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• Server 2003 SP2 BSOD caused by fltmgr.sys

  - by MasterMax1313

  I'm running into a problem where a Server 2003 SP2 box has started crashing roughly once an hour, BSODing out with the message that fltmgr.sys is probably the cause. I ran dumpchk.exe on the memory.dmp file, indicating the same thing. Any thoughts on typical root causes? The following is the error code I'm seeing: Error code 0000007e, parameter1 c0000005, parameter2 f723e087, parameter3 f78cea8c, parameter4 f78ce788. After running dumpchk on the memory.dmp file, I get the following note: Probably caused by : fltmgr.sys ( fltmgr!FltGetIrpName+63f ) The full log is here: Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.12.0002.633 X86 Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Loading Dump File [c:\windows\memory.dmp] Kernel Complete Dump File: Full address space is available Symbol search path is: *** Invalid *** **************************************************************************** * Symbol loading may be unreliable without a symbol search path. * * Use .symfix to have the debugger choose a symbol path. * * After setting your symbol path, use .reload to refresh symbol locations. * **************************************************************************** Executable search path is: ********************************************************************* * Symbols can not be loaded because symbol path is not initialized. * * * * The Symbol Path can be set by: * * using the _NT_SYMBOL_PATH environment variable. * * using the -y <symbol_path> argument when starting the debugger. * * using .sympath and .sympath+ * ********************************************************************* *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for ntkrnlpa.exe - Windows Server 2003 Kernel Version 3790 (Service Pack 2) UP Free x86 compatible Product: Server, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Built by: 3790.srv03_sp2_gdr.101019-0340 Machine Name: Kernel base = 0x80800000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0x8089ffa8 Debug session time: Wed Oct 5 08:48:04.803 2011 (UTC - 4:00) System Uptime: 0 days 14:25:12.085 ********************************************************************* * Symbols can not be loaded because symbol path is not initialized. * * * * The Symbol Path can be set by: * * using the _NT_SYMBOL_PATH environment variable. * * using the -y <symbol_path> argument when starting the debugger. * * using .sympath and .sympath+ * ********************************************************************* *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for ntkrnlpa.exe - Loading Kernel Symbols ............................................................... ................................................. Loading User Symbols Loading unloaded module list ... ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information. BugCheck 7E, {c0000005, f723e087, f78dea8c, f78de788} ***** Kernel symbols are WRONG. Please fix symbols to do analysis. *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for fltmgr.sys - --omitted-- Probably caused by : fltmgr.sys ( fltmgr!FltGetIrpName+63f ) Followup: MachineOwner --------- ----- 32 bit Kernel Full Dump Analysis DUMP_HEADER32: MajorVersion 0000000f MinorVersion 00000ece KdSecondaryVersion 00000000 DirectoryTableBase 004e7000 PfnDataBase 81600000 PsLoadedModuleList 8089ffa8 PsActiveProcessHead 808a61c8 MachineImageType 0000014c NumberProcessors 00000001 BugCheckCode 0000007e BugCheckParameter1 c0000005 BugCheckParameter2 f723e087 BugCheckParameter3 f78dea8c BugCheckParameter4 f78de788 PaeEnabled 00000001 KdDebuggerDataBlock 8088e3e0 SecondaryDataState 00000000 ProductType 00000003 SuiteMask 00000110 Physical Memory Description: Number of runs: 3 (limited to 3) FileOffset Start Address Length 00001000 0000000000001000 0009e000 0009f000 0000000000100000 bfdf0000 bfe8f000 00000000bff00000 00100000 Last Page: 00000000bff8e000 00000000bffff000 KiProcessorBlock at 8089f300 1 KiProcessorBlock entries: ffdff120 Windows Server 2003 Kernel Version 3790 (Service Pack 2) UP Free x86 compatible Product: Server, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS Built by: 3790.srv03_sp2_gdr.101019-0340 Machine Name:*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for srv.sys Kernel base = 0x80800000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0x8089ffa8 Debug session time: Wed Oct 5 08:48:04.803 2011 (UTC - 4:00) System Uptime: 0 days 14:25:12.085 start end module name 80800000 80a50000 nt Tue Oct 19 10:00:49 2010 (4CBDA491) 80a50000 80a6f000 hal Sat Feb 17 00:48:25 2007 (45D69729) b83d4000 b83fe000 Fastfat Sat Feb 17 01:27:55 2007 (45D6A06B) b8476000 b84a1000 RDPWD Sat Feb 17 00:44:38 2007 (45D69646) b8549000 b8554000 TDTCP Sat Feb 17 00:44:32 2007 (45D69640) b8fe1000 b9045000 srv Thu Feb 17 11:58:17 2011 (4D5D53A9) b956d000 b95be000 HTTP Fri Nov 06 07:51:22 2009 (4AF41BCA) b9816000 b982d780 hgfs Tue Aug 12 20:36:54 2008 (48A22CA6) b9b16000 b9b20000 ndisuio Sat Feb 17 00:58:25 2007 (45D69981) b9cf6000 b9d1ac60 iwfsd Wed Sep 29 01:43:59 2004 (415A4B9F) b9e5b000 b9e62000 parvdm Tue Mar 25 03:03:49 2003 (3E7FFF55) b9e63000 b9e67860 lgtosync Fri Sep 12 04:38:13 2003 (3F6185F5) b9ed3000 b9ee8000 Cdfs Sat Feb 17 01:27:08 2007 (45D6A03C) b9f10000 b9f2e000 EraserUtilRebootDrv Thu Jul 07 21:45:11 2011 (4E166127) b9f2e000 b9f8c000 eeCtrl Thu Jul 07 21:45:11 2011 (4E166127) b9f8c000 b9f9d000 Fips Sat Feb 17 01:26:33 2007 (45D6A019) b9f9d000 ba013000 mrxsmb Fri Feb 18 10:22:23 2011 (4D5E8EAF) ba013000 ba043000 rdbss Wed Feb 24 10:54:03 2010 (4B854B9B) ba043000 ba0ad000 SPBBCDrv Mon Dec 14 23:39:00 2009 (4B2712E4) ba0ad000 ba0d7000 afd Thu Feb 10 08:42:18 2011 (4D53EB3A) ba0d7000 ba108000 netbt Sat Feb 17 01:28:57 2007 (45D6A0A9) ba108000 ba19c000 tcpip Sat Aug 15 05:53:38 2009 (4A8685A2) ba19c000 ba1b5000 ipsec Sat Feb 17 01:29:28 2007 (45D6A0C8) ba275000 ba288600 NAVENG Fri Jul 29 08:10:02 2011 (4E32A31A) ba289000 ba2ae000 SYMEVENT Thu