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  • A CLR-supporting browser (4 replies)

    Microsoft, by seemingly ignoring the huge benefits of JIT compiling VMs on the browser and instead pushing Silverlight (which is pretty awesome though), is showing it STILL hasn't gotten the Web. (The fact that I can't seem to post on these newsgroups using Firefox (!!!) is yet another glaring example) What is so ironic is that it has a golden chance to leapfrog Chrome without even reinventing any...

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  • log in to web-app through less secure website [on hold]

    - by martijnve
    We are worried about the security of our website containing the login-button to our saas-application. Security measures put in place for our application won't do us much good if the website is hacked. The login button could be redirected to some malicious copy of our app. The product website is maintained by people outside the dev team. Those people are not too knowledgable concerning security. We (dev-team) could mantain the website ourselves but that would be a large burden on our small team. How is this usually handled?

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  • Trying to get WCF client to work with wss 1.0 username token security

    - by darius murauskas
    I am trying to use a WCF client to call a third party web service. The web Service usses username token authentication WSS-Security 1.0 Soap Message Security Here is a sample soap authentication header for what the web service expects <soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> <soap:Header> <wsse:Security soap:mustUnderstand="1"> <wsse:UsernameToken namespaces> <wsse:Username>username</wsse:Username> <wsse:Password Type="type info">password</wsse:Password> <wsse:Nonce>nonce</wsse:Nonce> <wsu:Created>date created</wsu:Created> </wsse:UsernameToken> <wsse:Security> </soap:Header> <soap:Body> <WebServiceMethodName xmlns="Web Service Namespace" /> I configured the client to the following way <basicHttpBinding> <binding name="Binding1"> <security mode="TransportWithMessageCredential"> <transport clientCredentialType="Basic"/> </security> </basicHttpBinding> but recieved an error that stating that the nonce and datecreated attributes were missing in the header. Does anyone know how to configure a WCF client to work with WSS-Security 1.0 Soap Message Security username token authentication?

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  • How Session out trigger on browser close?

    - by Hemant Kothiyal
    Hi, Yesterday morning i open gmail account in Internet Exlorer second tab. I checked my mail and closed that tab (not browser). Then at the time of evining i again open second tab of browser and enetr gmail.com, it automatically redirect me at my email account without asking login. I shocked and i thought i should remain browser open for whole night and today open gmail in second tab , it behave similar means without login screen it redirect in my gmail account. Then i closed that tab and open another browser session and enter gmail i again surprised that i redirect me login page. At the same time i open second tab of first browser and it automatically redirect me at mail account page. What i councluded by this behaviour is that might be gmail server keep my browser id at their server so that whenever i eneter gmail.com on second tab of first browser, it automatically redirect me at gmail account. I don't know i am right or not? Please clear me this concept? What happens with my session at gmail server when i closed my browser tab? As per my opinion it should automatically logout me but why this doesn't happened?

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  • What development technologies or technology stack is typically used in the security industry?

    - by vfilby
    In this case security means building security (access control, alarm systems, etc). And I am not talking about working directly with the hardware, more focused on web based applications/api's that clients or companies can use? Are there technologies that are commonly used? Are there technologies that shouldn't be used? Are there any real benefits to a linux based stack as opposed to a windows based stack for exposing web based applications?

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  • What is the correct way to configure a spring TextEncryptor for use on Heroku

    - by Ollie Edwards
    I have a spring TextEncryptor defined like this <bean id="textEncryptor" class="org.springframework.security.crypto.encrypt.Encryptors" factory-method="text"> <constructor-arg value="${security.encryptPassword}" /> <constructor-arg value="${security.encryptSalt}" /> </bean> Which is fed these properties security.encryptPassword=47582920264f212c566d5e5a6d security.encryptSalt=39783e315e6a207e733d6f4141 Which works fine on my local environment. When I deploy to Heroku I get java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Unable to initialize due to invalid secret key at org.springframework.security.crypto.encrypt.CipherUtils.initCipher(CipherUtils.java:110) at org.springframework.security.crypto.encrypt.AesBytesEncryptor.encrypt(AesBytesEncryptor.java:65) at org.springframework.security.crypto.encrypt.HexEncodingTextEncryptor.encrypt(HexEncodingTextEncryptor.java:36) ... Caused by: java.security.InvalidKeyException: Illegal key size at javax.crypto.Cipher.checkCryptoPerm(Cipher.java:972) at javax.crypto.Cipher.implInit(Cipher.java:738) at javax.crypto.Cipher.chooseProvider(Cipher.java:797) at javax.crypto.Cipher.init(Cipher.java:1276) at javax.crypto.Cipher.init(Cipher.java:1215) at org.springframework.security.crypto.encrypt.CipherUtils.initCipher(CipherUtils.java:105) ... 53 more So I tried some smaller keys but I always get the same problem. What is the correct key size to use on Heroku?

