Search Results

Search found 13196 results on 528 pages for 'security audit'.

Page 16/528 | < Previous Page | 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  | Next Page >

  • Basic security practices for desktop Ubuntu

    - by Daisetsu
    Most of us know the basic security practices on Windows: use a limited account set a password disable unused services uninstall bloatware Antivirus / Antimalware etc. I haven't ran linux as my main desktop computer before, so I don't know how to properly secure it. I have heard linux is supposed to be more secure than Windows, but I know that the default settings of anything are rarely secure. What are some things I should do as a new Linux user to secure my desktop system from attack?

    Read the article

  • Extend base type and automatically update audit information on Entity

    - by Nix
    I have an entity model that has audit information on every table (50+ tables) CreateDate CreateUser UpdateDate UpdateUser Currently we are programatically updating audit information. Ex: if(changed){ entity.UpdatedOn = DateTime.Now; entity.UpdatedBy = Environment.UserName; context.SaveChanges(); } But I am looking for a more automated solution. During save changes, if an entity is created/updated I would like to automatically update these fields before sending them to the database for storage. Any suggestion on how i could do this? I would prefer to not do any reflection, so using a text template is not out of the question. A solution has been proposed to override SaveChanges and do it there, but in order to achieve this i would either have to use reflection (in which I don't want to do ) or derive a base class. Assuming i go down this route how would I achieve this? For example EXAMPLE_DB_TABLE CODE NAME --Audit Tables CREATE_DATE CREATE_USER UPDATE_DATE UPDATE_USER And if i create a base class public abstract class IUpdatable{ public virtual DateTime CreateDate {set;} public virtual string CreateUser { set;} public virtual DateTime UpdateDate { set;} public virtual string UpdateUser { set;} } The end goal is to be able to do something like... public overrride void SaveChanges(){ //Go through state manager and update audit infromation //FOREACH changed entity in state manager if(entity is IUpdatable){ //If state is created... update create audit. //if state is updated... update update audit } } But I am not sure how I go about generating the code that would extend the interface.

    Read the article

  • How to add security zone information to files?

    - by user33938
    I recently enabled "Do not preserve zone information in file attachments", to get rid that annoying "Do you want to run this program" security warning. Now, how can I add this information to a file that doesn't have it? I would like to get that warning back on certain files.

    Read the article

  • Mobile security solutions

    - by techzen
    What are the mobile security solutions used by you / your organization. What are the pro's and cons of usage of these solution - and how far have you been successful in implementing these - were there any loopholes / issues faced in using them?. In general, can you suggest a set of guidelines to watch for when going for going for selecting a specific solution in this context.

    Read the article

  • "Hostile" network in the company - please comment on a security setup

    - by TomTom
    I have a little specific problem here that I want (need) to solve in a satisfactory way. My company has multiple (IPv4) networks that are controlled by our router sitting in the middle. Typical smaller shop setup. There is now one additional network that has an IP Range OUTSIDE of our control, connected to the internet with another router OUTSIDE of our control. Call it a project network that is part of another companies network and combined via VPN they set up. This means: They control the router that is used for this network and They can reconfigure things so that they can access the machines in this network. The network is physically split on our end through some VLAN capable switches as it covers three locations. At one end there is the router the other company controls. I Need / want to give the machines used in this network access to my company network. In fact, it may be good to make them part of my active directory domain. The people working on those machines are part of my company. BUT - I need to do so without compromising the security of my company network from outside influence. Any sort of router integration using the externally controlled router is out by this idea So, my idea is this: We accept the IPv4 address space and network topology in this network is not under our control. We seek alternatives to integrate those machines into our company network. The 2 concepts I came up with are: Use some sort of VPN - have the machines log into VPN. Thanks to them using modern windows, this could be transparent DirectAccess. This essentially treats the other IP space not different than any restaurant network a laptop of the company goes in. Alternatively - establish IPv6 routing to this ethernet segment. But - and this is a trick - block all IPv6 packets in the switch before they hit the third party controlled router, so that even IF they turn on IPv6 on that thing (not used now, but they could do it) they would get not a single packet. The switch can nicely do that by pulling all IPv6 traffic coming to that port into a separate VLAN (based on ethernet protocol type). Anyone sees a problem with using he switch to isolate the outer from IPv6? Any security hole? It is sad we have to treat this network as hostile - would be a lot easier - but the support personnel there is of "known dubious quality" and the legal side is clear - we can not fulfill our obligations when we integrate them into our company while they are under a jurisdiction we don't have a say in.

