lost. I can show data in a list and also display the Suppliers for each Product, but how do I Add and Edit. Should I break it into different views? With Web Forms I could do it all in one page. namespace MyProject.Mvc.Models { [MetadataType(typeof(ProductMetaData))] public partial class Product { public Product() { // Initialize Product this.CreateDate = System.DateTime.Now; } } public class ProductMetaData { [Required(ErrorMessage = "Product name is required")] [StringLength(50, ErrorMessage = "Product name must be under 50 characters")] public object ProductName { get; set; } [Required(ErrorMessage = "Description is required")] public object Description { get; set; } } public class ProductFormViewModel { public Product Product { get; private set; } public IEnumerable<ProductSupplier> ProductSupplier { get; private set; } public ProductFormViewModel() { Product = new Product(); } public ProductFormViewModel(Product product) { Product = product; ProductSupplier = product.ProductSupplier; } } } ProductRepository public Product GetProduct(int id) { var p = db.Product.FirstOrDefault(por => por.ProductId == id); p.ProductSupplier.Attach(p.ProductSupplier.CreateSourceQuery().Include("Product").ToList()); return p; } Product Create View <%@ Page Title="" Language="C#" MasterPageFile="~/Views/Shared/Site.Master" Inherits="System.Web.Mvc.ViewPage<MyProject.Mvc.Models.ProductFormViewModel>" %> <%= Html.ValidationSummary("Please correct the errors and try again.") %> <% using (Html.BeginForm()) {%> <fieldset> <legend>Fields</legend> <div class="editor-label"> <%= Html.LabelFor(model => model.Product.ProductId) %> </div> <div class="editor-field"> <%= Html.TextBoxFor(model => model.Product.ProductId) %> <%= Html.ValidationMessageFor(model => model.Product.ProductId) %> </div> <div class="editor-label"> <%= Html.LabelFor(model => model.Product.ProductName) %> </div> <div class="editor-field"> <%= Html.TextBoxFor(model => model.Product.ProductName) %> <%= Html.ValidationMessageFor(model => model.Product.ProductName) %> </div> <div class="editor-label"> <%= Html.LabelFor(model => model.Product.Description) %> </div> <div class="editor-field"> <%= Html.TextBoxFor(model => model.Product.Description) %> <%= Html.ValidationMessageFor(model => model.Product.Description) %> </div> <p> <input type="submit" value="Create" /> </p> </fieldset> <% } %>

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  • Toorcon14

    - by danx
    Toorcon 2012 Information Security Conference San Diego, CA, http://www.toorcon.org/ Dan Anderson, October 2012 It's almost Halloween, and we all know what that means—yes, of course, it's time for another Toorcon Conference! Toorcon is an annual conference for people interested in computer security. This includes the whole range of hackers, computer hobbyists, professionals, security consultants, press, law enforcement, prosecutors, FBI, etc. We're at Toorcon 14—see earlier blogs for some of the previous Toorcon's I've attended (back to 2003). This year's "con" was held at the Westin on Broadway in downtown San Diego, California. The following are not necessarily my views—I'm just the messenger—although I could have misquoted or misparaphrased the speakers. Also, I only reviewed some of the talks, below, which I attended and interested me. MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections, Aditya K. Sood Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata, Rebecca "bx" Shapiro Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules?, Valkyrie Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI, Dan Griffin You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program, Boris Sverdlik What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking, Dave Maas & Jason Leopold Accessibility and Security, Anna Shubina Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance, Adam Brand McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend, Jay James & Shane MacDougall MalAndroid—the Crux of Android Infections Aditya K. Sood, IOActive, Michigan State PhD candidate Aditya talked about Android smartphone malware. There's a lot of old Android software out there—over 50% Gingerbread (2.3.x)—and most have unpatched vulnerabilities. Of 9 Android vulnerabilities, 8 have known exploits (such as the old Gingerbread Global Object Table exploit). Android protection includes sandboxing, security scanner, app permissions, and screened Android app market. The Android permission checker has fine-grain resource control, policy enforcement. Android static analysis also includes a static analysis app checker (bouncer), and a vulnerablity checker. What security problems does Android have? User-centric security, which depends on the user to grant permission and make smart decisions. But users don't care or think about malware (the're not aware, not paranoid). All they want is functionality, extensibility, mobility Android had no "proper" encryption before Android 3.0 No built-in protection against social engineering and web tricks Alternative Android app markets are unsafe. Simply visiting some markets can infect Android Aditya classified Android Malware types as: Type A—Apps. These interact with the Android app framework. For example, a fake Netflix app. Or Android Gold Dream (game), which uploads user files stealthy manner to a remote location. Type K—Kernel. Exploits underlying Linux libraries or kernel Type H—Hybrid. These use multiple layers (app framework, libraries, kernel). These are most commonly used by Android botnets, which are popular with Chinese botnet authors What are the threats from Android malware? These incude leak info (contacts), banking fraud, corporate network attacks, malware advertising, malware "Hackivism" (the promotion of social causes. For example, promiting specific leaders of the Tunisian or Iranian revolutions. Android malware is frequently "masquerated". That is, repackaged inside a legit app with malware. To avoid detection, the hidden malware is not unwrapped until runtime. The malware payload can be hidden in, for example, PNG files. Less common are Android bootkits—there's not many around. What they do is hijack the Android init framework—alteering system programs and daemons, then deletes itself. For example, the DKF Bootkit (China). Android App Problems: no code signing! all self-signed native code execution permission sandbox — all or none alternate market places no robust Android malware detection at network level delayed patch process Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata Rebecca "bx" Shapiro, Dartmouth College, NH https://github.com/bx/elf-bf-tools @bxsays on twitter Definitions. "ELF" is an executable file format used in linking and loading executables (on UNIX/Linux-class machines). "Weird machine" uses undocumented computation sources (I think of them as unintended virtual machines). Some examples of "weird machines" are those that: return to weird location, does SQL injection, corrupts the heap. Bx then talked about using ELF metadata as (an uintended) "weird machine". Some ELF background: A compiler takes source code and generates a ELF object file (hello.o). A static linker makes an ELF executable from the object file. A runtime linker and loader takes ELF executable and loads and relocates it in memory. The ELF file has symbols to relocate functions and variables. ELF has two relocation tables—one at link time and another one at loading time: .rela.dyn (link time) and .dynsym (dynamic table). GOT: Global Offset Table of addresses for dynamically-linked functions. PLT: Procedure Linkage Tables—works with GOT. The memory layout of a process (not the ELF file) is, in order: program (+ heap), dynamic libraries, libc, ld.so, stack (which includes the dynamic table loaded into memory) For ELF, the "weird machine" is found and exploited in the loader. ELF can be crafted for executing viruses, by tricking runtime into executing interpreted "code" in the ELF symbol table. One can inject parasitic "code" without modifying the actual ELF code portions. Think of the ELF symbol table as an "assembly language" interpreter. It has these elements: instructions: Add, move, jump if not 0 (jnz) Think of symbol table entries as "registers" symbol table value is "contents" immediate values are constants direct values are addresses (e.g., 0xdeadbeef) move instruction: is a relocation table entry add instruction: relocation table "addend" entry jnz instruction: takes multiple relocation table entries The ELF weird machine exploits the loader by relocating relocation table entries. The loader will go on forever until told to stop. It stores state on stack at "end" and uses IFUNC table entries (containing function pointer address). The ELF weird machine, called "Brainfu*k" (BF) has: 8 instructions: pointer inc, dec, inc indirect, dec indirect, jump forward, jump backward, print. Three registers - 3 registers Bx showed example BF source code that implemented a Turing machine printing "hello, world". More interesting was the next demo, where bx modified ping. Ping runs suid as root, but quickly drops privilege. BF modified the loader to disable the library function call dropping privilege, so it remained as root. Then BF modified the ping -t argument to execute the -t filename as root. It's best to show what this modified ping does with an example: $ whoami bx $ ping localhost -t backdoor.sh # executes backdoor $ whoami root $ The modified code increased from 285948 bytes to 290209 bytes. A BF tool compiles "executable" by modifying the symbol table in an existing ELF executable. The tool modifies .dynsym and .rela.dyn table, but not code or data. Privacy at the Handset: New FCC Rules? "Valkyrie" (Christie Dudley, Santa Clara Law JD candidate) Valkyrie talked about mobile handset privacy. Some background: Senator Franken (also a comedian) became alarmed about CarrierIQ, where the carriers track their customers. Franken asked the FCC to find out what obligations carriers think they have to protect privacy. The carriers' response was that they are doing just fine with self-regulation—no worries! Carriers need to collect data, such as missed calls, to maintain network quality. But carriers also sell data for marketing. Verizon sells customer data and enables this with a narrow privacy policy (only 1 month to opt out, with difficulties). The data sold is not individually identifiable and is aggregated. But Verizon recommends, as an aggregation workaround to "recollate" data to other databases to identify customers indirectly. The FCC has regulated telephone privacy since 1934 and mobile network privacy since 2007. Also, the carriers say mobile phone privacy is a FTC responsibility (not FCC). FTC is trying to improve mobile app privacy, but FTC has no authority over carrier / customer relationships. As a side note, Apple iPhones are unique as carriers have extra control over iPhones they don't have with other smartphones. As a result iPhones may be more regulated. Who are the consumer advocates? Everyone knows EFF, but EPIC (Electrnic Privacy Info Center), although more obsecure, is more relevant. What to do? Carriers must be accountable. Opt-in and opt-out at any time. Carriers need incentive to grant users control for those who want it, by holding them liable and responsible for breeches on their clock. Location information should be added current CPNI privacy protection, and