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  • Using my own Postfix, filtering spam and getting all the mail into my ISP's inbox

    - by djechelon
    Hello, I currently own a domain bought via GoDaddy.com, which provides me a basic email setup for the most common needs. I configured it to forward all mail to [email protected] to [email protected]. I also own a virtual server with a running Postfix that I use for a specific website (all mail to somedomain.com gets forwarded via LMTP to a program written by me). Since I'm recently experiencing some harassing by spammers, since GoDaddy doesn't seem to filter spam, and since my Windows Phone's Pocket Outlook cannot filter spam, I would like to use SpamAssassin to filter inbound spam by changing my domain's MX records to my server My ideal setup is the following: All mail delivered to somedomain.com gets redirected via LMTP as usual via virtual transport without any spam check All mail to [email protected] gets redirected to [email protected] after a severe spam check I don't care about [email protected] since I use just one address for now I would like to train SpamAssassin with customized spam rules, possibly based on the presence of certain keywords (links to certain unsubscribe pages I found recurring) I currently configured Postfix with transport somedomain.com lmtp:[127.0.0.1]:8025 .somedomain.com error: Cannot accept mail for this domain relay somedomain.com OK (I guess I should add mydomain.com OK too) virtual @mydomain.com [email protected] (looks like a catch-all rule, it's OK as requirement 3) I installed SpamAssassin, I can do rcspamd start and set it to boot with the server, but I don't know if there is anything else to do for use in Postfix, and how to apply requirement 1 (only mail to mydomain.com gets filtered) I also tried to send an email via Telnet to make sure my settings are ready for MX change. I received the message into my account but I found that it gone through secureserver.net, like Postfix didn't rewrite the destination but simply relayed the message. Thank you in advance. I'm no expert in SpamAssassin, and I have little experience in Postfix (enough to avoid making my server an open relay)

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  • What Kind of Spam is This? Testing Blog Comment Limits

    - by Yar
    I received this comment on one of my blogs today (on blogger.com): Easily I agree but I about the post should acquire more info then it has. It's the third in a series. Before there was: I will not acquiesce in on it. I over precise post. Expressly the title attracted me to be familiar with the sound story. and before that Your blog keeps getting better and better! Your older articles are not as good as newer ones you have a lot more creativity and originality now keep it up! It is obviously computer-generated (well, not this last one). The comments are from Anonymous, so they're not trying to legitimate a user on Blogger. Is this a spam attack? What might its goal be? Or are they just testing my blog to see if I reject or not? Does this kind of "attack" have a name?

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  • How to send emails without getting into Spam Act trouble?

    - by Jason
    Lets say I have a database of 60,000 emails. I would like to send them an email notifying them of a new related service (similar to what they've signed up) which adds value to what they already signed up to. I know most of them would welcome it but they did not opt-in for this new related service. I don't want to send out the email invite only to find out I got into some Spam Act trouble. What is a friendly way to reach these targetted audience?

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  • How do you make sure email you send programmatically is not automatically marked as spam?

    - by Leon Bambrick
    This is a tricky one - and I've always relied on techniques such as permission-based emails (i.e. only sending to people you have permission to send to) and not using blatantly spamish terminology. Of late, some of the emails I send out programmatically have started being shuffled into people's spam folder automatically - and I'm wondering what i can do about it. This is despite the fact that these particular emails are not ones that humans would mark as spam (specifically, they are emails that contain license keys that people have paid good money for, so I don't think they're going to consider them spam) I figure this is a big topic in which I am essentially an ignorant simpleton.

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  • Extreme headache from ASSP Extreme Ban

