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  • Ajax cross domain in Safari/Chrome

    - by jAndy
    Hi Folks, Firefox & IE's do have browser-settings where an user may allow those forbidden cross domain calls. My question: Is there a similar setting/option in Safari's and/or Chrome browsers? Kind Regards --Andy

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  • What's an appropriate HTTP status code to return by a REST API service for a validation failure?

    - by michaeljoseph
    I'm currently returning 401 Unauthorized whenever I encounter a validation failure in my Django/Piston based REST API application. Having had a look at the HTTP Status Code Registry I'm not convinced that this is an appropriate code for a validation failure, what do y'all recommend? 400 Bad Request 401 Unauthorized 403 Forbidden 405 Method Not Allowed 406 Not Acceptable 412 Precondition Failed 417 Expectation Failed 422 Unprocessable Entity 424 Failed Dependency Update: "Validation failure" above means an application level data validation failure ie. incorrectly specified datetime, bogus email address etc.

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  • WCF client throws SocketException if I'm also running a Fiddler

    - by user437291
    Hi I'm trying to use Fiddler2 to inspect SOAP messages exchanged between WCF client and WCF service ( both client and service are running on same machine). But problem is, whenever I use Fiddler2, WCF client reports "EndpointnotFoundException:There was no endpoint listening at http://a-PC:8100 that could accept the message à System.Net.WebException: Unable to connect to the remote server - à System.Net.Sockets-SocketException:An attempt was made to access a socket in a way forbidden by its access permissions 127.0.0.1:8888" Thank you

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  • Include ":" character in parameter using Apache's mod_rewrite

    - by travis
    I use something like that to pass to the parameter 'text' what follows after the domain RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-d RewriteRule ^(.*)$ index.php?text=$1 [L,QSA] So if I have www.example.com/tralala I get $text='tralala' But I want it to be possible to have in the parameter the character ":" multiple times: www.example.com/me:you:him Can you give me a hand? If I test www.example.com/me:you:him I get the error: Forbidden You don't have permission to access /you:me:him on this server.

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  • Stop people from viewing contents of a directory

    - by pingu
    I want to stop people from viewing the contents of my images directory. I've built an app using Codeigniter and notice that they just have index.html pages with a 403 Forbidden message in all directories - is this a secure method to use? Is an index.html page in the directory sufficient or do I need to update config or .htaccess?

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  • How to disable customization for the TabBar?

    - by mana
    Hey, within my App it should be forbidden to edit (customize) the TabBar. This means there should be no edit button and no other possibility to change the order of the items. (this is not my decision, the boss wants it that way :) ) I can't find a property to do this - so is this possible after all? cheers

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  • basics of c++ encapsulation

    - by sasquatch
    I have a task to create class Encapsulation, with fields in available encapsulation sections. Then I must create an application showing all allowed and forbidden methods of fields access. What are the encapsulations sections in c++ ? And what methods apart from object.field or *object-field are there anyway ?

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  • Get an iPad/iPhones unique information from your app?

    - by MikeN
    How do you get the unique identifying information from an iPhone/iPad within an app? For instance, I want my app to send support emails to my website for users who have problems and I need to uniquely identify the phone number/id of the device it is running on. Is this possible, forbidden?

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  • FTP cannot access virtual folder

    - by user88746
    I've created a virtual folder for a folder residing at C:\Documents and Settings\..\Data Remote users are able to see the base folder of the FTP site, but are unable to see the Virtual folder. Is sharing a folder in the path forbidden? -zeekial

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  • hidden folders in Internet

    - by lego69
    very often in Internet I see links like this: www.abcde.com/~main/material/hello and this part ~main/material/hello is grey, if I remove hello I receive access forbidden, can somebody explain, what is this system, and is it possible receive access?