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  • Is it safe to change the 'Security.salt' line to a more lengthy string {64 hex key}

    - by Gaurav Sharma
    Hi everyone, I have changed the Configure::write('Security.salt', '############'); value in the file config/core.php file to a '256-bit hex key'. Is it safe or a good practice to change these lines for every different installation of cakephp application or shall I revert back to the original ? I also changed the Configure::write('Security.cipherSeed','7927237598237592759727'); to a different one of more length. Please throw some light on this. Thanks

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  • Where can I find a web-project "security checklist?"

    - by iaagty
    I'm looking for a complete list of security guidelines for programming and deploying PHP web sites and applications on an Apache (Linux) server. Basically, a "security check list" to run through before finishing a project. I.e., Cross Site Scripting Cross Site Request Forgery Sanitize form data that goes into database Disable register globals and error reporting in custom php.ini Upload files below web root ...(the list goes on) I did some searching on the internet and in this forum, but couldn't find a comprehensive, succinct, and complete list of guidelines. Thanks in advance.

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  • SINGLE SIGN ON SECURITY THREAT! FACEBOOK access_token broadcast in the open/clear

    - by MOKANA
    Subsequent to my posting there was a remark made that this was not really a question but I thought I did indeed postulate one. So that there is no ambiquity here is the question with a lead in: Since there is no data sent from Facebook during the Canvas Load process that is not at some point divulged, including the access_token, session and other data that could uniquely identify a user, does any one see any other way other than adding one more layer, i.e., a password, sent over the wire via HTTPS along with the access_toekn, that will insure unique untampered with security by the user? Using Wireshark I captured the local broadcast while loading my Canvas Application page. I was hugely surprised to see the access_token broadcast in the open, viewable for any one to see. This access_token is appended to any https call to the Facebook OpenGraph API. Using facebook as a single click log on has now raised huge concerns for me. It is stored in a session object in memory and the cookie is cleared upon app termination and after reviewing the FB.Init calls I saw a lot of HTTPS calls so I assumed the access_token was always encrypted. But last night I saw in the status bar a call from what was simply an http call that included the App ID so I felt I should sniff the Application Canvas load sequence. Today I did sniff the broadcast and in the attached image you can see that there are http calls with the access_token being broadcast in the open and clear for anyone to gain access to. Am I missing something, is what I am seeing and my interpretation really correct. If any one can sniff and get the access_token they can theorically make calls to the Graph API via https, even though the call back would still need to be the site established in Facebook's application set up. But what is truly a security threat is anyone using the access_token for access to their own site. I do not see the value of a single sign on via Facebook if the only thing that was established as secure was the access_token - becuase for what I can see it clearly is not secure. Access tokens that never have an expire date do not change. Access_tokens are different for every user, to access to another site could be held tight to just a single user, but compromising even a single user's data is unacceptable. http://www.creatingstory.com/images/InTheOpen.png Went back and did more research on this: FINDINGS: Went back an re ran the canvas application to verify that it was not any of my code that was not broadcasting. In this call: HTTP GET /connect.php/en_US/js/CacheData HTTP/1.1 The USER ID is clearly visible in the cookie. So USER_ID's are fully visible, but they are already. Anyone can go to pretty much any ones page and hover over the image and see the USER ID. So no big threat. APP_ID are also easily obtainable - but . . . http://www.creatingstory.com/images/InTheOpen2.png The above file clearly shows the FULL ACCESS TOKEN clearly in the OPEN via a Facebook initiated call. Am I wrong. TELL ME I AM WRONG because I want to be wrong about this. I have since reset my app secret so I am showing the real sniff of the Canvas Page being loaded. Additional data 02/20/2011: @ifaour - I appreciate the time you took to compile your response. I am pretty familiar with the OAuth process and have a pretty solid understanding of the signed_request unpacking and utilization of the access_token. I perform a substantial amount of my processing on the server and my Facebook server side flows are all complete and function without any flaw that I know of. The application secret is secure and never passed to the front end application and is