    Read the article

  • I need Internet Security software with following properties

    - by Eias.N
    Hello ,, I want to own an Internet Security software , but I prefer that it has following properties : Not a heavy one that killing the machine (Like Norton) . Delete the viruses , and don't keep it after clean it . The most important off all : Has an Offline databases that Can I download and add to program database without connecting to Internet (Not Like KIS 2010) Containing (anti spam -anti Virus - Fire wall - ....... ) So what is in your mind?(Don't tell me AVG I tested it)

    Read the article

  • Remove the Microsoft Security Essentials icon

    - by unam3d
    I've been using Microsoft Security Essentials on Windows 7 for sometime now and so far I don't have a bad word to say about it. I would like to permanently remove the MSE icon from the task bar and pop-up box, though I would still like to be informed when it detects a threat, etc.

    Read the article

  • Exposing server uptime a potential security vulnerability?

    - by Edward Mazur
    I run a browser-based game and as part of a page with a bunch of game statistics, I have the server uptime listed. It's currently at 177 days and so someone mentioned to me that I shouldn't do this because a long uptime indicates the kernel is old and therefore missing security updates. This certainly sounds logical, but I searched around and couldn't find any evidence to support it. So I'm just wondering, is this indeed something I should not have exposed?

    Read the article

  • Is it worth running nessus as well as OpenVAS?

    - by kdt
    Apparently OpenVAS originated as a fork of Nessus. It is very easy to install and use OpenVAS because it's, well, open. However, am I kidding myself if I just use that instead of Nessus? Should I be using both, or if I use Nessus then is OpenVAS surplus to requirements? To break it down into non-subjective sub-questions: * Is openvas a superset or subset of nessus? * Is one updated more often than the other? * Does one have a bigger vulnerability database than the other? * ...or are there other qualitative differences that I may be missing?

    Read the article

  • Options for PCI-DSS on AWS - file integrity monitoring and intrusion detection

    - by Brill Pappin
    I need to deploy some file integrity monitoring and intrusion detections software on AWS instances. I really wanted to use OSSEC, however it does not work well in an environment where servers can auto deploy and shut down based on load, because it requires server managed keys to be generated. Including the agent in the AMI will not allow monitoring as soon as it comes up because of that. There are many options out there, and several are listed in other posts on this site, however none that I've seen so far deal with the unique problems inherent in AWS or cloud based deployments in general. Can anyone point me at some products, preferably open source, that we might use to cover those portions of PCI DSS that require this software? Has anyone else achieved this on AWS?

    Read the article

  • Server Config on Github Security Considerations?

    - by Alan Griffith
    What are the security considerations of having my server configs in a repo on Github with world read-only access. I know to not include /etc/shadow and other password files. I'd like to share any of my good ideas and allow others to contribute, but I don't want to roll out a welcome mat for crackers.

    Read the article

  • Why is it good to have website content files on a separate drive other than system (OS) drive?

    - by Jeffrey
    I am wondering what benefits will give me to move all website content files from the default inetpub directory (C:) to something like D:\wwwroot. By default IIS creates separate application pool for each website and I am using the built-in user and group (IURS) as the authentication method. I’ve made sure each site directory has the appropriate permission settings so I am not sure what benefits I will gain. Some of the environment settings are as below: VMWare Windows 2008 R2 64 IIS 7.5 C:\inetpub\site1 C:\inetpub\site2 Also as this article (moving the iis7 inetpub directory to a different drive) points out, not sure if it's worth the trouble to migrate files to a different drive: PLEASE BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING: WINDOWS SERVICING EVENTS (I.E. HOTFIXES AND SERVICE PACKS) WOULD STILL REPLACE FILES IN THE ORIGINAL DIRECTORIES. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT FILES IN THE INETPUB DIRECTORIES HAVE TO BE REPLACED BY SERVICING IS LOW BUT FOR THIS REASON DELETING THE ORIGINAL DIRECTORIES IS NOT POSSIBLE.