Apr 15 21:31:23 2010 (4BC7BDEB) ba2ae000 ba42d300 NAVEX15 Fri Jul 29 08:07:28 2011 (4E32A280) ba42e000 ba479000 SRTSP Fri Mar 04 15:31:08 2011 (4D714C0C) ba485000 ba487b00 dump_vmscsi Wed Apr 11 13:55:32 2007 (461D2114) ba4e1000 ba540000 update Mon May 28 08:15:16 2007 (465AC7D4) ba568000 ba59f000 rdpdr Sat Feb 17 00:51:00 2007 (45D697C4) ba59f000 ba5b1000 raspptp Sat Feb 17 01:29:20 2007 (45D6A0C0) ba5b1000 ba5ca000 ndiswan Sat Feb 17 01:29:22 2007 (45D6A0C2) ba5da000 ba5e4000 dump_diskdump Sat Feb 17 01:07:44 2007 (45D69BB0) ba66a000 ba67e000 rasl2tp Sat Feb 17 01:29:02 2007 (45D6A0AE) ba67e000 ba69a000 VIDEOPRT Sat Feb 17 01:10:30 2007 (45D69C56) ba69a000 ba6c1000 ks Sat Feb 17 01:30:40 2007 (45D6A110) ba6c1000 ba6d5000 redbook Sat Feb 17 01:07:26 2007 (45D69B9E) ba6d5000 ba6ea000 cdrom Sat Feb 17 01:07:48 2007 (45D69BB4) ba6ea000 ba6ff000 serial Sat Feb 17 01:06:46 2007 (45D69B76) ba6ff000 ba717000 parport Sat Feb 17 01:06:42 2007 (45D69B72) ba717000 ba72a000 i8042prt Sat Feb 17 01:30:40 2007 (45D6A110) baff0000 baff3700 CmBatt Sat Feb 17 00:58:51 2007 (45D6999B) bf800000 bf9d3000 win32k Thu Mar 03 08:55:02 2011 (4D6F9DB6) bf9d3000 bf9ea000 dxg Sat Feb 17 01:14:39 2007 (45D69D4F) bf9ea000 bf9fec80 vmx_fb Sat Aug 16 07:23:10 2008 (48A6B89E) bf9ff000 bfa4a000 ATMFD Tue Feb 15 08:19:22 2011 (4D5A7D5A) bff60000 bff7e000 RDPDD Sat Feb 17 09:01:19 2007 (45D70AAF) f7214000 f723a000 KSecDD Mon Jun 15 13:45:11 2009 (4A3688A7) f723a000 f725f000 fltmgr Sat Feb 17 00:51:08 2007 (45D697CC) f725f000 f7272000 CLASSPNP Sat Feb 17 01:28:16 2007 (45D6A080) f7272000 f7283000 symmpi Mon Dec 13 16:03:14 2004 (41BE0392) f7283000 f72a2000 SCSIPORT Sat Feb 17 01:28:41 2007 (45D6A099) f72a2000 f72bf000 atapi Sat Feb 17 01:07:34 2007 (45D69BA6) f72bf000 f72e9000 volsnap Sat Feb 17 01:08:23 2007 (45D69BD7) f72e9000 f7315000 dmio Sat Feb 17 01:10:44 2007 (45D69C64) f7315000 f733c000 ftdisk Sat Feb 17 01:08:05 2007 (45D69BC5) f733c000 f7352000 pci Sat Feb 17 00:59:03 2007 (45D699A7) f7352000 f7386000 ACPI Sat Feb 17 00:58:47 2007 (45D69997) f7487000 f7490000 WMILIB Tue Mar 25 03:13:00 2003 (3E80017C) f7497000 f74a6000 isapnp Sat Feb 17 00:58:57 2007 (45D699A1) f74a7000 f74b4000 PCIIDEX Sat Feb 17 01:07:32 2007 (45D69BA4) f74b7000 f74c7000 MountMgr Sat Feb 17 01:05:35 2007 (45D69B2F) f74c7000 f74d2000 PartMgr Sat Feb 17 01:29:25 2007 (45D6A0C5) f74d7000 f74e7000 disk Sat Feb 17 01:07:51 2007 (45D69BB7) f74e7000 f74f3000 Dfs Sat Feb 17 00:51:17 2007 (45D697D5) f74f7000 f7501000 crcdisk Sat Feb 17 01:09:50 2007 (45D69C2E) f7507000 f7517000 agp440 Sat Feb 17 00:58:53 2007 (45D6999D) f7517000 f7522000 TDI Sat Feb 17 01:01:19 2007 (45D69A2F) f7527000 f7532000 ptilink Sat Feb 17 01:06:38 2007 (45D69B6E) f7537000 f7540000 raspti Sat Feb 17 00:59:23 2007 (45D699BB) f7547000 f7556000 termdd Sat Feb 17 00:44:32 2007 (45D69640) f7557000 f7561000 Dxapi Tue Mar 25 03:06:01 2003 (3E7FFFD9) f7577000 f7580000 mssmbios Sat Feb 17 00:59:12 2007 (45D699B0) f7587000 f7595000 NDProxy Wed Nov 03 09:25:59 2010 (4CD162E7) f75a7000 f75b1000 flpydisk Tue Mar 25 03:04:32 2003 (3E7FFF80) f75b7000 f75c0080 SRTSPX Fri Mar 04 15:31:24 2011 (4D714C1C) f75d7000 f75e3000 vga Sat Feb 17 01:10:30 2007 (45D69C56) f75e7000 f75f2000 Msfs Sat Feb 17 00:50:33 2007 (45D697A9) f75f7000 f7604000 Npfs Sat Feb 17 00:50:36 2007 (45D697AC) f7607000 f7615000 msgpc Sat Feb 17 00:58:37 2007 (45D6998D) f7617000 f7624000 netbios Sat Feb 17 00:58:29 2007 (45D69985) f7627000 f7634000 wanarp Sat Feb 17 00:59:17 2007 (45D699B5) f7637000 f7646000 intelppm Sat Feb 17 00:48:30 2007 (45D6972E) f7647000 f7652000 kbdclass Sat Feb 17 01:05:39 2007 (45D69B33) f7657000 f7661000 mouclass Tue Mar 25 03:03:09 2003 (3E7FFF2D) f7667000 f7671000 serenum Sat Feb 17 01:06:44 2007 (45D69B74) f7677000 f7682000 fdc Sat Feb 17 01:07:16 2007 (45D69B94) f7687000 f7694b00 vmx_svga Sat Aug 16 07:22:07 2008 (48A6B85F) f7697000 f76a0000 watchdog Sat Feb 17 01:11:45 2007 (45D69CA1) f76a7000 f76b0000 ndistapi Sat Feb 17 00:59:19 2007 (45D699B7) f76b7000 f76c6000 raspppoe Sat Feb 17 00:59:23 2007 (45D699BB) f76c8000 f7707000 NDIS Sat Feb 17 01:28:49 2007 (45D6A0A1) f7707000 f770f000 kdcom Tue Mar 25 03:08:00 2003 (3E800050) f770f000 f7717000 BOOTVID Tue Mar 25 03:07:58 2003 (3E80004E) f7717000 f771e000 intelide Sat Feb 17 01:07:32 2007 (45D69BA4) f771f000 f7726000 dmload Tue Mar 25 03:08:08 2003 (3E800058) f777f000 f7786000 dxgthk Tue Mar 25 03:05:52 2003 (3E7FFFD0) f7787000 f778e000 vmmemctl Tue Aug 12 20:37:25 2008 (48A22CC5) f77cf000 f77d6280 vmxnet Mon Sep 08 21:17:10 2008 (48C5CE96) f77d7000 f77df000 audstub Tue Mar 25 03:09:12 2003 (3E800098) f77ef000 f77f7000 Fs_Rec Tue Mar 25 03:08:36 2003 (3E800074) f77f7000 f77fe000 Null Tue Mar 25 03:03:05 2003 (3E7FFF29) f77ff000 f7806000 Beep Tue Mar 25 03:03:04 2003 (3E7FFF28) f7807000 f780f000 mnmdd Tue Mar 25 03:07:53 2003 (3E800049) f780f000 f7817000 RDPCDD Tue Mar 25 03:03:05 2003 (3E7FFF29) f7817000 f781f000 rasacd Tue Mar 25 03:11:50 2003 (3E800136) f7878000 f7897000 Mup Tue Apr 12 15:05:46 2011 (4DA4A28A) f7897000 f7899980 compbatt Sat Feb 17 00:58:51 2007 (45D6999B) f789b000 f789e900 BATTC Sat Feb 17 00:58:46 2007 (45D69996) f789f000 f78a1b00 vmscsi Wed Apr 11 13:55:32 2007 (461D2114) f79af000 f79b0280 vmmouse Mon Aug 11 07:16:51 2008 (48A01FA3) f79b1000 f79b2280 swenum Sat Feb 17 01:05:56 2007 (45D69B44) f7b4a000 f7bdf000 Ntfs Sat Feb 17 01:27:23 2007 (45D6A04B) Unloaded modules: ba65a000 ba668000 imapi.sys Timestamp: unavailable (00000000) Checksum: 00000000 ImageSize: 0000E000 ba1c4000 ba1d5000 vpc-8042.sys Timestamp: unavailable (00000000) Checksum: 00000000 ImageSize: 00011000 f77df000 f77e7000 Sfloppy.SYS Timestamp: unavailable (00000000) Checksum: 00000000 ImageSize: 00008000 ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information. BugCheck 7E, {c0000005, f723e087, f78dea8c, f78de788} ***** Kernel symbols are WRONG. Please fix symbols to do analysis. --omitted-- Probably caused by : fltmgr.sys ( fltmgr!FltGetIrpName+63f ) Followup: MachineOwner --------- Finished dump check