    - by Chase Florell
    I've got a local user on my server that as of today cannot send email from any of their devices. Only Webmail (which doesn't touch any of their devices) works. Here are the various email failures I'm receiving in the logs. Dec-04-12 19:52:47 75966-05166 [SpoofedSender] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [scoring:20] -- No Spoofing Allowed -- [Test]; Dec-04-12 19:52:47 75966-05166 [Extreme] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [spam found] -- score for 111.111.111.111 is 1980, surpassing extreme level of 500 -- [Test] -> spam/Test__1.eml; Dec-04-12 19:52:48 75968-05169 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [scoring:10] -- IP in HELO does not match connection: '[192.168.0.10]' -- [Re Demo Feedbacks for End of November Sales]; Dec-04-12 19:52:48 75968-05169 [SpoofedSender] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [scoring:20] -- No Spoofing Allowed -- [Re Demo Feedbacks for End of November Sales]; Dec-04-12 19:52:48 75968-05169 [Extreme] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [spam found] -- score for 111.111.111.111 is 2020, surpassing extreme level of 500 -- [Re Demo Feedbacks for End of November Sales] ->spam/Re_Demo_Feedbacks_for_End_of_N__2.eml; Dec-04-12 19:52:57 75977-05179 [SpoofedSender] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [scoring:20] -- No Spoofing Allowed -- [test]; Dec-04-12 19:52:57 75977-05179 [Extreme] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [spam found] -- score for 111.111.111.111 is 2040, surpassing extreme level of 500 -- [test] -> spam/test__3.eml; ……………. Dec-04-12 19:55:35 76135-05338 [SpoofedSender] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [scoring:20] -- No Spoofing Allowed -- [test]; Dec-04-12 19:55:35 76135-05338 [MsgID] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [scoring] (Message-ID not valid: 'E8472A91545B44FBAE413F6D8760C7C3@bts'); Dec-04-12 19:55:35 76135-05338 [InvalidHELO] 111.111.111.111 <[email protected]> to: [email protected] [spam found] -- Invalid HELO: 'bts' -- [test] -> discarded/test__4.eml; note: 111.111.111.111 is a replacement for the users home IP address Here is the headers of one of the messages X-Assp-Score: 10 (HELO contains IP: '[192.168.0.10]') X-Assp-Score: 10 (IP in HELO does not match connection: '[192.168.0.10]') X-Assp-Score: 20 (No Spoofing Allowed) X-Assp-Score: 10 (bombSubjectRe: 'sale') X-Assp-Score: 20 (blacklisted HELO '[192.168.0.10]') X-Assp-Score: 45 (DNSBLcache: failed, 111.111.111.111 listed in safe.dnsbl.sorbs.net) X-Assp-DNSBLcache: failed, 174.0.35.31 listed in safe.dnsbl.sorbs.net X-Assp-Received-SPF: fail (cache) ip=174.0.35.31 [email protected] helo=[192.168.0.10] X-Assp-Score: 10 (SPF fail) X-Assp-Envelope-From: [email protected] X-Assp-Intended-For: [email protected] X-Assp-Version: 1.7.5.7(1.0.07) on ASSP.nospam X-Assp-ID: ASSP.nospam (77953-07232) X-Assp-Spam: YES X-Assp-Original-Subject: Re: Demo Feedbacks for End of November Sales X-Spam-Status:yes X-Assp-Spam-Reason: MessageScore (125) over limit (50) X-Assp-Message-Totalscore: 125 Received: from [192.168.0.10] ([111.111.111.111] helo=[192.168.0.10]) with IPv4:25 by ASSP.nospam; 4 Dec 2012 20:25:52 -0700 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-40FE7453-4BE7-4AD6-B297-FB81DAA554EC Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: Re: Demo Feedbacks for End of November Sales References: <003c01cdd22e$eafbc6f0$c0f354d0$@com> From: Some User <[email protected]> In-Reply-To: <003c01cdd22e$eafbc6f0$c0f354d0$@com> Message-Id: <[email protected]> Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2012 19:32:28 -0700 To: External User <[email protected]> Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (10A523) Why is it that a local sender has been banned on our local server, and how can I fix this?

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  • Spam in Whois: How is it done and how do I protect my domain?

    - by user2964971
    Yes, there are answered questions regarding spam in Whois. But still unclear: How do they do it? How should I respond? What precautions can I take? For example: Whois for google.com [...] Server Name: GOOGLE.COM.ZOMBIED.AND.HACKED.BY.WWW.WEB-HACK.COM IP Address: 217.107.217.167 Registrar: DOMAINCONTEXT, INC. Whois Server: whois.domaincontext.com Referral URL: http://www.domaincontext.com Server Name: GOOGLE.COM.ZZZZZ.GET.LAID.AT.WWW.SWINGINGCOMMUNITY.COM IP Address: 69.41.185.195 Registrar: TUCOWS DOMAINS INC. Whois Server: whois.tucows.com Referral URL: http://domainhelp.opensrs.net Server Name: GOOGLE.COM.ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ.GET.ONE.MILLION.DOLLARS.AT.WWW.UNIMUNDI.COM IP Address: 209.126.190.70 Registrar: PDR LTD. D/B/A PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY.COM Whois Server: whois.PublicDomainRegistry.com Referral URL: http://www.PublicDomainRegistry.com Server Name: GOOGLE.COM.ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ.HAVENDATA.COM IP Address: 50.23.75.44 Registrar: PDR LTD. D/B/A PUBLICDOMAINREGISTRY.COM Whois Server: whois.PublicDomainRegistry.com Referral URL: http://www.PublicDomainRegistry.com Server Name: GOOGLE.COMMAS2CHAPTERS.COM IP Address: 216.239.32.21 Registrar: CRAZY DOMAINS FZ-LLC Whois Server: whois.crazydomains.com Referral URL: http://www.crazydomains.com [...] >>> Last update of whois database: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 02:10:51 UTC <<< [...] >>> Last update of WHOIS database: 2014-06-04T19:04:53-0700 <<< [...]

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  • Why is my Drupal Registration email considered spam by gmail? (headers included)

    - by Jasper
    I just created a Drupal website on a uni.cc subdomain that is brand-new also (it has barely had the 24 hours to propagate). However, when signing up for a test account, the confirmation email was marked as spam by gmail. Below are the headers of the email, which may provide some clues. Delivered-To: *my_email*@gmail.com Received: by 10.213.20.84 with SMTP id e20cs81420ebb; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:07:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.115.65.19 with SMTP id s19mr3930949wak.203.1271689651710; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:07:31 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: <[email protected]> Received: from bat.unixbsd.info (bat.unixbsd.info [208.87.242.79]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 12si14637941iwn.9.2010.04.19.08.07.31; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:07:31 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of [email protected] designates 208.87.242.79 as permitted sender) client-ip=208.87.242.79; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of [email protected] designates 208.87.242.79 as permitted sender) [email protected] Received: from nobody by bat.unixbsd.info with local (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from <[email protected]>) id 1O3sZP-0004mH-Ra for *my_email*@gmail.com; Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:07:32 -0700 To: *my_email*@gmail.com Subject: Account details for Test at YuGiOh Rebirth MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed; delsp=yes Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8Bit X-Mailer: Drupal Errors-To: info -A T- yugiohrebirth.uni.cc From: info -A T- yugiohrebirth.uni.cc Message-Id: <[email protected]> Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 08:07:31 -0700 X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - bat.unixbsd.info X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - gmail.com X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [99 500] / [47 12] X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - bat.unixbsd.info X-Source: X-Source-Args: /usr/local/apache/bin/httpd -DSSL X-Source-Dir: gmh.ugtech.net:/public_html/YuGiOhRebirth

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  • Why does my company's software download get blocked by anti-virus programs when downloading from the company website but not other websites?

