Search Results

Search found 17646 results on 706 pages for 'security warning'.

Page 149/706 | < Previous Page | 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156  | Next Page >

  • Is it okay to use an administrator account for everyday use if UAC is on?

    - by Valentin Radu
    Since I switched to Windows 7 about 3 years ago, and now using Windows 8.1, I have become familiar with the concept of User Account Control and used my PC the following way: a standard account which I use for every day work and the built-in Administrator account activated and used only to elevate processes when they request so, or to ”Run as administrator” applications when I need to. However, recently after reading more about User Account Control, I started wondering if my way of working is good? Or should I use an administrator account for every day work, since an administrator account is not elevated until requested by apps, or until I request so via the ”Run as administrator” option? I am asking this because I read somewhere that the built-in Administrator account is a true administrator, by which I mean UAC doesn't pop up when logged in within it, and I am scared of not having problems when potential malicious software come into scene. I have to mention that I do not use it on a daily basis, just when I need to elevate some apps. I barely log in into it 10 times a year... So, how's better? Thanks for your answers! And Happy New Year, of course! P.S. I asked this a year ago (:P) and I think I should reiterate it: is an administrator account as safe these days as a standard account coupled with the built-in Administrator account when needed?

    Read the article

  • Why are email transfers between mail servers often not encrypted? Why aren't users warned about it?

    - by AmV
    Users can often choose if they want to access their email provider (such as Gmail) using a secure channel (e.g. using HTTPS). However, to the best of my knowledge, when it comes to mail-server-to-mail-server communications, most emails are still transferred in plain text and not encrypted, making it possible to anybody on the network to read their content. Are there any technologies that give the user some guarantees that his emails are sent securely from end to end ? Why not let the user know when encryption is not supported and let him choose if he wants his email to be still delivered ?

    Read the article

  • How to defend agains botnet http requests

    - by Killercode
    I have a server with WHM + CPanel and 5 of my costumer got infected with zbot. This means that the domains they have are constantly receiving requests to certain destinations. I tried to use mod_security but seems that it can't filter every requests... I don't really know why? I still see in the access log the connection comming in and it's consuming a LOT of bandwidth and server load Those accounts have already been clean so all of those requests go to error 404 (the ones catched on mod_security I am dropping the connection). Is there anymore ways to defend against this requests?

    Read the article

  • Does anyone know how to "tcpdump" traffic decrypted by Mallory MITM? [migrated]

    - by chriv
    I'm looking for some help in capturing network traffic that I can analyze in Wireshare (or other tools). The tool I'm using is mallory. If anyone is familiar with mallory, I could use some help. I've got it configured and running correctly, but I don't know how to get the output that I want. The setup is on my private network. I have a VM (running Ubuntu 12.04 - precise) with two NICs: eth0 is on my "real" network eth1 is only on my "fake" network, and is using dnsmasq (for DNS and DHCP for other devices on the "fake" network) Effectively eth0 is the "WAN" on my VM, and eth1 is the "LAN" on my VM. I've setup mallory and iptables to intercept, decrypt, encrypt and rewrite all traffic coming in on destination port 443 on eth1. On the device I want intercepted, I have imported the ca.cer that mallory generated as a trusted root certificate. I need to analyze some strange behavior in the HTTPS stream between the client and server, so that's why mallory is setup in between for this MITM. I would like to take the decrypted HTTPS traffic and dump it to either a logfile or a socket in a format compatible with tcpdump/wireshark (so I can collect it later and analyze it). Running tcpdump on eth1 is too soon (it's encrypted), and running tcpdump on eth2 is too late (it's been re-encrypted). Is there a way to make mallory "tcpdump" the decrypted traffic (in both directions)?

    Read the article

  • china and gmail attachs -

    - by doug
    "We have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.” [source] I don't know much about how internet works, but as long the chines gov has access to the chines internet providers servers, why do they need to hack gmail accounts? I assume that i don't understand how submitting/writing a message(from user to gmail servers) works, in order to be sent later to the other email address. Who can tell me how submitting a message to a web form works?

