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  • How to switch users without entering password, part II

    - by torbengb
    I've got Ubuntu 9.10 with a user account for my wife, and one for myself. "Wake-from-screensaver" should result in "choose user" without having to enter any password. I know how to do that in Windows, but I'm not good with Linux (yet). Part of this was answered in this question which helped me get past the login screen without passwords (after booting, and after choosing "switch user"), but once the screensaver kicks in and I wake it up again, the system does not present the "choose user" screen. Instead, it either turns off the screensaver and presents the desktop of the most recent user, or (if the screensaver is set to lock the screen) prompt for the user's password (which can be handily surpassed by clicking the "switch user" button and choosing the same user again). So, the login ("choose user") screen has been dealt with. How do I make the (any) screensaver return to the login screen at wake, rather than to the current user's desktop? Windows can do this, I'm sure Linux can too - but how?

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  • inheritance from the django user model results in error when changing password

    - by Jerome
    I inherited form the django user model like so: from django.db import models from django.contrib.auth.models import User, UserManager from django.utils.translation import ugettext_lazy as _ class NewUserModel(User): custom_field_1 = models.CharField(_('custom field 1'), max_length=250, null=True, blank=True) custom_field_2 = models.CharField(_('custom field 2'), max_length=250, null=True, blank=True) objects = UserManager() When i go to the admin and add an entry into this model, it saves fine, but below the "Password" field where it has this text "Use '[algo]$[salt]$[hexdigest]' or use the change password form.", if i click on the "change password form' link, it produces this error Truncated incorrect DOUBLE value: '7/password' What can i do to fix this?

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  • Active Directory Incorrect password attempts double counting

    - by Hidayath
    Hi I am using the following C# code to connect to active directory and validate the login, DirectoryEntry de = new DirectoryEntry(); string username = "myuser", path = "LDAP://addev2.dev.mycompany.com/CN=myuser,DC=dev,DC=mycompany,DC=com", password = "test"; for (int i = 0; i < 4;i++ ) { try { de.AuthenticationType = AuthenticationTypes.Sealing | AuthenticationTypes.Secure | AuthenticationTypes.FastBind; de.Username = username; de.Password = password; de.Path = path; //de.RefreshCache(); Object obj = de.NativeObject; } catch (Exception ex) { Console.WriteLine(ex.Message); } this works fine when the password is correct. However when the password is incorrect this shows as 2 invalid attempts in AD. So what happens is when the AD admin allows 5 invalid attempts the user is locked out on the 3rd attempt. when i look in the AD's event log 1 see 2 entries. 1)Pre-authentication failed: 2)Logon attempt by: MICROSOFT_AUTHENTICATION_PACKAGE_V1_0 Logon account: [email protected] Source Workstation: WKSXXXX Error Code: 0xC000006A Stepping thro the code i see 2 event entries on the line de.RefreshCache() I tried using de.NativeObject to see if that would solve the problem. No Dice Anyone have any pointers?

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  • Is it possible to password protect an SQL server database even from administrators of the server ?

    - by imanabidi
    I want to install an application (ASP.Net + SQL server 2005 express) in local network of some small company for demo but I also want nobody even sysadmin see anything direct from the database and any permission wants a secure pass . I need to spend more time on this article Database Encryption in SQL Server 2008 Enterprise Edition that i found from this answer is-it-possible-to-password-protect-an-sql-server-database but 1.I like to be sure and more clear on this because the other answer in this page says : Yes. you can protect it from everyone except the administrators of the server. 2.if this is possible, the db have to be enterprise edition ? 3.is there any other possible solutions and workaround for this? thanks in advance

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  • Access denied for user 'root@localhost' (using password:NO)

    - by murgatroid99
    I am attempting to install a network management package called cacti onto Ubuntu running under Windows Virtual PC. I attempted to install MySQL as it is one of cacti's dependencies. I can install and start the MySQL server, but whenever I try to access it in any other way, such as to change the password, I get the error message Access denied for user 'root@localhost' (using password:NO). I would like to know what is causing this and how to fix it. Edit: (just in case my comments are not visible) The answers from HD and Devin Ceartas did not work for me.