    - by Adam Burgess
    My company distributes software via website download off of a URL that is on our company's website. The download is an .EXE. We are getting calls from multiple customers saying the download is being blocked. We can help them download by turning off the virus-scan software, but wondering what is causing the block. Here are the details: We have other downloadable .EXEs that download fine without being blocked from the same company website. Our problem download file downloads fine from other websites (i.e., Dropbox) without being blocked. In summary, this one particular download from our company website is being blocked by various anti-virus programs a high percentage of the time. Any suggestions?

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  • Why are emails sent from my applications being marked as spam?

    - by Brian
    Hi. I have 2 web apps running on the same server. The first is www.nimikri.com and the other is www.hourjar.com. Both apps share the same IP address (75.127.100.175). My server is through a shared hosting company. I've been testing my apps, and at first all my emails were being delivered to me just fine. Then a few days ago every email from both apps got dumped into my spam box (in gmail and google apps). So far the apps have just been sending emails to me and nobody else, so I know people aren't manually flagging them as spam. I did a reverse DNS lookup for my IP and the results I got were these: 100.127.75.in-addr.arpa NS DNS2.GNAX.NET. 100.127.75.in-addr.arpa NS DNS1.GNAX.NET. Should the reverse DNS lookup point to nimikri.com and hourjar.com, or are they set up fine the way they are? I noticed in the email header these 2 lines: Received: from nimikri.nimikri.com From: Hour Jar <[email protected]> Would the different domain names be causing gmail to think this is spam? Here is the header from one of the emails. Please let me know if any of this looks like a red flag for spam. Thanks. Delivered-To: [email protected] Received: by 10.231.157.85 with SMTP id a21cs54749ibx; Sun, 25 Apr 2010 10:03:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.151.130.18 with SMTP id h18mr3056714ybn.186.1272214992196; Sun, 25 Apr 2010 10:03:12 -0700 (PDT) Return-Path: <[email protected]> Received: from nimikri.nimikri.com ([75.127.100.175]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 28si4358025gxk.44.2010.04.25.10.03.11; Sun, 25 Apr 2010 10:03:11 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: neutral (google.com: 75.127.100.175 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of [email protected]) client-ip=75.127.100.175; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=neutral (google.com: 75.127.100.175 is neither permitted nor denied by best guess record for domain of [email protected]) [email protected] Received: from nimikri.nimikri.com (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by nimikri.nimikri.com (8.14.3/8.14.3) with ESMTP id o3PH3A7a029986 for <[email protected]>; Sun, 25 Apr 2010 12:03:11 -0500 Date: Sun, 25 Apr 2010 12:03:10 -0500 From: Hour Jar <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Message-ID: <[email protected]> Subject: [email protected] has invited you to New Event MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

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  • Exchange 2003 mail non-delivery (NDR), spam activity? events 7002 & 7004

    - by HighTechGeek
    Windows Server 2003 Small Business Server SP2 Exchange Version 6.5 (Build 7638.2: Service Pack 2) This network has been neglected and has been having email problems for years and was on many blacklists. I was called in after the server eventually crashed... I got the server back up and running, but email problems persist. Outgoing mail delivery is sporadic. Sometimes the mail goes through, sometimes a delayed delivery report is generated after a day or more, and sometimes it seems to go through, but the recipient never receives it. Not sure if spammers are successfully using the server as a relay (see event entries below after turning on maximum SMTP logging)... User PCs infected with viruses and server was blacklisted on many sites (I used mxtoolbox.com) I have cleaned all the PCs and changed all passwords (including administrator) I have requested removal from all of the blacklists - most have removed the listing, some take more time. I have setup rDNS pointer records with the ISP (Comcast) - that was one reason for some of the blacklistings. I have tested that it's not an open relay using telnet as described here: www.amset.info/exchange/smtp-openrelay.asp I followed the advise of a Spamhaus & Microsoft article to enable maximum SMTP logging. http://www.spamhaus.org/faq/answers.lasso?section=isp%20spam%20issues#320 which directed me to Microsoft KB article 895853, specifically, the part 2/3 down titled: "If mail relay occurs from an account on an Exchange computer that is not configured as an open relay" . The Application Event Log is filling with this type of activity (Event ID 7002, 7002 & 3018 errors): Event Type: Error Event Source: MSExchangeTransport Event Category: SMTP Protocol Event ID: 7004 Date: 1/18/2011 Time: 7:33:29 AM User: N/A Computer: SERVER Description: This is an SMTP protocol error log for virtual server ID 1, connection #621. The remote host "212.52.84.180", responded to the SMTP command "rcpt" with "550 #5.1.0 Address rejected [email protected] ". The full command sent was "RCPT TO: ". This will probably cause the connection to fail. and this: Event Type: Warning Event Source: MSExchangeTransport Event Category: SMTP Protocol Event ID: 7002 Date: 1/18/2011 Time: 7:33:29 AM User: N/A Computer: SERVER Description: This is an SMTP protocol warning log for virtual server ID 1, connection #620. The remote host "212.52.84.170", responded to the SMTP command "rcpt" with "452 Too many recipients received this hour ". The full command sent was "RCPT TO: ". This may cause the connection to fail. or a variant of: Event Type: Warning Event Source: MSExchangeTransport Event Category: SMTP Protocol Event ID: 7002 Date: 1/18/2011 Time: 8:39:21 AM User: N/A Computer: SERVER Description: This is an SMTP protocol warning log for virtual server ID 1, connection #661. The remote host "82.57.200.133", responded to the SMTP command "rcpt" with "421 Service not available - too busy ". The full command sent was "RCPT TO: ". This may cause the connection to fail. also Event Type: Error Event Source: MSExchangeTransport Event Category: NDR Event ID: 3018 Date: 1/18/2011 Time: 9:49:37 AM User: N/A Computer: SERVER Description: A non-delivery report with a status code of 5.4.0 was generated for recipient rfc822;[email protected] (Message-ID ). Causes: This message indicates a DNS problem or an IP address configuration problem Solution: Check the DNS using nslookup or dnsq. Verify the IP address is in IPv4 literal format. Data: 0000: ef 02 04 c0 ï..À Any guidance and/or suggestions and/or tests to perform would be greatly appreciated.

