Search Results

Search found 398 results on 16 pages for 'jungle hacker'.

Page 2/16 | < Previous Page | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  | Next Page >

  • apache-memory-hacker-linux

    - by bibhudatta
    When we start the linux system it take only 435mb memory and it is 4GB memory server. When we start the httpd services it take 1000mb and outmatically it take all the memory and the server crase. even we stop the apache just it release 200mb memory. What will be the problem Can any one tell me what these hacker are doing. I see they are goinging some hit to my apache by some but I thing they are doing from this system. Below is the log. Please help me out for this. [root@host ~]# tail -20 /var/log/httpd/dostizone.com-combined.log 180.76.5.143 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:16 +0530] "GET /blogs/10248/209403/nfl-panties-since-the-quality-of HTTP/1.1" 403 2298 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)" 180.76.5.88 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:31 +0530] "GET /blogs/815/158725/new-jersey-attorney-search HTTP/1.1" 403 2290 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)" 220.181.108.186 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:32 +0530] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 403 5043 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)" crawl-66-249-67-137.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:20 +0530] "GET /blogs/805/11279/supra-suprano-high-shoes HTTP/1.1" 200 30642 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" crawl-66-249-68-51.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:37 +0530] "GET /blogs/10514/215084/oakland-raiders-sweatpants-tags HTTP/1.1" 403 2297 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" 220.181.94.237 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:12 +0530] "GET /profile/8509 HTTP/1.1" 200 236894 "-" "Sogou web spider/4.0(+http://www.sogou.com/docs/help/webmasters.htm#07)" 220.181.94.237 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:43 +0530] "GET /mode-switch?return_url=%2Fblogs%2F8529%2F160217%2Fclimate-jordan-6 HTTP/1.1" 302 1 "-" "Sogou web spider/4.0(+http://www.sogou.com/docs/help/webmasters.htm#07)" crawl-66-249-68-51.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:44 +0530] "GET /blogs/390/61573/blackhawk-jerseys-from-the-you HTTP/1.1" 403 2293 "-" "SAMSUNG-SGH-E250/1.0 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1 UP.Browser/6.2.3.3.c.1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0 (compatible; Googlebot-Mobile/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" 124.115.0.159 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:24 +0530] "GET /blogs/693/46081/application/modules/Hecore/externals/scripts/core.js HTTP/1.1" 200 26869 "http://dostizone.com/blogs/693/46081/thomas-sabo-charms-hot-chilli" "Sosospider+(+http://help.soso.com/webspider.htm)" 124.115.0.159 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:24 +0530] "GET /blogs/693/46081/application/modules/Activity/externals/scripts/core.js HTTP/1.1" 200 26873 "http://dostizone.com/blogs/693/46081/thomas-sabo-charms-hot-chilli" "Sosospider+(+http://help.soso.com/webspider.htm)" 124.115.0.159 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:24 +0530] "GET /blogs/693/46081/application/modules/Hecore/externals/scripts/imagezoom/core.js HTTP/1.1" 200 26899 "http://dostizone.com/blogs/693/46081/thomas-sabo-charms-hot-chilli" "Sosospider+(+http://help.soso.com/webspider.htm)" 180.76.5.153 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:50 +0530] "GET /blogs/10252/212268/cleveland-browns-authentic-jerse HTTP/1.1" 403 2298 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)" crawl-66-249-68-51.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:51 +0530] "GET /blogs/741/46260/chocolate-ugg-women-boots-1873 HTTP/1.1" 403 2293 "-" "SAMSUNG-SGH-E250/1.0 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1 UP.Browser/6.2.3.3.c.1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0 (compatible; Googlebot-Mobile/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" 124.115.1.7 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:40 +0530] "GET /blogs/682/97454/swarovski-jewellry-sale-articles HTTP/1.1" 200 25770 "-" "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)" crawl-66-249-68-51.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:56 +0530] "GET /blogs/779/60941/players-a-to-z-michael-cuddyer HTTP/1.1" 403 2293 "-" "SAMSUNG-SGH-E250/1.0 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1 UP.Browser/6.2.3.3.c.1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0 (compatible; Googlebot-Mobile/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" crawl-66-249-68-51.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:31:01 +0530] "GET /blogs/469/58551/chicago-bears-news-there-exist HTTP/1.1" 403 2293 "-" "SAMSUNG-SGH-E250/1.0 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1 UP.Browser/6.2.3.3.c.1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0 (compatible; Googlebot-Mobile/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" 220.181.94.237 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:30:54 +0530] "GET /blogs/8529/160217/climate-jordan-6 HTTP/1.1" 200 30750 "-" "Sogou web spider/4.0(+http://www.sogou.com/docs/help/webmasters.htm#07)" 180.76.5.59 - - [14/Nov/2011:02:31:05 +0530] "GET /blogs/815/158197/cheap-calgary-flames-jerseys HTTP/1.1" 403 2292 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; Baiduspider/2.0; +http://www.baidu.com/search/spider.html)" crawl-66-249-68-51.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:31:06 +0530] "GET /mode-switch?return_url=%2Fblogs%2F387%2F45679%2Fhandbag-louis-vuitton-judy-mm-m4 HTTP/1.1" 403 2258 "-" "SAMSUNG-SGH-E250/1.0 Profile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration/CLDC-1.1 UP.Browser/6.2.3.3.c.1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0 (compatible; Googlebot-Mobile/2.1; +http://www.google.com/bot.html)" crawl-66-249-67-137.googlebot.com - - [14/Nov/2011:02:31:10 +0530] "GET /public/temporary/c83b731ecc556d7fd1a7732d9ac16ed6.png HTTP/1.1" 404 2305 "-" "Googlebot-Image/1

    Read the article

  • is this a hacker or normal apache logs?