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  • how to remove mysql root password

    - by nectar
    I want to remove password for user root in localhost how can I do that?by mistake I have set the password of root user thats why phpmyadmin is giving error- #1045 - Access denied for user 'root'@'localhost' (using password: NO)

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  • The best way to store username and password without a database

    - by Mokuchan
    Hello everyone, I want to build a simple single user login "library" in PHP, but I'm facing the following dilemma: how should I store username and password if I'm not using a database? A simple plain text file could be easily read and then the password could be easily decripted so that's not an option. If I create a php file with just <?php $Username= "username"; $Password= "password"; ?> then no one should be able to read it and I could simply include this file where I need it, but I'm not really sure you can't find a better way to do this! So what's, in your opinion, the best solution to this problem (and why)? Thanks

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  • magento .htaccess password protect inner pages (not homepage)

    - by Angel Wong
    I would like to use .htaccess to password protect all inner pages of Magento, except the home page. e.g. http://www.example.com/abc (password protect) http://www.example.com (home page, no need to password protect) I tried to use the setifenv request_uri = "/" => allow, but didn't work. It still password protect all pages including the homepage. I also tried a few ways inside the Magento admin URL rewrite, but those won't work either. Any expert can help? thx E

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  • Authenticate with Django 1.5

    - by gorjuce
    I'm currently testing django 1.5 and a custom User model, but I've some problems. I've created a User class in my account app, which looks like: class User(AbstractBaseUser): email = models.EmailField() activation_key = models.CharField(max_length=255) is_active = models.BooleanField(default=False) is_admin = models.BooleanField(default=False) USERNAME_FIELD = 'email' I can correctly register a user, who is stored in my account_user table. Now, how can I log in? I've tried with: def login(request): form = AuthenticationForm() if request.method == 'POST': form = AuthenticationForm(request.POST) email = request.POST['username'] password = request.POST['password'] user = authenticate(username=email, password=password) if user is not None: if user.is_active: login(user) else: message = 'disabled account, check validation email' return render( request, 'account-login-failed.html', {'message': message} ) return render(request, 'account-login.html', {'form': form}) I can correctly register a new User My forms.py which contains my register form class RegisterForm(forms.ModelForm): """ a form to create user""" password = forms.CharField( label="Password", widget=forms.PasswordInput() ) password_confirm = forms.CharField( label="Password Repeat", widget=forms.PasswordInput() ) class Meta: model = User exclude = ('last_login', 'activation_key') def clean_password_confirm(self): password = self.cleaned_data.get("password") password_confirm = self.cleaned_data.get("password_confirm") if password and password_confirm and password != password_confirm: raise forms.ValidationError("Password don't math") return password_confirm def clean_email(self): if User.objects.filter(email__iexact=self.cleaned_data.get("email")): raise forms.ValidationError("email already exists") return self.cleaned_data['email'] def save(self): user = super(RegisterForm, self).save(commit=False) user.password = self.cleaned_data['password'] user.activation_key = generate_sha1(user.email) user.save() return user My question is: Why does authenticate give me None? I know I'm trying to authenticate() with an email as username but is that not one of the reasons to use a custom User model?

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  • Spring Security: session expiration without redirect to expired-url?

    - by Kdeveloper
    I'm using Spring Security 3.0.2 form based authentication. But I can't figure out how I can configure it so that when a session expires that the request is not redirect to an other page (expired-url) or displays a 'session expires' message. I don't want any redirect or messages, I want that a anonymous session is started just like when a user without a session enters the website. My current configuration: <http> <intercept-url pattern="/login.action*" filters="none"/> <intercept-url pattern="/admin/**" access="ROLE_ADMIN" /> <intercept-url pattern="/**" access="IS_AUTHENTICATED_ANONYMOUSLY"/> <form-login login-page="/login.action" authentication-failure-url="/login.action?error=failed" login-processing-url="/login-handler.action"/> <logout logout-url="/logoff-execute.action" logout-success-url="/logoff.action?done=1"/> <remember-me key="remember-me-security" services-ref="rememberMeServices"/> <session-management > <concurrency-control max-sessions="1" error-if-maximum-exceeded="false" expired-url="/login.action?error=expired.url"/> </session-management> </http>

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  • How do I use a custom authentication mechanism for a Java web application with Spring Security?

    - by Adam
    Hi, I'm working on a project to convert an existing Java web application to use Spring Web MVC. As a part of this I will migrate the existing log-on/log-off mechanism to use Spring Security. The idea at this stage is to replicate the existing functionality and replace only the web layer, leaving the service classes and objects in place. The required functionality is simple. Access is controlled to URLs and to access certain pages the user must log on. Authentication is performed with a simple username and password along with an extra static piece of information that comes from the login page. There is no notion of a role: once a user has logged on they have access to all of the pages. Behind the scenes, the service layer has a class with a simple authentication method: doAuthenticate(String username, String password, String info) throws ServiceException An exception is thrown if the login fails. I'd like to leave this existing service object that does the authentication intact but to "plug it into" the Spring Security mechanism. Can somebody suggest the best approach to take for this please? Naturally, I'd like to take the path of least resistance and leave the work where possible to Spring... Thanks in advance, Adam.