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  • All my emails to Yahoo!, Hotmail and AOL are going to Spam, though I've implemented every validation

    - by Chetan
    Hi, I've implemented everything and checked everything (SPF, DomainKey, DKIM, reverse lookup), and only Gmail is allowing my emails to go to Inbox. Yahoo, Hotmail and AOL are all sending my messages to Spam. What am I doing wrong? Please help! Following are the headers of messages to Yahoo, Hotmail and AOL. I've changed names and domain names. The domain names I'm sending mail from are polluxapp.com and gemini.polluxapp.com. Yahoo: From Shift Licensing Tue Jan 26 21:55:14 2010 X-Apparently-To: [email protected] via 98.136.167.163; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:59:12 -0800 Return-Path: X-YahooFilteredBulk: 208.115.108.162 X-YMailISG: gPlFT1YWLDtTsHSCXAO2fxuGq5RdrsMxPffmkJFHiQyZW.2RGdDQ8OEpzWDYPS.MS_D5mvpu928sYN_86mQ2inD9zVLaVNyVVrmzIFCOHJO2gPwIG8c2L8WajG4ZRgoTwMFHkyEsefYtRLMg8AmHKnkS0PkPscwpVHtuUD91ghsTSqs4lxEMqhqw60US0cwMn_r_DrWNEUg_sESZsYeZpJcCCPL0wd6zcfKmtYaIkidsth3gWJPJgpwWtkgPvwsJUU_cmAQ8hAQ7RVM1usEs80PzihTLDR1yKc4RJCsesaf4NUO_yN1cPsbFyiaazKikC.eiQk4Z3VU.8O5Vd8i7mPNyOeAjyt7IgeA_ X-Originating-IP: [208.115.108.162] Authentication-Results: mta1035.mail.sk1.yahoo.com from=example.com; domainkeys=pass (ok); from=example.com; dkim=permerror (bad sig) Received: from 127.0.0.1 (EHLO gemini.example.com) (208.115.108.162) by mta1035.mail.sk1.yahoo.com with SMTP; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:59:12 -0800 Received: from gemini.example.com (gemini [127.0.0.1]) by gemini.example.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3984E21A0167 for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:55:14 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=example.com; h=to :subject:from:content-type:message-id:date; s=mail; bh=bRIHfxE3S e+YeCrIOqziZsiESJA=; b=J+D56Czff+6wGjQycLEvHyT32+06Nngf+6h7Ep6DL SmmJv3ihiAFJIJiPxiwLNpUsOSHhwJYjYQtynbBnag40A6EUBIsucDR+VoEYD+Cc 9L0dV3QD5D77VpG9PnRQDQa91R+NPIt5og9xbYfUWJ1b/jXkZopb0VTM+H9tandM 24= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=example.com; h=to:subject :from:content-type:message-id:date; q=dns; s=mail; b=pO5YvvjGTXs 3Qa83Ibq9woLq5VSsxUD5uoSrjNrW9ICMmdWyJpb9oT5byFR9hMthomTmfGWkkh6 3VxtD0hb0HVonN+1iheqJ9QBBOctadLCAOPZV3mfA99XUu7Y0DR2qtkU/UkSe8In 5PENWFbwub88ZsRDiW3hCbNHl+UO8Jsc= Received: by gemini.example.com (Postfix, from userid 502) id 386DE21A0166; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:55:14 -0800 (PST) To: [email protected] Subject: Shift License For James Xavier From: "Shift Licensing" Content-type: text/html Message-Id: <[email protected] Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:55:14 -0800 (PST) Content-Length: 282` Hotmail: X-Message-Delivery: Vj0xLjE7dXM9MDtsPTA7YT0wO0Q9MjtTQ0w9Ng== X-Message-Status: n:0 X-SID-PRA: [email protected] X-AUTH-Result: NONE X-Message-Info: 6sSXyD95QpWzUBaRfzf3NMbaiSGCCYGXSczlzLw49r01I25elu3oYM0V2uNa8BV2O7DOiFEeewTBKMtN+PW+ig== Received: from gemini.example.com ([208.115.108.162]) by snt0-mc4-f7.Snt0.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.3959); Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:18:53 -0800 Received: from gemini.example.com (gemini [127.0.0.1]) by gemini.example.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9431321A0167 for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:18:53 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=gemini.example.com; h=to :subject:message-id:date:from; s=mail; bh=DLF0k+uELpY6If5o3SWlSj 7j0vw=; b=nAMpb47xTVh73y6a2rf6V1rtYHuufr46dtuwWtHyFC85QKfZJReJJL oFIPjgEC28/1wSdy8VbfLG1g64W1hvnJjet3rcyv3ANNYxnFaiH5yt3SDEiLxydS gjCmNcZXyiVsWtpv7atVRO/t/Own+oFB9zz/9mj43Bhm4bnZ2cTno= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gemini.example.com; h=to :subject:message-id:date:from; q=dns; s=mail; b=sFpNxlskyz4MYT38 BA/rQ6ZAcQjhy7STkLPckrCDVVZcE4/zukHyARq7guMtYCCEjXoIbVEtNikPC97F cGpJGGZrppTGjx62N0flxG8hvwejiJYnUJF1EIP4JckGWyEI+21vtWLLQ27eegtN fs9OkIQ2iUPC/4u8N1eqiff0VZU= Received: by gemini.example.com (Postfix, from userid 504) id 8ED7221A0166; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:18:53 -0800 (PST) To: [email protected] Subject: Testing this Message-Id: <[email protected] Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:18:53 -0800 (PST) From: [email protected] Return-Path: [email protected] X-OriginalArrivalTime: 26 Jan 2010 21:18:54.0039 (UTC) FILETIME=[29CEE670:01CA9ECD] AOL: X-AOL-UID: 3158.1902377530 X-AOL-DATE: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 5:07:23 PM Eastern Standard Time Return-Path: Received: from rly-mg06.mx.aol.com (rly-mg06.mail.aol.com [172.20.83.112]) by air-mg06.mail.aol.com (v126.13) with ESMTP id MAILINMG061-a1d4b5f6787a4; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:07:22 -0500 Received: from gemini.example.com (gemini.example.com [208.115.108.162]) by rly-mg06.mx.aol.com (v125.7) with ESMTP id MAILRELAYINMG067-a1d4b5f6787a4; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 17:07:04 -0500 Received: from gemini.example.com (gemini [127.0.0.1]) by gemini.example.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32B3821A0167 for ; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 14:07:03 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=gemini.example.com; h=to :subject:message-id:date:from; s=mail; bh=RL0GLHd3dZ8IlIHoHIhA/U cLtUE=; b=BKg4p3qnaIdFRjAbvUa+Hwcyc6W91v4B4hN95dVymJrxyUBycWMUSC nzKmJ5QllhCYjwO+S7GrRdmlFpjBaK8kt2qmdCyC2UuiDF6xY6MXx/DBF56QpYtZ YDY4kXdiEMSbooH14B4CCPhaCTdC1wCtV0diat3EANCLxSDYAYq5k= DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gemini.example.com; h=to :subject:message-id:date:from; q=dns; s=mail; b=fDSjNpfWs7TfGXda uio8qbJIyD+UmPL+C0GM1VeeV8FADj6JiYIT1nT3iBwSHlrLFCJ1wxPbE4d9CGl8 gQkPIV6T4TL7ha052nur0EOWoBLoBAOmhTshF/gsIY+/KMibbIczuRyTgIGVV5Tw GZVGFddVFOYgee7SAu0KNFm7aIk= Received: by gemini.example.com (Postfix, from userid 504) id 2D5F521A0166; Tue, 26 Jan 2010 14:07:03 -0800 (PST) To: [email protected] Subject: Testing Message-Id: <[email protected] Date: Tue, 26 Jan 2010 14:07:03 -0800 (PST) From: [email protected] X-AOL-IP: 208.115.108.162 X-AOL-SCOLL-AUTHENTICATION: mail_rly_antispam_dkim-d227.1 ; domain : gemini.example.com DKIM : pass X-Mailer: Unknown (No Version) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