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  • Desktop Fun: Merry Christmas Fonts

    - by Asian Angel
    Christmas will soon be here and there are lots of cards, invitations, gift tags, photos, and more to prepare beforehand. To help you get ready we have gathered together a great collection of fun holiday fonts to help turn those ordinary looking holiday items into extraordinary looking ones. Note: To manage the fonts on your Windows 7, Vista, & XP systems see our article here. Oldchristmas Download Holly Download Christmas Flakes *includes two font types Download Frosty Download Kingthings Christmas Download Candy Time Download BodieMF Holly Download Snowfall Download Snowflake Letters Download Hultog Snowdrift Download AlphaShapes Xmas Trees Download Christmas Tree Download PF Wreath Download Snowy Caps Download PF Snowman *includes three font types Note: Shown in all capital letters here. Download BJF Holly Bells Download Christbaumkugeln Download Xmas Lights Download XmasDings *includes 62 individual characters Note: This group represents A – Z in all capital letters. Note: This group represents A – Z in all lower case letters. Note: This group represents the numbers 0 – 9. Download WWFlakes *includes 62 individual characters Note: This group represents A – Z in all capital letters. Note: This group represents A – Z in all lower case letters. Note: This group represents the numbers 0 – 9. Download For Christmas Card creating fun and a great way to use your new fonts see our MS Word Christmas Card project series here. Design and Print Your Own Christmas Cards in MS Word, Part 1 Design and Print Your Own Christmas Cards in MS Word, Part 2: How to Print Want more great ways to customize your computer? Then be certain to look through our Desktop Fun section. Latest Features How-To Geek ETC The How-To Geek Holiday Gift Guide (Geeky Stuff We Like) LCD? LED? Plasma? The How-To Geek Guide to HDTV Technology The How-To Geek Guide to Learning Photoshop, Part 8: Filters Improve Digital Photography by Calibrating Your Monitor Our Favorite Tech: What We’re Thankful For at How-To Geek The How-To Geek Guide to Learning Photoshop, Part 7: Design and Typography Happy Snow Bears Theme for Chrome and Iron [Holiday] Download Full Command and Conquer: Tiberian Sun Game for Free Scorched Cometary Planet Wallpaper Quick Fix: Add the RSS Button Back to the Firefox Awesome Bar Dropbox Desktop Client 1.0.0 RC for Windows, Linux, and Mac Released Hang in There Scrat! – Ice Age Wallpaper

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • Sixeyed.Caching available now on NuGet and GitHub!

    - by Elton Stoneman
    Originally posted on: http://geekswithblogs.net/EltonStoneman/archive/2013/10/22/sixeyed.caching-available-now-on-nuget-and-github.aspxThe good guys at Pluralsight have okayed me to publish my caching framework (as seen in Caching in the .NET Stack: Inside-Out) as an open-source library, and it’s out now. You can get it here: Sixeyed.Caching source code on GitHub, and here: Sixeyed.Caching package v1.0.0 on NuGet. If you haven’t seen the course, there’s a preview here on YouTube: In-Process and Out-of-Process Caches, which gives a good flavour. The library is a wrapper around various cache providers, including the .NET MemoryCache, AppFabric cache, and  memcached*. All the wrappers inherit from a base class which gives you a set of common functionality against all the cache implementations: •    inherits OutputCacheProvider, so you can use your chosen cache provider as an ASP.NET output cache; •    serialization and encryption, so you can configure whether you want your cache items serialized (XML, JSON or binary) and encrypted; •    instrumentation, you can optionally use performance counters to monitor cache attempts and hits, at a low level. The framework wraps up different caches into an ICache interface, and it lets you use a provider directly like this: Cache.Memory.Get<RefData>(refDataKey); - or with configuration to use the default cache provider: Cache.Default.Get<RefData>(refDataKey); The library uses Unity’s interception framework to implement AOP caching, which you can use by flagging methods with the [Cache] attribute: [Cache] public RefData GetItem(string refDataKey) - and you can be more specific on the required cache behaviour: [Cache(CacheType=CacheType.Memory, Days=1] public RefData GetItem(string refDataKey) - or really specific: [Cache(CacheType=CacheType.Disk, SerializationFormat=SerializationFormat.Json, Hours=2, Minutes=59)] public RefData GetItem(string refDataKey) Provided you get instances of classes with cacheable methods from the container, the attributed method results will be cached, and repeated calls will be fetched from the cache. You can also set a bunch of cache defaults in application config, like whether to use encryption and instrumentation, and whether the cache system is enabled at all: <sixeyed.caching enabled="true"> <performanceCounters instrumentCacheTotalCounts="true" instrumentCacheTargetCounts="true" categoryNamePrefix ="Sixeyed.Caching.Tests"/> <encryption enabled="true" key="1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef" iv="1234567890abcdef"/> <!-- key must be 32 characters, IV must be 16 characters--> </sixeyed.caching> For AOP and methods flagged with the cache attribute, you can override the compile-time cache settings at runtime with more config (keyed by the class and method name): <sixeyed.caching enabled="true"> <targets> <target keyPrefix="MethodLevelCachingStub.GetRandomIntCacheConfiguredInternal" enabled="false"/> <target keyPrefix="MethodLevelCachingStub.GetRandomIntCacheExpiresConfiguredInternal" seconds="1"/> </targets> It’s released under the MIT license, so you can use it freely in your own apps and modify as required. I’ll be adding more content to the GitHub wiki, which will be the main source of documentation, but for now there’s an FAQ to get you started. * - in the course the framework library also wraps NCache Express, but there's no public redistributable library that I can find, so it's not in Sixeyed.Caching.