    Read the article

  • Belarc Advisor (Store Passwords using Reversible Encryption)

    - by Steve
    Hi, I'm using Belarc Advisor to examine my PC. Part of BA is a security benchmark summary, which examines components of windows security and provides a benchmark rating. Two items are marked as Fail: - Store Passwords using Reversible Encryption - Password History Size I have opened the Local Security Settings tool from the Control Panel Administrative Tools, and ensured that the "Store passwords using reversible encryption" setting is enabled. Also, I've set the password history to a number. So I'm a bit miffed about the Fail marks. Any idea why the Fail marks appear? Any clues how I can Pass them? Thanks, Steve.

    Read the article

  • Security camera for HQ and remote sites?

    - by Atlas
    We want to install security cams at HQ site and 3 remotes sites. Basically: (1) Each site would have N cams (2) Each site should have DVR locally to record everything. What we want is that HQ to be able to see the live/recorded videos of each remote site and including itself. Preferably HQ would have 1 large screen, and display all cams of itself and remotes sites, say showing it in 32x32 cells. Does such system exists?

    Read the article

  • Limiting database security

    - by Torbal
    A number of texts signify that the most important aspects offered by a DBMS are availability, integrity and secrecy. As part of a homework assignment I have been tasked with mentioning attacks which would affect each aspect. This is what I have come up with - are they any good? Availability - DDOS attack Integrity Secrecy - SQL Injection attack Integrity - Use of trojans to gain access to objects with higher security roles