also changed regularly. I am being as fanatical about security as I can be, knowing there is so much I don’t know that could come back and bite me. Two huge access_token issues: The issues concern the possible utilization of the access_token from the USER AGENT (browser). During the FB.INIT() process of the Facebook JavaScript SDK, a cookie is created as well as an object in memory called a session object. This object, along with the cookie contain the access_token, session, a secret, and uid and status of the connection. The session object is structured such that is supports both the new OAuth and the legacy flows. With OAuth, the access_token and status are pretty much al that is used in the session object. The first issue is that the access_token is used to make HTTPS calls to the GRAPH API. If you had the access_token, you could do this from any browser: https://graph.facebook.com/220439?access_token=... and it will return a ton of information about the user. So any one with the access token can gain access to a Facebook account. You can also make additional calls to any info the user has granted access to the application tied to the access_token. At first I thought that a call into the GRAPH had to have a Callback to the URL established in the App Setup, but I tested it as mentioned below and it will return info back right into the browser. Adding that callback feature would be a good idea I think, tightens things up a bit. The second issue is utilization of some unique private secured data that identifies the user to the third party data base, i.e., like in my case, I would use a single sign on to populate user information into my database using this unique secured data item (i.e., access_token which contains the APP ID, the USER ID, and a hashed with secret sequence). None of this is a problem on the server side. You get a signed_request, you unpack it with secret, make HTTPS calls, get HTTPS responses back. When a user has information entered via the USER AGENT(browser) that must be stored via a POST, this unique secured data element would be sent via HTTPS such that they are validated prior to data base insertion. However, If there is NO secured piece of unique data that is supplied via the single sign on process, then there is no way to guarantee unauthorized access. The access_token is the one piece of data that is utilized by Facebook to make the HTTPS calls into the GRAPH API. it is considered unique in regards to BOTH the USER and the APPLICATION and is initially secure via the signed_request packaging. If however, it is subsequently transmitted in the clear and if I can sniff the wire and obtain the access_token, then I can pretend to be the application and gain the information they have authorized the application to see. I tried the above example from a Safari and IE browser and it returned all of my information to me in the browser. In conclusion, the access_token is part of the signed_request and that is how the application initially obtains it. After OAuth authentication and authorization, i.e., the USER has logged into Facebook and then runs your app, the access_token is stored as mentioned above and I have sniffed it such that I see it stored in a Cookie that is transmitted over the wire, resulting in there being NO UNIQUE SECURED IDENTIFIABLE piece of information that can be used to support interaction with the database, or in other words, unless there were one more piece of secure data sent along with the access_token to my database, i.e., a password, I would not be able to discern if it is a legitimate call. Luckily I utilized secure AJAX via POST and the call has to come from the same domain, but I am sure there is a way to hijack that. I am totally open to any ideas on this topic on how to uniquely identify my USERS other than adding another layer (password) via this single sign on process or if someone would just share with me that I read and analyzed my data incorrectly and that the access_token is always secure over the wire. Mahalo nui loa in advance.

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  • Cross-browser method for getting width and height of a DIV?

    - by thinkthank
    This is my first post, so please go easy on me. I'm sure I'm doing everything wrong. However, I couldn't find any posts that answered the question above. I use jQuery. I'm trying to find a way to get the current width and height of a DIV element, even if they're set to "auto". I've found many ways to do this, but no method returns the same width in IE. It is important that this method is cross-browser, as it will break the layout of the page if different numbers are returned in different browsers. .width() and .height() do not work because in IE, padding is subtracted (e.g. width() returns 25 where width is 30 and padding is 5). .outerWidth() and .outerHeight() are not consistent either. While they work IE (believe it or not) in FF, the padding is added again to the full width (e.g. outerWidth() returns 110 in FF where width is 100px and padding is 10px). Is there any way out of this mess without writing complex browser checks? Thanks!