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• Forcedeth - too many iterations (6) in > nv_nic_irq

  - by RyanC

  Hey, I'm having trouble with an onboard nvidia gigabit network, under times of heavy load on the network, I'm seeing this error logged: "too many iterations (6) in nv_nic_irq" I'm running Hadoop DFS over these NICs and I see checksum errors build up until the whole thing just fails. I'm running the 2.6.26-2-amd64 kernel, and my initial research seems to imply its a problem with the forcedeth driver. Has anyone run into this problem before? Thanks in advance if anyone can help! Ryan

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• Can "tar" backup incrementally?

  - by Somebody still uses you MS-DOS

  I have my home folder with a few GB. Is it possible to run tar on it, create a home.tar.gz, and then for changed files, it creates home1.tar.gz only with modified files from previous tar (thus being an incremental backup)? I would like to check the resulting checksum files and export them as well like home.md5, home1.md5, etc. (I know this could be another process, but interesting as well).

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• Identify Encoded Strings

  - by Steven

  Does anyone know of a utility (any OS or online) that, with a string input, identifies the encoding type (checksum, base64, etc) and if possible (and appropriate) decodes the string?

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• What are these google SHA1 images?

  - by acidzombie24

  If you look at this page you'll see an monochrome image Above it says "Tip: Use the SHA1 checksum shown to verify file integrity. " however i dont know if thats related. What are these things?

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• Toorcon 15 (2013)

  - by danx

  The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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• How do I compare the md5sum of a file with the md5 file (that was available to download with the file)?

  - by user91583

  Images are available for a distro on http://livedistro.org/gnulinux/israel-remix-team-mint-12. I want to use the 32-bit version. I have downloaded the ISO file for the 32-bit version (customdist.iso). I have downloaded the md5 file for the ISO file (customdist.iso.md5). I want to calculate the md5sum of the ISO file and compare it to the md5 file. I can use the md5sum command to display within the terminal the calculated md5 for the ISO file. I have searched the web and can't find a way to compare the calculated md5 for the ISO file with the downloaded md5 file. So far, the closest I have come is the command md5sum -c customdist.iso.md5 from within the folder containing both the files, but this command gives the result: md5sum: customdist.iso.md5: no properly formatted MD5 checksum lines found Any ideas?

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• Anti-cheat Javascript for browser/HTML5 game

  - by Billy Ninja

  I'm planning on venturing on making a single player action rpg in js/html5, and I'd like to prevent cheating. I don't need 100% protection, since it's not going to be a multiplayer game, but I want some level of protection. So what strategies you suggest beyond minify and obfuscation? I wouldn't bother to make some server side simple checking, but I don't want to go the Diablo 3 path keeping all my game state changes on the server side. Since it's going to be a rpg of sorts I came up with the idea of making a stats inspector that checks abrupt changes in their values, but I'm not sure how it consistent and trusty it can be. What about variables and functions escopes? Working on smaller escopes whenever possible is safer, but it's worth the effort? Is there anyway for the javascript to self inspect it's text, like in a checksum? There are browser specific solutions? I wouldn't bother to restrain it for Chrome only in the early builds.

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• One-line command to download Ubuntu ISO?