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  • Harmonizing Character Encoding Between Imported Data and MySQL

    MySQL's Latin-1 default encoding combined with MySQL 4.1.12's (or greater) UTF8 encoding allows the maximum number of characters codes, however incoming data with different character encoding can still present problems. Rob Gravelle shows you how to avoid problems before a lot of work is required to undo the damage.

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  • Harmonizing Character Encoding Between Imported Data and MySQL

    MySQL's Latin-1 default encoding combined with MySQL 4.1.12's (or greater) UTF8 encoding allows the maximum number of characters codes, however incoming data with different character encoding can still present problems. Rob Gravelle shows you how to avoid problems before a lot of work is required to undo the damage.

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  • Adding Descriptive Flex Field (DFF) through OAF Personalization

    - by Manoj Madhusoodanan
    In this blog I will explain how to add a DFF to a existing OAF page through personalization.I am using Supplier Quick Update Page ( /oracle/apps/pos/supplier/webui/SuppSummPG ). If you want to see how to create DFF please click here. In this scenario I am using a custom DFF. Following are the details. Application -> Payables ( Code: SQLAP )Name -> XXCUST_SUPPLIER_DFFTitle -> XXCUST - Supplier DFFTable Name -> AP_SUPPLIERSDFV View name -> XXCUST_SUPPLIER_DFVReference Fields -> ATTRIBUTE_CATEGORY Following are the Context Field Details. Prompt -> Supplier TypeValue Set -> XXCUST_SUP_TYPE ( Values : External and Internal )Reference Field -> ATTRIBUTE_CATEGORY Below table shows the segment details of XXCUST_SUPPLIER_DFF. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:10.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";} Code Segments Column Value Set Global Data Elements Identification Number ATTRIBUTE1 15 Characters External Type ATTRIBUTE2 XXCUST_EXT_SUP_TYPE Values          Domestic           International Internal Department ATTRIBUTE2 15 Characters Following steps you need to perform to create flex item in the Quick Update page. 1) Click on Personalize Page.In the Personalize Page click on Complete View. 2) Click on Create Item.( Based on where you want to place the DFF choose appropriate layout). 3) Create flex item with following details. 4) If you want to arrange the item in the page click on Reorder. Following is the output.

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  • Hugh Bin-Haad's SQL Rumours

    - by Paul Nielsen
    Insider rumours and gossip from the murky world of the Database Industry, and from the colourful characters that inhabit it http://www.simple-talk.com/sql/editors-corner/insider-insights/ Share this post: email it! | bookmark it! | digg it! | reddit! | kick it! | live it!...(read more)

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  • Hugh Bin-Haad's SQL Rumours

    - by Paul Nielsen
    Insider rumours and gossip from the murky world of the Database Industry, and from the colourful characters that inhabit it http://www.simple-talk.com/sql/editors-corner/insider-insights/ Share this post: email it! | bookmark it! | digg it! | reddit! | kick it! | live it!...(read more)