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  • Automated browser testing: How to test JavaScript in web pages?

    - by Dave
    I am trying to write an application that will test a series of web-pages programmatically. The web pages being tested have JavaScript embedded within them which alter the structure of the HTML when they complete execution. It is then the goal to take the final HTML (post-execution of the embedded JavaScript) and compare it against a known output. Essentially, the Input --- Output for the test application is: URL ---[retrieve HTML]--- HTML ---[execute JS, then compare]--- PASS/FAIL Here is the challenge: I have been unable to find a solution that is able to take the HTML I retrieve from the URL and process the JavaScript, as a browser would, and generate the final HTML a user might see from "View Source" on the same page within the browser. It would be very surprising if this sort of approach has not been made before, so I'm hoping someone out there knows of a fitting solution for this application/problem? If at all possible, I'm hoping for a solution that integrates with .NET (I've tried using the WebBrowser, with no luck). However, if there is an existing 3rd party application that can do exactly this, that would be quite acceptable. Thanks in advance for the suggestions! Dave

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  • Mal kurz erklärt: Advanced Security Option (ASO)

    - by Anne Manke
    v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);} .shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);} Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry 12.00 Normal 0 false false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:12.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry 12.00 Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:12.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} WER? Kunden, die die Oracle Datenbank Enterprise Edition einsetzen und deren Sicherheitsabteilungen bzw. Fachabteilungen die Daten- und/oder Netzwerkverschlüsselung fordern und / oder die personenbezogene Daten in Oracle Datenbanken speichern und / oder die den Zugang zu Datenbanksystemen von der Eingabe Benutzername/Passwort auf Smartcards oder Kerberos umstellen wollen. Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry 12.00 Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:12.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} WAS? Durch das Aktivieren der Option Advanced Security können folgende Anforderungen leicht erfüllt werden: Einzelne Tabellenspalten gezielt verschlüsselt ablegen, wenn beispielsweise der Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) oder der Europäischen Datenschutzrichtlinie eine Verschlüsselung bestimmter Daten nahelegen Sichere Datenablage – Verschlüsselung aller Anwendungsdaten Keine spürbare Performance-Veränderung Datensicherungen sind automatisch verschlüsselt - Datendiebstahl aus Backups wird verhindert Verschlüsselung der Netzwerkübertragung – Sniffer-Tools können keine lesbaren Daten abgreifen Aktuelle Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen werden genutzt (AES256, 3DES168, u.a.) Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry 12.00 Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:12.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} WIE? Die Oracle Advanced Security Option ist ein wichtiger Baustein einer ganzheitlichen Sicherheitsarchitektur. Mit ihr lässt sich das Risiko eines Datenmissbrauchs erheblich reduzieren und implementiert ebenfalls den Schutz vor Nicht-DB-Benutzer, wie „root unter Unix“. Somit kann „root“ nicht mehr unerlaubterweise die Datenbank-Files lesen . ASO deckt den kompletten physikalischen Stack ab. Von der Kommunikation zwischen dem Client und der Datenbank, über das verschlüsselte Ablegen der Daten ins Dateisystem bis hin zur Aufbewahrung der Daten in einem Backupsystem. Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry 12.00 Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:12.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Das BVA (Bundesverwaltungsamt) bietet seinen Kunden mit dem neuen Personalverwaltungssystem EPOS 2.0 mehr Sicherheit durch Oracle Sicherheitstechnologien an. Heinz-Wilhelm Fabry 12.00 Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:12.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Und sonst so? Verschlüsselung des Netzwerkverkehrs Wie beeinflusst die Netzwerkverschlüsselung die Performance? Unsere Kunden bestätigen ständig, dass sie besonders in modernen Mehr-Schichten-Architekturen Anwender kaum Performance-Einbußen feststellen. Falls genauere Daten zur Performance benötigt werden, sind realitätsnahe, kundenspezifische Tests unerlässlich. Verschlüsselung von Anwendungsdaten (Transparent Data Encryption-TDE ) Muss ich meine Anwendungen umschreiben, damit sie TDE nutzen können? NEIN. TDE ist völlig transparent für Ihre Anwendungen. Kann ich nicht auch durch meine Applikation die Daten verschlüsseln? Ja - die Applikationsdaten werden dadurch allerdings nur in LOBs oder Textfeldern gespeichert. Und das hat gravierende Nachteile: Es existieren zum Beispiel keine Datums- /Zahlenfelder. Daraus folgt, dass auf diesen Daten kein sinnvolles Berichtsverfahren funktioniert. Auch können Applikationen nicht mit den Daten arbeiten, die von einer anderen Applikation verschlüsselt wurden. Der wichtigste Aspekt gegen die Verschlüsselung innerhalb einer Applikation ist allerdings die Performanz. Da keine Indizes auf die durch eine Applikation verschlüsselten Daten erstellt werden können, wird die Datenbank bei jedem Zugriff ein Full-Table-Scan durchführen, also jeden Satz der betroffenen Tabelle lesen. Dadurch steigt der Ressourcenbedarf möglicherweise enorm und daraus resultieren wiederum möglicherweise höhere Lizenzkosten. Mit ASO verschlüsselte Daten können von der Oracle DB Firewall gelesen und ausgewertet werden. Warum sollte ich TDE nutzen statt einer kompletten Festplattenverschlüsselung? TDE bietet einen weitergehenden Schutz. Denn TDE schützt auch vor Systemadministratoren, die zwar keinen Zugriff auf die Datenbank, aber auf der Betriebssystemebene Zugriff auf die Datenbankdateien haben. Ausserdem bleiben einmal verschlüsselte Daten verschlüsselt, egal wo diese hinkopiert werden. Dies ist bei einer Festplattenverschlüssung nicht der Fall. Welche Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen stehen zur Verfügung? AES (256-, 192-, 128-bit key) 3DES (3-key)