  - by James Mitch

  I want to download an Ubuntu ISO, preferably over bittorrent, and verify its integrity. Currently, the following steps are required: start web browser, go to ubuntu.com, find download link find gpg signature for the checksums get the gpg key to check gpg signature of the checksums wait until download finished gpg verifiy checksum verification Isn't there a simpler way? Just like apt-get install 12.04-64bit-ubuntu-iso apt-get install 12.04-32bit-server-iso etc.? Of course, apt-get (or whatever it would be called) should download over bittorrent to remove load from the servers. If it doesn't exist, it should probable post that at ubuntu brainstorm? Is there already such a tool? I wanted to ask before posting to brainstorm.

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• SQL SERVER – Retrieving Random Rows from Table Using NEWID()

  - by pinaldave

  I have previously written about how to get random rows from SQL Server. SQL SERVER – Generate A Single Random Number for Range of Rows of Any Table – Very interesting Question from Reader SQL SERVER – Random Number Generator Script – SQL Query However, I have not blogged about following trick before. Let me share the trick here as well. You can generate random scripts using following methods as well. USE AdventureWorks2012 GO -- Method 1 SELECT TOP 100 * FROM Sales.SalesOrderDetail ORDER BY NEWID() GO -- Method 2 SELECT TOP 100 * FROM Sales.SalesOrderDetail ORDER BY CHECKSUM(NEWID()) GO You will notice that using NEWID() in the ORDER BY will return random rows in the result set. How many of you knew this trick? You can run above script multiple times and it will give random rows every single time. Reference: Pinal Dave (http://blog.sqlauthority.com)   Filed under: PostADay, SQL, SQL Authority, SQL Function, SQL Query, SQL Server, SQL Tips and Tricks, T SQL, Technology

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• Unable to mount /dev/loop0 during install

  - by AJP

  I was installing 32-bit Ubuntu(ubuntu-10.10-desktop-i386.iso) on VMWare workstation 7.1. During installation an error came up with the following text. (initramfs) mount: mounting dev/loop0 on //filesystem.squashfs failed: Input/Output error Can not mount /dev/loop0 (/cdrom/casper/filesystem.squashfs) on //filesystem.squashfs I did a memory test which was successful, but when selecting "Try Ubuntu without installing", "Install Ubuntu" or "Check disk for defects" the same error is showing up. I download the ISO image from Ubuntu website "http://www.ubuntu.com/desktop/get-ubuntu/download". As I couldn't find the checksum data, the ISO image was verified by mounting to a virtual drive and browsing the contents. The ISO image is mounted to a virtual drive in VMWare and not burnt to a CD.

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• Situations that require protecting files against tampering when stored on a users computer

  - by Joel

  I'm making a 'Pokémon Storage System' with a Client/Server model and as part of that I was thinking of storing an inventory file on the users computer which I do not wish to be edited except by my program. An alternative to this would be to instead to store the inventory file on the server and control it's editing by sending commands to the server but I was wondering if there are any situations which require files to be stored on a users computer where editing would be undesirable and if so how do you protect the files? I was thinking AES with some sort of checksum?

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• 12.04 Server- No Such Partition After Adding HDD

  - by Mark

  12.04 server installed. Physically added a 1TB drive to system and I'm now getting: GRUB loading. error: no such partition. grub rescue> Any thoughts/suggestions? Mark EDIT: Once I create a partition on the new drive (with GParted from LiveCD), I get a blinking cursor at boot and nothing else. EDIT: Unplugged first drive and tried to install on 2nd (1TB v. 120GB). When creating partition I get Incorrect metadata area header checksum in virtual console(f4)

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• I can't get a native resolution of 1920x1080 on 11.10 (AOC f22 on a Nvidia Geforce GTS 450)