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  • F# in 90 Seconds

    - by Ben Griswold
    I mentioned in a previous post that we’ve started a languages club at the office.  In an effort to decide which language we will first concentrate on, I volunteered to give the rundown on F#.  Rather than providing a summary here, I’ve provided my slide deck for your viewing enjoyment.  There’s nothing special here outside of a some pretty cool characters from The 56 Geeks Project by Scott Johnson and collection of information from my prior functional programming presentations.   Download F# in 90 Seconds

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  • Silverlight Cream for June 03, 2010 -- #875

    - by Dave Campbell
    In this Issue: Ben Hodson, Fons Sonnemans, SilverLaw, Mike Snow, John Papa, René Schulte, Walt Ritscher, and David Anson. Shoutouts: René Schulte announced a whole batch of new features for WriteableBitmap that are now available: Filled To The Bursting Point - WriteableBitmapEx 0.9.5.0 Check out John Papa's Sticky Seesmic Desktop Plugin ... download it, play with it... he's going to blog about building plugins later Tim Heuer reported a Silverlight 4 minor update–June 2010 Erik Mork and Crew have a new Podcast up: This Week in Silverlight: Redmond Exodus? From SilverlightCream.com: Tutorial for Configuring Silverlight 4, Entity Framework and WCF RIA Services in Separate Component Assemblies (DLL’s) Ben Hodson is a new author(to me) that submitted his post at SilverlightCream.com... this is a good-looking tutorial on configuring separate component assemblies for all your project pieces. SpiralText in Silverlight 4 Fons Sonnemans had a good time playing with the PathListBox in Blend and produced a demo of text on a Spiral... you can run it right on the post, then grab the code. How To: Starting A Storyboard Not Before The Application Has Completed Loading - Silverlight 4 SilverLaw takes a look at the problem of having a Storyboard start too early, and demonstrates code to avoid the problem. Silverlight Tip of the Day#27 – Displaying Special Characters in XAML Mike Snow's latest Tip of the day is on encoding 'special' characters for use in XAML... simple looking at it, frustrating to debug if you don't do it right. Diving into the RichTextBox (Silverlight TV #31) John Papa talks about the RichTextBox with Mark Rideout in this edition of Silverlight TV. Mark provides a great video tutorial for the control. Push and Pull - Silverlight Webcam Capturing Details Boy, René Schulte doesn't slow down does he?... his latest is (in his words from a section heading) "Silverlight Webcam 101" ... and he means it... this is one to save to OneNote or as a PDF! Looking for Silverlight BiDi or RTL? Use the FlowDirection property If you need RTL or BiDi in Silverlight and you haven't checked it out yet, Walt Ritscher has a nice intro up on using the FlowDirection property, with demos and code. How to: Show text labels on a numeric axis with Silverlight/WPF Toolkit Charting David Anson has another charting puzzle resolved on his site... putting text labels on the dependent axis. Stay in the 'Light! Twitter SilverlightNews | Twitter WynApse | WynApse.com | Tagged Posts | SilverlightCream Join me @ SilverlightCream | Phoenix Silverlight User Group Technorati Tags: Silverlight    Silverlight 3    Silverlight 4    Windows Phone MIX10

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  • Design considerations on JSON schema for scalars with a consistent attachment property