require "Pen/trap" judicial order to obtain (and would still be a lower standard than 4th Amendment). Politics are on a pro-privacy swing now, with many senators and the Whitehouse. There will probably be new regulation soon, and enforcement will be a problem, but consumers will still have some benefit. Hacking Measured Boot and UEFI Dan Griffin, JWSecure, Inc., Seattle, @JWSdan Dan talked about hacking measured UEFI boot. First some terms: UEFI is a boot technology that is replacing BIOS (has whitelisting and blacklisting). UEFI protects devices against rootkits. TPM - hardware security device to store hashs and hardware-protected keys "secure boot" can control at firmware level what boot images can boot "measured boot" OS feature that tracks hashes (from BIOS, boot loader, krnel, early drivers). "remote attestation" allows remote validation and control based on policy on a remote attestation server. Microsoft pushing TPM (Windows 8 required), but Google is not. Intel TianoCore is the only open source for UEFI. Dan has Measured Boot Tool at http://mbt.codeplex.com/ with a demo where you can also view TPM data. TPM support already on enterprise-class machines. UEFI Weaknesses. UEFI toolkits are evolving rapidly, but UEFI has weaknesses: assume user is an ally trust TPM implicitly, and attached to computer hibernate file is unprotected (disk encryption protects against this) protection migrating from hardware to firmware delays in patching and whitelist updates will UEFI really be adopted by the mainstream (smartphone hardware support, bank support, apathetic consumer support) You Can't Buy Security: Building the Open Source InfoSec Program Boris Sverdlik, ISDPodcast.com co-host Boris talked about problems typical with current security audits. "IT Security" is an oxymoron—IT exists to enable buiness, uptime, utilization, reporting, but don't care about security—IT has conflict of interest. There's no Magic Bullet ("blinky box"), no one-size-fits-all solution (e.g., Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)). Regulations don't make you secure. The cloud is not secure (because of shared data and admin access). Defense and pen testing is not sexy. Auditors are not solution (security not a checklist)—what's needed is experience and adaptability—need soft skills. Step 1: First thing is to Google and learn the company end-to-end before you start. Get to know the management team (not IT team), meet as many people as you can. Don't use arbitrary values such as CISSP scores. Quantitive risk assessment is a myth (e.g. AV*EF-SLE). Learn different Business Units, legal/regulatory obligations, learn the business and where the money is made, verify company is protected from script kiddies (easy), learn sensitive information (IP, internal use only), and start with low-hanging fruit (customer service reps and social engineering). Step 2: Policies. Keep policies short and relevant. Generic SANS "security" boilerplate policies don't make sense and are not followed. Focus on acceptable use, data usage, communications, physical security. Step 3: Implementation: keep it simple stupid. Open source, although useful, is not free (implementation cost). Access controls with authentication & authorization for local and remote access. MS Windows has it, otherwise use OpenLDAP, OpenIAM, etc. Application security Everyone tries to reinvent the wheel—use existing static analysis tools. Review high-risk apps and major revisions. Don't run different risk level apps on same system. Assume host/client compromised and use app-level security control. Network security VLAN != segregated because there's too many workarounds. Use explicit firwall rules, active and passive network monitoring (snort is free), disallow end user access to production environment, have a proxy instead of direct Internet access. Also, SSL certificates are not good two-factor auth and SSL does not mean "safe." Operational Controls Have change, patch, asset, & vulnerability management (OSSI is free). For change management, always review code before pushing to production For logging, have centralized security logging for business-critical systems, separate security logging from administrative/IT logging, and lock down log (as it has everything). Monitor with OSSIM (open source). Use intrusion detection, but not just to fulfill a checkbox: build rules from a whitelist perspective (snort). OSSEC has 95% of what you need. Vulnerability management is a QA function when done right: OpenVas and Seccubus are free. Security awareness The reality is users will always click everything. Build real awareness, not compliance driven checkbox, and have it integrated into the culture. Pen test by crowd sourcing—test with logging COSSP http://www.cossp.org/ - Comprehensive Open Source Security Project What Journalists Want: The Investigative Reporters' Perspective on Hacking Dave Maas, San Diego CityBeat Jason Leopold, Truthout.org The difference between hackers and investigative journalists: For hackers, the motivation varies, but method is same, technological specialties. For investigative journalists, it's about one thing—The Story, and they need broad info-gathering skills. J-School in 60 Seconds: Generic formula: Person or issue of pubic interest, new info, or angle. Generic criteria: proximity, prominence, timeliness, human interest, oddity, or consequence. Media awareness of hackers and trends: journalists becoming extremely aware of hackers with congressional debates (privacy, data breaches), demand for data-mining Journalists, use of coding and web development for Journalists, and Journalists busted for hacking (Murdock). Info gathering by investigative journalists include Public records laws. Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is good, but slow. California Public Records Act is a lot stronger. FOIA takes forever because of foot-dragging—it helps to be specific. Often need to sue (especially FBI). CPRA is faster, and requests can be vague. Dumps and leaks (a la Wikileaks) Journalists want: leads, protecting ourselves, our sources, and adapting tools for news gathering (Google hacking). Anonomity is important to whistleblowers. They want no digital footprint left behind (e.g., email, web log). They don't trust encryption, want to feel safe and secure. Whistleblower laws are very weak—there's no upside for whistleblowers—they have to be very passionate to do it. Accessibility and Security or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Halting Problem Anna Shubina, Dartmouth College Anna talked about how accessibility and security are related. Accessibility of digital content (not real world accessibility). mostly refers to blind users and screenreaders, for our purpose. Accessibility is about parsing documents, as are many security issues. "Rich" executable content causes accessibility to fail, and often causes security to fail. For example MS Word has executable format—it's not a document exchange format—more dangerous than PDF or HTML. Accessibility is often the first and maybe only sanity check with parsing. They have no choice because someone may want to read what you write. Google, for example, is very particular about web browser you use and are bad at supporting other browsers. Uses JavaScript instead of links, often requiring mouseover to display content. PDF is a security nightmare. Executible format, embedded flash, JavaScript, etc. 15 million lines of code. Google Chrome doesn't handle PDF correctly, causing several security bugs. PDF has an accessibility checker and PDF tagging, to help with accessibility. But no PDF checker checks for incorrect tags, untagged content, or validates lists or tables. None check executable content at all. The "Halting Problem" is: can one decide whether a program will ever stop? The answer, in general, is no (Rice's theorem). The same holds true for accessibility checkers. Language-theoretic Security says complicated data formats are hard to parse and cannot be solved due to the Halting Problem. W3C Web Accessibility Guidelines: "Perceivable, Operable, Understandable, Robust" Not much help though, except for "Robust", but here's some gems: * all information should be parsable (paraphrasing) * if not parsable, cannot be converted to alternate formats * maximize compatibility in new document formats Executible webpages are bad for security and accessibility. They say it's for a better web experience. But is it necessary to stuff web pages with JavaScript for a better experience? A good example is The Drudge Report—it has hand-written HTML with no JavaScript, yet drives a lot of web traffic due to good content. A bad example is Google News—hidden scrollbars, guessing user input. Solutions: Accessibility and security problems come from same source Expose "better user experience" myth Keep your corner of Internet parsable Remember "Halting Problem"—recognize false solutions (checking and verifying tools) Stop Patching, for Stronger PCI Compliance Adam Brand, protiviti @adamrbrand, http://www.picfun.com/ Adam talked about PCI compliance for retail sales. Take an example: for PCI compliance, 50% of Brian's time (a IT guy), 960 hours/year was spent patching POSs in 850 restaurants. Often applying some patches make no sense (like fixing a browser vulnerability on a server). "Scanner worship" is overuse of vulnerability scanners—it gives a warm and fuzzy and it's simple (red or green results—fix reds). Scanners give a false sense of security. In reality, breeches from missing patches are uncommon—more common problems are: default passwords, cleartext authentication, misconfiguration (firewall ports open). Patching Myths: Myth 1: install within 30 days of patch release (but PCI §6.1 allows a "risk-based approach" instead). Myth 2: vendor decides what's critical (also PCI §6.1). But §6.2 requires user ranking of vulnerabilities instead. Myth 3: scan and rescan until it passes. But PCI §11.2.1b says this applies only to high-risk vulnerabilities. Adam says good recommendations come from NIST 800-40. Instead use sane patching and focus on what's really important. From NIST 800-40: Proactive: Use a proactive vulnerability management process: use change control, configuration management, monitor file integrity. Monitor: start with NVD and other vulnerability alerts, not scanner results. Evaluate: public-facing system? workstation? internal server? (risk rank) Decide:on action and timeline Test: pre-test patches (stability, functionality, rollback) for change control Install: notify, change control, tickets McAfee Secure & Trustmarks — a Hacker's Best Friend Jay James, Shane MacDougall, Tactical Intelligence Inc., Canada "McAfee Secure Trustmark" is a website seal marketed by McAfee. A website gets this badge if they pass their remote scanning. The problem is a removal of trustmarks act as flags that you're vulnerable. Easy to view status change by viewing McAfee list on website or on Google. "Secure TrustGuard" is similar to McAfee. Jay and Shane wrote Perl scripts to gather sites from McAfee and search engines. If their certification image changes to a 1x1 pixel image, then they are longer certified. Their scripts take deltas of scans to see what changed daily. The bottom line is change in TrustGuard status is a flag for hackers to attack your site. Entire idea of seals is silly—you're raising a flag saying if you're vulnerable.