    - by Max
    Hey, just checked my Apache logs and stumbled upon this log: Client denied by server configuration. What I found weird, are the different phpMyAdmin versions. The IP is in Czech: http://whois.domaintools.com/188.120.221.206 Am I just too overcautious?

    Read the article

  • shared hacker houses in europe

    - by Mantas
    Hey, I'm a freelance web developer. I'm borred of my hometown, so I want to hit the road. Do you know any shared hacker houses in Europe? Do you have any ideas what is the best way to look for a shared flat? France, Spain, Holland, Italy... I'm interested in virtually any country :) P.S. I speak English and Lithuanian only, so it's hard to look up shared flat in local languages...

    Read the article

  • How can a hacker put a file on my server root (apache, php, 1and1)

    - by mike-sav
    Hi there, I have a site hosted on 1and1 and a couple of weeks ago I noticed a hacker had put a .php file on the server that when viewed in a browser exposed my DB schema, DB connection strings, FTP account (for file uploads using a form), etc, etc. Naturally I panicked and I wiped the server and reuploaded my files. Fortunatley I encrypt passwords using MD5 and I don't store things like credit card details, etc, etc. Now I checked my files and with all user input I use a clean function (htmlentities, sql_real_escape_string, etc, etc) that strips the input of any XSS or SQL injection. I have also made sure that the session key gets re-engineered when a user status changes (like they log into their account) to prevent session hijacking, my folder permissions are set to 755 and file permission are 644. Has anyone got any idea how this could have happened? Or if I'm missing something

    Read the article

  • facebook Hacker cup: studious Student problem.

    - by smartmuki
    During the qualification round, the following question was asked: You've been given a list of words to study and memorize. Being a diligent student of language and the arts, you've decided to not study them at all and instead make up pointless games based on them. One game you've come up with is to see how you can concatenate the words to generate the lexicographically lowest possible string. Input As input for playing this game you will receive a text file containing an integer N, the number of word sets you need to play your game against. This will be followed by N word sets, each starting with an integer M, the number of words in the set, followed by M words. All tokens in the input will be separated by some whitespace and, aside from N and M, will consist entirely of lowercase letters. Output Your submission should contain the lexicographically shortest strings for each corresponding word set, one per line and in order. Constraints 1 <= N <= 100 1 <= M <= 9 1 <= all word lengths <= 10 Example input 5 6 facebook hacker cup for studious students 5 k duz q rc lvraw 5 mybea zdr yubx xe dyroiy 5 jibw ji jp bw jibw 5 uiuy hopji li j dcyi Example output cupfacebookforhackerstudentsstudious duzklvrawqrc dyroiymybeaxeyubxzdr bwjibwjibwjijp dcyihopjijliuiuy The program I wrote goes as: chomp($numberElements=<STDIN>); for(my $i=0; $i < $numberElements; $i++) { my $string; chomp ($string = <STDIN>); my @array=split(/\s+/,$string); my $number=shift @array; @sorted=sort @array; $sortedStr=join("",@sorted); push(@data,$sortedStr); } foreach (@data) { print "$_\n"; } The program gives the correct output for the given test cases but still facebook shows it to be incorrect. Is there something wrong with the program??

    Read the article

  • How to find out what Hackathons are coming up near me? [closed]

    - by codeulike
    I just went to my first hackathon (London GreenHackathon) and I want to go to lots more. Specifically, hackathons that have a theme of helping people or making the world a better place in some way. I know about Random Hacks of Kindness and a couple of others but is there some central aggregator that will help me find out about hackathons? Also, if anyone else can suggest specific hackathon initiatives I should check out that would be handy too. I'm in London but obviously for other people reading this question other locations will be of interest.

    Read the article

  • Handling multiple HTTP requests from one source (e.g.a hacker)

    - by Haraldo
    Hi there, I have a script to handle http requests. I'm trying to think of some of the security issues I might have with it. My biggest concern at the moment is how I can manage multiple requests from the same source over and over. For instance someone trying to shut down my system. Do I need to be concerned or will Apache handling this issue. If not what is the best approach to take using php? Thanks,

    Read the article

  • What is this hacker trying to do?

    - by JW
    If you do a search for: http://www.google.co.uk/search?q=0x57414954464F522044454C4159202730303A30303A313527&hl=en&start=30&sa=N you will see a lot of examples of an attempted hack along the lines of: 1) declare @q varchar(8000) select @q = 0x57414954464F522044454C4159202730303A30303A313527 exec(@q) -- What is exactly is it trying to do? Which db is it trying to work on? Do you know of any advisories about this?