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  • How to ensure DB security for a Windows Forms application?

    - by Vilx-
    The basic setup is classic - you're creating a Windows Forms application that connects to a DB and does all kinds of enterprise-y stuff. Naturally, such an application will have many users with different access rights in the DB, and each with their own login name and password. So how do you implement this? One way is to create a DB login for every application user, but that's a pretty serious thing to do, which even requires admin rights on the DB server, etc. If the DB server hosts several applications, the admins are quite likely not to be happy with this. In the web world typically one creates his own "Users" table which contains all the necessary info, and uses one fixed DB login for all interaction. That is all nice for a web app, but a windows forms can't hide this master login information, negating security altogether. (It can try to hide, but all such attempts are easily broken with a bit of effort). So... is there some middle way? Perhaps logging in with a fixed login, and then elevating priviledges from a special stored procedure which checks the username and password?

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  • Are there any security issues to avoid when providing a email-or-username-can-act-as-username login

    - by Tchalvak
    I am in the process of moving from a "username/password" system to one that uses email for login. I don't think that there's any horrible problem with allowing either email or username for login, and I remember seeing sites that I consider somewhat respectable doing it as well, but I'd like to be aware of any major security flaws that I may be introducing. More specifically, here is the pertinent function (the query_row function parameterizes the sql). function authenticate($p_user, $p_pass) { $user = (string)$p_user; $pass = (string)$p_pass; $returnValue = false; if ($user != '' && $pass != '') { // Allow login via username or email. $sql = "SELECT account_id, account_identity, uname, player_id FROM accounts join account_players on account_id=_account_id join players on player_id = _player_id WHERE lower(account_identity) = lower(:login) OR lower(uname) = lower(:login) AND phash = crypt(:pass, phash)"; $returnValue = query_row($sql, array(':login'=>$user, ':pass'=>$pass)); } return $returnValue; } Notably, I have added the WHERE lower(account_identity) = lower(:login) OR lower(uname) = lower(:login) ...etc section to allow graceful backwards compatibility for users who won't be used to using their email for the login procedure. I'm not completely sure that that OR is safe, though. Are there some ways that I should tighten the security of the php code above?

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  • Are there any security issues to avoid when providing a either-email-or-username-can-act-as-username

    - by Tchalvak
    I am in the process of moving from a "username/password" system to one that uses email for login. I don't think that there's any horrible problem with allowing either email or username for login, and I remember seeing sites that I consider somewhat respectable doing it as well, but I'd like to be aware of any major security flaws that I may be introducing. More specifically, here is the pertinent function (the query_row function parameterizes the sql). function authenticate($p_user, $p_pass) { $user = (string)$p_user; $pass = (string)$p_pass; $returnValue = false; if ($user != '' && $pass != '') { // Allow login via username or email. $sql = "SELECT account_id, account_identity, uname, player_id FROM accounts join account_players on account_id=_account_id join players on player_id = _player_id WHERE lower(account_identity) = lower(:login) OR lower(uname) = lower(:login) AND phash = crypt(:pass, phash)"; $returnValue = query_row($sql, array(':login'=>$user, ':pass'=>$pass)); } return $returnValue; } Notably, I have added the WHERE lower(account_identity) = lower(:login) OR lower(uname) = lower(:login) ...etc section to allow graceful backwards compatibility for users who won't be used to using their email for the login procedure. I'm not completely sure that that OR is safe, though. Are there some ways that I should tighten the security of the php code above?

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  • How do I resolve "conflicting accounts" in google apps without breaking links to online photos on picasa?