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  • value types in the vm

    - by john.rose
    value types in the vm p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times} p.p2 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 14.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times} p.p3 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 12.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times} p.p4 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 15.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times} p.p5 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Courier} p.p6 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Courier; min-height: 17.0px} p.p7 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times; min-height: 18.0px} p.p8 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 36.0px; text-indent: -36.0px; font: 14.0px Times; min-height: 18.0px} p.p9 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 12.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times; min-height: 18.0px} p.p10 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 12.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times; color: #000000} li.li1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times} li.li7 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 14.0px Times; min-height: 18.0px} span.s1 {font: 14.0px Courier} span.s2 {color: #000000} span.s3 {font: 14.0px Courier; color: #000000} ol.ol1 {list-style-type: decimal} Or, enduring values for a changing world. Introduction A value type is a data type which, generally speaking, is designed for being passed by value in and out of methods, and stored by value in data structures. The only value types which the Java language directly supports are the eight primitive types. Java indirectly and approximately supports value types, if they are implemented in terms of classes. For example, both Integer and String may be viewed as value types, especially if their usage is restricted to avoid operations appropriate to Object. In this note, we propose a definition of value types in terms of a design pattern for Java classes, accompanied by a set of usage restrictions. We also sketch the relation of such value types to tuple types (which are a JVM-level notion), and point out JVM optimizations that can apply to value types. This note is a thought experiment to extend the JVM’s performance model in support of value types. The demonstration has two phases.  Initially the extension can simply use design patterns, within the current bytecode architecture, and in today’s Java language. But if the performance model is to be realized in practice, it will probably require new JVM bytecode features, changes to the Java language, or both.  We will look at a few possibilities for these new features. An Axiom of Value In the context of the JVM, a value type is a data type equipped with construction, assignment, and equality operations, and a set of typed components, such that, whenever two variables of the value type produce equal corresponding values for their components, the values of the two variables cannot be distinguished by any JVM operation. Here are some corollaries: A value type is immutable, since otherwise a copy could be constructed and the original could be modified in one of its components, allowing the copies to be distinguished. Changing the component of a value type requires construction of a new value. The equals and hashCode operations are strictly component-wise. If a value type is represented by a JVM reference, that reference cannot be successfully synchronized on, and cannot be usefully compared for reference equality. A value type can be viewed in terms of what it doesn’t do. We can say that a value type omits all value-unsafe operations, which could violate the constraints on value types.  These operations, which are ordinarily allowed for Java object types, are pointer equality comparison (the acmp instruction), synchronization (the monitor instructions), all the wait and notify methods of class Object, and non-trivial finalize methods. The clone method is also value-unsafe, although for value types it could be treated as the identity function. Finally, and most importantly, any side effect on an object (however visible) also counts as an value-unsafe operation. A value type may have methods, but such methods must not change the components of the value. It is reasonable and useful to define methods like toString, equals, and hashCode on value types, and also methods which are specifically valuable to users of the value type. Representations of Value Value types have two natural representations in the JVM, unboxed and boxed. An unboxed value consists of the components, as simple variables. For example, the complex number x=(1+2i), in rectangular coordinate form, may be represented in unboxed form by the following pair of variables: /*Complex x = Complex.valueOf(1.0, 2.0):*/ double x_re = 1.0, x_im = 2.0; These variables might be locals, parameters, or fields. Their association as components of a single value is not defined to the JVM. Here is a sample computation which computes the norm of the difference between two complex numbers: double distance(/*Complex x:*/ double x_re, double x_im,         /*Complex y:*/ double y_re, double y_im) {     /*Complex z = x.minus(y):*/     double z_re = x_re - y_re, z_im = x_im - y_im;     /*return z.abs():*/     return Math.sqrt(z_re*z_re + z_im*z_im); } A boxed representation groups component values under a single object reference. The reference is to a ‘wrapper class’ that carries the component values in its fields. (A primitive type can naturally be equated with a trivial value type with just one component of that type. In that view, the wrapper class Integer can serve as a boxed representation of value type int.) The unboxed representation of complex numbers is practical for many uses, but it fails to cover several major use cases: return values, array elements, and generic APIs. The two components of a complex number cannot be directly returned from a Java function, since Java does not support multiple return values. The same story applies to array elements: Java has no ’array of structs’ feature. (Double-length arrays are a possible workaround for complex numbers, but not for value types with heterogeneous components.) By generic APIs I mean both those which use generic types, like Arrays.asList and those which have special case support for primitive types, like String.valueOf and PrintStream.println. Those APIs do not support unboxed values, and offer some problems to boxed values. Any ’real’ JVM type should have a story for returns, arrays, and API interoperability. The basic problem here is that value types fall between primitive types and object types. Value types are clearly more complex than primitive types, and object types are slightly too complicated. Objects are a little bit dangerous to use as value carriers, since object references can be compared for pointer equality, and can be synchronized on. Also, as many Java programmers have observed, there is often a performance cost to using wrapper objects, even on modern JVMs. Even so, wrapper classes are a good starting point for talking about value types. If there were a set of structural rules and restrictions which would prevent value-unsafe operations on value types, wrapper classes would provide a good notation for defining value types. This note attempts to define such rules and restrictions. Let’s Start Coding Now it is time to look at some real code. Here is a definition, written in Java, of a complex number value type. @ValueSafe public final class Complex implements java.io.Serializable {     // immutable component structure:     public final double re, im;     private Complex(double re, double im) {         this.re = re; this.im = im;     }     // interoperability methods:     public String toString() { return "Complex("+re+","+im+")"; }     public List<Double> asList() { return Arrays.asList(re, im); }     public boolean equals(Complex c) {         return re == c.re && im == c.im;     }     public boolean equals(@ValueSafe Object x) {         return x instanceof Complex && equals((Complex) x);     }     public int hashCode() {         return 31*Double.valueOf(re).hashCode()                 + Double.valueOf(im).hashCode();     }     // factory methods:     public static Complex valueOf(double re, double im) {         return new Complex(re, im);     }     public Complex changeRe(double re2) { return valueOf(re2, im); }     public Complex changeIm(double im2) { return valueOf(re, im2); }     public static Complex cast(@ValueSafe Object x) {         return x == null ? ZERO : (Complex) x;     }     // utility methods and constants:     public Complex plus(Complex c)  { return new Complex(re+c.re, im+c.im); }     public Complex minus(Complex c) { return new Complex(re-c.re, im-c.im); }     public double abs() { return Math.sqrt(re*re + im*im); }     public static final Complex PI = valueOf(Math.PI, 0.0);     public static final Complex ZERO = valueOf(0.0, 0.0); } This is not a minimal definition, because it includes some utility methods and other optional parts.  The essential elements are as follows: The class is marked as a value type with an annotation. The class is final, because it does not make sense to create subclasses of value types. The fields of the class are all non-private and final.  (I.e., the type is immutable and structurally transparent.) From the supertype Object, all public non-final methods are overridden. The constructor is private. Beyond these bare essentials, we can observe the following features in this example, which are likely to be typical of all value types: One or more factory methods are responsible for value creation, including a component-wise valueOf method. There are utility methods for complex arithmetic and instance creation, such as plus and changeIm. There are static utility constants, such as PI. The type is serializable, using the default mechanisms. There are methods for converting to and from dynamically typed references, such as asList and cast. The Rules In order to use value types properly, the programmer must avoid value-unsafe operations.  A helpful Java compiler should issue errors (or at least warnings) for code which provably applies value-unsafe operations, and should issue warnings for code which might be correct but does not provably avoid value-unsafe operations.  No such compilers exist today, but to simplify our account here, we will pretend that they do exist. A value-safe type is any class, interface, or type parameter marked with the @ValueSafe annotation, or any subtype of a value-safe type.  If a value-safe class is marked final, it is in fact a value type.  All other value-safe classes must be abstract.  The non-static fields of a value class must be non-public and final, and all its constructors must be private. Under the above rules, a standard interface could be helpful to define value types like Complex.  Here is an example: @ValueSafe public interface ValueType extends java.io.Serializable {     // All methods listed here must get redefined.     // Definitions must be value-safe, which means     // they may depend on component values only.     