    Read the article

  • Un hacker de 12 ans pirate des sites officiels pour Anonymous en échange de jeux vidéo, « et il a dit aux autres comment faire » ajoute la police

    Un hacker de 12 ans pirate des sites officiels pour Anonymous en échange de jeux vidéo, « et il a dit aux autres comment faire » ajoute la police 12 ans et il plaide déjà coupable à trois chefs d'accusation de piratage par un tribunal canadien. L'élève de cinquième qui avait alors 11 ans au moment des faits a aidé le collectif Anonymous à lancer des attaques DDoS contre des sites gouvernementaux pendant la crise estudiantine québécoise de l'année passée. Avec la promesse d'obtenir des jeux...

    Read the article

  • Un chercheur utilise le cloud d'Amazon pour hacker les réseaux protégés, en cassant le chiffrage WPA-PSK par force brute

    Un chercheur utilise le cloud d'Amazon pour hacker les réseaux protégés, en cassant le chiffrage WPA-PSK par force brute Un chercheur en sécurité informatique vient de déclarer avoir identifié une manière simple, rapide et économique d'exploiter une faille dans les Amazon Web Services. Il s'agit de Thomas Roth, consultant allemand, qui affirme pouvoir s'infiltrer dans des réseaux protégés. Comment ? Grâce à un programme spécifique, qu'il a écrit et qui tourne sur les ordinateurs basés sur le Cloud d'Amazon. Ce dernier lance alors des attaques par force brute et teste pas loin de 400.000 mots de passes différents par seconde via les machines d'Amazon. La technique s'en prends à un type précis et très co...

    Read the article

  • Comment faut-il juger les cybercriminels ? Un hacker condamné à 20 ans de prison pour vol de données

    Mise à jour du 29.03.2010 par Katleen Comment faut-il juger les cybercriminels ? Un hacker condamné à 20 ans de prison pour vol de données Après une délibération longue, c'est un verdict lourd qui a été rendu avec plusieurs mois de retards sur la date annoncée en début de procès. Rappelez-vous, fin 2009, nous vous avions parlé d'Albert Gonzalez, ce pirate qui avait dérobé plus de 130 millions de numéros de cartes de crédit. Lors de son procès, il avait finalement décidé de plaider coupable. Le pirate de 28 ans était inquiet de la sentence qui l'attendait, mais s'attendait-il à une peine aussi lourde ? Jeudi, il a été condamné par un tribuna...

    Read the article

  • L'iPad ne serait pas un terminal sûr : un hacker pense que la tablette peut devenir une machine à sp

    Mise à jour du 15/06/10 L'iPad ne serait pas assez sécurisé D'après un hacker qui pense que la tablette peut devenir une machine à spams, voire pire Le groupe de hackers Goatse Security vient d'accuser Apple de ne pas assez prendre au sérieux la sécurité de l'iPad. En mars dernier, le groupe avait découvert une faille dans Safari, le navigateur d'Apple, qui est également présent en natif dans la nouvelle tablette de la marque à la pomme. La faille en question a été colmatée dans la version desktop de l'application, mais pas dans celle de l'iPad. Résultat, le terminal serait une proie idéale pour des attaques à gr...

    Read the article

  • puma init.d for centos 6 fails with runuser: user /var/log/puma.log does not exist

