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• What harm can javascript do?

  - by The King

  I just happen to read the joel's blog here... So for example if you have a web page that says “What is your name?” with an edit box and then submitting that page takes you to another page that says, Hello, Elmer! (assuming the user’s name is Elmer), well, that’s a security vulnerability, because the user could type in all kinds of weird HTML and JavaScript instead of “Elmer” and their weird JavaScript could do narsty things, and now those narsty things appear to come from you, so for example they can read cookies that you put there and forward them on to Dr. Evil’s evil site. Since javascript runs on client end. All it can access or do is only on the client end. It can read informations stored in hidden fields and change them. It can read, write or manipulate cookies... But I feel, these informations are anyway available to him. (if he is smart enough to pass javascript in a textbox. So we are not empowering him with new information or providing him undue access to our server... Just curious to know whether I miss something. Can you list the things that a malicious user can do with this security hole. Edit : Thanks to all for enlightening . As kizzx2 pointed out in one of the comments... I was overlooking the fact that a JavaScript written by User A may get executed in the browser of User B under numerous circumstances, in which case it becomes a great risk.

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• chrome extension login security with iframe

  - by Weaver

  I should note, I'm not a chrome extension expert. However, I'm looking for some advice or high level solution to a security concern I have with my chrome extension. I've searched quite a bit but can't seem to find a concrete answer. The situation I have a chrome extension that needs to have the user login to our backend server. However, it was decided for design reasons that the default chrome popup balloon was undesirable. Thus I've used a modal dialog and jquery to make a styled popup that is injected with content scripts. Hence, the popup is injected into the DOM o the page you are visiting. The Problem Everything works, however now that I need to implement login functionality I've noticed a vulnerability: If the site we've injected our popup into knows the password fields ID they could run a script to continuously monitor the password and username field and store that data. Call me paranoid, but I see it as a risk. In fact,I wrote a mockup attack site that can correctly pull the user and password when entered into the given fields. My devised solution I took a look at some other chrome extensions, like Buffer, and noticed what they do is load their popup from their website and, instead, embed an iFrame which contains the popup in it. The popup would interact with the server inside the iframe. My understanding is iframes are subject to same-origin scripting policies as other websites, but I may be mistaken. As such, would doing the same thing be secure? TLDR To simplify, if I embedded an https login form from our server into a given DOM, via a chrome extension, are there security concerns to password sniffing? If this is not the best way to deal with chrome extension logins, do you have suggestions with what is? Perhaps there is a way to declare text fields that javascript can simply not interact with? Not too sure! Thank you so much for your time! I will happily clarify anything required.

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• Is it necessary to "escape" character "<" and ">" for javascript string?

  - by Morgan Cheng

  Sometimes, server side will generate strings to be embedded in inline JavaScript code. For example, if "UserName" should be generated by ASP.NET. Then it looks like. <script> var username = "<%UserName%>"; </script> This is not safe, because a user can have his/her name to be </script><script>alert('bug')</script></script> It is XSS vulnerability. So, basically, the code should be: <script> var username = "<% JavascriptEncode(UserName)%>"; </script> What JavascriptEncode does is to add charater "\" before "/" and "'" and """. So, the output html is like. var username = "<\/scriptalert(\'bug\')<\/script<\/script"; Browser will not interpret "<\/script" as end of script block. So, XSS in avoided. However, there are still "<" and "" there. It is suggested to escape these two characters as well. First of all, I don't believe it is a good idea to change "<" to "&lt;" and "" to "&gt;" here. And, I'm not sure changing "<" to "\<" and "" to "\" is recognizable to all browsers. It seems it is not necessary to do further encoding for "<" and "". Is there any suggestion on this? Thanks.

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• Detecting an online poker cheat

  - by Tom Gullen

  It recently emerged on a large poker site that some players were possibly able to see all opponents cards as they played through exploiting a security vulnerability that was discovered. A naïve cheater would win at an incredibly fast rate, and these cheats are caught very quickly usually, and if not caught quickly they are easy to detect through a quick scan through their hand histories. The more difficult problem occurs when the cheater exhibits intelligence, bluffing in spots they are bound to be called in, calling river bets with the worst hands, the basic premise is that they lose pots on purpose to disguise their ability to see other players cards, and they win at a reasonably realistic rate. Given: A data set of millions of verified and complete information hand histories Theoretical unlimited computer power Assume the game No Limit Hold'em, although suggestions on Omaha or limit poker may be beneficial How could we reasonably accurately classify these cheaters? The original 2+2 thread appeals for ideas, and I thought that the SO community might have some useful suggestions. It's an interesting problem also because it is current, and has real application in bettering the world if someone finds a creative solution, as there is a good chance genuine players will have funds refunded to them when identified cheaters are discovered.

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• javascript toolkit for offline webapps

  - by anjanb

  hi all, we're building an survey webapp which will let the user to add new records to the survey when offline and will upload when the browser reconnects with the server. We've identified that this will need offline storage and hence google gears seems to be an obvious choice (we understand that adobe Flash has Offline Storage but not sure if that is the best way). I am aware of Dojo offline javascript toolkit which uses google gears for the underlying functionality. However, dojo offline is not part of the dojo toolkit after version 1.3. (currently dojo is 1.4.2). Google gears toolkit is currently frozen except for critical vulnerability fixes (it has not been updated almost for the last 1 yr) because they think that HTML 5 is the way to go ahead. Hence, we're looking for a higher abstraction on top of Google Gears engine TODAY, AND which will (in the future) switch the underlying engine to HTML5 if the browser supports HTML5 standards. We'd love to use Dojo but they have discontinued Dojo offline -- we'd prefer something that will be maintained for some time. Which are possible good strategies, JS toolkits/libraries to use for building this webapp ? Pls. advise.

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• Simple encryption - Sum of Hashes in C

  - by Dogbert

  I am attempting to demonstrate a simple proof of concept with respect to a vulnerability in a piece of code in a game written in C. Let's say that we want to validate a character login. The login is handled by the user choosing n items, (let's just assume n=5 for now) from a graphical menu. The items are all medieval themed: eg: _______________________________ | | | | | Bow | Sword | Staff | |-----------|-----------|-------| | Shield | Potion | Gold | |___________|___________|_______| The user must click on each item, then choose a number for each item. The validation algorithm then does the following: Determines which items were selected Drops each string to lowercase (ie: Bow becomes bow, etc) Calculates a simple string hash for each string (ie: `bow = b=2, o=15, w=23, sum = (2+15+23=40) Multiplies the hash by the value the user selected for the corresponding item; This new value is called the key Sums together the keys for each of the selected items; this is the final validation hash IMPORTANT: The validator will accept this hash, along with non-zero multiples of it (ie: if the final hash equals 1111, then 2222, 3333, 8888, etc are also valid). So, for example, let's say I select: Bow (1) Sword (2) Staff (10) Shield (1) Potion (6) The algorithm drops each of these strings to lowercase, calculates their string hashes, multiplies that hash by the number selected for each string, then sums these keys together. eg: Final_Validation_Hash = 1*HASH(Bow) + 2*HASH(Sword) + 10*HASH(Staff) + 1*HASH(Shield) + 6*HASH(Potion) By application of Euler's Method, I plan to demonstrate that these hashes are not unique, and want to devise a simple application to prove it. in my case, for 5 items, I would essentially be trying to calculate: (B)(y) = (A_1)(x_1) + (A_2)(x_2) + (A_3)(x_3) + (A_4)(x_4) + (A_5)(x_5) Where: B is arbitrary A_j are the selected coefficients/values for each string/category x_j are the hash values for each string/category y is the final validation hash (eg: 1111 above) B,y,A_j,x_j are all discrete-valued, positive, and non-zero (ie: natural numbers) Can someone either assist me in solving this problem or point me to a similar example (ie: code, worked out equations, etc)? I just need to solve the final step (ie: (B)(Y) = ...). Thank you all in advance.

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• Looking for resources to explain a security risk.