    - by lee
    I have been using google apps for some time, and only recently learned I have what google calls "conflicting accounts" which is creating a problem I haven't been able to resolve. Turns out that the apps account really only covers email, google docs, and the calendar and not other features like picasa, blogger, youtube etc. and at some point they gave me a non-apps google account with my same (proprietary non-gmail) email address for the additional apps. This is the "conflicting account." I had noticed that I sometimes had to come in through another door when I went back and forth, between docs, picasa, and mail let's say, but never understood why since it was the same username and password and I didn't get any communication about it at the time. Google is now in the process of giving google apps users access to the additional apps and providing instructions for consolidating the two accounts. But if I want to move my picasa site into the new apps structure I have to download my albums and re-synch them. This would be disastrous for me as I have hundreds of photos embedded in my websites, and new web addresses would break all the connections. The alternative seems to be to rename my "personal" (non-apps) accounts as described at http://www.google.com/support/a/bin/answer.py?answer=185186: Users with conflicting Google Accounts can easily resolve their conflicts by renaming their personal Google Accounts, and the data in their personal accounts will remain safe and accessible to them. Here’s how a user can rename their personal Google Account: * Step 1: Visit www.google.com/accounts and sign in with your personal Google Account * Step 2: Click ‘Change email’ under ‘Personal Settings’ * Step 3: Enter a different email address where you can receive mail, enter your password, and click ‘Save email address’ * Step 4: Check your other email If your users don’t have different email addresses where they can receive mail, they can resolve the conflict by renaming their personal Google Accounts to @gmail.com addresses instead. Sounds easy enough, right? I gave them a gmail address. The wizard said "sorry you can't use a gmail account for this" --which contradicts the last paragraph above but ok, I switched to a new email address I just created for one of my domains. I can send email back and forth between this account and my google apps account with no problem. But when I try to use it as a replacement on the "personal" side I always get "The password you gave is incorrect." I have tried it over and over and know the password is correct. Since I like to get all my emails though one web interface I initially had the new email set up as an add-on to my google apps email account, but noting that the instructions said the "personal account" email could not be associated with any other gmail account I took it off and went back to accessing it via horde so there would be no conflict there, which seemed to make no difference. I can't figure out why it won't accept the password. Does anyone have any thoughts about that? or suggestions for another way to resolve my picasa problem? any help at all is greatly appreciated. Lee

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  • Is the salt contained in a phpass hash or do you need to salt its input?