    - by Rubytastic
    Trying to get a init.d/puma to work on Centos 6. It throws error runuser: user /var/log/puma.log does not exist I run this from the /srv/books/current folder but it fails. I tried to debug the values but not quite get what is missing and why it throws this error. #! /bin/sh # puma - this script starts and stops the puma daemon # # chkconfig: - 85 15 # description: Puma # processname: puma # config: /etc/puma.conf # pidfile: /srv/books/current/tmp/pids/puma.pid # Author: Darío Javier Cravero &lt;[email protected]> # # Do NOT "set -e" # Original script https://github.com/puma/puma/blob/master/tools/jungle/puma # It was modified here by Stanislaw Pankevich <[email protected]> # to run on CentOS 5.5 boxes. # Script works perfectly on CentOS 5: script uses its native daemon(). # Puma is being stopped/restarted by sending signals, control app is not used. # Source function library. . /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions # Source networking configuration. . /etc/sysconfig/network # Check that networking is up. [ "$NETWORKING" = "no" ] && exit 0 # PATH should only include /usr/* if it runs after the mountnfs.sh script PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/sbin/:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/usr/bin DESC="Puma rack web server" NAME=puma DAEMON=$NAME SCRIPTNAME=/etc/init.d/$NAME CONFIG=/etc/puma.conf JUNGLE=`cat $CONFIG` RUNPUMA=/usr/local/bin/run-puma # Skipping the following non-CentOS string # Load the VERBOSE setting and other rcS variables # . /lib/init/vars.sh # CentOS does not have these functions natively log_daemon_msg() { echo "$@"; } log_end_msg() { [ $1 -eq 0 ] && RES=OK; logger ${RES:=FAIL}; } # Define LSB log_* functions. # Depend on lsb-base (>= 3.0-6) to ensure that this file is present. . /lib/lsb/init-functions # # Function that performs a clean up of puma.* files # cleanup() { echo "Cleaning up puma temporary files..." echo $1; PIDFILE=$1/tmp/puma/puma.pid STATEFILE=$1/tmp/puma/puma.state SOCKFILE=$1/tmp/puma/puma.sock rm -f $PIDFILE $STATEFILE $SOCKFILE } # # Function that starts the jungle # do_start() { log_daemon_msg "=> Running the jungle..." for i in $JUNGLE; do dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` user=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 2` config_file=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 3` if [ "$config_file" = "" ]; then config_file="$dir/puma/config.rb" fi log_file=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 4` if [ "$log_file" = "" ]; then log_file="$dir/puma/puma.log" fi do_start_one $dir $user $config_file $log_file done } do_start_one() { PIDFILE=$1/puma/puma.pid if [ -e $PIDFILE ]; then PID=`cat $PIDFILE` # If the puma isn't running, run it, otherwise restart it. if [ "`ps -A -o pid= | grep -c $PID`" -eq 0 ]; then do_start_one_do $1 $2 $3 $4 else do_restart_one $1 fi else do_start_one_do $1 $2 $3 $4 fi } do_start_one_do() { log_daemon_msg "--> Woke up puma $1" log_daemon_msg "user $2" log_daemon_msg "log to $4" cleanup $1; daemon --user $2 $RUNPUMA $1 $3 $4 } # # Function that stops the jungle # do_stop() { log_daemon_msg "=> Putting all the beasts to bed..." for i in $JUNGLE; do dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` do_stop_one $dir done } # # Function that stops the daemon/service # do_stop_one() { log_daemon_msg "--> Stopping $1" PIDFILE=$1/tmp/puma/puma.pid STATEFILE=$1/tmp/puma/puma.state echo $PIDFILE if [ -e $PIDFILE ]; then PID=`cat $PIDFILE` echo "Pid:" echo $PID if [ "`ps -A -o pid= | grep -c $PID`" -eq 0 ]; then log_daemon_msg "---> Puma $1 isn't running." else log_daemon_msg "---> About to kill PID `cat $PIDFILE`" # pumactl --state $STATEFILE stop # Many daemons don't delete their pidfiles when they exit. kill -9 $PID fi cleanup $1 else log_daemon_msg "---> No puma here..." fi return 0 } # # Function that restarts the jungle # do_restart() { for i in $JUNGLE; do dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` do_restart_one $dir done } # # Function that sends a SIGUSR2 to the daemon/service # do_restart_one() { PIDFILE=$1/tmp/puma/puma.pid i=`grep $1 $CONFIG` dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` if [ -e $PIDFILE ]; then log_daemon_msg "--> About to restart puma $1" # pumactl --state $dir/tmp/puma/state restart kill -s USR2 `cat $PIDFILE` # TODO Check if process exist else log_daemon_msg "--> Your puma was never playing... Let's get it out there first" user=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 2` config_file=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 3` if [ "$config_file" = "" ]; then config_file="$dir/config/puma.rb" fi log_file=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 4` if [ "$log_file" = "" ]; then log_file="$dir/log/puma.log" fi do_start_one $dir $user $config_file $log_file fi return 0 } # # Function that statuss then jungle # do_status() { for i in $JUNGLE; do dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` do_status_one $dir done } # # Function that sends a SIGUSR2 to the daemon/service # do_status_one() { PIDFILE=$1/tmp/puma/pid i=`grep $1 $CONFIG` dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` if [ -e $PIDFILE ]; then log_daemon_msg "--> About to status puma $1" pumactl --state $dir/tmp/puma/state stats # kill -s USR2 `cat $PIDFILE` # TODO Check if process exist else log_daemon_msg "--> $1 isn't there :(..." fi return 0 } do_add() { str="" # App's directory if [ -d "$1" ]; then if [ "`grep -c "^$1" $CONFIG`" -eq 0 ]; then str=$1 else echo "The app is already being managed. Remove it if you want to update its config." exit 1 fi else echo "The directory $1 doesn't exist." exit 1 fi # User to run it as if [ "`grep -c "^$2:" /etc/passwd`" -eq 0 ]; then echo "The user $2 doesn't exist." exit 1 else str="$str,$2" fi # Config file if [ "$3" != "" ]; then if [ -e $3 ]; then str="$str,$3" else echo "The config file $3 doesn't exist." exit 1 fi fi # Log file if [ "$4" != "" ]; then str="$str,$4" fi # Add it to the jungle echo $str >> $CONFIG log_daemon_msg "Added a Puma to the jungle: $str. You still have to start it though." } do_remove() { if [ "`grep -c "^$1" $CONFIG`" -eq 0 ]; then echo "There's no app $1 to remove." else # Stop it first. do_stop_one $1 # Remove it from the config. sed -i "\\:^$1:d" $CONFIG log_daemon_msg "Removed a Puma from the jungle: $1." fi } case "$1" in start) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_daemon_msg "Starting $DESC" "$NAME" if [ "$#" -eq 1 ]; then do_start else i=`grep $2 $CONFIG` dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` user=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 2` config_file=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 3` if [ "$config_file" = "" ]; then config_file="$dir/config/puma.rb" fi log_file=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 4` if [ "$log_file" = "" ]; then log_file="$dir/log/puma.log" fi do_start_one $dir $user $config_file $log_file fi case "$?" in 0|1) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 0 ;; 2) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 1 ;; esac ;; stop) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_daemon_msg "Stopping $DESC" "$NAME" if [ "$#" -eq 1 ]; then do_stop else i=`grep $2 $CONFIG` dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` do_stop_one $dir fi case "$?" in 0|1) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 0 ;; 2) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 1 ;; esac ;; status) # TODO Implement. log_daemon_msg "Status $DESC" "$NAME" if [ "$#" -eq 1 ]; then do_status else i=`grep $2 $CONFIG` dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` do_status_one $dir fi case "$?" in 0|1) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 0 ;; 2) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 1 ;; esac ;; restart) log_daemon_msg "Restarting $DESC" "$NAME" if [ "$#" -eq 1 ]; then do_restart else i=`grep $2 $CONFIG` dir=`echo $i | cut -d , -f 1` do_restart_one $dir fi case "$?" in 0|1) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 0 ;; 2) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 1 ;; esac ;; add) if [ "$#" -lt 3 ]; then echo "Please, specifiy the app's directory and the user that will run it at least." echo " Usage: $SCRIPTNAME add /path/to/app user /path/to/app/config/puma.rb /path/to/app/config/log/puma.log" echo " config and log are optionals." exit 1 else do_add $2 $3 $4 $5 fi case "$?" in 0|1) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 0 ;; 2) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 1 ;; esac ;; remove) if [ "$#" -lt 2 ]; then echo "Please, specifiy the app's directory to remove." exit 1 else do_remove $2 fi case "$?" in 0|1) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 0 ;; 2) [ "$VERBOSE" != no ] && log_end_msg 1 ;; esac ;; *) echo "Usage:" >&2 echo " Run the jungle: $SCRIPTNAME {start|stop|status|restart}" >&2 echo " Add a Puma: $SCRIPTNAME add /path/to/app user /path/to/app/config/puma.rb /path/to/app/config/log/puma.log" echo " config and log are optionals." echo " Remove a Puma: $SCRIPTNAME remove /path/to/app" echo " On a Puma: $SCRIPTNAME {start|stop|status|restart} PUMA-NAME" >&2 exit 3 ;; esac :