    Read the article

  • Manually start screensaver with password protect

    - by gibberish
    Windows 7 I wish to manually lock the computer so I placed a shortcut to scrnsave.exe on the desktop. (I do not want the user to use Ctrl+Alt+Del -- Lock This Computer for various reasons) Problem is that when double-clicked, the screen saver starts but it's not password protected. However, in Personalization -- Screen Saver, that same screen saver is the selected one and it IS configured to display logon screen upon resume. And that works when Windows starts the screen saver. So how can I cause "On resume, display logon screen" behavior by manually starting a screen saver? (Scripting is an option if I know what to do.)

    Read the article

  • Why some recovery tools are still able to find deleted files after I purge Recycle Bin, defrag the disk and zero-fill free space?

    - by Ivan
    As far as I understand, when I delete (without using Recycle Bin) a file, its record is removed from the file system table of contents (FAT/MFT/etc...) but the values of the disk sectors which were occupied by the file remain intact until these sectors are reused to write something else. When I use some sort of erased files recovery tool, it reads those sectors directly and tries to build up the original file. In this case, what I can't understand is why recovery tools are still able to find deleted files (with reduced chance of rebuilding them though) after I defragment the drive and overwrite all the free space with zeros. Can you explain this? I thought zero-overwritten deleted files can be only found by means of some special forensic lab magnetic scan hardware and those complex wiping algorithms (overwriting free space multiple times with random and non-random patterns) only make sense to prevent such a physical scan to succeed, but practically it seems that plain zero-fill is not enough to wipe all the tracks of deleted files. How can this be?

    Read the article

  • secure user-authentication in squid: The Story

    - by Isaac
    once upon a time, there was a beautiful warm virtual-jungle in south america, and a squid server lived there. here is an perceptual image of the network: <the Internet> | | A | B Users <---------> [squid-Server] <---> [LDAP-Server] When the Users request access to the Internet, squid ask their name and passport, authenticate them by LDAP and if ldap approved them, then he granted them. Everyone was happy until some sniffers stole passport in path between users and squid [path A]. This disaster happened because squid used Basic-Authentication method. The people of jungle gathered to solve the problem. Some bunnies offered using NTLM of method. Snakes prefered Digest-Authentication while Kerberos recommended by trees. After all, many solution offered by people of jungle and all was confused! The Lion decided to end the situation. He shouted the rules for solutions: Shall the solution be secure! Shall the solution work for most of browsers and softwares (e.g. download softwares) Shall the solution be simple and do not need other huge subsystem (like Samba server) Shall not the method depend on special domain. (e.g. Active Directory) Then, a very resonable-comprehensive-clever solution offered by a monkey, making him the new king of the jungle! can you guess what was the solution? Tip: The path between squid and LDAP is protected by the lion, so the solution have not to secure it. Note: sorry for this boring and messy story! /~\/~\/~\ /\~/~\/~\/~\/~\ ((/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\)) (/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\) (//// ~ ~ \\\\) (\\\\( (0) (0) )////) (\\\\( __\-/__ )////) (\\\( /-\ )///) (\\\( (""""") )///) (\\\( \^^^/ )///) (\\\( )///) (\/~\/~\/~\/) ** (\/~\/~\/) *####* | | **** /| | | |\ \\ _/ | | | | \_ _________// Thanks! (,,)(,,)_(,,)(,,)--------'

    Read the article

  • Does the password get sent in the clear when connecting to Sql-Server?

    - by Scott Chamberlain
    I was asked this today and I honestly did not know the answer. If you connect using a connection string without sspi to a server is there any way a 3rd party can intercept on the wire the password used to log in? "Data Source=MyServer;Initial Catalog=MyDatabase;User Id=sa;Password=CanThisBeSniffed;" I am not asking about MiTM attacks just someone listing on the same computer or on the same hub on the network with wireshark or something similar running. I fired up wireshark myself and did not see it in plain text but it could be a simple obfuscation or proper encryption, I just wanted to know which.