    - by Exception e
    phpass is a widely used hashing 'framework'. Is it good practice to salt the plain password before giving it to PasswordHash (v0.2), like so?: $dynamicSalt = $record['salt']; $staticSalt = 'i5ininsfj5lt4hbfduk54fjbhoxc80sdf'; $plainPassword = $_POST['password']; $password = $plainPassword . $dynamicSalt . $staticSalt; $passwordHash = new PasswordHash(8, false); $storedPassword = $passwordHash->HashPassword($password); For reference the phpsalt class: # Portable PHP password hashing framework. # # Version 0.2 / genuine. # # Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2004-2006 and placed in # the public domain. # # # class PasswordHash { var $itoa64; var $iteration_count_log2; var $portable_hashes; var $random_state; function PasswordHash($iteration_count_log2, $portable_hashes) { $this->itoa64 = './0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; if ($iteration_count_log2 < 4 || $iteration_count_log2 > 31) $iteration_count_log2 = 8; $this->iteration_count_log2 = $iteration_count_log2; $this->portable_hashes = $portable_hashes; $this->random_state = microtime() . getmypid(); } function get_random_bytes($count) { $output = ''; if (is_readable('/dev/urandom') && ($fh = @fopen('/dev/urandom', 'rb'))) { $output = fread($fh, $count); fclose($fh); } if (strlen($output) < $count) { $output = ''; for ($i = 0; $i < $count; $i += 16) { $this->random_state = md5(microtime() . $this->random_state); $output .= pack('H*', md5($this->random_state)); } $output = substr($output, 0, $count); } return $output; } function encode64($input, $count) { $output = ''; $i = 0; do { $value = ord($input[$i++]); $output .= $this->itoa64[$value & 0x3f]; if ($i < $count) $value |= ord($input[$i]) << 8; $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 6) & 0x3f]; if ($i++ >= $count) break; if ($i < $count) $value |= ord($input[$i]) << 16; $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 12) & 0x3f]; if ($i++ >= $count) break; $output .= $this->itoa64[($value >> 18) & 0x3f]; } while ($i < $count); return $output; } function gensalt_private($input) { $output = '$P$'; $output .= $this->itoa64[min($this->iteration_count_log2 + ((PHP_VERSION >= '5') ? 5 : 3), 30)]; $output .= $this->encode64($input, 6); return $output; } function crypt_private($password, $setting) { $output = '*0'; if (substr($setting, 0, 2) == $output) $output = '*1'; if (substr($setting, 0, 3) != '$P$') return $output; $count_log2 = strpos($this->itoa64, $setting[3]); if ($count_log2 < 7 || $count_log2 > 30) return $output; $count = 1 << $count_log2; $salt = substr($setting, 4, 8); if (strlen($salt) != 8) return $output; # We're kind of forced to use MD5 here since it's the only # cryptographic primitive available in all versions of PHP # currently in use. To implement our own low-level crypto # in PHP would result in much worse performance and # consequently in lower iteration counts and hashes that are # quicker to crack (by non-PHP code). if (PHP_VERSION >= '5') { $hash = md5($salt . $password, TRUE); do { $hash = md5($hash . $password, TRUE); } while (--$count); } else { $hash = pack('H*', md5($salt . $password)); do { $hash = pack('H*', md5($hash . $password)); } while (--$count); } $output = substr($setting, 0, 12); $output .= $this->encode64($hash, 16); return $output; } function gensalt_extended($input) { $count_log2 = min($this->iteration_count_log2 + 8, 24); # This should be odd to not reveal weak DES keys, and the # maximum valid value is (2**24 - 1) which is odd anyway. $count = (1 << $count_log2) - 1; $output = '_'; $output .= $this->itoa64[$count & 0x3f]; $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 6) & 0x3f]; $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 12) & 0x3f]; $output .= $this->itoa64[($count >> 18) & 0x3f]; $output .= $this->encode64($input, 3); return $output; } function gensalt_blowfish($input) { # This one needs to use a different order of characters and a # different encoding scheme from the one in encode64() above. # We care because the last character in our encoded string will # only represent 2 bits. While two known implementations of # bcrypt will happily accept and correct a salt string which # has the 4 unused bits set to non-zero, we do not want to take # chances and we also do not want to waste an additional byte # of entropy. $itoa64 = './ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789'; $output = '$2a$'; $output .= chr(ord('0') + $this->iteration_count_log2 / 10); $output .= chr(ord('0') + $this->iteration_count_log2 % 10); $output .= '$'; $i = 0; do { $c1 = ord($input[$i++]); $output .= $itoa64[$c1 >> 2]; $c1 = ($c1 & 0x03) << 4; if ($i >= 16) { $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; break; } $c2 = ord($input[$i++]); $c1 |= $c2 >> 4; $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; $c1 = ($c2 & 0x0f) << 2; $c2 = ord($input[$i++]); $c1 |= $c2 >> 6; $output .= $itoa64[$c1]; $output .= $itoa64[$c2 & 0x3f]; } while (1); return $output; } function HashPassword($password) { $random = ''; if (CRYPT_BLOWFISH == 1 && !$this->portable_hashes) { $random = $this->get_random_bytes(16); $hash = crypt($password, $this->gensalt_blowfish($random)); if (strlen($hash) == 60) return $hash; } if (CRYPT_EXT_DES == 1 && !$this->portable_hashes) { if (strlen($random) < 3) $random = $this->get_random_bytes(3); $hash = crypt($password, $this->gensalt_extended($random)); if (strlen($hash) == 20) return $hash; } if (strlen($random) < 6) $random = $this->get_random_bytes(6); $hash = $this->crypt_private($password, $this->gensalt_private($random)); if (strlen($hash) == 34) return $hash; # Returning '*' on error is safe here, but would _not_ be safe # in a crypt(3)-like function used _both_ for generating new # hashes and for validating passwords against existing hashes. return '*'; } function CheckPassword($password, $stored_hash) { $hash = $this->crypt_private($password, $stored_hash); if ($hash[0] == '*') $hash = crypt($password, $stored_hash); return $hash == $stored_hash; } }

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  • Leaks on Wikis: "Corporations...You're Next!" Oracle Desktop Virtualization Can Help.