    Read the article

  • C#: How to Make it Harder for Hacker/Cracker to Get Around or Bypass the Licensing Check?

    - by Peter Lee
    Hi all, Suppose that the user has saved the License file under the Application.StartupPath, where all users can read. And then, every time when the app starts, it will check if it can find and verify the license file. If the app can find and verify, we let the user to continue with full functinalities. If not, we prompt a MessageBox showing "Unlicencsed, continue to use with trial version, functionalities limited." My question is, if I'm a hacker/cracker, I would try to get around or bypass the licensing check instead of cracking the license file, because, if we use RSA signature, it's very difficult to crack a license file. So where should we put the license check? thanks. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year! Peter P.S.: and also, is it safe if I put a global variable IsLicensed (true / false) to limit the functionalities? Is it easy for a hacker to change IsLicensed = true?

    Read the article

  • Can a malicious hacker share Linux distributions which trust bad root certificates?

    - by iamrohitbanga
    Suppose a hacker launches a new Linux distro with firefox provided with it. Now a browser contains the certificates of the root certification authorities of PKI. Because firefox is a free browser anyone can package it with fake root certificates. Thus a fake root certificate would contain a the certification authority that is not actually certified. Can this be used to authenticate some websites. How? Many existing linux distros are mirrored by people. They can easily package software containing certificates that can lead to such attacks. Is the above possible? Has such an attack taken place before?

    Read the article

  • Grep /var/log for hacker/script kiddy activity and e-mail?

    - by Jason
    CentOS 6 Apache Server version: Apache/2.2.15 (Unix) Thinking about how to automatically, once a day, grep all the logs in /var/log/httpd for hacker, phishing, etc activity and e-mail it to myself so I can evaluate what I might need to do. But what are the patterns I can look for? IE, we dont run Wordpress and we see a lot of attempts to access Wordpress related content, obviously for an exploit. Same with PHPMyAdmin. I could do something like repeatedly, matching common patterns we see. # grep -r -i wp-content /var/log/httpd/ # grep -r -i php-my-admin /var/log/httpd/ How do I e-mail myself this the results of each grep command or better yet all Grep results in a single e-mail?

    Read the article

  • Is it worth hiring a hacker to perform some penetration testing on my servers ?

    - by Brann
    I'm working in a small IT company with paranoid clients, so security has always been an important consideration to us ; In the past, we've already mandated two penetration testing from independent companies specialized in this area (Dionach and GSS). We've also ran some automated penetration tests using Nessus. Those two auditors were given a lot of insider information, and found almost nothing* ... While it feels comfortable to think our system is perfectly sure (and it was surely comfortable to show those reports to our clients when they performed their due diligence work), I've got a hard time believing that we've achieved a perfectly sure system, especially considering that we have no security specialist in our company (Security has always been a concern, and we're completely paranoid, which helps, but that's far as it goes!) If hackers can hack into companies that probably employ at least a few people whose sole task is to ensure their data stays private, surely they could hack into our small business, right ? Does someone have any experience in hiring an "ethical hacker"? How to find one? How much would it cost? *The only recommendation they made us was to upgrade our remote desktop protocols on two windows servers, which they were able to access because we gave them the correct non-standard port and whitelisted their IP

    Read the article

  • can some hacker steal the cookie from a user and login with that name on the web site ?

    - by Aristos
    Reading this question different users get the same cookie value in aspxanonymous and search for a solution, I start thinking, if it is possible for some one to really steal the cookie with some way, and then place it on his browser and login lets say as administrator. Do you know how form authentication can ensure that even if the cookie is stoled, the hacker not actual login using it ? Or do you know any other automatic defense mechanism ? Thank you in advanced.