  - by Dave

  I've a developer which has given users the ability to download a zip archive which contains an html document which references a relative javascript file and flash document. The flash document accepts as one of it's parameters a url which is embedded in the html document. I believe that this archive is meant to be used as a means to transfer an advertisement to someone who would use the source to display the ad on their site, however the end user appears to want to view it locally. When one opens the html document the flash document is presented and when the user clicks on the flash document it redirects to this embedded url. However, if one extracts the archive on the desktop and opens the html document in a browser and clicks the flash object, nothing observable happens, they will not be redirected to the external url. I believe this is a security risk because one is transferring from the local computer zone to an external zone. I'm trying to determine the best way to explain this security risk in the simplest of terms to a very end user. They simply believe it's "broken" when it's not broken, they're being protected from a known vulnerability. The developer attempted to explain how to copy the files to a local iis instance, which I highly doubt is running on the users machine, and I do not consider this to be a viable explanation.

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• Best Practice: Protecting Personally Identifiable Data in a ASP.NET / SQL Server 2008 Environment

  - by William

  Thanks to a SQL injection vulnerability found last week, some of my recommendations are being investigated at work. We recently re-did an application which stores personally identifiable information whose disclosure could lead to identity theft. While we read some of the data on a regular basis, the restricted data we only need a couple of times a year and then only two employees need it. I've read up on SQL Server 2008's encryption function, but I'm not convinced that's the route I want to go. My problem ultimately boils down to the fact that we're either using symmetric keys or assymetric keys encrypted by a symmetric key. Thus it seems like a SQL injection attack could lead to a data leak. I realize permissions should prevent that, permissions should also prevent the leaking in the first place. It seems to me the better method would be to asymmetrically encrypt the data in the web application. Then store the private key offline and have a fat client that they can run the few times a year they need to access the restricted data so the data could be decrypted on the client. This way, if the server get compromised, we don't leak old data although depending on what they do we may leak future data. I think the big disadvantage is this would require re-writing the web application and creating a new fat application (to pull the restricted data). Due to the recent problem, I can probably get the time allocated, so now would be the proper time to make the recommendation. Do you have a better suggestion? Which method would you recommend? More importantly why?

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• When is it safe to use a broken hash function?

  - by The Rook

  It is trivial to use a secure hash function like SHA256 and continuing to use md5 is reckless behavior. However, there are some complexities to hash function vulnerabilities that I would like to better understand. Collisions have been generated for md4 and md5. According to NIST md5() is not a secure hash function. It only takes 2^39th operations to generate a collision and should never be used for passwords. However SHA1 is vulnerable to a similar collision attack in which a collision can be found in 2^69 operations, where as brute force is 2^80th. No one has generated a sha1 collision and NIST still lists sha1 as a secure message digest function. So when is it safe to use a broken hash function? Even though a function is broken it can still be "big enough". According to Schneier a hash function vulnerable to a collsion attack can still be used as an HMAC. I believe this is because the security of an HMAC is Dependant on its secret key and a collision cannot be found until this key is obtained. Once you have the key used in a HMAC its already broken, so its a moot point. What hash function vulnerabilities would undermine the security of an HMAC? Lets take this property a bit further. Does it then become safe to use a very weak message digest like md4 for passwords if a salt is perpended to the password? Keep in mind the md4 and md5 attacks are prefixing attacks, and if a salt is perpended then an attacker cannot control the prefix of the message. If the salt is truly a secret, and isn't known to the attacker, then does it matter if its a appended to the end of the password? Is it safe to assume that an attacker cannot generate a collision until the entire message has been obtained? Do you know of other cases where a broken hash function can be used in a security context without introducing a vulnerability? (Please post supporting evidence because it is awesome!)

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• Always send certain values with an ajax request/post

  - by DZittersteyn

  I'm building a system that displays a list of user, and on selection of a user requests some form of password. These values are saved in a hidden field on the page, and need to be sent with every request as a form of authentication. (I'm aware of the MITM-vulnerability that lies herein, but it's a very low-key system, so security is not a large concern). Now I need to send these values with each and every request, to auth the currently 'logged in' user. I'd like to automate this, via ajaxSetup, however i'm running into some issues. My first try was: init_user_auth: function(){ $.ajaxSetup({ data: { 'user' : site_user.selected_user_id(), 'passcode': site_user.selected_user_pc(), 'barcode' : site_user.selected_user_bc() } }); }, However, as I should have known, this reads the values once, at the time of the call to ajaxSetup, and never rereads them. What I need is a way to actually call the functions every time an ajax-call is made. I'm currently trying to understand what is happening here: https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups=#!topic/jquery-dev/OBcEfgvTJ9I, however through the flamewar and very low-level stuff going on there, I'm not exactly sure I get what is going on. Is this the way to proceed, or should I just face facts and manually add login-info to each ajax-call?

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• How security of the systems might be improved using database procedures?

  - by Centurion

  The usage of Oracle PL/SQL procedures for controlling access to data often emphasized in PL/SQL books and other sources as being more secure approach. I'v seen several systems where all business logic related with data is performed through packages, procedures and functions, so application code becomes quite "dumb" and is only responsible for visualization part. I even heard some devs call such approaches and driving architects as database nazi :) because all logic code resides in database. I do know about DB procedure performance benefits, but now I'm interested in a "better security" when using thick client model. I assume such design mostly used when Oracle (and maybe MS SQL Server) databases are used. I do agree such approach improves security but only if there are not much users and every system user has a database account, so we might control and monitor data access through standard database user security. However, how such approach could increase the security for an average web system where thick clients are used: for example one database user with DML grants on all tables, and other users are handled using "users" and"user_rights" tables? We could use DB procedures, save usernames into context use that for filtering but vulnerability resides at the root - if the main database account is compromised than nothing will help. Of course in a real system we might consider at least several main users (for example frontend_db_user, backend_db_user).

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• Block IP Address including ICMP using UFW

  - by dr jimbob

  I prefer ufw to iptables for configuring my software firewall. After reading about this vulnerability also on askubuntu, I decided to block the fixed IP of the control server: 212.7.208.65. I don't think I'm vulnerable to this particular worm (and understand the IP could easily change), but wanted to answer this particular comment about how you would configure a firewall to block it. I planned on using: # sudo ufw deny to 212.7.208.65 # sudo ufw deny from 212.7.208.65 However as a test that the rules were working, I tried pinging after I setup the rules and saw that my default ufw settings let ICMP through even from an IP address set to REJECT or DENY. # ping 212.7.208.65 PING 212.7.208.65 (212.7.208.65) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 212.7.208.65: icmp_seq=1 ttl=52 time=79.6 ms ^C --- 212.7.208.65 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 79.630/79.630/79.630/0.000 ms Now, I'm worried that my ICMP settings are too generous (conceivably this or a future worm could setup an ICMP tunnel to bypass my firewall rules). I believe this is the relevant part of my iptables rules is given below (and even though grep doesn't show it; the rules are associated with the chains shown): # sudo iptables -L -n | grep -E '(INPUT|user-input|before-input|icmp |212.7.208.65)' Chain INPUT (policy DROP) ufw-before-input all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 Chain ufw-before-input (1 references) ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 3 ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 4 ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 11 ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 12 ACCEPT icmp -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 8 ufw-user-input all -- 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 Chain ufw-user-input (1 references) DROP all -- 0.0.0.0/0 212.7.208.65 DROP all -- 212.7.208.65 0.0.0.0/0 How should I go about making it so ufw blocks ICMP when I specifically attempt to block an IP address? My /etc/ufw/before.rules has in part: # ok icmp codes -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ACCEPT -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -j ACCEPT -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ACCEPT -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -j ACCEPT -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ACCEPT I'm tried changing ACCEPT above to ufw-user-input: # ok icmp codes -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -j ufw-user-input -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -j ufw-user-input -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -j ufw-user-input -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -j ufw-user-input -A ufw-before-input -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j ufw-user-input But ufw wouldn't restart after that. I'm not sure why (still troubleshooting) and also not sure if this is sensible? Will there be any negative effects (besides forcing the software firewall to force ICMP through a few more rules)?