List<? extends Object> asList();     int hashCode();     boolean equals(@ValueSafe Object c);     String toString(); } //@ValueSafe inherited from supertype: public final class Complex implements ValueType { … The main advantage of such a conventional interface is that (unlike an annotation) it is reified in the runtime type system.  It could appear as an element type or parameter bound, for facilities which are designed to work on value types only.  More broadly, it might assist the JVM to perform dynamic enforcement of the rules for value types. Besides types, the annotation @ValueSafe can mark fields, parameters, local variables, and methods.  (This is redundant when the type is also value-safe, but may be useful when the type is Object or another supertype of a value type.)  Working forward from these annotations, an expression E is defined as value-safe if it satisfies one or more of the following: The type of E is a value-safe type. E names a field, parameter, or local variable whose declaration is marked @ValueSafe. E is a call to a method whose declaration is marked @ValueSafe. E is an assignment to a value-safe variable, field reference, or array reference. E is a cast to a value-safe type from a value-safe expression. E is a conditional expression E0 ? E1 : E2, and both E1 and E2 are value-safe. Assignments to value-safe expressions and initializations of value-safe names must take their values from value-safe expressions. A value-safe expression may not be the subject of a value-unsafe operation.  In particular, it cannot be synchronized on, nor can it be compared with the “==” operator, not even with a null or with another value-safe type. In a program where all of these rules are followed, no value-type value will be subject to a value-unsafe operation.  Thus, the prime axiom of value types will be satisfied, that no two value type will be distinguishable as long as their component values are equal. More Code To illustrate these rules, here are some usage examples for Complex: Complex pi = Complex.valueOf(Math.PI, 0); Complex zero = pi.changeRe(0);  //zero = pi; zero.re = 0; ValueType vtype = pi; @SuppressWarnings("value-unsafe")   Object obj = pi; @ValueSafe Object obj2 = pi; obj2 = new Object();  // ok List<Complex> clist = new ArrayList<Complex>(); clist.add(pi);  // (ok assuming List.add param is @ValueSafe) List<ValueType> vlist = new ArrayList<ValueType>(); vlist.add(pi);  // (ok) List<Object> olist = new ArrayList<Object>(); olist.add(pi);  // warning: "value-unsafe" boolean z = pi.equals(zero); boolean z1 = (pi == zero);  // error: reference comparison on value type boolean z2 = (pi == null);  // error: reference comparison on value type boolean z3 = (pi == obj2);  // error: reference comparison on value type synchronized (pi) { }  // error: synch of value, unpredictable result synchronized (obj2) { }  // unpredictable result Complex qq = pi; qq = null;  // possible NPE; warning: “null-unsafe" qq = (Complex) obj;  // warning: “null-unsafe" qq = Complex.cast(obj);  // OK @SuppressWarnings("null-unsafe")   Complex empty = null;  // possible NPE qq = empty;  // possible NPE (null pollution) The Payoffs It follows from this that either the JVM or the java compiler can replace boxed value-type values with unboxed ones, without affecting normal computations.  Fields and variables of value types can be split into their unboxed components.  Non-static methods on value types can be transformed into static methods which take the components as value parameters. Some common questions arise around this point in any discussion of value types. Why burden the programmer with all these extra rules?  Why not detect programs automagically and perform unboxing transparently?  The answer is that it is easy to break the rules accidently unless they are agreed to by the programmer and enforced.  Automatic unboxing optimizations are tantalizing but (so far) unreachable ideal.  In the current state of the art, it is possible exhibit benchmarks in which automatic unboxing provides the desired effects, but it is not possible to provide a JVM with a performance model that assures the programmer when unboxing will occur.  This is why I’m writing this note, to enlist help from, and provide assurances to, the programmer.  Basically, I’m shooting for a good set of user-supplied “pragmas” to frame the desired optimization. Again, the important thing is that the unboxing must be done reliably, or else programmers will have no reason to work with the extra complexity of the value-safety rules.  There must be a reasonably stable performance model, wherein using a value type has approximately the same performance characteristics as writing the unboxed components as separate Java variables. There are some rough corners to the present scheme.  Since Java fields and array elements are initialized to null, value-type computations which incorporate uninitialized variables can produce null pointer exceptions.  One workaround for this is to require such variables to be null-tested, and the result replaced with a suitable all-zero value of the value type.  That is what the “cast” method does above. Generically typed APIs like List<T> will continue to manipulate boxed values always, at least until we figure out how to do reification of generic type instances.  Use of such APIs will elicit warnings until their type parameters (and/or relevant members) are annotated or typed as value-safe.  Retrofitting List<T> is likely to expose flaws in the present scheme, which we will need to engineer around.  Here are a couple of first approaches: public interface java.util.List<@ValueSafe T> extends Collection<T> { … public interface java.util.List<T extends Object|ValueType> extends Collection<T> { … (The second approach would require disjunctive types, in which value-safety is “contagious” from the constituent types.) With more transformations, the return value types of methods can also be unboxed.  This may require significant bytecode-level transformations, and would work best in the presence of a bytecode representation for multiple value groups, which I have proposed elsewhere under the title “Tuples in the VM”. But for starters, the JVM can apply this transformation under the covers, to internally compiled methods.  This would give a way to express multiple return values and structured return values, which is a significant pain-point for Java programmers, especially those who work with low-level structure types favored by modern vector and graphics processors.  The lack of multiple return values has a strong distorting effect on many Java APIs. Even if the JVM fails to unbox a value, there is still potential benefit to the value type.  Clustered computing systems something have copy operations (serialization or something similar) which apply implicitly to command operands.  When copying JVM objects, it is extremely helpful to know when an object’s identity is important or not.  If an object reference is a copied operand, the system may have to create a proxy handle which points back to the original object, so that side effects are visible.  Proxies must be managed carefully, and this can be expensive.  On the other hand, value types are exactly those types which a JVM can “copy and forget” with no downside. Array types are crucial to bulk data interfaces.  (As data sizes and rates increase, bulk data becomes more important than scalar data, so arrays are definitely accompanying us into the future of computing.)  Value types are very helpful for adding structure to bulk data, so a successful value type mechanism will make it easier for us to express richer forms of bulk data. Unboxing arrays (i.e., arrays containing unboxed values) will provide better cache and memory density, and more direct data movement within clustered or heterogeneous computing systems.  They require the deepest transformations, relative to today’s JVM.  There is an impedance mismatch between value-type arrays and Java’s covariant array typing, so compromises will need to be struck with existing Java semantics.  It is probably worth the effort, since arrays of unboxed value types are inherently more memory-efficient than standard Java arrays, which rely on dependent pointer chains. It may be sufficient to extend the “value-safe” concept to array declarations, and allow low-level transformations to change value-safe array declarations from the standard boxed form into an unboxed tuple-based form.  Such value-safe arrays would not be convertible to Object[] arrays.  Certain connection points, such as Arrays.copyOf and System.arraycopy might need additional input/output combinations, to allow smooth conversion between arrays with boxed and unboxed elements. Alternatively, the correct solution may have to wait until we have enough reification of generic types, and enough operator overloading, to enable an overhaul of Java arrays. Implicit Method Definitions The example of class Complex above may be unattractively complex.  I believe most or all of the elements of the example class are required by the logic of value types. If this is true, a programmer who writes a value type will have to write lots of error-prone boilerplate code.  On the other hand, I think nearly all of the code (except for the domain-specific parts like plus and minus) can be implicitly generated. Java has a rule for implicitly defining a class’s constructor, if no it defines no constructors explicitly.  Likewise, there are rules for providing default access modifiers for interface members.  Because of the highly regular structure of value types, it might be reasonable to perform similar implicit transformations on value types.  Here’s an example of a “highly implicit” definition of a complex number type: public class Complex implements ValueType {  // implicitly final     public double re, im;  // implicitly public final     //implicit methods are defined elementwise from te fields:     //  toString, asList, equals(2), hashCode, valueOf, cast     //optionally, explicit methods (plus, abs, etc.) would go here } In other words, with the right defaults, a simple value type definition can be a one-liner.  The observant reader will have noticed the similarities (and suitable differences) between the explicit methods above and the corresponding methods for List<T>. Another way to abbreviate such a class would be to make an annotation the primary trigger of the functionality, and to add the interface(s) implicitly: public @ValueType class Complex { … // implicitly final, implements ValueType (But to me it seems better to communicate the “magic” via an interface, even if it is rooted in an annotation.) Implicitly Defined Value Types So far we have been working with nominal value types, which is to say that the sequence of typed components is associated with a name and additional methods that convey the intention of the programmer.  A simple ordered pair of floating point numbers can be variously interpreted as (to name a few possibilities) a rectangular or polar complex number or Cartesian point.  The name and the methods convey the intended meaning. But what if we need a truly simple ordered pair of floating point numbers, without any further conceptual baggage?  Perhaps we are writing a method (like “divideAndRemainder”) which naturally returns a pair of numbers instead of a single number.  