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  • Chrome Web Browser Messages: Some Observations

    - by ultan o'broin
    I'm always on the lookout for how different apps handle errors and what kind of messages are shown (I probably need to get out more), I use this 'research' to reflect on our own application error messages patterns and guidelines and how we might make things better for our users in future. Users are influenced by all sorts of things, but their everyday experiences of technology, and especially what they encounter on the internet, increasingly sets their expectations for the enterprise user experience too. I recently came across a couple of examples from Google's Chrome web browser that got me thinking. In the first case, we have a Chrome error about not being able to find a web page. I like how simple, straightforward messaging language is used along with an optional ability to explore things a bit further--for those users who want to. The 'more information' option shows the error encountered by the browser (or 'original' error) in technical terms, along with an error number. Contrasting the two messages about essentially the same problem reveals what's useful to users and what's not. Everyone can use the first message, but the technical version of the message has to be explicitly disclosed for any more advanced user to pursue further. More technical users might search for a resolution, using that Error 324 number, but I imagine most users who see the message will try again later or check their URL again. Seems reasonable that such an approach be adopted in the enterprise space too, right? Maybe. Generally, end users don't go searching for solutions based on those error numbers, and help desk folks generally prefer they don't do so. That's because of the more critical nature of enterprise data or the fact that end users may not have the necessary privileges to make any fixes anyway. What might be more useful here is a link to a trusted source of additional help provided by the help desk or reputable community instead. This takes me on to the second case, this time more closely related to the language used in messaging situations. Here, I first noticed by the using of the (s) approach to convey possibilities of there being one or more pages at the heart of the problem. This approach is a no-no in Oracle style terms (the plural would be used) and it can create translation issues (though it is not a show-stopper). I think Google could have gone with the plural too. However, of more interest is the use of the verb "kill", shown in the message text and as an action button label. For many writers, words like "kill" and "abort" are to be avoided as they can give offense. I am not so sure about that judgment, as really their use cannot be separated from the context. Certainly, for more technical users, they're fine and have been in use for years, so I see no reason to avoid these terms if the audience has accepted them. Most end users too, I think would find the idea of "kill" usable and may even use the term in every day speech. Others might disagree--Apple uses a concept of Force Quit, for example. Ultimately, the only way to really know how to proceed is to research these matter by asking users of differing roles and expertise to perform some tasks, encounter these messages and then make recommendations based on those findings for our designs. Something to do in 2011!