  - by Mikeeeee

  I have a problem were the highest resolution I can get is 1360x769, this is a 22 inch LCD monitor with a native resolution of 1920x1080_60 I have tried numerous drivers but nothing changed I tried editing the xorg.conf scipt with no success (I am a noob with linux though). Running many commands in terminal witch I got from people with similar problems only gives me errors like "Failed to get size of gamma for output default. I get edid checksum is invalid error on boot down also. I think there maybe a communication problem between my screens EDID and ubuntu although xp and windows 7 detect my screen without any errors and automatically set native resolution. also when I am installing ubuntu I get a horrible screen flashing every few seconds until I have installed the nvidia driver. pc specks if it helps x64 os, mainboard N68PV-GS, 4 gig ram, AMD Phenom(tm) 9350e Quad-Core Processor × 4, Nvidia Geforce gts450 512mb, hard drives set up in a onboard nvidia raid array striped. realy need to get a better resolution, 1360x769 does not look nice on a 22 inch screen. ty

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• How to establish VPN Connection using Vodafone K3773 HSPA USB Stick?

  - by user1889139

  I am using Ubuntu 12.04 Desktop. I am trying to establish VPN PPTP connection to Ubuntu 12.04 Server. VPN connection available when PC is connected to LAN - ADSL modem - Internet - VPN Server. No VPN connection available when using 3G modem Vodafone K3773 HSPA USB Stick - Internet - VPN Server. Internet is connected. VPN is not. How to establish the VPN Connection? Server side log: GRE: Bad checksum from pppd.

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• Would md5 hashes allow detection of synced files?

  - by codpursue

  We have to develop our own file management system in Java web application. We need to sync files between our main server and client severs and find out whether all the client server has all the latest version of files. Our files are in pdf, doc and xls format they changes every now and then as and when it is required. What we are thinking of using MD5 checksum to find out hashcode of files on Main server and store it in database. Same would be there in Client Servers database. After comparing records on database we would come to know whether client servers are synced or not. Please suggest if there are any better ways to do the same.

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• CRC for PNG file format

  - by darkie15

  Hi All, I need to read a PNG file and interpret all the information stored in it and print it in human readable format. While working on PNG, i understood that it uses CRC-32 for generating checksum for each chunk. But I could not understand the following information mentioned on the PNG file specification site: The polynomial used by PNG is: x32 + x26 + x23 + x22 + x16 + x12 + x11 + x10 + x8 + x7 + x5 + x4 + x2 + x + 1 Here is the link for reference: http://www.w3.org/TR/PNG/ Can anyone please help me in understanding this? Regards, darkie

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• crc check in a sector of usb pendrive

  - by nithin

  I am trying to check for the data integrity in fat32 filesystem.Currently I have implemented fat on lpc2478. For the checking of data integrity, I come to know that each sector of a disk has checksum or CRC.But I wanted to find the location of the CRC in the sector.Can you please advice me on how to find the location of the CRC in a sector of usb pendrive? and will this CRC change with manufacturer of the pendrive.?

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• Avoid change in database record

  - by Khou

  how do you make your software aware of database records changes that was not modifed by your application? (ie it was modified externally, in MS SQL Server Management Studio or other). Do you do a checksum? and store it somewhere? or what do you do?

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• Sockets receiving null (Android)

  - by Henrik

  I have a android app that is communicating with a server (written in java). Between these two parts I have established a Socket connection and want to send data. The problem I am having is that sometimes, for some users, the information that reaches the server is null. This works (for all phones, all users): Server: int a = Integer.parseInt(in.readLine()); int b = Integer.parseInt(in.readLine()); int c = Integer.parseInt(in.readLine()); int d = Integer.parseInt(in.readLine()); String checksum = in.readLine(); String model = in.readLine(); String device = in.readLine(); String name = in.readLine(); Client: out.println(a); out.println(b); out.println(c); out.println(d); out.println(hash); out.println(Build.MODEL); out.println(Build.DEVICE); String name = fixName(); out.print(name); out.flush(); This does not work (for some users): Server: int a = Integer.parseInt(in.readLine()); String checksum = in.readLine(); String model = in.readLine(); String device = in.readLine(); String name = in.readLine(); String msg = in.readLine(); int version = -1; String test = "hej"; try{ test = in.readLine(); version = Integer.parseInt(test); }catch(Exception e){ e.printStackTrace(); } Client: out.println(a); out.println(hash); out.println(Build.MODEL); out.println(Build.DEVICE); String name = fixName(); if(name == null) name = "John Doe"; out.println(name); String msg = fixMsg(); if(msg == null) name = "nada"; out.println(msg); out.println(curversion); out.flush(); Sometimes, in the second case, the name, msg, and version (the string test) are null at the server side. The catch is triggered because test is null. curversion,a are ints, the rest are strings. Any ideas?