Wrapping the pair of numbers in a nominal type (like “QuotientAndRemainder”) makes as little sense as wrapping a single return value in a nominal type (like “Quotient”).  What we need here are structural value types commonly known as tuples. For the present discussion, let us assign a conventional, JVM-friendly name to tuples, roughly as follows: public class java.lang.tuple.$DD extends java.lang.tuple.Tuple {      double $1, $2; } Here the component names are fixed and all the required methods are defined implicitly.  The supertype is an abstract class which has suitable shared declarations.  The name itself mentions a JVM-style method parameter descriptor, which may be “cracked” to determine the number and types of the component fields. The odd thing about such a tuple type (and structural types in general) is it must be instantiated lazily, in response to linkage requests from one or more classes that need it.  The JVM and/or its class loaders must be prepared to spin a tuple type on demand, given a simple name reference, $xyz, where the xyz is cracked into a series of component types.  (Specifics of naming and name mangling need some tasteful engineering.) Tuples also seem to demand, even more than nominal types, some support from the language.  (This is probably because notations for non-nominal types work best as combinations of punctuation and type names, rather than named constructors like Function3 or Tuple2.)  At a minimum, languages with tuples usually (I think) have some sort of simple bracket notation for creating tuples, and a corresponding pattern-matching syntax (or “destructuring bind”) for taking tuples apart, at least when they are parameter lists.  Designing such a syntax is no simple thing, because it ought to play well with nominal value types, and also with pre-existing Java features, such as method parameter lists, implicit conversions, generic types, and reflection.  That is a task for another day. Other Use Cases Besides complex numbers and simple tuples there are many use cases for value types.  Many tuple-like types have natural value-type representations. These include rational numbers, point locations and pixel colors, and various kinds of dates and addresses. Other types have a variable-length ‘tail’ of internal values. The most common example of this is String, which is (mathematically) a sequence of UTF-16 character values. Similarly, bit vectors, multiple-precision numbers, and polynomials are composed of sequences of values. Such types include, in their representation, a reference to a variable-sized data structure (often an array) which (somehow) represents the sequence of values. The value type may also include ’header’ information. Variable-sized values often have a length distribution which favors short lengths. In that case, the design of the value type can make the first few values in the sequence be direct ’header’ fields of the value type. In the common case where the header is enough to represent the whole value, the tail can be a shared null value, or even just a null reference. Note that the tail need not be an immutable object, as long as the header type encapsulates it well enough. This is the case with String, where the tail is a mutable (but never mutated) character array. Field types and their order must be a globally visible part of the API.  The structure of the value type must be transparent enough to have a globally consistent unboxed representation, so that all callers and callees agree about the type and order of components  that appear as parameters, return types, and array elements.  This is a trade-off between efficiency and encapsulation, which is forced on us when we remove an indirection enjoyed by boxed representations.  A JVM-only transformation would not care about such visibility, but a bytecode transformation would need to take care that (say) the components of complex numbers would not get swapped after a redefinition of Complex and a partial recompile.  Perhaps constant pool references to value types need to declare the field order as assumed by each API user. This brings up the delicate status of private fields in a value type.  It must always be possible to load, store, and copy value types as coordinated groups, and the JVM performs those movements by moving individual scalar values between locals and stack.  If a component field is not public, what is to prevent hostile code from plucking it out of the tuple using a rogue aload or astore instruction?  Nothing but the verifier, so we may need to give it more smarts, so that it treats value types as inseparable groups of stack slots or locals (something like long or double). My initial thought was to make the fields always public, which would make the security problem moot.  But public is not always the right answer; consider the case of String, where the underlying mutable character array must be encapsulated to prevent security holes.  I believe we can win back both sides of the tradeoff, by training the verifier never to split up the components in an unboxed value.  Just as the verifier encapsulates the two halves of a 64-bit primitive, it can encapsulate the the header and body of an unboxed String, so that no code other than that of class String itself can take apart the values. Similar to String, we could build an efficient multi-precision decimal type along these lines: public final class DecimalValue extends ValueType {     protected final long header;     protected private final BigInteger digits;     public DecimalValue valueOf(int value, int scale) {         assert(scale >= 0);         return new DecimalValue(((long)value << 32) + scale, null);     }     public DecimalValue valueOf(long value, int scale) {         if (value == (int) value)             return valueOf((int)value, scale);         return new DecimalValue(-scale, new BigInteger(value));     } } Values of this type would be passed between methods as two machine words. Small values (those with a significand which fits into 32 bits) would be represented without any heap data at all, unless the DecimalValue itself were boxed. (Note the tension between encapsulation and unboxing in this case.  It would be better if the header and digits fields were private, but depending on where the unboxing information must “leak”, it is probably safer to make a public revelation of the internal structure.) Note that, although an array of Complex can be faked with a double-length array of double, there is no easy way to fake an array of unboxed DecimalValues.  (Either an array of boxed values or a transposed pair of homogeneous arrays would be reasonable fallbacks, in a current JVM.)  Getting the full benefit of unboxing and arrays will require some new JVM magic. Although the JVM emphasizes portability, system dependent code will benefit from using machine-level types larger than 64 bits.  For example, the back end of a linear algebra package might benefit from value types like Float4 which map to stock vector types.  This is probably only worthwhile if the unboxing arrays can be packed with such values. More Daydreams A more finely-divided design for dynamic enforcement of value safety could feature separate marker interfaces for each invariant.  An empty marker interface Unsynchronizable could cause suitable exceptions for monitor instructions on objects in marked classes.  More radically, a Interchangeable marker interface could cause JVM primitives that are sensitive to object identity to raise exceptions; the strangest result would be that the acmp instruction would have to be specified as raising an exception. @ValueSafe public interface ValueType extends java.io.Serializable,         Unsynchronizable, Interchangeable { … public class Complex implements ValueType {     // inherits Serializable, Unsynchronizable, Interchangeable, @ValueSafe     … It seems possible that Integer and the other wrapper types could be retro-fitted as value-safe types.  This is a major change, since wrapper objects would be unsynchronizable and their references interchangeable.  It is likely that code which violates value-safety for wrapper types exists but is uncommon.  It is less plausible to retro-fit String, since the prominent operation String.intern is often used with value-unsafe code. We should also reconsider the distinction between boxed and unboxed values in code.  The design presented above obscures that distinction.  As another thought experiment, we could imagine making a first class distinction in the type system between boxed and unboxed representations.  Since only primitive types are named with a lower-case initial letter, we could define that the capitalized version of a value type name always refers to the boxed representation, while the initial lower-case variant always refers to boxed.  For example: complex pi = complex.valueOf(Math.PI, 0); Complex boxPi = pi;  // convert to boxed myList.add(boxPi); complex z = myList.get(0);  // unbox Such a convention could perhaps absorb the current difference between int and Integer, double and Double. It might also allow the programmer to express a helpful distinction among array types. As said above, array types are crucial to bulk data interfaces, but are limited in the JVM.  Extending arrays beyond the present limitations is worth thinking about; for example, the Maxine JVM implementation has a hybrid object/array type.  Something like this which can also accommodate value type components seems worthwhile.  On the other hand, does it make sense for value types to contain short arrays?  And why should random-access arrays be the end of our design process, when bulk data is often sequentially accessed, and it might make sense to have heterogeneous streams of data as the natural “jumbo” data structure.  These considerations must wait for another day and another note. More Work It seems to me that a good sequence for introducing such value types would be as follows: Add the value-safety restrictions to an experimental version of javac. Code some sample applications with value types, including Complex and DecimalValue. Create an experimental JVM which internally unboxes value types but does not require new bytecodes to do so.  Ensure the feasibility of the performance model for the sample applications. Add tuple-like bytecodes (with or without generic type reification) to a major revision of the JVM, and teach the Java compiler to switch in the new bytecodes without code changes. A staggered roll-out like this would decouple language changes from bytecode changes, which is always a convenient thing. A similar investigation should be applied (concurrently) to array types.  In this case, it seems to me that the starting point is in the JVM: Add an experimental unboxing array data structure to a production JVM, perhaps along the lines of Maxine hybrids.  No bytecode or language support is required at first; everything can be done with encapsulated unsafe operations and/or method handles. Create an experimental JVM which internally unboxes value types but does not require new bytecodes to do so.  Ensure the feasibility of the performance model for the sample applications. Add tuple-like bytecodes (with or without generic type reification) to a major revision of the JVM, and teach the Java compiler to switch in the new bytecodes without code changes. That’s enough musing me for now.  Back to work!