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• Our VPS is being used as a Warez mule

  - by Mikuso

  The company I work for runs a series of ecommerce stores on a VPS. It's a WAMP stack, 50gb storage. We use an archaic piece of ecommerce software which operates almost entirely client-side. When an order is taken, it writes it to disk and then we schedule a task to download the orders once every 10 minutes. A few days ago, we ran out of disk space, which caused orders to fail to be written. I quickly hopped on to delete some old logs from the mailserver and freed up a couple of GB pretty quickly, but I wondered how we could fill up 50gb will nothing much more than logs. Turns out, we didn't. Hidden deep within the c:\System Volume Information directory, we have a stack of pirated videos, which seem to have appeared (looking at the timestamps) over the past three weeks. Porn, American Sports, Australian cooking shows. A very odd collection. Doesn't look like an individual's personal tastes - more like the VPS is being used as a mule. We have a 5-attempts and you're blocked policy on our FTP server (plus, there is no FTP account with access to that directory), and the windows user account has had it's password changed recently. The main avenues are sealed - and logs can verify that. I thought I'd watch and see if it happened again, and yes, another cooking show has appeared this morning. I am the only one to know of this problem at my company, and only one of two with access to the VPS (the other being my boss, but no - it's not him). So how is this happening? Is there a vulnerability in some of the software on the VPS? Are the VPS owners peddling warez across our rented space? (can they do this?) I don't want to delete the warez in case it is seen as a hostile action against this outside force, and they choose to retaliate. What should I do? How do I troubleshoot this? Has this happened to anyone else before?

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• Linux-Containers — Part 1: Overview

  - by Lenz Grimmer

  "Containers" by Jean-Pierre Martineau (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0). Linux Containers (LXC) provide a means to isolate individual services or applications as well as of a complete Linux operating system from other services running on the same host. To accomplish this, each container gets its own directory structure, network devices, IP addresses and process table. The processes running in other containers or the host system are not visible from inside a container. Additionally, Linux Containers allow for fine granular control of resources like RAM, CPU or disk I/O. Generally speaking, Linux Containers use a completely different approach than "classicial" virtualization technologies like KVM or Xen (on which Oracle VM Server for x86 is based on). An application running inside a container will be executed directly on the operating system kernel of the host system, shielded from all other running processes in a sandbox-like environment. This allows a very direct and fair distribution of CPU and I/O-resources. Linux containers can offer the best possible performance and several possibilities for managing and sharing the resources available. Similar to Containers (or Zones) on Oracle Solaris or FreeBSD jails, the same kernel version runs on the host as well as in the containers; it is not possible to run different Linux kernel versions or other operating systems like Microsoft Windows or Oracle Solaris for x86 inside a container. However, it is possible to run different Linux distribution versions (e.g. Fedora Linux in a container on top of an Oracle Linux host), provided it supports the version of the Linux kernel that runs on the host. This approach has one caveat, though - if any of the containers causes a kernel crash, it will bring down all other containers (and the host system) as well. For example, Oracle's Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel Release 2 (2.6.39) is supported for both Oracle Linux 5 and 6. This makes it possible to run Oracle Linux 5 and 6 container instances on top of an Oracle Linux 6 system. Since Linux Containers are fully implemented on the OS level (the Linux kernel), they can be easily combined with other virtualization technologies. It's certainly possible to set up Linux containers within a virtualized Linux instance that runs inside Oracle VM Server for Oracle VM Virtualbox. Some use cases for Linux Containers include: Consolidation of multiple separate Linux systems on one server: instances of Linux systems that are not performance-critical or only see sporadic use (e.g. a fax or print server or intranet services) do not necessarily need a dedicated server for their operations. These can easily be consolidated to run inside containers on a single server, to preserve energy and rack space. Running multiple instances of an application in parallel, e.g. for different users or customers. Each user receives his "own" application instance, with a defined level of service/performance. This prevents that one user's application could hog the entire system and ensures, that each user only has access to his own data set. It also helps to save main memory — if multiple instances of a same process are running, the Linux kernel can share memory pages that are identical and unchanged across all application instances. This also applies to shared libraries that applications may use, they are generally held in memory once and mapped to multiple processes. Quickly creating sandbox environments for development and testing purposes: containers that have been created and configured once can be archived as templates and can be duplicated (cloned) instantly on demand. After finishing the activity, the clone can safely be discarded. This allows to provide repeatable software builds and test environments, because the system will always be reset to its initial state for each run. Linux Containers also boot significantly faster than "classic" virtual machines, which can save a lot of time when running frequent build or test runs on applications. Safe execution of an individual application: if an application running inside a container has been compromised because of a security vulnerability, the host system and other containers remain unaffected. The potential damage can be minimized, analyzed and resolved directly from the host system. Note: Linux Containers on Oracle Linux 6 with the Unbreakable Enterprise Kernel Release 2 (2.6.39) are still marked as Technology Preview - their use is only recommended for testing and evaluation purposes. The Open-Source project "Linux Containers" (LXC) is driving the development of the technology behind this, which is based on the "Control Groups" (CGroups) and "Name Spaces" functionality of the Linux kernel. Oracle is actively involved in the Linux Containers development and contributes patches to the upstream LXC code base. Control Groups provide means to manage and monitor the allocation of resources for individual processes or process groups. Among other things, you can restrict the maximum amount of memory, CPU cycles as well as the disk and network throughput (in MB/s or IOP/s) that are available for an application. Name Spaces help to isolate process groups from each other, e.g. the visibility of other running processes or the exclusive access to a network device. It's also possible to restrict a process group's access and visibility of the entire file system hierarchy (similar to a classic "chroot" environment). CGroups and Name Spaces provide the foundation on which Linux containers are based on, but they can actually be used independently as well. A more detailed description of how Linux Containers can be created and managed on Oracle Linux will be explained in the second part of this article. Additional links related to Linux Containers: OTN Article: The Role of Oracle Solaris Zones and Linux Containers in a Virtualization Strategy Linux Containers on Wikipedia - Lenz Grimmer Follow me on: Personal Blog | Facebook | Twitter | Linux Blog |

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• Five Things Learned at the BSR Conference in San Francisco on Nov 2nd-4th

  - by Evelyn Neumayr

  The BSR Conference 2011—“Redefining Leadership”—held from Nov 2nd to Nov 4th in San Francisco, with Oracle as one of the main sponsors, saw senior business executives, civil society representatives, and other experts from around the world gathering to share strategies and insights on the future of sustainability. The general conference sessions kicked off on November 2nd with a plenary address by former U.S. Vice President Al Gore. Other sessions were presented by CEOs of the caliber of Carl Bass (Autodesk), Brian Dunn (Best Buy), Carlos Brito (Anheuser-Busch InBev) and Ofra Strauss (Strauss Group). Here are five key highlights from the conference: 1.      The main leadership challenge is integrating sustainability into core business functions and overcoming short-termism. The “BSR GlobeScan State of Sustainable Business Poll 2011” - a survey of nearly 500 business leaders from 300 member companies - shows that 84% of respondents are optimistic that global businesses will embrace CSR/sustainability as part of their core strategies and operations in the next five years but consider integrating sustainability into their core business functions the key challenge. It is still difficult for many companies that are committed to the sustainability agenda to find investors that understand the long-term implications and as Al Gore said “Many companies are given the signal by the investors that it is the short term results that matter and that is a terribly debilitating force in the market.” 2.      Companies are required to address increasing compliance requirements and transparency in their supply chain, especially in relation with conflict minerals legislation and water management. The Dodd-Frank legislation, OECD guidelines, and the upcoming Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules require companies to monitor upstream the sourcing of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold, but given the complexity of this issue companies need to collaborate and partner with peer companies in their industry as well as in other industries to understand how to address conflict minerals in their supply chains. The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs’ (IPE) China Water Pollution Map enables the public to access thousands of environmental quality, discharge, and infraction records released by various government agencies. Empowered with this information, the public has the opportunity to place greater pressure on polluting companies to comply with environmental standards and create solutions to improve their performance. 3.      A new standard for reporting on supply chain greenhouse gas emissions is available. The New “Scope 3” Supply Chain Greenhouse Gas Inventory Standard, released on October 4th 2011, is the only international greenhouse gas emissions standard that accounts for the full lifecycle of a company’s products. It provides a framework for companies to account for indirect emissions outside of energy use, such as transportation, manufacturing, and distribution, and it incorporates both upstream and downstream impacts of a product. With key investors now listing supplier vulnerability to rising energy prices and disruptions of service as a key concern, greenhouse gas (GHG) management isn’t just for leading companies but a necessity for any business. 4.      Environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) reporting is becoming increasingly important to investors and other stakeholders. While European investors have traditionally driven the ESG agenda, U.S. investors are increasingly including ESG data in their analyses. This trend will likely increase as stakeholders continue to demand that an ESG lens be applied to their investments. Investors are increasingly looking to partner on sustainability, as they see the benefits of ESG providing significant returns on investment. 5.      Software companies are offering an increasing variety of solutions to help drive changes and measure performance internally, in supply chains, and across peer companies. The significant challenge is how to integrate different software systems to facilitate decision-making based on a holistic understanding of trade-offs. Jon Chorley, Chief Sustainability Officer and Vice President, Supply Chain Management Product Strategy at Oracle was a panelist in the “Trends in Sustainability Software” session and commented that, “How we think about our business decisions really comes down to how we think about cost. And as long as we don’t assign a cost to things that have an environmental impact or social impact, then we make decisions based on incomplete information. If we could include that in the process that determines ‘Is this product profitable? we would then have a much better decision.” For more information on BSR visit www.brs.org. You can also view highlights of the plenary session at http://www.bsr.org/en/bsr-conference/session-summaries/2011. Oracle is proud to be a sponsor of this BSR conference. By Elena Avesani, Principal Product Strategy Manager, Oracle          