    - by adam.hawley
    Between all the press coverage on the unauthorized release of 251,287 diplomatic documents and on previous extensive releases of classified documents on the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, one could be forgiven for thinking massive leaks are really an issue for governments, but it is not: It is an issue for corporations as well. In fact, corporations are apparently set to be the next big target for things like Wikileaks. Just the threat of such a release against one corporation recently caused the price of their stock to drop 3% after the leak organization claimed to have 5GB of information from inside the company, with the implication that it might be damaging or embarrassing information. At the moment of this blog anyway, we don't know yet if that is true or how they got the information but how did the diplomatic cable leak happen? For the diplomatic cables, according to press reports, a private in the military, with some appropriate level of security clearance (that is, he apparently had the correct level of security clearance to be accessing the information...he reportedly didn't "hack" his way through anything to get to the documents which might have raised some red flags...), is accused of accessing the material and copying it onto a writeable CD labeled "Lady Gaga" and walking out the door with it. Upload and... Done. In the same article, the accused is quoted as saying "Information should be free. It belongs in the public domain." Now think about all the confidential information in your company or non-profit... from credit card information, to phone records, to customer or donor lists, to corporate strategy documents, product cost information, etc, etc.... And then think about that last quote above from what was a very junior level person in the organization...still feeling comfortable with your ability to control all your information? So what can you do to guard against these types of breaches where there is no outsider (or even insider) intrusion to detect per se, but rather someone with malicious intent is physically walking out the door with data that they are otherwise allowed to access in their daily work? A major first step it to make it physically, logistically much harder to walk away with the information. If the user with malicious intent has no way to copy to removable or moble media (USB sticks, thumb drives, CDs, DVDs, memory cards, or even laptop disk drives) then, as a practical matter it is much more difficult to physically move the information outside the firewall. But how can you control access tightly and reliably and still keep your hundreds or even thousands of users productive in their daily job? Oracle Desktop Virtualization products can help.Oracle's comprehensive suite of desktop virtualization and access products allow your applications and, most importantly, the related data, to stay in the (highly secured) data center while still allowing secure access from just about anywhere your users need to be to be productive.  Users can securely access all the data they need to do their job, whether from work, from home, or on the road and in the field, but fully configurable policies set up centrally by privileged administrators allow you to control whether, for instance, they are allowed to print documents or use USB devices or other removable media.  Centrally set policies can also control not only whether they can download to removable devices, but also whether they can upload information (see StuxNet for why that is important...)In fact, by using Sun Ray Client desktop hardware, which does not contain any disk drives, or removable media drives, even theft of the desktop device itself would not make you vulnerable to data loss, unlike a laptop that can be stolen with hundreds of gigabytes of information on its disk drive.  And for extreme security situations, Sun Ray Clients even come standard with the ability to use fibre optic ethernet networking to each client to prevent the possibility of unauthorized monitoring of network traffic.But even without Sun Ray Client hardware, users can leverage Oracle's Secure Global Desktop software or the Oracle Virtual Desktop Client to securely access server-resident applications, desktop sessions, or full desktop virtual machines without persisting any application data on the desktop or laptop being used to access the information.  And, again, even in this context, the Oracle products allow you to control what gets uploaded, downloaded, or printed for example.Another benefit of Oracle's Desktop Virtualization and access products is the ability to rapidly and easily shut off user access centrally through administrative polices if, for example, an employee changes roles or leaves the company and should no longer have access to the information.Oracle's Desktop Virtualization suite of products can help reduce operating expense and increase user productivity, and those are good reasons alone to consider their use.  But the dynamics of today's world dictate that security is one of the top reasons for implementing a virtual desktop architecture in enterprises.For more information on these products, view the webpages on www.oracle.com and the Oracle Technology Network website.

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  • How to find domain registrar and DNS hosting with good DNSSEC support?