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  • Unable to install Xdebug

    - by burnt1ce
    I've registered xdebug in php.ini (as per http://xdebug.org/docs/install) but it's not showing up when i run "php -m" or when i get a test page to run "phpinfo()". I've just installed the latest version of XAMPP. Can anyone provide any suggestions in getting xdebug to show up? This is what i get when i run phpinfo(). **PHP Version 5.3.1** System Windows NT ANDREW_LAPTOP 5.1 build 2600 (Windows XP Professional Service Pack 3) i586 Build Date Nov 20 2009 17:20:57 Compiler MSVC6 (Visual C++ 6.0) Architecture x86 Configure Command cscript /nologo configure.js "--enable-snapshot-build" Server API Apache 2.0 Handler Virtual Directory Support enabled Configuration File (php.ini) Path no value Loaded Configuration File C:\xampp\php\php.ini Scan this dir for additional .ini files (none) Additional .ini files parsed (none) PHP API 20090626 PHP Extension 20090626 Zend Extension 220090626 Zend Extension Build API220090626,TS,VC6 PHP Extension Build API20090626,TS,VC6 Debug Build no Thread Safety enabled Zend Memory Manager enabled Zend Multibyte Support disabled IPv6 Support enabled Registered PHP Streams https, ftps, php, file, glob, data, http, ftp, compress.zlib, compress.bzip2, phar, zip Registered Stream Socket Transports tcp, udp, ssl, sslv3, sslv2, tls Registered Stream Filters convert.iconv.*, string.rot13, string.toupper, string.tolower, string.strip_tags, convert.*, consumed, dechunk, zlib.*, bzip2.* This program makes use of the Zend Scripting Language Engine: Zend Engine v2.3.0, Copyright (c) 1998-2009 Zend Technologies PHP Credits Configuration apache2handler Apache Version Apache/2.2.14 (Win32) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.14 OpenSSL/0.9.8l mod_autoindex_color PHP/5.3.1 mod_apreq2-20090110/2.7.1 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 Apache API Version 20051115 Server Administrator postmaster@localhost Hostname:Port localhost:80 Max Requests Per Child: 0 - Keep Alive: on - Max Per Connection: 100 Timeouts Connection: 300 - Keep-Alive: 5 Virtual Server No Server Root C:/xampp/apache Loaded Modules core mod_win32 mpm_winnt http_core mod_so mod_actions mod_alias mod_asis mod_auth_basic mod_auth_digest mod_authn_default mod_authn_file mod_authz_default mod_authz_groupfile mod_authz_host mod_authz_user mod_cgi mod_dav mod_dav_fs mod_dav_lock mod_dir mod_env mod_headers mod_include mod_info mod_isapi mod_log_config mod_mime mod_negotiation mod_rewrite mod_setenvif mod_ssl mod_status mod_autoindex_color mod_php5 mod_perl mod_apreq2 Directive Local Value Master Value engine 1 1 last_modified 0 0 xbithack 0 0 Apache Environment Variable Value MIBDIRS C:/xampp/php/extras/mibs MYSQL_HOME C:\xampp\mysql\bin OPENSSL_CONF C:/xampp/apache/bin/openssl.cnf PHP_PEAR_SYSCONF_DIR C:\xampp\php PHPRC C:\xampp\php TMP C:\xampp\tmp HTTP_HOST localhost HTTP_CONNECTION keep-alive HTTP_USER_AGENT Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/533.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/5.0.342.8 Safari/533.2 HTTP_CACHE_CONTROL max-age=0 HTTP_ACCEPT application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING gzip,deflate,sdch HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE en-US,en;q=0.8 HTTP_ACCEPT_CHARSET ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 PATH C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\Application;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem;c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\Tools\Binn\;c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\DTS\Binn\;C:\Program Files\QuickTime\QTSystem\;C:\Program Files\Common Files\DivX Shared\;C:\Program Files\WiTopia.Net\bin SystemRoot C:\WINDOWS COMSPEC C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe PATHEXT .COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH WINDIR C:\WINDOWS SERVER_SIGNATURE <address>Apache/2.2.14 (Win32) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.14 OpenSSL/0.9.8l mod_autoindex_color PHP/5.3.1 mod_apreq2-20090110/2.7.1 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 Server at localhost Port 80</address> SERVER_SOFTWARE Apache/2.2.14 (Win32) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.14 OpenSSL/0.9.8l mod_autoindex_color PHP/5.3.1 mod_apreq2-20090110/2.7.1 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 SERVER_NAME localhost SERVER_ADDR 127.0.0.1 SERVER_PORT 80 REMOTE_ADDR 127.0.0.1 DOCUMENT_ROOT C:/xampp/htdocs SERVER_ADMIN postmaster@localhost SCRIPT_FILENAME C:/xampp/htdocs/test.php REMOTE_PORT 3275 GATEWAY_INTERFACE CGI/1.1 SERVER_PROTOCOL HTTP/1.1 REQUEST_METHOD GET QUERY_STRING no value REQUEST_URI /test.php SCRIPT_NAME /test.php HTTP Headers Information HTTP Request Headers HTTP Request GET /test.php HTTP/1.1 Host localhost Connection keep-alive User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/533.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/5.0.342.8 Safari/533.2 Cache-Control max-age=0 Accept application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding gzip,deflate,sdch Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.8 Accept-Charset ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 HTTP Response Headers X-Powered-By PHP/5.3.1 Keep-Alive timeout=5, max=80 Connection Keep-Alive Transfer-Encoding chunked Content-Type text/html bcmath BCMath support enabled Directive Local Value Master Value bcmath.scale 0 0 bz2 BZip2 Support Enabled Stream Wrapper support compress.bz2:// Stream Filter support bzip2.decompress, bzip2.compress BZip2 Version 1.0.5, 10-Dec-2007 calendar Calendar support enabled com_dotnet COM support enabled DCOM support disabled .Net support enabled Directive Local Value Master Value com.allow_dcom 0 0 com.autoregister_casesensitive 1 1 com.autoregister_typelib 0 0 com.autoregister_verbose 0 0 com.code_page no value no value com.typelib_file no value no value Core PHP Version 5.3.1 Directive Local Value Master Value allow_call_time_pass_reference On On allow_url_fopen On On allow_url_include Off Off always_populate_raw_post_data Off Off arg_separator.input & & arg_separator.output &amp; &amp; asp_tags Off Off auto_append_file no value no value auto_globals_jit On On auto_prepend_file no value no value browscap C:\xampp\php\extras\browscap.ini C:\xampp\php\extras\browscap.ini default_charset no value no value default_mimetype text/html text/html define_syslog_variables Off Off disable_classes no value no value disable_functions no value no value display_errors On On display_startup_errors On On doc_root no value no value docref_ext no value no value docref_root no value no value enable_dl On On error_append_string no value no value error_log no value no value error_prepend_string no value no value error_reporting 22519 22519 exit_on_timeout Off Off expose_php On On extension_dir C:\xampp\php\ext C:\xampp\php\ext file_uploads On On highlight.bg #FFFFFF #FFFFFF highlight.comment #FF8000 #FF8000 highlight.default #0000BB #0000BB highlight.html #000000 #000000 highlight.keyword #007700 #007700 highlight.string #DD0000 #DD0000 html_errors On On ignore_repeated_errors Off Off ignore_repeated_source Off Off ignore_user_abort Off Off implicit_flush Off Off include_path .;C:\xampp\php\PEAR .;C:\xampp\php\PEAR log_errors Off Off log_errors_max_len 1024 1024 magic_quotes_gpc Off Off magic_quotes_runtime Off Off magic_quotes_sybase Off Off mail.add_x_header Off Off mail.force_extra_parameters no value no value mail.log no value no value max_execution_time 60 60 max_file_uploads 20 20 max_input_nesting_level 64 64 max_input_time 60 60 memory_limit 128M 128M open_basedir no value no value output_buffering no value no value output_handler no value no value post_max_size 128M 128M precision 14 14 realpath_cache_size 16K 16K realpath_cache_ttl 120 120 register_argc_argv On On register_globals Off Off register_long_arrays Off Off report_memleaks On On report_zend_debug On On request_order no value no value safe_mode Off Off safe_mode_exec_dir no value no value safe_mode_gid Off Off safe_mode_include_dir no value no value sendmail_from no value no value sendmail_path no value no value serialize_precision 100 100 short_open_tag Off Off SMTP localhost localhost smtp_port 25 25 sql.safe_mode Off Off track_errors Off Off unserialize_callback_func no value no value upload_max_filesize 128M 128M upload_tmp_dir C:\xampp\tmp C:\xampp\tmp user_dir no value no value user_ini.cache_ttl 300 300 user_ini.filename .user.ini .user.ini variables_order GPCS GPCS xmlrpc_error_number 0 0 xmlrpc_errors Off Off y2k_compliance On On zend.enable_gc On On ctype ctype functions enabled date date/time support enabled "Olson" Timezone Database Version 2009.18 Timezone Database internal Default timezone America/New_York Directive Local Value Master Value date.default_latitude 31.7667 31.7667 date.default_longitude 35.2333 35.2333 date.sunrise_zenith 90.583333 90.583333 date.sunset_zenith 90.583333 90.583333 date.timezone America/New_York America/New_York dom DOM/XML enabled DOM/XML API Version 20031129 libxml Version 2.7.6 HTML Support enabled XPath Support enabled XPointer Support enabled Schema Support enabled RelaxNG Support enabled ereg Regex Library System library enabled exif EXIF Support enabled EXIF Version 1.4 $Id: exif.c 287372 2009-08-16 14:32:32Z iliaa $ Supported EXIF Version 