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• Computer Networks UNISA - Chap 14 &ndash; Insuring Integrity &amp; Availability

  - by MarkPearl

  After reading this section you should be able to Identify the characteristics of a network that keep data safe from loss or damage Protect an enterprise-wide network from viruses Explain network and system level fault tolerance techniques Discuss issues related to network backup and recovery strategies Describe the components of a useful disaster recovery plan and the options for disaster contingencies What are integrity and availability? Integrity – the soundness of a networks programs, data, services, devices, and connections Availability – How consistently and reliably a file or system can be accessed by authorized personnel A number of phenomena can compromise both integrity and availability including… security breaches natural disasters malicious intruders power flaws human error users etc Although you cannot predict every type of vulnerability, you can take measures to guard against the most damaging events. The following are some guidelines… Allow only network administrators to create or modify NOS and application system users. Monitor the network for unauthorized access or changes Record authorized system changes in a change management system’ Install redundant components Perform regular health checks on the network Check system performance, error logs, and the system log book regularly Keep backups Implement and enforce security and disaster recovery policies These are just some of the basics… Malware Malware refers to any program or piece of code designed to intrude upon or harm a system or its resources. Types of Malware… Boot sector viruses Macro viruses File infector viruses Worms Trojan Horse Network Viruses Bots Malware characteristics Some common characteristics of Malware include… Encryption Stealth Polymorphism Time dependence Malware Protection There are various tools available to protect you from malware called anti-malware software. These monitor your system for indications that a program is performing potential malware operations. A number of techniques are used to detect malware including… Signature Scanning Integrity Checking Monitoring unexpected file changes or virus like behaviours It is important to decide where anti-malware tools will be installed and find a balance between performance and protection. There are several general purpose malware policies that can be implemented to protect your network including… Every compute in an organization should be equipped with malware detection and cleaning software that regularly runs Users should not be allowed to alter or disable the anti-malware software Users should know what to do in case the anti-malware program detects a malware virus Users should be prohibited from installing any unauthorized software on their systems System wide alerts should be issued to network users notifying them if a serious malware virus has been detected. Fault Tolerance Besides guarding against malware, another key factor in maintaining the availability and integrity of data is fault tolerance. Fault tolerance is the ability for a system to continue performing despite an unexpected hardware or software malfunction. Fault tolerance can be realized in varying degrees, the optimal level of fault tolerance for a system depends on how critical its services and files are to productivity. Generally the more fault tolerant the system, the more expensive it is. The following describe some of the areas that need to be considered for fault tolerance. Environment (Temperature and humidity) Power Topology and Connectivity Servers Storage Power Typical power flaws include Surges – a brief increase in voltage due to lightening strikes, solar flares or some idiot at City Power Noise – Fluctuation in voltage levels caused by other devices on the network or electromagnetic interference Brownout – A sag in voltage for just a moment Blackout – A complete power loss The are various alternate power sources to consider including UPS’s and Generators. UPS’s are found in two categories… Standby UPS – provides continuous power when mains goes down (brief period of switching over) Online UPS – is online all the time and the device receives power from the UPS all the time (the UPS is charged continuously) Servers There are various techniques for fault tolerance with servers. Server mirroring is an option where one device or component duplicates the activities of another. It is generally an expensive process. Clustering is a fault tolerance technique that links multiple servers together to appear as a single server. They share processing and storage responsibilities and if one unit in the cluster goes down, another unit can be brought in to replace it. Storage There are various techniques available including the following… RAID Arrays NAS (Storage (Network Attached Storage) SANs (Storage Area Networks) Data Backup A backup is a copy of data or program files created for archiving or safekeeping. Many different options for backups exist with various media including… These vary in cost and speed. Optical Media Tape Backup External Disk Drives Network Backups Backup Strategy After selecting the appropriate tool for performing your servers backup, devise a backup strategy to guide you through performing reliable backups that provide maximum data protection. Questions that should be answered include… What data must be backed up At what time of day or night will the backups occur How will you verify the accuracy of the backups Where and for how long will backup media be stored Who will take responsibility for ensuring that backups occurred How long will you save backups Where will backup and recovery documentation be stored Different backup methods provide varying levels of certainty and corresponding labour cost. There are also different ways to determine which files should be backed up including… Full backup – all data on all servers is copied to storage media Incremental backup – Only data that has changed since the last full or incremental backup is copied to a storage medium Differential backup – Only data that has changed since the last backup is coped to a storage medium Disaster Recovery Disaster recovery is the process of restoring your critical functionality and data after an enterprise wide outage has occurred. A disaster recovery plan is for extreme scenarios (i.e. fire, line fault, etc). A cold site is a place were the computers, devices, and connectivity necessary to rebuild a network exist but they are not appropriately configured. A warm site is a place where the computers, devices, and connectivity necessary to rebuild a network exists with some appropriately configured devices. A hot site is a place where the computers, devices, and connectivity necessary to rebuild a network exists and all are appropriately configured.

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• Taking the Plunge - or Dipping Your Toe - into the Fluffy IAM Cloud by Paul Dhanjal (Simeio Solutions)

  - by Greg Jensen

  In our last three posts, we’ve examined the revolution that’s occurring today in identity and access management (IAM). We looked at the business drivers behind the growth of cloud-based IAM, the shortcomings of the old, last-century IAM models, and the new opportunities that federation, identity hubs and other new cloud capabilities can provide by changing the way you interact with everyone who does business with you. In this, our final post in the series, we’ll cover the key things you, the enterprise architect, should keep in mind when considering moving IAM to the cloud. Invariably, what starts the consideration process is a burning business need: a compliance requirement, security vulnerability or belt-tightening edict. Many on the business side view IAM as the “silver bullet” – and for good reason. You can almost always devise a solution using some aspect of IAM. The most critical question to ask first when using IAM to address the business need is, simply: is my solution complete? Typically, “business” is not focused on the big picture. Understandably, they’re focused instead on the need at hand: Can we be HIPAA compliant in 6 months? Can we tighten our new hire, employee transfer and termination processes? What can we do to prevent another password breach? Can we reduce our service center costs by the end of next quarter? The business may not be focused on the complete set of services offered by IAM but rather a single aspect or two. But it is the job – indeed the duty – of the enterprise architect to ensure that all aspects are being met. It’s like remodeling a house but failing to consider the impact on the foundation, the furnace or the zoning or setback requirements. While the homeowners may not be thinking of such things, the architect, of course, must. At Simeio Solutions, the way we ensure that all aspects are being taken into account – to expose any gaps or weaknesses – is to assess our client’s IAM capabilities against a five-step maturity model ranging from “ad hoc” to “optimized.” The model we use is similar to Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University. It’s based upon some simple criteria, which can provide a visual representation of how well our clients fair when evaluated against four core categories: ·         Program Governance ·         Access Management (e.g., Single Sign-On) ·         Identity and Access Governance (e.g., Identity Intelligence) ·         Enterprise Security (e.g., DLP and SIEM) Often our clients believe they have a solution with all the bases covered, but the model exposes the gaps or weaknesses. The gaps are ideal opportunities for the cloud to enter into the conversation. The complete process is straightforward: 1.    Look at the big picture, not just the immediate need – what is our roadmap and how does this solution fit? 2.    Determine where you stand with respect to the four core areas – what are the gaps? 3.    Decide how to cover the gaps – what role can the cloud play? Returning to our home remodeling analogy, at some point, if gaps or weaknesses are discovered when evaluating the complete impact of the proposed remodel – if the existing foundation wouldn’t support the new addition, for example – the owners need to decide if it’s time to move to a new house instead of trying to remodel the old one. However, with IAM it’s not an either-or proposition – i.e., either move to the cloud or fix the existing infrastructure. It’s possible to use new cloud technologies just to cover the gaps. Many of our clients start their migration to the cloud this way, dipping in their toe instead of taking the plunge all at once. Because our cloud services offering is based on the Oracle Identity and Access Management Suite, we can offer a tremendous amount of flexibility in this regard. The Oracle platform is not a collection of point solutions, but rather a complete, integrated, best-of-breed suite. Yet it’s not an all-or-nothing proposition. You can choose just the features and capabilities you need using a pay-as-you-go model, incrementally turning on and off services as needed. Better still, all the other capabilities are there, at the ready, whenever you need them. Spooling up these cloud-only services takes just a fraction of the time it would take a typical organization to deploy internally. SLAs in the cloud may be higher than on premise, too. And by using a suite of software that’s complete and integrated, you can dramatically lower cost and complexity. If your in-house solution cannot be migrated to the cloud, you might consider using hardware appliances such as Simeio’s Cloud Interceptor to extend your enterprise out into the network. You might also consider using Expert Managed Services. Cost is usually the key factor – not just development costs but also operational sustainment costs. Talent or resourcing issues often come into play when thinking about sustaining a program. Expert Managed Services such as those we offer at Simeio can address those concerns head on. In a cloud offering, identity and access services lend to the new paradigms described in my previous posts. Most importantly, it allows us all to focus on what we're meant to do – provide value, lower costs and increase security to our respective organizations. It’s that magic “silver bullet” that business knew you had all along. If you’d like to talk more, you can find us at simeiosolutions.com.