    Read the article

  • How to deal with transport level security policy with OSB

    - by Jian Liang
    Recently, we received a use case for Oracle Service Bus (OSB) 11gPS4 to consume a Web Service which is secured by HTTP transport level security policy. The WSDL of the remote web service looks like following where the part marked in red shows the security policy: <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?> <definitions xmlns:wssutil="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd" xmlns:wsp="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/09/policy" xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/soap/" xmlns:tns="https://httpsbasicauth" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/wsdl/" targetNamespace="https://httpsbasicauth" name="HttpsBasicAuthService"> <wsp:UsingPolicy wssutil:Required="true"/> <wsp:Policy wssutil:Id="WSHttpBinding_IPartyServicePortType_policy"> <wsp:ExactlyOne> <wsp:All> <ns1:TransportBinding xmlns:ns1="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/07/securitypolicy"> <wsp:Policy> <ns1:TransportToken> <wsp:Policy> <ns1:HttpsToken RequireClientCertificate="false"/> </wsp:Policy> </ns1:TransportToken> <ns1:AlgorithmSuite> <wsp:Policy> <ns1:Basic256/> </wsp:Policy> </ns1:AlgorithmSuite> <ns1:Layout> <wsp:Policy> <ns1:Strict/> </wsp:Policy> </ns1:Layout> </wsp:Policy> </ns1:TransportBinding> <ns2:UsingAddressing xmlns:ns2="http://www.w3.org/2006/05/addressing/wsdl"/> </wsp:All> </wsp:ExactlyOne> </wsp:Policy> <types> <xsd:schema> <xsd:import namespace="https://proxyhttpsbasicauth" schemaLocation="http://localhost:7001/WS/HttpsBasicAuthService?xsd=1"/> </xsd:schema> <xsd:schema> <xsd:import namespace="https://httpsbasicauth" schemaLocation="http://localhost:7001/WS/HttpsBasicAuthService?xsd=2"/> </xsd:schema> </types> <message name="echoString"> <part name="parameters" element="tns:echoString"/> </message> <message name="echoStringResponse"> <part name="parameters" element="tns:echoStringResponse"/> </message> <portType name="HttpsBasicAuth"> <operation name="echoString"> <input message="tns:echoString"/> <output message="tns:echoStringResponse"/> </operation> </portType> <binding name="HttpsBasicAuthSoapPortBinding" type="tns:HttpsBasicAuth"> <wsp:PolicyReference URI="#WSHttpBinding_IPartyServicePortType_policy"/> <soap:binding transport="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/http" style="document"/> <operation name="echoString"> <soap:operation soapAction=""/> <input> <soap:body use="literal"/> </input> <output> <soap:body use="literal"/> </output> </operation> </binding> <service name="HttpsBasicAuthService"> <port name="HttpsBasicAuthSoapPort" binding="tns:HttpsBasicAuthSoapPortBinding"> <soap:address location="https://localhost:7002/WS/HttpsBasicAuthService"/> </port> </service> </definitions> The security assertion in the WSDL (marked in red) indicates that this is the HTTP transport level security policy which requires one way SSL with default authentication (aka. basic authenticate with username/password). Normally, there are two ways to handle web service security policy with OSB 11g: Use WebLogic 9.x policy Use OWSM Since OSB doesn’t support WebLogic 9.x WSSP transport level assertion (except for WS transport), when we tried to create the business service based on the imported WSDL, OSB complained with the following message: [OSB Kernel:398133]The service is based on WSDL with Web Services Security Policies that are not natively supported by Oracle Service Bus. Please select OWSM Policies - From OWSM Policy Store option and attach equivalent OWSM security policy. For the Business Service, either you can add the necessary client policies manually by clicking Add button or you can let Oracle Service Bus automatically pick and add compatible client policies by clicking Add Compatible button. Unfortunately, when tried with OWSM, we couldn’t find http_token_policy from OWSM since OSB PS4 doesn’t support OWSM http_token_policy. It seems that we ran into an unsupported situation that no appropriate policy can be used from both WebLogic and OWSM. As this security policy requires one way SSL with basic authentication at the transport level, a possible workaround is to meet the remote service's requirement at transport level without using web service policy. We can simply use OSB to establish SSL connection and provide username/password for authentication at the transport level to the remote web service. In this case, the business service within OSB will be transparent to the web service policy. However, we still need to deal with OSB console’s complaint related to unsupported security policy because the failure of WSDL validation prohibits OSB console to move forward. With the help from OSB Product Management team, we finally came up with the following solutions: Solution 1: OSB PS5 The good news is that the http_token_policy is made available in OSB PS5. With OSB PS5, you can simply add OWSM oracle/wss_http_token_over_ssl_client_policy to the business service. The simplest solution is to upgrade to OSB PS5 where the OWSM solution is provided out of the box. But if you are not in a position where upgrading is an immediate option, you might want to consider other two workaround solutions described below. Solution 2: Modifying WSDL This solution addresses OSB console’s complaint by removing the security policy from the imported WSDL within OSB. Without the security policy, OSB console allows the business service to be created based on modified WSDL.  Please bear in mind, modifying WSDL is done only for the OSB side via OSB console, no change is required on the remote Web Service. The main steps of this solution: Connect to OSB console import the remote WSDL into OSB remove security assertion (the red marked part) from the imported WSDL create a service account. In our sample, we simply take the user weblogic create the business service and check "Basic" for Authentication and select the created service account make sure that OSB consumes the web service via https. This solution requires modifying WSDL. It is suitable for any OSB version (10g or OSB 11g version) prior to PS5 without OWSM. However, modifying WSDL by hand is troublesome as it requires the user to remember that the original WSDL was edited.  It forces you to make the same edit each time you want to re-import the service WSDL when changes occur at the service level. This also prevents you from using UDDI to import WSDL.  Solution 3: Using original WSDL This solution keeps the WSDL intact and ignores the embedded policy by using OWSM. By design, OWSM doesn’t like WSDL with embedded security assertion. Since OWSM doesn’t provide the feature to explicitly ignore the embedded policy from a remote WSDL, in this solution, we use OWSM in a tricky way to ignore the embedded policy. Connect to OSB console import the remote WSDL into OSB create a service account create the business service in which check "Basic" for Authentication and select the created service account as the imported WSDL is intact, the OSB Kernel:398133 error is expected ignore this error message for the moment and navigate to the Policies Page of business service Select “From OWSM Policy Store” and click “Add” button, the list of policies will pop-up Here is the tricky part: select an arbitrary policy, and click “Cancel” Update and save By clicking “Cancel’ button, we didn’t add any OWSM policy to business service, but the embedded policy is ignored. Yes, this is tricky. According to Oracle OSB Product Manager, the future release of OWSM will add a button “None” which allows to ignore the embedded policy explicitly. This solution keeps the imported WSDL intact which is the big advantage over the solution 2. It is suitable for OSB 11g (version prior to PS5) domain with OWSM configured. This blog addressed the unsupported transport level web service security policy with OSB PS4. To summarize, if you are using OSB PS5 or in a position to upgrade to PS5, the recommendation is to use OWSM OOTB transport level security policy directly. With the release prior to 11g PS5, you can consider the solution 2 or 3 depending on if OWSM is configured.