0220 Supported filetypes JPEG,TIFF Directive Local Value Master Value exif.decode_jis_intel JIS JIS exif.decode_jis_motorola JIS JIS exif.decode_unicode_intel UCS-2LE UCS-2LE exif.decode_unicode_motorola UCS-2BE UCS-2BE exif.encode_jis no value no value exif.encode_unicode ISO-8859-15 ISO-8859-15 fileinfo fileinfo support enabled version 1.0.5-dev filter Input Validation and Filtering enabled Revision $Revision: 289434 $ Directive Local Value Master Value filter.default unsafe_raw unsafe_raw filter.default_flags no value no value ftp FTP support enabled gd GD Support enabled GD Version bundled (2.0.34 compatible) FreeType Support enabled FreeType Linkage with freetype FreeType Version 2.3.11 T1Lib Support enabled GIF Read Support enabled GIF Create Support enabled JPEG Support enabled libJPEG Version 7 PNG Support enabled libPNG Version 1.2.40 WBMP Support enabled XBM Support enabled JIS-mapped Japanese Font Support enabled Directive Local Value Master Value gd.jpeg_ignore_warning 0 0 gettext GetText Support enabled hash hash support enabled Hashing Engines md2 md4 md5 sha1 sha224 sha256 sha384 sha512 ripemd128 ripemd160 ripemd256 ripemd320 whirlpool tiger128,3 tiger160,3 tiger192,3 tiger128,4 tiger160,4 tiger192,4 snefru snefru256 gost adler32 crc32 crc32b salsa10 salsa20 haval128,3 haval160,3 haval192,3 haval224,3 haval256,3 haval128,4 haval160,4 haval192,4 haval224,4 haval256,4 haval128,5 haval160,5 haval192,5 haval224,5 haval256,5 iconv iconv support enabled iconv implementation "libiconv" iconv library version 1.13 Directive Local Value Master Value iconv.input_encoding ISO-8859-1 ISO-8859-1 iconv.internal_encoding ISO-8859-1 ISO-8859-1 iconv.output_encoding ISO-8859-1 ISO-8859-1 imap IMAP c-Client Version 2007e SSL Support enabled json json support enabled json version 1.2.1 libxml libXML support active libXML Compiled Version 2.7.6 libXML Loaded Version 20706 libXML streams enabled mbstring Multibyte Support enabled Multibyte string engine libmbfl HTTP input encoding translation disabled mbstring extension makes use of "streamable kanji code filter and converter", which is distributed under the GNU Lesser General Public License version 2.1. Multibyte (japanese) regex support enabled Multibyte regex (oniguruma) version 4.7.1 Directive Local Value Master Value mbstring.detect_order no value no value mbstring.encoding_translation Off Off mbstring.func_overload 0 0 mbstring.http_input pass pass mbstring.http_output pass pass mbstring.http_output_conv_mimetypes ^(text/|application/xhtml\+xml) ^(text/|application/xhtml\+xml) mbstring.internal_encoding no value no value mbstring.language neutral neutral mbstring.strict_detection Off Off mbstring.substitute_character no value no value mcrypt mcrypt support enabled Version 2.5.8 Api No 20021217 Supported ciphers cast-128 gost rijndael-128 twofish arcfour cast-256 loki97 rijndael-192 saferplus wake blowfish-compat des rijndael-256 serpent xtea blowfish enigma rc2 tripledes Supported modes cbc cfb ctr ecb ncfb nofb ofb stream Directive Local Value Master Value mcrypt.algorithms_dir no value no value mcrypt.modes_dir no value no value mhash MHASH support Enabled MHASH API Version Emulated Support ming Ming SWF output library enabled Version 0.4.3 mysql MySQL Support enabled Active Persistent Links 0 Active Links 0 Client API version 5.1.41 Directive Local Value Master Value mysql.allow_local_infile On On mysql.allow_persistent On On mysql.connect_timeout 60 60 mysql.default_host no value no value mysql.default_password no value no value mysql.default_port 3306 3306 mysql.default_socket MySQL MySQL mysql.default_user no value no value mysql.max_links Unlimited Unlimited mysql.max_persistent Unlimited Unlimited mysql.trace_mode Off Off mysqli MysqlI Support enabled Client API library version 5.1.41 Active Persistent Links 0 Inactive Persistent Links 0 Active Links 0 Client API header version 5.1.41 MYSQLI_SOCKET MySQL Directive Local Value Master Value mysqli.allow_local_infile On On mysqli.allow_persistent On On mysqli.default_host no value no value mysqli.default_port 3306 3306 mysqli.default_pw no value no value mysqli.default_socket MySQL MySQL mysqli.default_user no value no value mysqli.max_links Unlimited Unlimited mysqli.max_persistent Unlimited Unlimited mysqli.reconnect Off Off mysqlnd mysqlnd enabled Version mysqlnd 5.0.5-dev - 081106 - $Revision: 289630 $ Command buffer size 4096 Read buffer size 32768 Read timeout 31536000 Collecting statistics Yes Collecting memory statistics No Client statistics bytes_sent 0 bytes_received 0 packets_sent 0 packets_received 0 protocol_overhead_in 0 protocol_overhead_out 0 bytes_received_ok_packet 0 bytes_received_eof_packet 0 bytes_received_rset_header_packet 0 bytes_received_rset_field_meta_packet 0 bytes_received_rset_row_packet 0 bytes_received_prepare_response_packet 0 bytes_received_change_user_packet 0 packets_sent_command 0 packets_received_ok 0 packets_received_eof 0 packets_received_rset_header 0 packets_received_rset_field_meta 0 packets_received_rset_row 0 packets_received_prepare_response 0 packets_received_change_user 0 result_set_queries 0 non_result_set_queries 0 no_index_used 0 bad_index_used 0 slow_queries 0 buffered_sets 0 unbuffered_sets 0 ps_buffered_sets 0 ps_unbuffered_sets 0 flushed_normal_sets 0 flushed_ps_sets 0 ps_prepared_never_executed 0 ps_prepared_once_executed 0 rows_fetched_from_server_normal 0 rows_fetched_from_server_ps 0 rows_buffered_from_client_normal 0 rows_buffered_from_client_ps 0 rows_fetched_from_client_normal_buffered 0 rows_fetched_from_client_normal_unbuffered 0 rows_fetched_from_client_ps_buffered 0 rows_fetched_from_client_ps_unbuffered 0 rows_fetched_from_client_ps_cursor 0 rows_skipped_normal 0 rows_skipped_ps 0 copy_on_write_saved 0 copy_on_write_performed 0 command_buffer_too_small 0 connect_success 0 connect_failure 0 connection_reused 0 reconnect 0 pconnect_success 0 active_connections 0 active_persistent_connections 0 explicit_close 0 implicit_close 0 disconnect_close 0 in_middle_of_command_close 0 explicit_free_result 0 implicit_free_result 0 explicit_stmt_close 0 implicit_stmt_close 0 mem_emalloc_count 0 mem_emalloc_ammount 0 mem_ecalloc_count 0 mem_ecalloc_ammount 0 mem_erealloc_count 0 mem_erealloc_ammount 0 mem_efree_count 0 mem_malloc_count 0 mem_malloc_ammount 0 mem_calloc_count 0 mem_calloc_ammount 0 mem_realloc_count 0 mem_realloc_ammount 0 mem_free_count 0 proto_text_fetched_null 0 proto_text_fetched_bit 0 proto_text_fetched_tinyint 0 proto_text_fetched_short 0 proto_text_fetched_int24 0 proto_text_fetched_int 0 proto_text_fetched_bigint 0 proto_text_fetched_decimal 0 proto_text_fetched_float 0 proto_text_fetched_double 0 proto_text_fetched_date 0 proto_text_fetched_year 0 proto_text_fetched_time 0 proto_text_fetched_datetime 0 proto_text_fetched_timestamp 0 proto_text_fetched_string 0 proto_text_fetched_blob 0 proto_text_fetched_enum 0 proto_text_fetched_set 0 proto_text_fetched_geometry 0 proto_text_fetched_other 0 proto_binary_fetched_null 0 proto_binary_fetched_bit 0 proto_binary_fetched_tinyint 0 proto_binary_fetched_short 0 proto_binary_fetched_int24 0 proto_binary_fetched_int 0 proto_binary_fetched_bigint 0 proto_binary_fetched_decimal 0 proto_binary_fetched_float 0 proto_binary_fetched_double 0 proto_binary_fetched_date 0 proto_binary_fetched_year 0 proto_binary_fetched_time 0 proto_binary_fetched_datetime 0 proto_binary_fetched_timestamp 0 proto_binary_fetched_string 0 proto_binary_fetched_blob 0 proto_binary_fetched_enum 0 proto_binary_fetched_set 0 proto_binary_fetched_geometry 0 proto_binary_fetched_other 0 init_command_executed_count 0 init_command_failed_count 0 odbc ODBC Support enabled Active Persistent Links 0 Active Links 0 ODBC library Win32 Directive Local Value Master Value odbc.allow_persistent On On odbc.check_persistent On On odbc.default_cursortype Static cursor Static cursor odbc.default_db no value no value odbc.default_pw no value no value odbc.default_user no value no value odbc.defaultbinmode return as is return as is odbc.defaultlrl return up to 4096 bytes return up to 4096 bytes odbc.max_links Unlimited Unlimited odbc.max_persistent Unlimited Unlimited openssl OpenSSL support enabled OpenSSL Library Version OpenSSL 0.9.8l 5 Nov 2009 OpenSSL Header Version OpenSSL 0.9.8l 5 Nov 2009 pcre PCRE (Perl Compatible Regular Expressions) Support enabled PCRE Library Version 8.00 2009-10-19 Directive Local Value Master Value pcre.backtrack_limit 100000 100000 pcre.recursion_limit 100000 100000 pdf PDF Support enabled PDFlib GmbH Version 7.0.4p4 PECL Version 2.1.6 Revision $Revision: 277110 $ PDO PDO support enabled PDO drivers mysql, odbc, sqlite, sqlite2 pdo_mysql PDO Driver for MySQL enabled Client API version 5.1.41 PDO_ODBC PDO Driver for ODBC (Win32) enabled ODBC Connection Pooling Enabled, strict matching pdo_sqlite PDO Driver for SQLite 3.x enabled SQLite Library 3.6.20 Phar Phar: PHP Archive support enabled Phar EXT version 2.0.1 Phar API version 1.1.1 CVS revision $Revision: 286338 $ Phar-based phar archives enabled Tar-based phar archives enabled ZIP-based phar archives enabled gzip compression enabled bzip2 compression enabled Native OpenSSL support enabled Phar based on pear/PHP_Archive, original concept by Davey Shafik. Phar fully realized by Gregory Beaver and Marcus Boerger. Portions of tar implementation Copyright (c) 2003-2009 