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  • Anti-Forgery Request in ASP.NET MVC and AJAX

    - by Dixin
    Background To secure websites from cross-site request forgery (CSRF, or XSRF) attack, ASP.NET MVC provides an excellent mechanism: The server prints tokens to cookie and inside the form; When the form is submitted to server, token in cookie and token inside the form are sent by the HTTP request; Server validates the tokens. To print tokens to browser, just invoke HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken():<% using (Html.BeginForm()) { %> <%: this.Html.AntiForgeryToken(Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)%> <%-- Other fields. --%> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <% } %> which writes to token to the form:<form action="..." method="post"> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP" /> <!-- Other fields. --> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </form> and the cookie: __RequestVerificationToken_Lw__=J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP When the above form is submitted, they are both sent to server. [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is used to specify the controllers or actions to validate them:[HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult Action(/* ... */) { // ... } This is very productive for form scenarios. But recently, when resolving security vulnerabilities for Web products, I encountered 2 problems: It is expected to add [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] to each controller, but actually I have to add it for each POST actions, which is a little crazy; After anti-forgery validation is turned on for server side, AJAX POST requests will consistently fail. Specify validation on controller (not on each action) Problem For the first problem, usually a controller contains actions for both HTTP GET and HTTP POST requests, and usually validations are expected for HTTP POST requests. So, if the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] is declared on the controller, the HTTP GET requests become always invalid:[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Index page cannot work at all. { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } If user sends a HTTP GET request from a link: http://Site/Some/Index, validation definitely fails, because no token is provided. So the result is, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute must be distributed to each HTTP POST action in the application:public class SomeController : Controller { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Works. { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } Solution To avoid a large number of [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes (one attribute for one HTTP POST action), I created a wrapper class of ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute, where HTTP verbs can be specified:[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)] public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) : this(verbs, null) { } public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } public void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } When this attribute is declared on controller, only HTTP requests with the specified verbs are validated:[ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper(HttpVerbs.Post, Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { // Actions for HTTP GET requests are not affected. // Only HTTP POST requests are validated. } Now one single attribute on controller turns on validation for all HTTP POST actions. Submit token via AJAX Problem For AJAX scenarios, when request is sent by JavaScript instead of form:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 // Token is not posted. }, callback); This kind of AJAX POST requests will always be invalid, because server side code cannot see the token in the posted data. Solution The token must be printed to browser then submitted back to server. So first of all, HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be called in the page where the AJAX POST will be sent. Then jQuery must find the printed token in the page, and post it:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1, __RequestVerificationToken: getToken() // Token is posted. }, callback); To be reusable, this can be encapsulated in a tiny jQuery plugin:(function ($) { $.getAntiForgeryToken = function () { // HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be invoked to print the token. return $("input[type='hidden'][name='__RequestVerificationToken']").val(); }; var addToken = function (data) { // Converts data if not already a string. if (data && typeof data !== "string") { data = $.param(data); } data = data ? data + "&" : ""; return data + "__RequestVerificationToken=" + encodeURIComponent($.getAntiForgeryToken()); }; $.postAntiForgery = function (url, data, callback, type) { return $.post(url, addToken(data), callback, type); }; $.ajaxAntiForgery = function (settings) { settings.data = addToken(settings.data); return $.ajax(settings); }; })(jQuery); Then in the application just replace $.post() invocation with $.postAntiForgery(), and replace $.ajax() instead of $.ajaxAntiForgery():$.postAntiForgery(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 }, callback); // Token is posted. This solution looks hard coded and stupid. If you have more elegant solution, please do tell me.

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  • Anti-Forgery Request Helpers for ASP.NET MVC and jQuery AJAX

    - by Dixin
    Background To secure websites from cross-site request forgery (CSRF, or XSRF) attack, ASP.NET MVC provides an excellent mechanism: The server prints tokens to cookie and inside the form; When the form is submitted to server, token in cookie and token inside the form are sent in the HTTP request; Server validates the tokens. To print tokens to browser, just invoke HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken():<% using (Html.BeginForm()) { %> <%: this.Html.AntiForgeryToken(Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)%> <%-- Other fields. --%> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <% } %> This invocation generates a token then writes inside the form:<form action="..." method="post"> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP" /> <!