    Read the article

  • Security Issues with Single Page Apps

    - by Stephen.Walther
    Last week, I was asked to do a code review of a Single Page App built using the ASP.NET Web API, Durandal, and Knockout (good stuff!). In particular, I was asked to investigate whether there any special security issues associated with building a Single Page App which are not present in the case of a traditional server-side ASP.NET application. In this blog entry, I discuss two areas in which you need to exercise extra caution when building a Single Page App. I discuss how Single Page Apps are extra vulnerable to both Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. This goal of this blog post is NOT to persuade you to avoid writing Single Page Apps. I’m a big fan of Single Page Apps. Instead, the goal is to ensure that you are fully aware of some of the security issues related to Single Page Apps and ensure that you know how to guard against them. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks According to WhiteHat Security, over 65% of public websites are open to XSS attacks. That’s bad. By taking advantage of XSS holes in a website, a hacker can steal your credit cards, passwords, or bank account information. Any website that redisplays untrusted information is open to XSS attacks. Let me give you a simple example. Imagine that you want to display the name of the current user on a page. To do this, you create the following server-side ASP.NET page located at http://MajorBank.com/SomePage.aspx: <%@Page Language="C#" %> <html> <head> <title>Some Page</title> </head> <body> Welcome <%= Request["username"] %> </body> </html> Nothing fancy here. Notice that the page displays the current username by using Request[“username”]. Using Request[“username”] displays the username regardless of whether the username is present in a cookie, a form field, or a query string variable. Unfortunately, by using Request[“username”] to redisplay untrusted information, you have now opened your website to XSS attacks. Here’s how. Imagine that an evil hacker creates the following link on another website (hackers.com): <a href="/SomePage.aspx?username=<script src=Evil.js></script>">Visit MajorBank</a> Notice that the link includes a query string variable named username and the value of the username variable is an HTML <SCRIPT> tag which points to a JavaScript file named Evil.js. When anyone clicks on the link, the <SCRIPT> tag will be injected into SomePage.aspx and the Evil.js script will be loaded and executed. What can a hacker do in the Evil.js script? Anything the hacker wants. For example, the hacker could display a popup dialog on the MajorBank.com site which asks the user to enter their password. The script could then post the password back to hackers.com and now the evil hacker has your secret password. ASP.NET Web Forms and ASP.NET MVC have two automatic safeguards against this type of attack: Request Validation and Automatic HTML Encoding. Protecting Coming In (Request Validation) In a server-side ASP.NET app, you are protected against the XSS attack described above by a feature named Request Validation. If you attempt to submit “potentially dangerous” content — such as a JavaScript <SCRIPT> tag — in a form field or query string variable then you get an exception. Unfortunately, Request Validation only applies to server-side apps. Request Validation does not help in the case of a Single Page App. In particular, the ASP.NET Web API does not pay attention to Request Validation. You can post any content you want – including <SCRIPT> tags – to an ASP.NET Web API action. For example, the following HTML page contains a form. When you submit the form, the form data is submitted to an ASP.NET Web API controller on the server using an Ajax request: <!DOCTYPE html> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <title></title> </head> <body> <form data-bind="submit:submit"> <div> <label> User Name: <input data-bind="value:user.userName" /> </label> </div> <div> <label> Email: <input data-bind="value:user.email" /> </label> </div> <div> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </div> </form> <script src="Scripts/jquery-1.7.1.js"></script> <script src="Scripts/knockout-2.1.0.js"></script> <script> var viewModel = { user: { userName: ko.observable(), email: ko.observable() }, submit: function () { $.post("/api/users", ko.toJS(this.user)); } }; ko.applyBindings(viewModel); </script> </body> </html> The form above is using Knockout to bind the form fields to a view model. When you submit the form, the view model is submitted to an ASP.NET Web API action on the server. Here’s the server-side ASP.NET Web API controller and model class: public class UsersController : ApiController { public HttpResponseMessage Post(UserViewModel user) { var userName = user.UserName; return Request.CreateResponse(HttpStatusCode.OK); } } public class UserViewModel { public string UserName { get; set; } public string Email { get; set; } } If you submit the HTML form, you don’t get an error. The “potentially dangerous” content is passed to the server without any exception being thrown. In the screenshot below, you can see that I was able to post a username form field with the value “<script>alert(‘boo’)</script”. So what this means is that you do not get automatic Request Validation in the case of a Single Page App. You need to be extra careful in a Single Page App about ensuring that you do not display untrusted content because you don’t have the Request Validation safety net which you have in a traditional server-side ASP.NET app. Protecting Going Out (Automatic HTML Encoding) Server-side ASP.NET also protects you from XSS attacks when you render content. By default, all content rendered by the razor view engine is HTML encoded. For example, the following razor view displays the text “<b>Hello!</b>” instead of the text “Hello!” in bold: @{ var message = "<b>Hello!</b>"; } @message   If you don’t want to render content as HTML encoded in razor then you need to take the extra step of using the @Html.Raw() helper. In a Web Form page, if you use <%: %> instead of <%= %> then you get automatic HTML Encoding: <%@ Page Language="C#" %> <% var message = "<b>Hello!