Tim Kientzle. Directive Local Value Master Value phar.cache_list no value no value phar.readonly On On phar.require_hash On On Reflection Reflection enabled Version $Revision: 287991 $ session Session Support enabled Registered save handlers files user sqlite Registered serializer handlers php php_binary wddx Directive Local Value Master Value session.auto_start Off Off session.bug_compat_42 On On session.bug_compat_warn On On session.cache_expire 180 180 session.cache_limiter nocache nocache session.cookie_domain no value no value session.cookie_httponly Off Off session.cookie_lifetime 0 0 session.cookie_path / / session.cookie_secure Off Off session.entropy_file no value no value session.entropy_length 0 0 session.gc_divisor 100 100 session.gc_maxlifetime 1440 1440 session.gc_probability 1 1 session.hash_bits_per_character 5 5 session.hash_function 0 0 session.name PHPSESSID PHPSESSID session.referer_check no value no value session.save_handler files files session.save_path C:\xampp\tmp C:\xampp\tmp session.serialize_handler php php session.use_cookies On On session.use_only_cookies Off Off session.use_trans_sid 0 0 SimpleXML Simplexml support enabled Revision $Revision: 281953 $ Schema support enabled soap Soap Client enabled Soap Server enabled Directive Local Value Master Value soap.wsdl_cache 1 1 soap.wsdl_cache_dir /tmp /tmp soap.wsdl_cache_enabled 1 1 soap.wsdl_cache_limit 5 5 soap.wsdl_cache_ttl 86400 86400 sockets Sockets Support enabled SPL SPL support enabled Interfaces Countable, OuterIterator, RecursiveIterator, SeekableIterator, SplObserver, SplSubject Classes AppendIterator, ArrayIterator, ArrayObject, BadFunctionCallException, BadMethodCallException, CachingIterator, DirectoryIterator, DomainException, EmptyIterator, FilesystemIterator, FilterIterator, GlobIterator, InfiniteIterator, InvalidArgumentException, IteratorIterator, LengthException, LimitIterator, LogicException, MultipleIterator, NoRewindIterator, OutOfBoundsException, OutOfRangeException, OverflowException, ParentIterator, RangeException, RecursiveArrayIterator, RecursiveCachingIterator, RecursiveDirectoryIterator, RecursiveFilterIterator, RecursiveIteratorIterator, RecursiveRegexIterator, RecursiveTreeIterator, RegexIterator, RuntimeException, SplDoublyLinkedList, SplFileInfo, SplFileObject, SplFixedArray, SplHeap, SplMinHeap, SplMaxHeap, SplObjectStorage, SplPriorityQueue, SplQueue, SplStack, SplTempFileObject, UnderflowException, UnexpectedValueException SQLite SQLite support enabled PECL Module version 2.0-dev $Id: sqlite.c 289598 2009-10-12 22:37:52Z pajoye $ SQLite Library 2.8.17 SQLite Encoding iso8859 Directive Local Value Master Value sqlite.assoc_case 0 0 sqlite3 SQLite3 support enabled SQLite3 module version 0.7-dev SQLite Library 3.6.20 Directive Local Value Master Value sqlite3.extension_dir no value no value standard Dynamic Library Support enabled Internal Sendmail Support for Windows enabled Directive Local Value Master Value assert.active 1 1 assert.bail 0 0 assert.callback no value no value assert.quiet_eval 0 0 assert.warning 1 1 auto_detect_line_endings 0 0 default_socket_timeout 60 60 safe_mode_allowed_env_vars PHP_ PHP_ safe_mode_protected_env_vars LD_LIBRARY_PATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH url_rewriter.tags a=href,area=href,frame=src,input=src,form=,fieldset= a=href,area=href,frame=src,input=src,form=,fieldset= user_agent no value no value tokenizer Tokenizer Support enabled wddx WDDX Support enabled WDDX Session Serializer enabled xml XML Support active XML Namespace Support active libxml2 Version 2.7.6 xmlreader XMLReader enabled xmlrpc core library version xmlrpc-epi v. 0.54 php extension version 0.51 author Dan Libby homepage http://xmlrpc-epi.sourceforge.net open sourced by Epinions.com xmlwriter XMLWriter enabled xsl XSL enabled libxslt Version 1.1.26 libxslt compiled against libxml Version 2.7.6 EXSLT enabled libexslt Version 1.1.26 zip Zip enabled Extension Version $Id: php_zip.c 276389 2009-02-24 23:55:14Z iliaa $ Zip version 1.9.1 Libzip version 0.9.0 zlib ZLib Support enabled Stream Wrapper support compress.zlib:// Stream Filter support zlib.inflate, zlib.deflate Compiled Version 1.2.3 Linked Version 1.2.3 Directive Local Value Master Value zlib.output_compression Off Off zlib.output_compression_level -1 -1 zlib.output_handler no value no value Additional Modules Module Name Environment Variable Value no value ::=::\ no value C:=C:\xampp ALLUSERSPROFILE C:\Documents and Settings\All Users APPDATA C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew\Application Data CHROME_RESTART Google Chrome|Whoa! Google Chrome has crashed. Restart now?|LEFT_TO_RIGHT CHROME_VERSION 5.0.342.8 CLASSPATH .;C:\Program Files\QuickTime\QTSystem\QTJava.zip CommonProgramFiles C:\Program Files\Common Files COMPUTERNAME ANDREW_LAPTOP ComSpec C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe FP_NO_HOST_CHECK NO HOMEDRIVE C: HOMEPATH \Documents and Settings\Andrew LOGONSERVER \\ANDREW_LAPTOP NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS 2 OS Windows_NT PATH C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\Application;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem;c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\Tools\Binn\;c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\DTS\Binn\;C:\Program Files\QuickTime\QTSystem\;C:\Program Files\Common Files\DivX Shared\;C:\Program Files\WiTopia.Net\bin PATHEXT .COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE x86 PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER x86 Family 6 Model 15 Stepping 10, GenuineIntel PROCESSOR_LEVEL 6 PROCESSOR_REVISION 0f0a ProgramFiles C:\Program Files PROMPT $P$G QTJAVA C:\Program Files\QuickTime\QTSystem\QTJava.zip SESSIONNAME Console sfxcmd "C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew\My Documents\Downloads\xampp-win32-1.7.3.exe" sfxname C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew\My Documents\Downloads\xampp-win32-1.7.3.exe SystemDrive C: SystemRoot C:\WINDOWS TEMP C:\DOCUME~1\Andrew\LOCALS~1\Temp TMP C:\DOCUME~1\Andrew\LOCALS~1\Temp USERDOMAIN ANDREW_LAPTOP USERNAME Andrew USERPROFILE C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew VS100COMNTOOLS C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio 10.0\Common7\Tools\ windir C:\WINDOWS AP_PARENT_PID 2216 PHP Variables Variable Value _SERVER["MIBDIRS"] C:/xampp/php/extras/mibs _SERVER["MYSQL_HOME"] C:\xampp\mysql\bin _SERVER["OPENSSL_CONF"] C:/xampp/apache/bin/openssl.cnf _SERVER["PHP_PEAR_SYSCONF_DIR"] C:\xampp\php _SERVER["PHPRC"] C:\xampp\php _SERVER["TMP"] C:\xampp\tmp _SERVER["HTTP_HOST"] localhost _SERVER["HTTP_CONNECTION"] keep-alive _SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"] Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/533.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/5.0.342.8 Safari/533.2 _SERVER["HTTP_CACHE_CONTROL"] max-age=0 _SERVER["HTTP_ACCEPT"] application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 _SERVER["HTTP_ACCEPT_ENCODING"] gzip,deflate,sdch _SERVER["HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE"] en-US,en;q=0.8 _SERVER["HTTP_ACCEPT_CHARSET"] ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3 _SERVER["PATH"] C:\Documents and Settings\Andrew\Local Settings\Application Data\Google\Chrome\Application;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem;c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\Tools\Binn\;c:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\100\DTS\Binn\;C:\Program Files\QuickTime\QTSystem\;C:\Program Files\Common Files\DivX Shared\;C:\Program Files\WiTopia.Net\bin _SERVER["SystemRoot"] C:\WINDOWS _SERVER["COMSPEC"] C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe _SERVER["PATHEXT"] .COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH _SERVER["WINDIR"] C:\WINDOWS _SERVER["SERVER_SIGNATURE"] <address>Apache/2.2.14 (Win32) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.14 OpenSSL/0.9.8l mod_autoindex_color PHP/5.3.1 mod_apreq2-20090110/2.7.1 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 Server at localhost Port 80</address> _SERVER["SERVER_SOFTWARE"] Apache/2.2.14 (Win32) DAV/2 mod_ssl/2.2.14 OpenSSL/0.9.8l mod_autoindex_color PHP/5.3.1 mod_apreq2-20090110/2.7.1 mod_perl/2.0.4 Perl/v5.10.1 _SERVER["SERVER_NAME"] localhost _SERVER["SERVER_ADDR"] 127.0.0.1 _SERVER["SERVER_PORT"] 80 _SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"] 127.0.0.1 _SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"] C:/xampp/htdocs _SERVER["SERVER_ADMIN"] postmaster@localhost _SERVER["SCRIPT_FILENAME"] C:/xampp/htdocs/test.php _SERVER["REMOTE_PORT"] 3275 _SERVER["GATEWAY_INTERFACE"] CGI/1.1 _SERVER["SERVER_PROTOCOL"] HTTP/1.1 _SERVER["REQUEST_METHOD"] GET _SERVER["QUERY_STRING"] no value _SERVER["REQUEST_URI"] /test.php _SERVER["SCRIPT_NAME"] /test.php _SERVER["PHP_SELF"] /test.php _SERVER["REQUEST_TIME"] 1270600868 _SERVER["argv"] Array ( ) _SERVER["argc"] 0 PHP License This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the PHP License as published by the PHP Group and included in the distribution in the file: LICENSE This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. If you did not receive a copy of the PHP license, or have any questions about PHP licensing, please contact [email protected].

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