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• Using XA Transactions in Coherence-based Applications

  - by jpurdy

  While the costs of XA transactions are well known (e.g. increased data contention, higher latency, significant disk I/O for logging, availability challenges, etc.), in many cases they are the most attractive option for coordinating logical transactions across multiple resources. There are a few common approaches when integrating Coherence into applications via the use of an application server's transaction manager: Use of Coherence as a read-only cache, applying transactions to the underlying database (or any system of record) instead of the cache. Use of TransactionMap interface via the included resource adapter. Use of the new ACID transaction framework, introduced in Coherence 3.6.   Each of these may have significant drawbacks for certain workloads. Using Coherence as a read-only cache is the simplest option. In this approach, the application is responsible for managing both the database and the cache (either within the business logic or via application server hooks). This approach also tends to provide limited benefit for many workloads, particularly those workloads that either have queries (given the complexity of maintaining a fully cached data set in Coherence) or are not read-heavy (where the cost of managing the cache may outweigh the benefits of reading from it). All updates are made synchronously to the database, leaving it as both a source of latency as well as a potential bottleneck. This approach also prevents addressing "hot data" problems (when certain objects are updated by many concurrent transactions) since most database servers offer no facilities for explicitly controlling concurrent updates. Finally, this option tends to be a better fit for key-based access (rather than filter-based access such as queries) since this makes it easier to aggressively invalidate cache entries without worrying about when they will be reloaded. The advantage of this approach is that it allows strong data consistency as long as optimistic concurrency control is used to ensure that database updates are applied correctly regardless of whether the cache contains stale (or even dirty) data. Another benefit of this approach is that it avoids the limitations of Coherence's write-through caching implementation. TransactionMap is generally used when Coherence acts as system of record. TransactionMap is not generally compatible with write-through caching, so it will usually be either used to manage a standalone cache or when the cache is backed by a database via write-behind caching. TransactionMap has some restrictions that may limit its utility, the most significant being: The lock-based concurrency model is relatively inefficient and may introduce significant latency and contention. As an example, in a typical configuration, a transaction that updates 20 cache entries will require roughly 40ms just for lock management (assuming all locks are granted immediately, and excluding validation and writing which will require a similar amount of time). This may be partially mitigated by denormalizing (e.g. combining a parent object and its set of child objects into a single cache entry), at the cost of increasing false contention (e.g. transactions will conflict even when updating different child objects). If the client (application server JVM) fails during the commit phase, locks will be released immediately, and the transaction may be partially committed. In practice, this is usually not as bad as it may sound since the commit phase is usually very short (all locks having been previously acquired). Note that this vulnerability does not exist when a single NamedCache is used and all updates are confined to a single partition (generally implying the use of partition affinity). The unconventional TransactionMap API is cumbersome but manageable. Only a few methods are transactional, primarily get(), put() and remove(). The ACID transactions framework (accessed via the Connection class) provides atomicity guarantees by implementing the NamedCache interface, maintaining its own cache data and transaction logs inside a set of private partitioned caches. This feature may be used as either a local transactional resource or as logging XA resource. However, a lack of database integration precludes the use of this functionality for most applications. A side effect of this is that this feature has not seen significant adoption, meaning that any use of this is subject to the usual headaches associated with being an early adopter (greater chance of bugs and greater risk of hitting an unoptimized code path). As a result, for the moment, we generally recommend against using this feature. In summary, it is possible to use Coherence in XA-oriented applications, and several customers are doing this successfully, but it is not a core usage model for the product, so care should be taken before committing to this path. For most applications, the most robust solution is normally to use Coherence as a read-only cache of the underlying data resources, even if this prevents taking advantage of certain product features.

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• Authorizing a computer to access a web application

  - by HackedByChinese

  I have a web application, and am tasked with adding secure sign-on to bolster security, akin to what Google has added to Google accounts. Use Case Essentially, when a user logs in, we want to detect if the user has previously authorized this computer. If the computer has not been authorized, the user is sent a one-time password (via email, SMS, or phone call) that they must enter, where the user may choose to remember this computer. In the web application, we will track authorized devices, allowing users to see when/where they logged in from that device last, and deauthorize any devices if they so choose. We require a solution that is very light touch (meaning, requiring no client-side software installation), and works with Safari, Chrome, Firefox, and IE 7+ (unfortunately). We will offer x509 security, which provides adequate security, but we still need a solution for customers that can't or won't use x509. My intention is to store authorization information using cookies (or, potentially, using local storage, degrading to flash cookies, and then normal cookies). At First Blush Track two separate values (local data or cookies): a hash representing a secure sign-on token, as well as a device token. Both values are driven (and recorded) by the web application, and dictated to the client. The SSO token is dependent on the device as well as a sequence number. This effectively allows devices to be deauthorized (all SSO tokens become invalid) and mitigates replay (not effectively, though, which is why I'm asking this question) through the use of a sequence number, and uses a nonce. Problem With this solution, it's possible for someone to just copy the SSO and device tokens and use in another request. While the sequence number will help me detect such an abuse and thus deauthorize the device, the detection and response can only happen after the valid device and malicious request both attempt access, which is ample time for damage to be done. I feel like using HMAC would be better. Track the device, the sequence, create a nonce, timestamp, and hash with a private key, then send the hash plus those values as plain text. Server does the same (in addition to validating the device and sequence) and compares. That seems much easier, and much more reliable.... assuming we can securely negotiate, exchange, and store private keys. Question So then, how can I securely negotiate a private key for authorized device, and then securely store that key? Is it more possible, at least, if I settle for storing the private key using local storage or flash cookies and just say it's "good enough"? Or, is there something I can do to my original draft to mitigate the vulnerability I describe?

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• Consistent PHP _SERVER variables between Apache and nginx?