    Read the article

  • New Big Data Appliance Security Features

    - by mgubar
    The Oracle Big Data Appliance (BDA) is an engineered system for big data processing.  It greatly simplifies the deployment of an optimized Hadoop Cluster – whether that cluster is used for batch or real-time processing.  The vast majority of BDA customers are integrating the appliance with their Oracle Databases and they have certain expectations – especially around security.  Oracle Database customers have benefited from a rich set of security features:  encryption, redaction, data masking, database firewall, label based access control – and much, much more.  They want similar capabilities with their Hadoop cluster.    Unfortunately, Hadoop wasn’t developed with security in mind.  By default, a Hadoop cluster is insecure – the antithesis of an Oracle Database.  Some critical security features have been implemented – but even those capabilities are arduous to setup and configure.  Oracle believes that a key element of an optimized appliance is that its data should be secure.  Therefore, by default the BDA delivers the “AAA of security”: authentication, authorization and auditing. Security Starts at Authentication A successful security strategy is predicated on strong authentication – for both users and software services.  Consider the default configuration for a newly installed Oracle Database; it’s been a long time since you had a legitimate chance at accessing the database using the credentials “system/manager” or “scott/tiger”.  The default Oracle Database policy is to lock accounts thereby restricting access; administrators must consciously grant access to users. Default Authentication in Hadoop By default, a Hadoop cluster fails the authentication test. For example, it is easy for a malicious user to masquerade as any other user on the system.  Consider the following scenario that illustrates how a user can access any data on a Hadoop cluster by masquerading as a more privileged user.  In our scenario, the Hadoop cluster contains sensitive salary information in the file /user/hrdata/salaries.txt.  When logged in as the hr user, you can see the following files.  Notice, we’re using the Hadoop command line utilities for accessing the data: $ hadoop fs -ls /user/hrdataFound 1 items-rw-r--r--   1 oracle supergroup         70 2013-10-31 10:38 /user/hrdata/salaries.txt$ hadoop fs -cat /user/hrdata/salaries.txtTom Brady,11000000Tom Hanks,5000000Bob Smith,250000Oprah,300000000 User DrEvil has access to the cluster – and can see that there is an interesting folder called “hrdata”.  $ hadoop fs -ls /user Found 1 items drwx------   - hr supergroup          0 2013-10-31 10:38 /user/hrdata However, DrEvil cannot view the contents of the folder due to lack of access privileges: $ hadoop fs -ls /user/hrdata ls: Permission denied: user=drevil, access=READ_EXECUTE, inode="/user/hrdata":oracle:supergroup:drwx------ Accessing this data will not be a problem for DrEvil. He knows that the hr user owns the data by looking at the folder’s ACLs. To overcome this challenge, he will simply masquerade as the hr user. On his local machine, he adds the hr user, assigns that user a password, and then accesses the data on the Hadoop cluster: $ sudo useradd hr $ sudo passwd $ su hr $ hadoop fs -cat /user/hrdata/salaries.txt Tom Brady,11000000 Tom Hanks,5000000 Bob Smith,250000 Oprah,300000000 Hadoop has not authenticated the user; it trusts that the identity that has been presented is indeed the hr user. Therefore, sensitive data has been easily compromised. Clearly, the default security policy is inappropriate and dangerous to many organizations storing critical data in HDFS. Big Data Appliance Provides Secure Authentication The BDA provides secure authentication to the Hadoop cluster by default – preventing the type of masquerading described above. It accomplishes this thru Kerberos integration. Figure 1: Kerberos Integration The Key Distribution Center (KDC) is a server that has two components: an authentication server and a ticket granting service. The authentication server validates the identity of the user and service. Once authenticated, a client must request a ticket from the ticket granting service – allowing it to access the BDA’s NameNode, JobTracker, etc. At installation, you simply point the BDA to an external KDC or automatically install a highly available KDC on the BDA itself. Kerberos will then provide strong authentication for not just the end user – but also for important Hadoop services running on the appliance. You can now guarantee that users are who they claim to be – and rogue services (like fake data nodes) are not added to the system. It is common for organizations to want to leverage existing LDAP servers for common user and group management. Kerberos integrates with LDAP servers – allowing the principals and encryption keys to be stored in the common repository. This simplifies the deployment and administration of the secure environment. Authorize Access to Sensitive Data Kerberos-based authentication ensures secure access to the system and the establishment of a trusted identity – a prerequisite for any authorization scheme. Once this identity is established, you need to authorize access to the data. HDFS will authorize access to files using ACLs with the authorization specification applied using classic Linux-style commands like chmod and chown (e.g. hadoop fs -chown oracle:oracle /user/hrdata changes the ownership of the /user/hrdata folder to oracle). Authorization is applied at the user or group level – utilizing group membership found in the Linux environment (i.e. /etc/group) or in the LDAP server. For SQL-based data stores – like Hive and Impala – finer grained access control is required. Access to databases, tables, columns, etc. must be controlled. And, you want to leverage roles to facilitate administration. Apache Sentry is a new project that delivers fine grained access control; both Cloudera and Oracle are the project’s founding members. Sentry satisfies the following three authorization requirements: Secure Authorization:  the ability to control access to data and/or privileges on data for authenticated users. Fine-Grained Authorization:  the ability to give users access to a subset of the data (e.g. column) in a database Role-Based Authorization:  the ability to create/apply template-based privileges based on functional roles. With Sentry, “all”, “select” or “insert” privileges are granted to an object. The descendants of that object automatically inherit that privilege. A collection of privileges across many objects may be aggregated into a role – and users/groups are then assigned that role. This leads to simplified administration of security across the system. Figure 2: Object Hierarchy – granting a privilege on the database object will be inherited by its tables and views. Sentry is currently used by both Hive and Impala – but it is a framework that other data sources can leverage when offering fine-grained authorization. For example, one can expect Sentry to deliver authorization capabilities to Cloudera Search in the near future. Audit Hadoop Cluster Activity Auditing is a critical component to a secure system and is oftentimes required for SOX, PCI and other regulations. The BDA integrates with Oracle Audit Vault and Database Firewall – tracking different types of activity taking place on the cluster: Figure 3: Monitored Hadoop services. At the lowest level, every operation that accesses data in HDFS is captured. The HDFS audit log identifies the user who accessed the file, the time that file was accessed, the type of access (read, write, delete, list, etc.) and whether or not that file access was successful. The other auditing features include: MapReduce:  correlate the MapReduce job that accessed the file Oozie:  describes who ran what as part of a workflow Hive:  captures changes were made to the Hive metadata The audit data is captured in the Audit Vault Server – which integrates audit activity from a variety of sources, adding databases (Oracle, DB2, SQL Server) and operating systems to activity from the BDA. Figure 4: Consolidated audit data across the enterprise.  Once the data is in the Audit Vault server, you can leverage a rich set of prebuilt and custom reports to monitor all the activity in the enterprise. In addition, alerts may be defined to trigger violations of audit policies. Conclusion Security cannot be considered an afterthought in big data deployments. Across most organizations, Hadoop is managing sensitive data that must be protected; it is not simply crunching publicly available information used for search applications. The BDA provides a strong security foundation – ensuring users are only allowed to view authorized data and that data access is audited in a consolidated framework.