-- Other fields. --> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </form> and also writes into the cookie: __RequestVerificationToken_Lw__= J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP When the above form is submitted, they are both sent to server. In the server side, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is used to specify the controllers or actions to validate them:[HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult Action(/* ... */) { // ... } This is very productive for form scenarios. But recently, when resolving security vulnerabilities for Web products, some problems are encountered. Specify validation on controller (not on each action) The server side problem is, It is expected to declare [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] on controller, but actually it has be to declared on each POST actions. Because POST actions are usually much more then controllers, this is a little crazy Problem Usually a controller contains actions for HTTP GET and actions for HTTP POST requests, and usually validations are expected for HTTP POST requests. So, if the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] is declared on the controller, the HTTP GET requests become invalid:[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller // One [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Index() cannot work. { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } If browser sends an HTTP GET request by clicking a link: http://Site/Some/Index, validation definitely fails, because no token is provided. So the result is, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute must be distributed to each POST action:public class SomeController : Controller // Many [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Works. { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } This is a little bit crazy, because one application can have a lot of POST actions. Solution To avoid a large number of [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes (one for each POST action), the following ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute wrapper class can be helpful, where HTTP verbs can be specified:[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)] public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) : this(verbs, null) { } public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } public void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } When this attribute is declared on controller, only HTTP requests with the specified verbs are validated:[ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper(HttpVerbs.Post, Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { // GET actions are not affected. // Only HTTP POST requests are validated. } Now one single attribute on controller turns on validation for all POST actions. Maybe it would be nice if HTTP verbs can be specified on the built-in [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute, which is easy to implemented. Submit token via AJAX The browser side problem is, if server side turns on anti-forgery validation for POST, then AJAX POST requests will fail be default. Problem For AJAX scenarios, when request is sent by jQuery instead of form:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 // Token is not posted. }, callback); This kind of AJAX POST requests will always be invalid, because server side code cannot see the token in the posted data. Solution The tokens are printed to browser then sent back to server. So first of all, HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be called somewhere. Now the browser has token in HTML and cookie. Then jQuery must find the printed token in the HTML, and append token to the data before sending:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1, __RequestVerificationToken: getToken() // Token is posted. }, callback); To be reusable, this can be encapsulated into a tiny jQuery plugin:/// <reference path="jquery-1.4.2.js" /> (function ($) { $.getAntiForgeryToken = function (tokenWindow, appPath) { // HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be invoked to print the token. tokenWindow = tokenWindow && typeof tokenWindow === typeof window ? tokenWindow : window; appPath = appPath && typeof appPath === "string" ? "_" + appPath.toString() : ""; // The name attribute is either __RequestVerificationToken, // or __RequestVerificationToken_{appPath}. tokenName = "__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath; // Finds the <input type="hidden" name={tokenName} value="..." /> from the specified. // var inputElements = $("input[type='hidden'][name='__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath + "']"); var inputElements = tokenWindow.document.getElementsByTagName("input"); for (var i = 0; i < inputElements.length; i++) { var inputElement = inputElements[i]; if (inputElement.type === "hidden" && inputElement.name === tokenName) { return { name: tokenName, value: inputElement.value }; } } return null; }; $.appendAntiForgeryToken = function (data, token) { // Converts data if not already a string. if (data && typeof data !== "string") { data = $.param(data); } // Gets token from current window by default. token = token ? token : $.getAntiForgeryToken(); // $.getAntiForgeryToken(window). data = data ? data + "&" : ""; // If token exists, appends {token.name}={token.value} to data. return token ? data + encodeURIComponent(token.name) + "=" + encodeURIComponent(token.value) : data; }; // Wraps $.post(url, data, callback, type). $.postAntiForgery = function (url, data, callback, type) { return $.post(url, $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data), callback, type); }; // Wraps $.ajax(settings). $.ajaxAntiForgery = function (settings) { settings.data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(settings.data); return $.ajax(settings); }; })(jQuery); In most of the scenarios, it is Ok to just replace $.post() invocation with $.postAntiForgery(), and replace $.ajax() with $.ajaxAntiForgery():$.postAntiForgery(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 }, callback); // Token is posted. There might be some scenarios of custom token. Here $.appendAntiForgeryToken() is provided:data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, token); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); And there are scenarios that the token is not in the current window. For example, an HTTP POST request can be sent by iframe, while the token is in the parent window. Here window can be specified for $.getAntiForgeryToken():data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, $.getAntiForgeryToken(window.parent)); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); If you have better solution, please do tell me.