  - by Alix Axel

  I'm not sure if this should be asked here or on ServerFault, but here it goes... I am trying to get started on nginx with PHP-FPM, but I noticed that the server block setup I currently have (gathered from several guides including the nginx Pitfalls wiki page) produces $_SERVER variables that are different from what I'm used to seeing in Apache setups. After spending the last evening trying to "fix" this, I decided to install Apache on my local computer and gather the variables that I'm interested in under different conditions so that I could try and mimic them on nginx. The Apache setup I've on my computer has only one mod_rewrite rule: RewriteEngine On RewriteCond %{SCRIPT_FILENAME} !-f RewriteCond %{SCRIPT_FILENAME} !-d RewriteRule ^(.*)$ /index.php/$1 [L] And these are the values I get for different request URIs (left is Apache, right is nginx): localhost/ - http://www.mergely.com/GnzBHRV1/ localhost/foo/bar/baz/?foo=bar - http://www.mergely.com/VwsT8oTf/ localhost/index.php/foo/bar/baz/?foo=bar - http://www.mergely.com/VGEFehfT/ What configuration directives would allow me to get similar values on requests handled by nginx? My current configuration in nginx is: server { listen 80; listen 443 ssl; server_name default; ssl_certificate /etc/nginx/certificates/dummy.crt; ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certificates/dummy.key; root /var/www/default/html; index index.php index.html; autoindex on; location / { try_files $uri $uri/ /index.php; } location ~ /(?:favicon[.]ico|robots[.]txt)$ { log_not_found off; } location ~* [.]php { #try_files $uri =404; include fastcgi_params; fastcgi_pass unix:/var/run/php5-fpm.sock; fastcgi_index index.php; fastcgi_split_path_info ^(.+[.]php)(/.+)$; } location ~* [.]ht { deny all; } } And my fastcgi_params file looks like this: fastcgi_param PATH_INFO $fastcgi_path_info; fastcgi_param PATH_TRANSLATED $document_root$fastcgi_path_info; fastcgi_param QUERY_STRING $query_string; fastcgi_param REQUEST_METHOD $request_method; fastcgi_param CONTENT_TYPE $content_type; fastcgi_param CONTENT_LENGTH $content_length; fastcgi_param SCRIPT_NAME $fastcgi_script_name; fastcgi_param SCRIPT_FILENAME $document_root$fastcgi_script_name; fastcgi_param REQUEST_URI $request_uri; fastcgi_param DOCUMENT_URI $document_uri; fastcgi_param DOCUMENT_ROOT $document_root; fastcgi_param SERVER_PROTOCOL $server_protocol; fastcgi_param GATEWAY_INTERFACE CGI/1.1; fastcgi_param SERVER_SOFTWARE nginx/$nginx_version; fastcgi_param REMOTE_ADDR $remote_addr; fastcgi_param REMOTE_PORT $remote_port; fastcgi_param SERVER_ADDR $server_addr; fastcgi_param SERVER_PORT $server_port; fastcgi_param SERVER_NAME $server_name; fastcgi_param HTTPS $https; I know that the try_files $uri =404; directive is commented and that it is a security vulnerability but, if I uncomment it, the third request (localhost/index.php/foo/bar/baz/?foo=bar) will return a 404. It's also worth noting that my PHP cgi.fix_pathinfo in On (contrary to what some of the guides recommend), if I try to set it to Off, I'm presented with a "Access denied." message on every PHP request. I'm running PHP 5.4.8 and nginx/1.1.19. I don't know what else to try... Help?

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• Router 2wire, Slackware desktop in DMZ mode, iptables policy aginst ping, but still pingable

  - by user135501

  I'm in DMZ mode, so I'm firewalling myself, stealthy all ok, but I get faulty test results from Shields Up that there are pings. Yesterday I couldn't make a connection to game servers work, because ping block was enabled (on the router). I disabled it, but this persists even due to my firewall. What is the connection between me and my router in DMZ mode (for my machine, there is bunch of others too behind router firewall)? When it allows router affecting if I'm pingable or not and if router has setting not blocking ping, rules in my iptables for this scenario do not work. Please ignore commented rules, I do uncomment them as I want. These two should do the job right? iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j DROP echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all Here are my iptables: #!/bin/sh # Begin /bin/firewall-start # Insert connection-tracking modules (not needed if built into the kernel). #modprobe ip_tables #modprobe iptable_filter #modprobe ip_conntrack #modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp #modprobe ipt_state #modprobe ipt_LOG # allow local-only connections iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT # free output on any interface to any ip for any service # (equal to -P ACCEPT) iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT # permit answers on already established connections # and permit new connections related to established ones (eg active-ftp) iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT #Gamespy&NWN #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp -m multiport --ports 5120:5129 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 6667 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 28910 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 29900 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 29901 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 29920 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp -m multiport --ports 5120:5129 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 6500 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 27900 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 27901 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 29910 -j ACCEPT # Log everything else: What's Windows' latest exploitable vulnerability? iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INPUT" # set a sane policy: everything not accepted > /dev/null iptables -P INPUT DROP iptables -P FORWARD DROP iptables -P OUTPUT DROP iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j DROP # be verbose on dynamic ip-addresses (not needed in case of static IP) echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr # disable ExplicitCongestionNotification - too many routers are still # ignorant echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ecn #ping death echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all # If you are frequently accessing ftp-servers or enjoy chatting you might # notice certain delays because some implementations of these daemons have # the feature of querying an identd on your box for your username for # logging. Although there's really no harm in this, having an identd # running is not recommended because some implementations are known to be # vulnerable. # To avoid these delays you could reject the requests with a 'tcp-reset': #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 113 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset #iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 113 -m state --state RELATED -j ACCEPT # To log and drop invalid packets, mostly harmless packets that came in # after netfilter's timeout, sometimes scans: #iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID -j LOG --log-prefix \ "FIREWALL:INVALID" #iptables -I INPUT 2 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # End /bin/firewall-start

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• Week in Geek: New Security Flaw Confirmed for Internet Explorer Edition

  - by Asian Angel

  This week we learned how to use a PC to stay entertained while traveling for the holidays, create quality photo prints with free software, share links between any browser and any smartphone, create perfect Christmas photos using How-To Geek’s 10 best how-to photo guides, and had fun decorating Firefox with a collection of Holiday 2010 Personas themes. Photo by Repoort. Random Geek Links Photo by Asian Angel. Critical 0-Day Flaw Affects All Internet Explorer Versions, Microsoft Warns Microsoft has confirmed a zero-day vulnerability affecting all supported versions of Internet Explorer, including IE8, IE7 and IE6. Note: Article contains link to Microsoft Security Advisory detailing two work-arounds until a security update is released. Hackers targeting human rights, indie media groups Hackers are increasingly hitting the Web sites of human rights and independent media groups in an attempt to silence them, says a new study released this week by Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society. OpenBSD: audits give no indication of back doors So far, the analyses of OpenBSD’s crypto and IPSec code have not provided any indication that the system contains back doors for listening to encrypted VPN connections. But the developers have already found two bugs during their current audits. Sophos: Beware Facebook’s new facial-recognition feature Facebook’s new facial recognition software might result in undesirable photos of users being circulated online, warned a security expert, who urged users to keep abreast with the social network’s privacy settings to prevent the abovementioned scenario from becoming a reality. Microsoft withdraws flawed Outlook update Microsoft has withdrawn update KB2412171 for Outlook 2007, released last Patch Tuesday, after a number of user complaints. Skype: Millions still without service Skype was still working to right itself going into the holiday weekend from a major outage that began this past Wednesday. Mozilla improves sync setup and WebGL in Firefox 4 beta 8 Firefox 4.0 beta 8 brings better support for WebGL and introduces an improved setup process for Firefox Sync that simplifies the steps for configuring the synchronization service across multiple devices. Chrome OS the litmus test for cloud The success or failure of Google’s browser-oriented Chrome OS will be the litmus test to decide if the cloud is capable of addressing user needs for content and services, according to a new Ovum report released Monday. FCC Net neutrality rules reach mobile apps The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) finally released its long-expected regulations on Thursday and the related explanations total a whopping 194 pages. One new item that was not previously disclosed: mobile wireless providers can’t block “applications that compete with the provider’s” own voice or video telephony services. KDE and the Document Foundation join Open Invention Network The KDE e.V. and the Document Foundation (TDF) have both joined the Open Invention Network (OIN) as licensees, expanding the organization’s roster of supporters. Report: SEC looks into Hurd’s ousting from HP The scandal surrounding Mark Hurd’s departure from the world’s largest technology company in August has officially drawn attention from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Report: Google requests delay of new Google TVs Google TV is apparently encountering a bit of static that has resulted in a programming change. Geek Video of the Week This week we have a double dose of geeky video goodness for you with the original Mac vs PC video and the trailer for the sequel. Photo courtesy of Peacer. Mac vs PC Photo courtesy of Peacer. Mac vs PC 2 Trailer Random TinyHacker Links Awesome Tools To Extract Audio From Video Here’s a list of really useful, and free tools to rip audio from videos. Getting Your iPhone Out of Recovery Mode Is your iPhone stuck in recovery mode? This tutorial will help you get it out of that state. Google Shared Spaces Quickly create a shared space and collaborate with friends online. McAfee Internet Security 2011 – Upgrade not worthy of a version change McAfee has released their 2011 version of security products. And as this review details, the upgrades are minimal when compared to their 2010 products. For more information, check out the review. 200 Countries Plotted Hans Rosling’s famous lectures combine enormous quantities of public data with a sport’s commentator’s style to reveal the story of the world’s past, present and future development. Now he explores stats in a way he has never done before – using augmented reality animation. Super User Questions Enjoy looking through this week’s batch of popular questions and answers from Super User. How to restore windows 7 to a known working state every time it boots? Is there an easy way to mass-transfer all files between two computers? Coffee spilled inside computer, damaged hard drive Computer does not boot after ram upgrade Keyboard not detected when trying to install Ubuntu 10.10 How-To Geek Weekly Article Recap Have you had a super busy week while preparing for the holiday weekend? Then here is your chance to get caught up on your reading with our five hottest articles for the week. Ask How-To Geek: Rescuing an Infected PC, Installing Bloat-free iTunes, and Taming a Crazy Trackpad How to Use the Avira Rescue CD to Clean Your Infected PC Eight Geektacular Christmas Projects for Your Day Off VirtualBox 4.0 Rocks Extensions and a Simplified GUI Ask the Readers: How Many Monitors Do You Use with Your Computer? One Year Ago on How-To Geek Here are more great articles from one year ago for you to read and enjoy during the holiday break. Enjoy Distraction-Free Writing with WriteMonkey Shutter is a State of Art Screenshot Tool for Ubuntu Get Hex & RGB Color Codes the Easy Way Find User Scripts for Your Favorite Websites the Easy Way Access Your Unsorted Bookmarks the Easy Way (Firefox) The Geek Note That “wraps” things up for this week and we hope that everyone enjoys the rest of their holiday break! Found a great tip during the break? Then be sure to send it in to us at [email protected]. Photo by ArSiSa7. Latest Features How-To Geek ETC How to Use the Avira Rescue CD to Clean Your Infected PC The Complete List of iPad Tips, Tricks, and Tutorials Is Your Desktop Printer More Expensive Than Printing Services? 20 OS X Keyboard Shortcuts You Might Not Know HTG Explains: Which Linux File System Should You Choose? HTG Explains: Why Does Photo Paper Improve Print Quality? Simon’s Cat Explores the Christmas Tree! [Video] The Outdoor Lights Scene from National Lampoon’s Christmas Vacation [Video] The Famous Home Alone Pizza Delivery Scene [Classic Video] Chronicles of Narnia: The Voyage of the Dawn Treader Theme for Windows 7 Cardinal and Rabbit Sharing a Tree on a Cold Winter Morning Wallpaper An Alternate Star Wars Christmas Special [Video]