    - by rsp
    Simplified problem I want to buy a domain and make a website that is fully secured with DNSSEC. Background I've been hearing about the insecurity of DNS for years. I've watched all of the talks by Dan Kaminsky and others from DNS exploits to The future of DNS Security Panel. I knew that using DNS without security is a disaster waiting to happen. I followed the development of the DNSSEC standard. I celebrated the key signing ceremony. Everything was on the right track to finally have a secure DNS system in place. And now more than 2 years later I wanted to just do what everyone said I should do: use DNSSEC for a new domain. So I need a domain registrar and a DNS hosting service that supports DNSSEC. Surprisingly it is not that easy to even find out who does support DNSSEC. It was actually much easier to find info on DNSSEC two years ago when everyone was going to support DNSSEC Real Soon Now but now years passed and I hardly see any progress done. I just hope that I was just looking in the wrong places and someone here will explain all of the doubts. I hope that other people who want to have a secure website will also find this question useful. What is needed registrar and DNS servers with full DNSSEC support for .com domains What is not needed IPv6 support Web hosting anything more What I found out so far Go Daddy offers Premium DNS service for additional $36 per year that lets you "Secure up to 5 domains with DNSSEC". easyDNS has DNSSEC available in Beta across all service levels (you need to enable the "beta" flag in configuration) but it doesn't seem to be production ready and judging from the lack of updates it isn't a feature of highest priority (the last update from March 2011 on the easyDNS blog). Name.com - according to The Register (US domain registrar does IPv6, DNSSEC) it has DNSSEC support since 2010 but right now (October 2012) I couldn't find anything related to DNSSEC on their website. Dynadot that is very often recommended doesn't support DNSSEC Namecheap that is also often recommended doesn't support DNSSEC. The support answer from 2011 suggested that it was being added but in 2012 still no ETA is given to customers. DynDNS was supposed to support DNSSEC, I found a link explaining DNSSEC support but it gives 404 Not Found page and offers a search box - when searching for DNSSEC I get "No results were found for your query." GKG was recommended online for DNSSEC support but it's hard to find any information on the level of DNSSEC support - there is a brief explanation on what is DNSSEC and how to sign Delegation Signer records in their FAQ but no information about the level of actual support can be found. Ask Slashdot: Which Registrars Support DNSSEC? from July 2011 - Answers list Go Daddy, DynDNS, GKG, Name.com as registrars that support DNSSEC but: see above. Related questions How to find web hosting that meets my requirements? What is needed to add DNSSEC to my site? DNS hosting better managed by Domain provider or Hosting provider? Registrar with good security, DNS hosting, and DNSSEC and IPv6 resolvers? In no. 1 no one is ever mentioning DNS at all. In no. 2 answers only mention the .se TLD, there are very few answers and they seem very outdated. In no. 3 one answer says "On projects that demand higher security, I might look for a web host that supports DNSSEC" but no more information is provided. The only relevant answers are in no. 4 where easyDNS is recommended by someone who has never used them personally. Meanwhile, as of October 2012, the support of DNSSEC is described as "in beta" on the easyDNS feature list. Another one recommends SiteGround but searching their site for DNSSEC returns no results. Other answers recommend web hosting providers that don't meet the requirement of DNSSEC support. Also the question mentioned above lists 9 very specific requirements other than only DNSSEC (like eg. HTTP-only login cookies, two-factor authentications, no DNS record limits, DNS statistics of queries/day, audit trails etc.) which might have excluded many possible recommendations if one is only interested in DNSSEC support. Conclusions I thought that by the end of 2012 the support of DNSSEC among domain registrars and DNS providers would be nearly universal. I am shocked that the support seems virtually nonexistent. Is this a result of some serious problems with the DNSSEC adoption? Or is it just not a hot topic and no one bothers anymore? According to the DNSSEC Scoreboard roughly about 0.1% of .com domains support DNSSEC. Could that be caused by the lack of DNSSEC support among registrars and DNS providers, is the information too hard to find or maybe no one cares? There is even no "dnssec" tag here. Questions The information is surprisingly hard to find. That is why I am asking for first-hand experience and personal recommendations. Has anyone here actually set up a website with DNSSEC, from the domain registration to the configuration of DNS servers? Can anyone recommend any of the registrars mentioned above? Can anyone recommend any registrar not mentioned above?

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  • Take Advantage of Oracle's Ongoing Assurance Effort!