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  • How do I avoid spam domains pointing to my site or IP

    - by Amol Ghotankar
    I came across an issue where I saw some xyz.com is pointing to mydomain.com. How do I avoid spam domains pointing to my domain? I read some posts about setting my virtual hosts and such, but nothing specific about how to avoid it in the first place. I searched on Google but most answers are for HTTP servers and there are no exact answers for Tomcat 7. I am not using Apache or IIS, but Tomcat directly.

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  • SEO Providers - Freelancers, Professionals, Or Spam Artists?

    Again, many of these offers you'll receive look legit enough. They come complete from a real email address, with a realistic name, a real phone number, and all of the other necessary credentials to look respectable. Sure, they're real people on the other end of the line, but unlike most reputable freelancers in the SEO business, these folks have chosen to use dubious tactics (sending mass emails and spam) to thousands and thousands of people in the hopes that one or two follow up and fall into the trap.

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  • 'Grum' Botnet Leads Spam Charge

    According to a report by messaging security specialist MessageLabs, spam now accounts for close to 90 percent of all e-mail traffic....Did you know that DotNetSlackers also publishes .net articles written by top known .net Authors? We already have over 80 articles in several categories including Silverlight. Take a look: here.

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  • Text after Control Sequence

    - by SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM
    I am trying to parse the output of a command that expects to be writing to the screen. It has data separated by move-to-origin control sequences (for the VT220, ESC[1;1H). I only need the last part (i.e. after the last move-to-origin). I have tried doing this multiple ways (primarily awk and sed), but the problem is always that parts of the control sequence have special meaning (to the program, not just to the shell), and I cannot quote them when I substitute tput's output. Any suggestions?

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  • Anti-Forgery Request Recipes For ASP.NET MVC And AJAX