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• A New Threat To Web Applications: Connection String Parameter Pollution (CSPP)

  - by eric.maurice

  Hi, this is Shaomin Wang. I am a security analyst in Oracle's Security Alerts Group. My primary responsibility is to evaluate the security vulnerabilities reported externally by security researchers on Oracle Fusion Middleware and to ensure timely resolution through the Critical Patch Update. Today, I am going to talk about a serious type of attack: Connection String Parameter Pollution (CSPP). Earlier this year, at the Black Hat DC 2010 Conference, two Spanish security researchers, Jose Palazon and Chema Alonso, unveiled a new class of security vulnerabilities, which target insecure dynamic connections between web applications and databases. The attack called Connection String Parameter Pollution (CSPP) exploits specifically the semicolon delimited database connection strings that are constructed dynamically based on the user inputs from web applications. CSPP, if carried out successfully, can be used to steal user identities and hijack web credentials. CSPP is a high risk attack because of the relative ease with which it can be carried out (low access complexity) and the potential results it can have (high impact). In today's blog, we are going to first look at what connection strings are and then review the different ways connection string injections can be leveraged by malicious hackers. We will then discuss how CSPP differs from traditional connection string injection, and the measures organizations can take to prevent this kind of attacks. In web applications, a connection string is a set of values that specifies information to connect to backend data repositories, in most cases, databases. The connection string is passed to a provider or driver to initiate a connection. Vendors or manufacturers write their own providers for different databases. Since there are many different providers and each provider has multiple ways to make a connection, there are many different ways to write a connection string. Here are some examples of connection strings from Oracle Data Provider for .Net/ODP.Net: Oracle Data Provider for .Net / ODP.Net; Manufacturer: Oracle; Type: .NET Framework Class Library: - Using TNS Data Source = orcl; User ID = myUsername; Password = myPassword; - Using integrated security Data Source = orcl; Integrated Security = SSPI; - Using the Easy Connect Naming Method Data Source = username/password@//myserver:1521/my.server.com - Specifying Pooling parameters Data Source=myOracleDB; User Id=myUsername; Password=myPassword; Min Pool Size=10; Connection Lifetime=120; Connection Timeout=60; Incr Pool Size=5; Decr Pool Size=2; There are many variations of the connection strings, but the majority of connection strings are key value pairs delimited by semicolons. Attacks on connection strings are not new (see for example, this SANS White Paper on Securing SQL Connection String). Connection strings are vulnerable to injection attacks when dynamic string concatenation is used to build connection strings based on user input. When the user input is not validated or filtered, and malicious text or characters are not properly escaped, an attacker can potentially access sensitive data or resources. For a number of years now, vendors, including Oracle, have created connection string builder class tools to help developers generate valid connection strings and potentially prevent this kind of vulnerability. Unfortunately, not all application developers use these utilities because they are not aware of the danger posed by this kind of attacks. So how are Connection String parameter Pollution (CSPP) attacks different from traditional Connection String Injection attacks? First, let's look at what parameter pollution attacks are. Parameter pollution is a technique, which typically involves appending repeating parameters to the request strings to attack the receiving end. Much of the public attention around parameter pollution was initiated as a result of a presentation on HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks by Stefano Di Paola and Luca Carettoni delivered at the 2009 Appsec OWASP Conference in Poland. In HTTP Parameter Pollution attacks, an attacker submits additional parameters in HTTP GET/POST to a web application, and if these parameters have the same name as an existing parameter, the web application may react in different ways depends on how the web application and web server deal with multiple parameters with the same name. When applied to connections strings, the rule for the majority of database providers is the "last one wins" algorithm. If a KEYWORD=VALUE pair occurs more than once in the connection string, the value associated with the LAST occurrence is used. This opens the door to some serious attacks. By way of example, in a web application, a user enters username and password; a subsequent connection string is generated to connect to the back end database. Data Source = myDataSource; Initial Catalog = db; Integrated Security = no; User ID = myUsername; Password = XXX; In the password field, if the attacker enters "xxx; Integrated Security = true", the connection string becomes, Data Source = myDataSource; Initial Catalog = db; Integrated Security = no; User ID = myUsername; Password = XXX; Intergrated Security = true; Under the "last one wins" principle, the web application will then try to connect to the database using the operating system account under which the application is running to bypass normal authentication. CSPP poses serious risks for unprepared organizations. It can be particularly dangerous if an Enterprise Systems Management web front-end is compromised, because attackers can then gain access to control panels to configure databases, systems accounts, etc. Fortunately, organizations can take steps to prevent this kind of attacks. CSPP falls into the Injection category of attacks like Cross Site Scripting or SQL Injection, which are made possible when inputs from users are not properly escaped or sanitized. Escaping is a technique used to ensure that characters (mostly from user inputs) are treated as data, not as characters, that is relevant to the interpreter's parser. Software developers need to become aware of the danger of these attacks and learn about the defenses mechanism they need to introduce in their code. As well, software vendors need to provide templates or classes to facilitate coding and eliminate developers' guesswork for protecting against such vulnerabilities. Oracle has introduced the OracleConnectionStringBuilder class in Oracle Data Provider for .NET. Using this class, developers can employ a configuration file to provide the connection string and/or dynamically set the values through key/value pairs. It makes creating connection strings less error-prone and easier to manager, and ultimately using the OracleConnectionStringBuilder class provides better security against injection into connection strings. For More Information: - The OracleConnectionStringBuilder is located at http://download.oracle.com/docs/cd/B28359_01/win.111/b28375/OracleConnectionStringBuilderClass.htm - Oracle has developed a publicly available course on preventing SQL Injections. The Server Technologies Curriculum course "Defending Against SQL Injection Attacks!" is located at http://st-curriculum.oracle.com/tutorial/SQLInjection/index.htm - The OWASP web site also provides a number of useful resources. It is located at http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page

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• Can Google Employees See My Saved Google Chrome Passwords?