    - by eric.maurice
    Hi, this is Eric Maurice again! A few years ago, I posted a blog entry, which discussed the psychology of patching. The point of this blog entry was that a natural tendency existed for systems and database administrators to be reluctant to apply patches, even security patches, because of the fear of "breaking" the system. Unfortunately, this belief in the principle "if it ain't broke, don't fix it!" creates significant risks for organizations. Running systems without applying the proper security patches can greatly compromise the security posture of the organization because the security controls available in the affected system may be compromised as a result of the existence of the unfixed vulnerabilities. As a result, Oracle continues to strongly recommend that customers apply all security fixes as soon as possible. Most recently, I have had a number of conversations with customers who questioned the need to upgrade their highly stable but otherwise unsupported Oracle systems. These customers wanted to know more about the kind of security risks they were exposed to, by running obsolete versions of Oracle software. As per Oracle Support Policies, Critical Patch Updates are produced for currently supported products. In other words, Critical Patch Updates are not created by Oracle for product versions that are no longer covered under the Premier Support or Extended Support phases of the Lifetime Support Policy. One statement used in each Critical Patch Update Advisory is particularly important: "We recommend that customers upgrade to a supported version of Oracle products in order to obtain patches. Unsupported products, releases and versions are not tested for the presence of vulnerabilities addressed by this Critical Patch Update. However, it is likely that earlier versions of affected releases are also affected by these vulnerabilities." The purpose of this warning is to inform Oracle customers that a number of the vulnerabilities fixed in each Critical Patch Update may affect older versions of a specific product line. In other words, each Critical Patch Update provides a number of fixes for currently supported versions of a given product line (this information is listed for each bug in the Risk Matrices of the Critical Patch Update Advisory), but the unsupported versions in the same product line, while they may be affected by the vulnerabilities, will not receive the fixes, and are therefore vulnerable to attacks. The risk assumed by organizations wishing to remain on unsupported versions is amplified by the behavior of malicious hackers, who typically will attempt to, and sometimes succeed in, reverse-engineering the content of vendors' security fixes. As a result, it is not uncommon for exploits to be published soon after Oracle discloses vulnerabilities with the release of a Critical Patch Update or Security Alert. Let's consider now the nature of the vulnerabilities that may exist in obsolete versions of Oracle software. A number of severe vulnerabilities have been fixed by Oracle over the years. While Oracle does not test unsupported products, releases and versions for the presence of vulnerabilities addressed by each Critical Patch Update, it should be assumed that a number of the vulnerabilities fixed with the Critical Patch Update program do exist in unsupported versions (regardless of the product considered). The most severe vulnerabilities fixed in past Critical Patch Updates may result in full compromise of the targeted systems, down to the OS level, by remote and unauthenticated users (these vulnerabilities receive a CVSS Base Score of 10.0) or almost as critically, may result in the compromise of the affected systems (without compromising the underlying OS) by a remote and unauthenticated users (these vulnerabilities receive a CVSS Base Score of 7.5). Such vulnerabilities may result in complete takeover of the targeted machine (for the CVSS 10.0), or may result in allowing the attacker the ability to create a denial of service against the affected system or even hijacking or stealing all the data hosted by the compromised system (for the CVSS 7.5). The bottom line is that organizations should assume the worst case: that the most critical vulnerabilities are present in their unsupported version; therefore, it is Oracle's recommendation that all organizations move to supported systems and apply security patches in a timely fashion. Organizations that currently run supported versions but may be late in their security patch release level can quickly catch up because most Critical Patch Updates are cumulative. With a few exceptions noted in Oracle's Critical Patch Update Advisory, the application of the most recent Critical Patch Update will bring these products to current security patch level and provide the organization with the best possible security posture for their patch level. Furthermore, organizations are encouraged to upgrade to most recent versions as this will greatly improve their security posture. At Oracle, our security fixing policies state that security fixes are produced for the main code line first, and as a result, our products benefit from the mistakes made in previous version(s). Our ongoing assurance effort ensures that we work diligently to fix the vulnerabilities we find, and aim at constantly improving the security posture our products provide by default. Patch sets include numerous in-depth fixes in addition to those delivered through the Critical Patch Update and, in certain instances, important security fixes require major architectural changes that can only be included in new product releases (and cannot be backported through the Critical Patch Update program). For More Information: • Mary Ann Davidson is giving a webcast interview on Oracle Software Security Assurance on February 24th. The registration link for attending this webcast is located at http://event.on24.com/r.htm?e=280304&s=1&k=6A7152F62313CA09F77EBCEEA9B6294F&partnerref=EricMblog • A blog entry discussing Oracle's practices for ensuring the quality of Critical patch Updates can be found at http://blogs.oracle.com/security/2009/07/ensuring_critical_patch_update_quality.html • The blog entry "To patch or not to patch" is located at http://blogs.oracle.com/security/2008/01/to_patch_or_not_to_patch.html • Oracle's Support Policies are located at http://www.oracle.com/us/support/policies/index.html • The Critical Patch Update & Security Alert page is located at http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alerts-086861.html

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  • How do you make Bastille work and secure Ubuntu 12.04? It doesnt work for me `sudo bastille -x`

    - by BobMil
    I was able to install bastille from the normal repositories and then run the GUI. After going through the options and clicking OK to apply, it showed these errors. Do you know why Bastille wont work on Ubuntu 12.04? NOTE: Executing PSAD Specific Configuration NOTE: Executing File Permissions Specific Configuration NOTE: Executing Account Security Specific Configuration NOTE: Executing Boot Security Specific Configuration ERROR: Unable to open /etc/inittab as the swap file /etc/inittab.bastille already exists. Rename the swap file to allow Bastille to make desired file modifications. ERROR: open /etc/inittab.bastille failed... ERROR: open /etc/inittab failed. ERROR: Couldn't insert line to /etc/inittab, since open failed.NOTE: Executing Inetd Specific Configuration

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