    Read the article

  • Hide/Replace Nginx Location Header?

    - by Steven Ou
    I am trying to pass a PCI compliance test, and I'm getting a single "high risk vulnerability". The problem is described as: Information on the machine which a web server is located is sometimes included in the header of a web page. Under certain circumstances that information may include local information from behind a firewall or proxy server such as the local IP address. It looks like Nginx is responding with: Service: https Received: HTTP/1.1 302 Found Cache-Control: no-cache Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Location: http://ip-10-194-73-254/ Server: nginx/1.0.4 + Phusion Passenger 3.0.7 (mod_rails/mod_rack) Status: 302 X-Powered-By: Phusion Passenger (mod_rails/mod_rack) 3.0.7 X-Runtime: 0 Content-Length: 90 Connection: Close <html><body>You are being <a href="http://ip-10-194-73-254/">redirect ed</a>.</body></html> I'm no expert, so please correct me if I'm wrong: but from what I gathered, I think the problem is that the Location header is returning http://ip-10-194-73-254/, which is a private address, when it should be returning our domain name (which is ravn.com). So, I'm guessing I need to either hide or replace the Location header somehow? I'm a programmer and not a server admin so I have no idea what to do... Any help would be greatly appreciated! Also, might I add that we're running more than 1 server, so the configuration would need to be transferable to any server with any private address.

    Read the article

  • Managing service passwords with Puppet

    - by Jeff Ferland
    I'm setting up my Bacula configuration in Puppet. One thing I want to do is ensure that each password field is different. My current thought is to hash the hostname with a secret value that would ensure each file daemon has a unique password and that password can be written to both the director configuration and the file server. I definitely don't want to use one universal password as that would permit anybody who might compromise one machine to get access to any machine through Bacula. Is there another way to do this other than using a hash function to generate the passwords? Clarification: This is NOT about user accounts for services. This is about the authentication tokens (to use another term) in the client / server files. Example snippet: Director { # define myself Name = <%= hostname $>-dir QueryFile = "/etc/bacula/scripts/query.sql" WorkingDirectory = "/var/lib/bacula" PidDirectory = "/var/run/bacula" Maximum Concurrent Jobs = 3 Password = "<%= somePasswordFunction =>" # Console password Messages = Daemon }

    Read the article

  • Using IP Tables to deny packet patterns?

    - by Chris
    I'm not experienced with IP tables but it's something I'll be looking into if this is plausible. I'm looking to set up a system to inspect packets and look for a pattern similar to korek's chop chop attack. Is there a way to set up the IP tables to defend against this attack? Thanks

    Read the article

  • Restrict Computer or Users from Internet but allow access to intranet and Windows Update / ePO?

    - by MoSiAc
    So this may be impossible but I've been asked to try and find something about it. So far nothing I have found is possible. I need to restrict specific machines or user accounts from regular Internet access but let them have access to the intranet portion of our network. I do not have Active Directory control, nor does anyone at my local workplace (corporate control in a different state). I have tried going through IPsec and doing this per local machine, but that system seems to have been removed from the images that are installed on these machines so that is out. So far the only other option I can think of is assigning the machines a specific ip address and removing their gateway access. This would probably work but the machines need to be able to receive updates that are being pushed to them through ePO and LanDesk. I would really like to do this on the user level because then if I need to do tech work to the machine and need internet access I can get to it but a "special" user could login and not be able to get into anything.

    Read the article

  • Hardening Word and Reader against exploits

    - by satuon
    I have recently heard a lot about exploits for PDF and DOC files on Windows, which when opened in Reader or Word would infect the computer. I'm assuming most of those exploits rely on some kind of active content, I've heard that Reader allows JavaScript for example. I already have antivirus, but I've heard they often don't catch those types of exploits, so I want to try a little proactive defense. Is there a way to harden Reader and Word by disabling plugins or options that are often used by exploits?