  - by Jason Fitzpatrick

  Storing your passwords in your web browser seems like a great time saver, but are the passwords secure and inaccessible to others (even employees of the browser company) when squirreled away? Today’s Question & Answer session comes to us courtesy of SuperUser—a subdivision of Stack Exchange, a community-driven grouping of Q&A web sites. The Question SuperUser reader MMA is curious if Google employees have (or could have) access to the passwords he stores in Google Chrome: I understand that we are really tempted to save our passwords in Google Chrome. The likely benefit is two fold, You don’t need to (memorize and) input those long and cryptic passwords. These are available wherever you are once you log in to your Google account. The last point sparked my doubt. Since the password is available anywhere, the storage must in some central location, and this should be at Google. Now, my simple question is, can a Google employee see my passwords? Searching over the Internet revealed several articles/messages. Do you save passwords in Chrome? Maybe you should reconsider: Talks about your passwords being stolen by someone who has access to your computer account. Nothing mentioned about the central storage security and vulnerability. There is even a response from Chrome browser security tech lead about the first issue. Chrome’s insane password security strategy: Mostly along the same line. You can steal password from somebody if you have access to the computer account. How to Steal Passwords Saved in Google Chrome in 5 Simple Steps: Teaches you how to actually perform the act mentioned in the previous two when you have access to somebody else’s account. There are many more (including this one at this site), mostly along the same line, points, counter-points, huge debates. I refrain from mentioning them here, simply carry a search if you want to find them. Coming back to my original query, can a Google employee see my password? Since I can view the password using a simple button, definitely they can be unhashed (decrypted) even if encrypted. This is very different from the passwords saved in Unix-like OS’s where the saved password can never be seen in plain text. They use a one-way encryption algorithm to encrypt your passwords. This encrypted password is then stored in the passwd or shadow file. When you attempt to login, the password you type in is encrypted again and compared with the entry in the file that stores your passwords. If they match, it must be the same password, and you are allowed access. Thus, a superuser can change my password, can block my account, but he can never see my password. So are his concerns well founded or will a little insight dispel his worry? The Answer SuperUser contributor Zeel helps put his mind at ease: Short answer: No* Passwords stored on your local machine can be decrypted by Chrome, as long as your OS user account is logged in. And then you can view those in plain text. At first this seems horrible, but how did you think auto-fill worked? When that password field gets filled in, Chrome must insert the real password into the HTML form element – or else the page wouldn’t work right, and you could not submit the form. And if the connection to the website is not over HTTPS, the plain text is then sent over the internet. In other words, if chrome can’t get the plain text passwords, then they are totally useless. A one way hash is no good, because we need to use them. Now the passwords are in fact encrypted, the only way to get them back to plain text is to have the decryption key. That key is your Google password, or a secondary key you can set up. When you sign into Chrome and sync the Google servers will transmit the encrypted passwords, settings, bookmarks, auto-fill, etc, to your local machine. Here Chrome will decrypt the information and be able to use it. On Google’s end all that info is stored in its encrpyted state, and they do not have the key to decrypt it. Your account password is checked against a hash to log in to Google, and even if you let chrome remember it, that encrypted version is hidden in the same bundle as the other passwords, impossible to access. So an employee could probably grab a dump of the encrypted data, but it wouldn’t do them any good, since they would have no way to use it.* So no, Google employees can not** access your passwords, since they are encrypted on their servers. * However, do not forget that any system that can be accessed by an authorized user can be accessed by an unauthorized user. Some systems are easier to break than other, but none are fail-proof. . . That being said, I think I will trust Google and the millions they spend on security systems, over any other password storage solution. And heck, I’m a wimpy nerd, it would be easier to beat the passwords out of me than break Google’s encryption. ** I am also assuming that there isn’t a person who just happens to work for Google gaining access to your local machine. In that case you are screwed, but employment at Google isn’t actually a factor any more. Moral: Hit Win + L before leaving machine. While we agree with zeel that it’s a pretty safe bet (as long as your computer is not compromised) that your passwords are in fact safe while stored in Chrome, we prefer to encrypt all our logins and passwords in a LastPass vault. Have something to add to the explanation? Sound off in the the comments. Want to read more answers from other tech-savvy Stack Exchange users? Check out the full discussion thread here.     

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• Router 2wire, Slackware desktop in DMZ mode, iptables policy aginst ping, but still pingable

  - by skriatok

  I'm in DMZ mode, so I'm firewalling myself, stealthy all ok, but I get faulty test results from Shields Up that there are pings. Yesterday I couldn't make a connection to game servers work, because ping block was enabled (on the router). I disabled it, but this persists even due to my firewall. What is the connection between me and my router in DMZ mode (for my machine, there is bunch of others too behind router firewall)? When it allows router affecting if I'm pingable or not and if router has setting not blocking ping, rules in my iptables for this scenario do not work. Please ignore commented rules, I do uncomment them as I want. These two should do the job right? iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j DROP echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all Here are my iptables: #!/bin/sh # Begin /bin/firewall-start # Insert connection-tracking modules (not needed if built into the kernel). #modprobe ip_tables #modprobe iptable_filter #modprobe ip_conntrack #modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp #modprobe ipt_state #modprobe ipt_LOG # allow local-only connections iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT # free output on any interface to any ip for any service # (equal to -P ACCEPT) iptables -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT # permit answers on already established connections # and permit new connections related to established ones (eg active-ftp) iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT #Gamespy&NWN #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp -m multiport --ports 5120:5129 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 6667 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 28910 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 29900 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 29901 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 29920 --tcp-flags SYN,RST,ACK SYN -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp -m multiport --ports 5120:5129 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 6500 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 27900 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 27901 -j ACCEPT #iptables -A INPUT -p udp -m udp --dport 29910 -j ACCEPT # Log everything else: What's Windows' latest exploitable vulnerability? iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "FIREWALL:INPUT" # set a sane policy: everything not accepted > /dev/null iptables -P INPUT DROP iptables -P FORWARD DROP iptables -P OUTPUT DROP iptables -A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -j DROP # be verbose on dynamic ip-addresses (not needed in case of static IP) echo 2 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_dynaddr # disable ExplicitCongestionNotification - too many routers are still # ignorant echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_ecn #ping death echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all # If you are frequently accessing ftp-servers or enjoy chatting you might # notice certain delays because some implementations of these daemons have # the feature of querying an identd on your box for your username for # logging. Although there's really no harm in this, having an identd # running is not recommended because some implementations are known to be # vulnerable. # To avoid these delays you could reject the requests with a 'tcp-reset': #iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 113 -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset #iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 113 -m state --state RELATED -j ACCEPT # To log and drop invalid packets, mostly harmless packets that came in # after netfilter's timeout, sometimes scans: #iptables -I INPUT 1 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID -j LOG --log-prefix \ "FIREWALL:INVALID" #iptables -I INPUT 2 -p tcp -m state --state INVALID -j DROP # End /bin/firewall-start Active ruleset: bash-4.1# iptables -L -n -v Chain INPUT (policy DROP 38 packets, 2228 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination 0 0 ACCEPT all -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 844 542K ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 38 2228 LOG all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 LOG flags 0 level 4 prefix `FIREWALL:INPUT' 0 0 ACCEPT all -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0 0 ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 38 2228 LOG all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 LOG flags 0 level 4 prefix `FIREWALL:INPUT' Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain OUTPUT (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination 1158 111K ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 0 0 ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 Active ruleset: (after editing iptables into below sugested form) bash-4.1# iptables -L -n -v Chain INPUT (policy DROP 2567 packets, 172K bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination 49 4157 ACCEPT all -- lo * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 412K 441M ACCEPT all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 state RELATED,ESTABLISHED 2567 172K LOG all -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 LOG flags 0 level 4 prefix `FIREWALL:INPUT' 0 0 DROP icmp -- * * 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0 icmp type 8 Chain FORWARD (policy DROP 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT 312K packets, 25M bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination ping and syslog simultaneous screenshots from phone (pinger) and from laptop (being pinged) http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4160051/slckwr/pingfrom%20mobile.jpg http://dl.dropbox.com/u/4160051/slckwr/tailsyslog.jpg

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