</b>"; %> <%: message %> This automatic HTML Encoding will prevent many types of XSS attacks. It prevents <script> tags from being rendered and only allows &lt;script&gt; tags to be rendered which are useless for executing JavaScript. (This automatic HTML encoding does not protect you from all forms of XSS attacks. For example, you can assign the value “javascript:alert(‘evil’)” to the Hyperlink control’s NavigateUrl property and execute the JavaScript). The situation with Knockout is more complicated. If you use the Knockout TEXT binding then you get HTML encoded content. On the other hand, if you use the HTML binding then you do not: <!-- This JavaScript DOES NOT execute --> <div data-bind="text:someProp"></div> <!-- This Javacript DOES execute --> <div data-bind="html:someProp"></div> <script src="Scripts/jquery-1.7.1.js"></script> <script src="Scripts/knockout-2.1.0.js"></script> <script> var viewModel = { someProp : "<script>alert('Evil!')<" + "/script>" }; ko.applyBindings(viewModel); </script>   So, in the page above, the DIV element which uses the TEXT binding is safe from XSS attacks. According to the Knockout documentation: “Since this binding sets your text value using a text node, it’s safe to set any string value without risking HTML or script injection.” Just like server-side HTML encoding, Knockout does not protect you from all types of XSS attacks. For example, there is nothing in Knockout which prevents you from binding JavaScript to a hyperlink like this: <a data-bind="attr:{href:homePageUrl}">Go</a> <script src="Scripts/jquery-1.7.1.min.js"></script> <script src="Scripts/knockout-2.1.0.js"></script> <script> var viewModel = { homePageUrl: "javascript:alert('evil!')" }; ko.applyBindings(viewModel); </script> In the page above, the value “javascript:alert(‘evil’)” is bound to the HREF attribute using Knockout. When you click the link, the JavaScript executes. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attacks Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks rely on the fact that a session cookie does not expire until you close your browser. In particular, if you visit and login to MajorBank.com and then you navigate to Hackers.com then you will still be authenticated against MajorBank.com even after you navigate to Hackers.com. Because MajorBank.com cannot tell whether a request is coming from MajorBank.com or Hackers.com, Hackers.com can submit requests to MajorBank.com pretending to be you. For example, Hackers.com can post an HTML form from Hackers.com to MajorBank.com and change your email address at MajorBank.com. Hackers.com can post a form to MajorBank.com using your authentication cookie. After your email address has been changed, by using a password reset page at MajorBank.com, a hacker can access your bank account. To prevent CSRF attacks, you need some mechanism for detecting whether a request is coming from a page loaded from your website or whether the request is coming from some other website. The recommended way of preventing Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks is to use the “Synchronizer Token Pattern” as described here: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_%28CSRF%29_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet When using the Synchronizer Token Pattern, you include a hidden input field which contains a random token whenever you display an HTML form. When the user opens the form, you add a cookie to the user’s browser with the same random token. When the user posts the form, you verify that the hidden form token and the cookie token match. Preventing Cross-Site Request Forgery Attacks with ASP.NET MVC ASP.NET gives you a helper and an action filter which you can use to thwart Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks. For example, the following razor form for creating a product shows how you use the @Html.AntiForgeryToken() helper: @model MvcApplication2.Models.Product <h2>Create Product</h2> @using (Html.BeginForm()) { @Html.AntiForgeryToken(); <div> @Html.LabelFor( p => p.Name, "Product Name:") @Html.TextBoxFor( p => p.Name) </div> <div> @Html.LabelFor( p => p.Price, "Product Price:") @Html.TextBoxFor( p => p.Price) </div> <input type="submit" /> } The @Html.AntiForgeryToken() helper generates a random token and assigns a serialized version of the same random token to both a cookie and a hidden form field. (Actually, if you dive into the source code, the AntiForgeryToken() does something a little more complex because it takes advantage of a user’s identity when generating the token). Here’s what the hidden form field looks like: <input name=”__RequestVerificationToken” type=”hidden” value=”NqqZGAmlDHh6fPTNR_mti3nYGUDgpIkCiJHnEEL59S7FNToyyeSo7v4AfzF2i67Cv0qTB1TgmZcqiVtgdkW2NnXgEcBc-iBts0x6WAIShtM1″ /> And here’s what the cookie looks like using the Google Chrome developer toolbar: You use the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] action filter on the controller action which is the recipient of the form post to validate that the token in the hidden form field matches the token in the cookie. If the tokens don’t match then validation fails and you can’t post the form: public ActionResult Create() { return View(); } [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] [HttpPost] public ActionResult Create(Product productToCreate) { if (ModelState.IsValid) { // save product to db return RedirectToAction("Index"); } return View(); } How does this all work? Let’s imagine that a hacker has copied the Create Product page from MajorBank.com to Hackers.com – the hacker grabs the HTML source and places it at Hackers.com. Now, imagine that the hacker trick you into submitting the Create Product form from Hackers.com to MajorBank.com. You’ll get the following exception: The Cross-Site Request Forgery attack is blocked because the anti-forgery token included in the Create Product form at Hackers.com won’t match the anti-forgery token stored in the cookie in your browser. The tokens were generated at different times for different users so the attack fails. Preventing Cross-Site Request Forgery