    Read the article

  • Trouble getting started with the STEALTH monitoring package

    - by dlanced
    Is anyone here familiar with the Linux-based STEALTH package (for monitoring FS integrity of client systems)? I'm trying to get started with a very simple configuration, but I'm running into trouble (this is running under Ubuntu 14.04): Config line `USE BASE/root/stealth/10.0.0.79' invalid STEALTH (2.11.02) started at Fri, 30 May 2014 15:25:00 +0000 Program terminated due to non-zero exit value for -type f -exec /usr/bin/sha1sum {} \; (EOC Fri May 30 15:25:00 2014 127) Stealth is creating a binary tmp file in the Stealth server root and generating a "report" file in the start directory, but not much else. Regarding the "USE BASE...invalid" error, and just to be sure, I manually created the directories in /root, but it didn't help. And, by the way, I am running stealth with sudo. Everything seems to be configured correctly: I'm able to ssh into root@client from the stealth machine without a password Here's my "policy" file (I've removed the email directives just for simplicity): DEFINE SSHCMD /usr/bin/ssh [email protected] -T -q exec /bin/bash --noprofile DEFINE EXECSHA1 -xdev -perm +u+s,g+s ( -user root -or -group root ) \ -type f -exec /usr/bin/sha1sum {} \; USE BASE/root/stealth/10.0.0.79 USE SSH ${SSHCMD} USE DD /bin/dd USE DIFF /usr/bin/diff USE PIDFILE /var/run/stealth- USE REPORT report USE SH /bin/sh GET /usr/bin/sha1sum /root/tmp LABEL \nchecking the client's /usr/bin/find program CHECK LOG = remote/binfind /usr/bin/sha1sum /usr/bin/find LABEL \nsuid/sgid/executable files uid or gid root on the / partition CHECK LOG = remote/setuidgid /usr/bin/find / ${EXECSHA1} LABEL \nconfiguration files under /etc CHECK LOG = remote/etcfiles \ /usr/bin/find /etc -type f -not -perm /6111 \ -not -regex "/etc/(adjtime\|mtab)"\ -exec /usr/bin/sha1sum {} \; Any ideas? Thanks,

    Read the article

  • The Story of secure user-authentication in squid

    - by Isaac
    once upon a time, there was a beautiful warm virtual-jungle in south america, and a squid server lived there. here is an perceptual image of the network: <the Internet> | | A | B Users <---------> [squid-Server] <---> [LDAP-Server] When the Users request access to the Internet, squid ask their name and passport, authenticate them by LDAP and if ldap approved them, then he granted them. Everyone was happy until some sniffers stole passport in path between users and squid [path A]. This disaster happened because squid used Basic-Authentication method. The people of jungle gathered to solve the problem. Some bunnies offered using NTLM of method. Snakes prefered Digest-Authentication while Kerberos recommended by trees. After all, many solution offered by people of jungle and all was confused! The Lion decided to end the situation. He shouted the rules for solutions: Shall the solution be secure! Shall the solution work for most of browsers and softwares (e.g. download softwares) Shall the solution be simple and do not need other huge subsystem (like Samba server) Shall not the method depend on special domain. (e.g. Active Directory) Then, a very resonable-comprehensive-clever solution offered by a monkey, making him the new king of the jungle! can you guess what was the solution? Tip: The path between squid and LDAP is protected by the lion, so the solution have not to secure it. Note: sorry if the story is boring and messy, but most of it is real! =) /~\/~\/~\ /\~/~\/~\/~\/~\ ((/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\)) (/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\) (//// ~ ~ \\\\) (\\\\( (0) (0) )////) (\\\\( __\-/__ )////) (\\\( /-\ )///) (\\\( (""""") )///) (\\\( \^^^/ )///) (\\\( )///) (\/~\/~\/~\/) ** (\/~\/~\/) *####* | | **** /| | | |\ \\ _/ | | | | \_ _________// Thanks! (,,)(,,)_(,,)(,,)--------'

    Read the article

  • Is there a filesystem firewall?