    - by casperOne
    I'm trying to create a JSON schema for the results of doing statistical analysis based on disparate pieces of data. The current schema I have looks something like this: { // Basic key information. video : "http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uwfjpfK0jo", start : "00:00:00", end : null, // For results of analysis, to be populated: // *** This is where it gets interesting *** analysis : { game : { value: "Super Street Fighter 4: Arcade Edition Ver. 2012", confidence: 0.9725 } teams : [ { player : { value : "Desk", confidence: 0.95, } characters : [ { value : "Hakan", confidence: 0.80 } ] } ] } } The issue is the tuples that are used to store a value and the confidence related to that value (i.e. { value : "some value", confidence : 0.85 }), populated after the results of the analysis. This leads to a creep of this tuple for every value. Take a fully-fleshed out value from the characters array: { name : { value : "Hakan", confidence: 0.80 } ultra : { value: 1, confidence: 0.90 } } As the structures that represent the values become more and more detailed (and more analysis is done on them to try and determine the confidence behind that analysis), the nesting of the tuples adds great deal of noise to the overall structure, considering that the final result (when verified) will be: { name : "Hakan", ultra : 1 } (And recall that this is just a nested value) In .NET (in which I'll be using to work with this data), I'd have a little helper like this: public class UnknownValue<T> { T Value { get; set; } double? Confidence { get; set; } } Which I'd then use like so: public class Character { public UnknownValue<Character> Name { get; set; } } While the same as the JSON representation in code, it doesn't have the same creep because I don't have to redefine the tuple every time and property accessors hide the appearance of creep. Of course, this is an apples-to-oranges comparison, the above is code while the JSON is data. Is there a more formalized/cleaner/best practice way of containing the creep of these tuples in JSON, or is the approach above an accepted approach for the type of data I'm trying to store (and I'm just perceiving it the wrong way)? Note, this is being represented in JSON because this will ultimately go in a document database (something like RavenDB or elasticsearch). I'm not concerned about being able to serialize into the object above, because I can always use data transfer objects to facilitate getting data into/out of my underlying data store.

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  • Conversion of BizTalk Projects to Use the New WCF-SAP Adaptor