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• What do programs see when ZFS can't deliver uncorrupted data?

  - by Jay Kominek

  Say my program attempts a read of a byte in a file on a ZFS filesystem. ZFS can locate a copy of the necessary block, but cannot locate any copy with a valid checksum (they're all corrupted, or the only disks present have corrupted copies). What does my program see, in terms of the return value from the read, and the byte it tried to read? And is there a way to influence the behavior (under Solaris, or any other ZFS-implementing OS), that is, force failure, or force success, with potentially corrupt data?

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• A smart UDP protocol analyzer?

  - by ripper234

  Is there a "smart" UDP protocol analyzer that can help me reverse engineer a message based protocol? I'm using Wireshark to do the sniffing, but if there's a tool that can detect regularities in the protocol (repeated strings, bits of the protocol that are CRC/Checksum or length, ...) and aid the process that would help.

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• wso2 governance email templates

  - by Barry Allott

  We have gotten WSO2 governance registry to send e-mails successfully. Now we want to template the emails that are being sent out. There is a sample at : http://docs.wso2.org/wiki/display/Governance450/Notification+E-mail+Customization+Sample This allows you to alter the text coming through the event but is there an easier way that writing Java code? We cannot compile the sample anyway as the Maven compiler keeps looking up the references files and errors with checksum validation failed. Thanks

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• Java compilation with two versions of Eclipse

  - by lepnio

  I've got an old project in Eclipse 2.1 and compiled with a JDK 1.4.2_12. I want to upgrade the version of Eclipse to Eclipse Galileo. I've imported my project and set the compilation level to 1.4 and I've also updated my build path to use the correct JDK. The problem is that when I compare the compiled files in the classes folder in the two versions of Eclipse, the MD5 checksum are different. Should I be worried about that fact or this is normal?

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• Webservice for uploading data: security considerations

  - by Philip Daubmeier

  Hi everyone! Im not sure about what authentification method I should use for my webservice. I've searched on SO, and found nothing that helped me. Preliminary Im building an application that uploads data from a local database to a server (running my webservice), where all records are merged and stored in a central database. I am currently binary serializing a DataTable, that holds a small fragment of the local database, where all uninteresting stuff is already filtered out. The byte[] (serialized DataTable), together with the userid and a hash of the users password is then uploaded to the webservice via SOAP. The application together with the webservice already work exactly like intended. The Problem The issue I am thinking about is now: What is if someone just sniffs the network traffic, 'steals' the users id and password hash to send his own SOAP message with modified data that corrupts my database? Options The approaches to solving that problem, I already thought of, are: Using ssl + certificates for establishing the connection: I dont really want to use ssl, I would prefer a simpler solution. After all, every information that is transfered to the webservice can be seen on the website later on. What I want to say is: there is no secret/financial/business-critical information, that has to be hidden. I think ssl would be sort of an overkill for that task. Encrypting the byte[]: I think that would be a performance killer, considering that the goal of the excercise was simply to authenticate the user. Hashing the users password together with the data: I kind of like the idea: Creating a checksum from the data, concatenating that checksum with the password-hash and hashing this whole thing again. That would assure the data was sent from this specific user, and the data wasnt modified. The actual question So, what do you think is the best approach in terms of meeting the following requirements? Rather simple solution (As it doesnt have to be super secure; no secret/business-critical information transfered) Easily implementable retrospectively (Dont want to write it all again :) ) Doesnt impact to much on performance What do you think of my prefered solution, the last one in the list above? Is there any alternative solution I didnt mention, that would fit better? You dont have to answer every question in detail. Just push me in the right direction. I very much appreciate every well-grounded opinion. Thanks in advance!

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