    - by Jenko
    Ever since firewalls appeared on the scene, it became hard for rogue programs to access the internet. But you and I know that running applications get unrestricted access to the filesystem. They can read your files and send them to poppa. (programs such as web browsers and IM clients, which are allowed thru the internet firewall) Any way to know which programs are accessing your files? or limit their access to a specific partition?

    Read the article

  • Could it be that "chkrootkit" just doesn't like .hmac, .packlist, and .relocation-tag files?

    - by Danijel
    I just cleaned up my hacked CentOS server (due to not updating since versino 5.3). But still, "chkrootkit" says this: Possible t0rn v8 \(or variation\) rootkit installed /usr/lib/.libfipscheck.so.1.1.0.hmac /usr/lib/.libgcrypt.so.11.hmac /usr/lib/.libfipscheck.so.1.hmac /lib/.libcrypto.so.0.9.8e.hmac /lib/.libssl.so.0.9.8e.hmac /lib/.libssl.so.6.hmac /lib/.libcrypto.so.6.hmac /usr/lib/perl5/site_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/Text/Iconv/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/HTML-Tree/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/Font/AFM/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/MLDBM/Sync/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/MLDBM/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/FreezeThaw/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/Apache/ASP/.packlist /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.8.8/i386-linux-thread-multi/auto/HTML-Format/.packlist /usr/lib/gtk-2.0/immodules/.relocation-tag /usr/lib/python2.4/plat-linux2/.relocation-tag /usr/lib/python2.4/distutils/.relocation-tag /usr/lib/python2.4/config/.relocation-tag Could it be that "chkrootkit" just doesn't like .hmac, .packlist, and .relocation-tag files? Are these realy still infected?

    Read the article

  • secure user-authentication in squid

    - by Isaac
    once upon a time, there was a beautiful warm virtual-jungle in south america, and a squid server lived there. here is an perceptual image of the network: <the Internet> | | A | B Users <---------> [squid-Server] <---> [LDAP-Server] When the Users request access to the Internet, squid ask their name and passport, authenticate them by LDAP and if ldap approved them, then he granted them. Everyone was happy until some sniffers stole passport in path between users and squid [path A]. This disaster happened because squid used Basic-Authentication method. The people of jungle gathered to solve the problem. Some bunnies offered using NTLM of method. Snakes prefered Digest-Authentication while Kerberos recommended by trees. After all, many solution offered by people of jungle and all was confused! The Lion decided to end the situation. He shouted the rules for solutions: Shall the solution be secure! Shall the solution work for most of browsers and softwares (e.g. download softwares) Shall the solution be simple and do not need other huge subsystem (like Samba server) Shall not the method depend on special domain. (e.g. Active Directory) Then, a very resonable-comprehensive-clever solution offered by a monkey, making him the new king of the jungle! can you guess what was the solution? Tip: The path between squid and LDAP is protected by the lion, so the solution have not to secure it. Note: sorry for this boring and messy story! /~\/~\/~\ /\~/~\/~\/~\/~\ ((/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\)) (/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\/~\) (//// ~ ~ \\\\) (\\\\( (0) (0) )////) (\\\\( __\-/__ )////) (\\\( /-\ )///) (\\\( (""""") )///) (\\\( \^^^/ )///) (\\\( )///) (\/~\/~\/~\/) ** (\/~\/~\/) *####* | | **** /| | | |\ \\ _/ | | | | \_ _________// Thanks! (,,)(,,)_(,,)(,,)--------'

    Read the article

  • How do anti-viruses work?

    - by Phoshi
    So I was thinking about viruses recently, and wondering how exactly antiviruses keep up? Considering anybody who'd been coding for a few weeks could hack together something do do nasty, nasty things to somebody's PC, the quantity alone would make a simple list of hashes prohibitive, so how do antiviruses do it? Do they monitor process activity and have a 3 strikes rule for doing virus-like things? And if so, what's stopping it from triggering on perfectly harmless things (like me moving files around in \system32)? I did a bit of googling, but the regular places didn't particularly help, and I couldn't find a dupe here, so I thought it'd be good to ask :)

    Read the article

< Previous Page | 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156  | Next Page >