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  • A more elegant way of embedding a SOAP security header in Silverlight 4

    - by Your DisplayName here!
    The current situation with Silverlight is, that there is no support for the WCF federation binding. This means that all security token related interactions have to be done manually. Requesting the token from an STS is not really the bad part, sending it along with outgoing SOAP messages is what’s a little annoying. So far you had to wrap all calls on the channel in an OperationContextScope wrapping an IContextChannel. This “programming model” was a little disruptive (in addition to all the async stuff that you are forced to do). It seems that starting with SL4 there is more support for traditional WCF extensibility points – especially IEndpointBehavior, IClientMessageInspector. I never read somewhere that these are new features in SL4 – but I am pretty sure they did not exist in SL3. With the above mentioned interfaces at my disposal, I thought I have another go at embedding a security header – and yeah – I managed to make the code much prettier (and much less bizarre). Here’s the code for the behavior/inspector: public class IssuedTokenHeaderInspector : IClientMessageInspector {     RequestSecurityTokenResponse _rstr;       public IssuedTokenHeaderInspector(RequestSecurityTokenResponse rstr)     {         _rstr = rstr;     }       public void AfterReceiveReply(ref Message reply, object correlationState)     { }       public object BeforeSendRequest(ref Message request, IClientChannel channel)     {         request.Headers.Add(new IssuedTokenHeader(_rstr));                  return null;     } }   public class IssuedTokenHeaderBehavior : IEndpointBehavior {     RequestSecurityTokenResponse _rstr;       public IssuedTokenHeaderBehavior(RequestSecurityTokenResponse rstr)     {         if (rstr == null)         {             throw new ArgumentNullException();         }           _rstr = rstr;     }       public void ApplyClientBehavior(       ServiceEndpoint endpoint, ClientRuntime clientRuntime)     {         clientRuntime.MessageInspectors.Add(new IssuedTokenHeaderInspector(_rstr));     }       // rest omitted } This allows to set up a proxy with an issued token header and you don’t have to worry anymore with embedding the header manually with every call: var client = GetWSTrustClient();   var rst = new RequestSecurityToken(WSTrust13Constants.KeyTypes.Symmetric) {     AppliesTo = new EndpointAddress("https://rp/") };   client.IssueCompleted += (s, args) => {     _proxy = new StarterServiceContractClient();     _proxy.Endpoint.Behaviors.Add(new IssuedTokenHeaderBehavior(args.Result));   };   client.IssueAsync(rst); Since SL4 also support the IExtension<T> interface, you can also combine this with Nicholas Allen’s AutoHeaderExtension.

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  • Using Cloud Formation provisioned security group with specific subnet

    - by Fred Clausen
    Summary I'm attempting to create an AWS CloudFormation template which contains an instance for which I want to select a particular subnet. If I specify the subnet ID then I get the following error The parameter groupName cannot be used with the parameter subnet. From reading this thread it appears I need to provide security group IDs - not names. How can I create a security group in CloudFormation and then get its ID after the fact? Details The relevant part of the instance config is as follows "WebServerHost": { "Type" : "AWS::EC2::Instance", <..skipping metadata...> "Properties": { "ImageId" : { "ami-1234" }, "InstanceType" : { "Ref" : "WebServerInstanceType" }, "SecurityGroups" : [ {"Ref" : "WebServerSecurityGroup"} ], "SubnetId" : "subnet-abcdef123", and the security group looks as follows "WebServerSecurityGroup" : { "Type" : "AWS::EC2::SecurityGroup", "Properties" : { "GroupDescription" : "Enable HTTP and SSH", "SecurityGroupIngress" : [ {"IpProtocol" : "tcp", "FromPort" : "80", "ToPort" : "80", "CidrIp" : "0.0.0.0/0"}, {"IpProtocol" : "tcp", "FromPort" : "22", "ToPort" : "22", "CidrIp" : "0.0.0.0/0"} ] } }, How can I create and then get that security group's ID?

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