    - by Dixin
    Background To secure websites from cross-site request forgery (CSRF, or XSRF) attack, ASP.NET MVC provides an excellent mechanism: The server prints tokens to cookie and inside the form; When the form is submitted to server, token in cookie and token inside the form are sent in the HTTP request; Server validates the tokens. To print tokens to browser, just invoke HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken():<% using (Html.BeginForm()) { %> <%: this.Html.AntiForgeryToken(Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)%> <%-- Other fields. --%> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <% } %> This invocation generates a token then writes inside the form:<form action="..." method="post"> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP" /> <!-- Other fields. --> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </form> and also writes into the cookie: __RequestVerificationToken_Lw__= J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP When the above form is submitted, they are both sent to server. In the server side, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is used to specify the controllers or actions to validate them:[HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult Action(/* ... */) { // ... } This is very productive for form scenarios. But recently, when resolving security vulnerabilities for Web products, some problems are encountered. Specify validation on controller (not on each action) The server side problem is, It is expected to declare [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] on controller, but actually it has be to declared on each POST actions. Because POST actions are usually much more then controllers, the work would be a little crazy. Problem Usually a controller contains actions for HTTP GET and actions for HTTP POST requests, and usually validations are expected for HTTP POST requests. So, if the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] is declared on the controller, the HTTP GET requests become invalid:[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller // One [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Index() cannot work. { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } If browser sends an HTTP GET request by clicking a link: http://Site/Some/Index, validation definitely fails, because no token is provided. So the result is, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute must be distributed to each POST action:public class SomeController : Controller // Many [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Works. { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } This is a little bit crazy, because one application can have a lot of POST actions. Solution To avoid a large number of [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes (one for each POST action), the following ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute wrapper class can be helpful, where HTTP verbs can be specified:[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)] public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) : this(verbs, null) { } public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } public void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } When this attribute is declared on controller, only HTTP requests with the specified verbs are validated:[ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper(HttpVerbs.Post, Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { // GET actions are not affected. // Only HTTP POST requests are validated. } Now one single attribute on controller turns on validation for all POST actions. Maybe it would be nice if HTTP verbs can be specified on the built-in [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute, which is easy to implemented. Specify Non-constant salt in runtime By default, the salt should be a compile time constant, so it can be used for the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] or [ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper] attribute. Problem One Web product might be sold to many clients. If a constant salt is evaluated in compile time, after the product is built and deployed to many clients, they all have the same salt. Of course, clients do not like this. Even some clients might want to specify a custom salt in configuration. In these scenarios, salt is required to be a runtime value. Solution In the above [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] and [ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper] attribute, the salt is passed through constructor. So one solution is to remove this parameter:public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = AntiForgeryToken.Value }; } // Other members. } But here the injected dependency becomes a hard dependency. So the other solution is moving validation code into controller to work around the limitation of attributes:public abstract class AntiForgeryControllerBase : Controller { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; protected AntiForgeryControllerBase(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } protected override void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { base.OnAuthorization(filterContext); string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } Then make controller classes inheriting from this AntiForgeryControllerBase class. Now the salt is no long required to be a compile time constant. Submit token via AJAX For browser side, once server side turns on anti-forgery validation for HTTP POST, all AJAX POST requests will fail by default. Problem In AJAX scenarios, the HTTP POST request is not sent by form. Take jQuery as an example:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 // Token is not posted. }, callback); This kind of AJAX POST requests will always be invalid, because server side code cannot see the token in the posted data. Solution Basically, the tokens must be printed to browser then sent back to server. So first of all, HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() need to be called somewhere. Now the browser has token in both HTML and cookie. Then jQuery must find the printed token in the HTML, and append token to the data before sending:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1, __RequestVerificationToken: getToken() // Token is posted. }, callback); To be reusable, this can be encapsulated into a tiny jQuery plugin:/// <reference path="jquery-1.4.2.js" /> (function ($) { $.getAntiForgeryToken = function (tokenWindow, appPath) { // HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be invoked to print the token. tokenWindow = tokenWindow && typeof tokenWindow === typeof window ? tokenWindow : window; appPath = appPath && typeof appPath === "string" ? "_" + appPath.toString() : ""; // The name attribute is either __RequestVerificationToken, // or __RequestVerificationToken_{appPath}. tokenName = "__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath; // Finds the <input type="hidden" name={tokenName} value="..." /> from the specified. // var inputElements = $("input[type='hidden'][name='__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath + "']"); var inputElements = tokenWindow.document.getElementsByTagName("input"); for (var i = 0; i < inputElements.length; i++) { var inputElement = inputElements[i]; if (inputElement.type === "hidden" && inputElement.name === tokenName) { return { name: tokenName, value: inputElement.value }; } } return null; }; $.appendAntiForgeryToken = function (data, token) { // Converts data if not already a string. if (data && typeof data !== "string") { data = $.param(data); } // Gets token from current window by default. token = token ? token : $.getAntiForgeryToken(); // $.getAntiForgeryToken(window). data = data ? data + "&" : ""; // If token exists, appends {token.name}={token.value} to data. return token ? data + encodeURIComponent(token.name) + "=" + encodeURIComponent(token.value) : data; }; // Wraps $.post(url, data, callback, type). $.postAntiForgery = function (url, data, callback, type) { return $.post(url, $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data), callback, type); }; // Wraps $.ajax(settings). $.ajaxAntiForgery = function (settings) { settings.data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(settings.data); return $.ajax(settings); }; })(jQuery); In most of the scenarios, it is Ok to just replace $.post() invocation with $.postAntiForgery(), and replace $.ajax() with $.ajaxAntiForgery():$.postAntiForgery(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 }, callback); // Token is posted. There might be some scenarios of custom token, where $.appendAntiForgeryToken() is useful:data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, token); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); And there are scenarios that the token is not in the current window. For example, an HTTP POST request can be sent by an iframe, while the token is in the parent window. Here, token's container window can be specified for $.getAntiForgeryToken():data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, $.getAntiForgeryToken(window.parent)); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); If you have better solution, please do tell me.

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  • Bayesian content filter for vbulletin [on hold]

    - by mc0e
    I've been tasked with coming up with a tool to automatically flag some posts for moderator attention on a large vbulletin forum. It's not spam per se, but the task has a lot in common with the sort of handling that might be done by a spam protection plugin (a mod in vbulletin speak). There's only so much I can say, but the task does not involve bad users, so much as particular kinds of posts which the moderators need to be aware of. Filtering out user registrations and links is therefore not useful, and we are talking about posts by real human users. What I'm looking for is an existing bayesian classification plugin, or something that I can study to get an understanding of how to do the vbulletin side of the interface in order to build such a thing. Ie I'd need ways for moderators to list flagged posts, and to correct the classification of posts which have been mis-classified. Ideally I want a 3 way split with an "unsure" category in order to reduce what has to be reviewed to find any mis-classifications. Any pointers? I've searched around a bit, and so far what I've found has been more or less entirely targetted at intervening in sign-ups (mostly using stopforumspam), captchas, and use of external services like akismet which are spam specific. I'm also considering an external solution, which might be ableto be interfaced i

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  • Alternative to K9 spam handler?

    - by overtherainbow
    I've been using the free K9 spam handler for a couple of years now, but it hasn't been updated since 2004 and has a couple of bugs that bother me: The Find feature stops at the first e-mail found, and doesn't go further I'd like to copy the list of e-mails marked as either real or SPAM, but K9 only copies the first item in the clipboard For those of you who have researched desktop anti-SPAM handlers under Windows, what do you suggest as an alternative, either free or moderately priced?

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