    - by Geordie
    We are in the process of upgrading our BizTalk Environment from BizTalk 2006 R2 to BizTalk 2010. The SAP adaptor in BizTalk 2010 is an all new and more powerful WCF-SAP adaptor. When my colleagues tested out the new adaptor they discovered that the format of the data extracted from SAP was not identical to the old adaptor. This is not a big deal if the structure of the messages from SAP is simple. In this case we were receiving the delivery and invoice iDocs. Both these structures are complex especially the delivery document. Over the past few years I have tweaked the delivery mapping to remove bugs from original mapping. The idea of redoing these maps did not appeal and due to the current work load was not even an option. I opted for a rather crude alternative of pulling in the iDoc in the new typed format and then adding a static map at the start of the orchestration to convert the data to the old schema.  Note WCF-SAP data formats (on the binding tab of the configuration dialog box is the ‘RecieiveIdocFormat’ field): Typed:  Returns a XML document with the hierarchy represented in XML and all fields being represented by XML tags. RFC: Returns an XML document with the hierarchy represented in XML but the iDoc lines in flat file format. String: This returns the iDoc in a format that is closest to the original flat file format but is still wrapped with some top level XML tags. The files also contained some strange characters at the end of each line. I started with the invoice document and it was quite straight forward to add the mapping but this is where my problems started. The orchestrations for these documents are dynamic and so require the identity of the partner to be able to correctly configure the orchestration. The partner identity is in the EDI_DC40 segment of the iDoc. In the old project the RECPRN node of the segment was promoted. The code to set a variable to the partner ID was now failing. After lot of head scratching I discovered the problem was due to the addition of Namespaces to the fields in the EDI_DC40 segment. To overcome this I needed to use an xPath query with a Namespace Manager. This had to be done in custom code. I now tried to repeat the process with the delivery document. Unfortunately when we tried to get sample typed data from SAP an exception was thrown. The adapter "WCF-SAP" raised an error message. Details "Microsoft.ServiceModel.Channels.Common.XmlReaderGenerationException: The segment or group definition E2EDKA1001 was not found in the IDoc metadata. The UniqueId of the IDoc type is: IDOCTYP/3/DESADV01/ZASNEXT1/640. For Receive operations, the SAP adapter does not support unreleased segments.   Our guess is that when the WCF-SAP adaptor tries to down load the data it retrieves a data schema from SAP. For some reason the schema does not match the data. This may be due to the version of SAP we are running or due to a customization. Either way resolving this problem did not look easy. When doing some research on this problem I found an article showing me how to get the data from SAP using the WCF-SAP adaptor without any XML tags. http://blogs.msdn.com/b/adapters/archive/2007/10/05/receiving-idocs-getting-the-raw-idoc-data.aspx Reproduction of Mustansir blog: Since the WCF based SAP Adapter is ... well, WCF based, all data flowing in and out of the adapter is encapsulated within a SOAP message. Which means there are those pesky xml tags all over the place. If you want to receive an Idoc from SAP, you can receive it in "Typed" format (in which case each column in each segment of the idoc appears within its own xml tag), or you can receive it in "String" format (in which case there are just 2 xml tags at the top, the raw xml data in string/flat file format, and the 2 closing xml tags). In "String" format, an incoming idoc (for ORDERS05, containing 5 data records) would look like: <ReceiveIdoc ><idocData>EDI_DC40 8000000000001064985620 E2EDK01005 800000000000106498500000100000001 E2EDK14 8000000000001064985000002000000020111000 E2EDK14 8000000000001064985000003000000020081000 E2EDK14 80000000000010649850000040000000200710 E2EDK14 80000000000010649850000050000000200600</idocData></ReceiveIdoc> (I have trimmed part of the control record so that it fits cleanly here on one line). Now, you're only interested in the IDOC data, and don't care much for the XML tags. It isn't that difficult to write your own pipeline component, or even some logic in the orchestration to remove the tags, right? Well, you don't need to write any extra code at all - the WCF Adapter can help you here! During the configuration of your one-way Receive Location using WCF-Custom, navigate to the Messages tab. Under the section "Inbound BizTalk Messge Body", select the "Path" radio button, and: (a) Enter the body path expression as: /*[local-name()='ReceiveIdoc']/*[local-name()='idocData'] (b) Choose "String" for the Node Encoding. What we've done is, used an XPATH to pull out the value of the "idocData" node from the XML. Your Receive Location will now emit text containing only the idoc data. You can at this point, for example, put the Flat File Pipeline component to convert the flat text into a different xml format based on some other schema you already have, and receive your version of the xml formatted message in your orchestration.   This was potentially a much easier solution than adding the static maps to the orchestrations and overcame the issue with ‘Typed’ delivery documents. Not quite so fast… Note: When I followed Mustansir’s blog the characters at the end of each line disappeared. After configuring the adaptor and passing the iDoc data into the original flat file receive pipelines I was receiving exceptions. There was a failure executing the receive pipeline: "PAPINETPipelines.DeliveryFlatFileReceive, CustomerIntegration2.PAPINET.Pipelines, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=4ca3635fbf092bbb" Source: "Pipeline " Receive Port: "recSAP_Delivery" URI: "D:\CustomerIntegration2\SAP\Delivery\*.xml" Reason: An error occurred when parsing the incoming document: "Unexpected data found while looking for: 'Z2EDPZ7' The current definition being parsed is E2EDP07GRP. The stream offset where the error occured is 8859. The line number where the error occured is 23. The column where the error occured is 0.". Although the new flat file looked the same as the old one there was a differences. In the original file all lines in the document were exactly 1064 character long. In the new file all lines were truncated to the last alphanumeric character. The final piece of the puzzle was to add a custom pipeline component to pad all the lines to 1064 characters. This component was added to the decode node of the custom delivery and invoice flat file disassembler pipelines. Execute method of the custom pipeline component: public IBaseMessage Execute(IPipelineContext pc, IBaseMessage inmsg) { //Convert Stream to a string Stream s = null; IBaseMessagePart bodyPart = inmsg.BodyPart;   // NOTE inmsg.BodyPart.Data is implemented only as a setter in the http adapter API and a //getter and setter for the file adapter. Use GetOriginalDataStream to get data instead. if (bodyPart != null) s = bodyPart.GetOriginalDataStream();   string newMsg = string.Empty; string strLine; try { StreamReader sr = new StreamReader(s); strLine = sr.ReadLine(); while (strLine != null) { //Execute padding code if (strLine != null) strLine = strLine.PadRight(1064, ' ') + "\r\n"; newMsg += strLine; strLine = sr.ReadLine(); } sr.Close(); } catch (IOException ex) { throw new Exception("Error occured trying to pad the message to 1064 charactors"); }   //Convert back to stream and set to Data property inmsg.BodyPart.Data = new MemoryStream(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(newMsg)); ; //reset the position of the stream to zero inmsg.BodyPart.Data.Position = 0; return inmsg; }

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