    Read the article

  • Filtering option list values based on security in UCM

    - by kyle.hatlestad
    Fellow UCM blog writer John Sim recently posted a comment asking about filtering values based on the user's security. I had never dug into that detail before, but thought I would take a look. It ended up being tricker then I originally thought and required a bit of insider knowledge, so I thought I would share. The first step is to create the option list table in Configuration Manager. You want to define the column for the option list value and any other columns desired. You then want to have a column which will store the security attribute to apply to the option list value. In this example, we'll name the column 'dGroupName'. Next step is to create a View based on the new table. For the Internal and Visible column, you can select the option list column name. Then click on the Security tab, uncheck the 'Publish view data' checkbox and select the 'Use standard document security' radio button. Click on the 'Edit Values...' button and add the values for the option list. In the dGroupName field, enter the Security Group (or Account if you use Accounts for security) to apply to that value. Create the custom metadata field and apply the View just created. The next step requires file system access to the server. Open the file [ucm directory]\data\schema\views\[view name].hda in a text editor. Below the line '@Properties LocalData', add the line: schSecurityImplementorColumnMap=dGroupName:dSecurityGroup The 'dGroupName' value designates the column in the table which stores the security value. 'dSecurityGroup' indicates the type of security to check against. It would be 'dDocAccount' if using Accounts. Save the file and restart UCM. Now when a user goes to the check-in page, they will only see the options for which they have read and write privileges to the associated Security Group. And on the Search page, they will see the options for which they have just read access. One thing to note is if a value that a user normally can't view on Check-in or Search is applied to a document, but the document is viewable by the user, the user will be able to see the value on the Content Information screen.

    Read the article

< Previous Page | 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  | Next Page >