Attacks with a Single Page App In a Single Page App, you can’t prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks using the same method as a server-side ASP.NET MVC app. In a Single Page App, HTML forms are not generated on the server. Instead, in a Single Page App, forms are loaded dynamically in the browser. Phil Haack has a blog post on this topic where he discusses passing the anti-forgery token in an Ajax header instead of a hidden form field. He also describes how you can create a custom anti-forgery token attribute to compare the token in the Ajax header and the token in the cookie. See: http://haacked.com/archive/2011/10/10/preventing-csrf-with-ajax.aspx Also, take a look at Johan’s update to Phil Haack’s original post: http://johan.driessen.se/posts/Updated-Anti-XSRF-Validation-for-ASP.NET-MVC-4-RC (Other server frameworks such as Rails and Django do something similar. For example, Rails uses an X-CSRF-Token to prevent CSRF attacks which you generate on the server – see http://excid3.com/blog/rails-tip-2-include-csrf-token-with-every-ajax-request/#.UTFtgDDkvL8 ). For example, if you are creating a Durandal app, then you can use the following razor view for your one and only server-side page: @{ Layout = null; } <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <title>Index</title> </head> <body> @Html.AntiForgeryToken() <div id="applicationHost"> Loading app.... </div> @Scripts.Render("~/scripts/vendor") <script type="text/javascript" src="~/App/durandal/amd/require.js" data-main="/App/main"></script> </body> </html> Notice that this page includes a call to @Html.AntiForgeryToken() to generate the anti-forgery token. Then, whenever you make an Ajax request in the Durandal app, you can retrieve the anti-forgery token from the razor view and pass the token as a header: var csrfToken = $("input[name='__RequestVerificationToken']").val(); $.ajax({ headers: { __RequestVerificationToken: csrfToken }, type: "POST", dataType: "json", contentType: 'application/json; charset=utf-8', url: "/api/products", data: JSON.stringify({ name: "Milk", price: 2.33 }), statusCode: { 200: function () { alert("Success!"); } } }); Use the following code to create an action filter which you can use to match the header and cookie tokens: using System.Linq; using System.Net.Http; using System.Web.Helpers; using System.Web.Http.Controllers; namespace MvcApplication2.Infrastructure { public class ValidateAjaxAntiForgeryToken : System.Web.Http.AuthorizeAttribute { protected override bool IsAuthorized(HttpActionContext actionContext) { var headerToken = actionContext .Request .Headers .GetValues("__RequestVerificationToken") .FirstOrDefault(); ; var cookieToken = actionContext .Request .Headers .GetCookies() .Select(c => c[AntiForgeryConfig.CookieName]) .FirstOrDefault(); // check for missing cookie or header if (cookieToken == null || headerToken == null) { return false; } // ensure that the cookie matches the header try { AntiForgery.Validate(cookieToken.Value, headerToken); } catch { return false; } return base.IsAuthorized(actionContext); } } } Notice that the action filter derives from the base AuthorizeAttribute. The ValidateAjaxAntiForgeryToken only works when the user is authenticated and it will not work for anonymous requests. Add the action filter to your ASP.NET Web API controller actions like this: [ValidateAjaxAntiForgeryToken] public HttpResponseMessage PostProduct(Product productToCreate) { // add product to db return Request.CreateResponse(HttpStatusCode.OK); } After you complete these steps, it won’t be possible for a hacker to pretend to be you at Hackers.com and submit a form to MajorBank.com. The header token used in the Ajax request won’t travel to Hackers.com. This approach works, but I am not entirely happy with it. The one thing that I don’t like about this approach is that it creates a hard dependency on using razor. Your single page in your Single Page App must be generated from a server-side razor view. A better solution would be to generate the anti-forgery token in JavaScript. Unfortunately, until all browsers support a way to generate cryptographically strong random numbers – for example, by supporting the window.crypto.getRandomValues() method — there is no good way to generate anti-forgery tokens in JavaScript. So, at least right now, the best solution for generating the tokens is the server-side solution with the (regrettable) dependency on razor. Conclusion The goal of this blog entry was to explore some ways in which you need to handle security differently in the case of a Single Page App than in the case of a traditional server app. In particular, I focused on how to prevent Cross-Site Scripting and Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks in the case of a Single Page App. I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting that Single Page Apps are inherently less secure than server-side apps. Whatever type of web application you build – regardless of whether it is a Single Page App, an ASP.NET MVC app, an ASP.NET Web Forms app, or a Rails app – you must constantly guard against security vulnerabilities.

    Read the article

  • cakephp site domain change, having 301 issues

    - by veryMickey
    I moved my cakephp site from a subdomain over to a different domain. I handled the permanent redirect in my htaccess file but in the redirect i am losing my neat/clean url handling. old site iphone.gameachievements.org new site gameachievements.org example of current redirect iphone.gameachievements.org/games/jungle-swing - gameachievements.org/index.php?url=games/jungle-swing what i want.. is iphone.gameachievements.org/games/jungle-swing - gameachievements.org/games/jungle-swing here is what my htaccess file looks like... RewriteEngine On RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-d RewriteCond %{REQUEST_FILENAME} !-f RewriteRule ^(.*)$ index.php?url=$1 [QSA,L] RewriteCond %{HTTP_HOST} iphone.gameachievements.org RewriteRule (.*) http://gameachievements.org/$1 [R=301,L] any help is appricated thanks m!

    Read the article

< Previous Page | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12  | Next Page >