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  • New January 2013 Release of the Ajax Control Toolkit

    - by Stephen.Walther
    I am super excited to announce the January 2013 release of the Ajax Control Toolkit! I have one word to describe this release and that word is “Charts” – we’ve added lots of great new chart controls to the Ajax Control Toolkit. You can download the new release directly from http://AjaxControlToolkit.CodePlex.com – or, just fire the following command from the Visual Studio Library Package Manager Console Window (NuGet): Install-Package AjaxControlToolkit You also can view the new chart controls by visiting the “live” Ajax Control Toolkit Sample Site. 5 New Ajax Control Toolkit Chart Controls The Ajax Control Toolkit contains five new chart controls: the AreaChart, BarChart, BubbleChart, LineChart, and PieChart controls. Here is a sample of each of the controls: AreaChart: BarChart: BubbleChart: LineChart: PieChart: We realize that people love to customize the appearance of their charts so all of the chart controls include properties such as color properties. The chart controls render the chart on the browser using SVG. The chart controls are compatible with any browser which supports SVG including Internet Explorer 9 and new and recent versions of Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and Apple Safari. (If you attempt to display a chart on a browser which does not support SVG then you won’t get an error – you just won’t get anything). Updates to the HTML Sanitizer If you are using the HtmlEditorExtender on a public-facing website then it is really important that you enable the HTML Sanitizer to prevent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. The HtmlEditorExtender uses the HTML Sanitizer by default. The HTML Sanitizer strips out any suspicious content (like JavaScript code and CSS expressions) from the HTML submitted with the HtmlEditorExtender. We followed the recommendations of OWASP and ha.ckers.org to identify suspicious content. We updated the HTML Sanitizer with this release to protect against new types of XSS attacks. The HTML Sanitizer now has over 220 unit tests. The Ajax Control Toolkit team would like to thank Gil Cohen who helped us identify and block additional XSS attacks. Change in Ajax Control Toolkit Version Format We ran out of numbers. The Ajax Control Toolkit was first released way back in 2006. In previous releases, the version of the Ajax Control Toolkit followed the format: Release Year + Date. So, the previous release was 60919 where 6 represented the 6th release year and 0919 represent September 19. Unfortunately, the AssembyVersion attribute uses a UInt16 data type which has a maximum size of 65,534. The number 70123 is bigger than 65,534 so we had to change our version format with this release. Fortunately, the AssemblyVersion attribute actually accepts four UInt16 numbers so we used another one. This release of the Ajax Control Toolkit is officially version 7.0123. This new version format should work for another 65,000 years. And yes, I realize that 7.0123 is less than 60,919, but we ran out of numbers. Summary I hope that you find the chart controls included with this latest release of the Ajax Control Toolkit useful. Let me know if you use them in applications that you build. And, let me know if you run into any issues using the new chart controls. Next month, back to improving the File Upload control – more exciting stuff.

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  • Are Parameters really enough to prevent Sql injections?

    - by Rune Grimstad
    I've been preaching both to my colleagues and here on SO about the goodness of using parameters in SQL queries, especially in .NET applications. I've even gone so far as to promise them as giving immunity against SQL injection attacks. But I'm starting to wonder if this really is true. Are there any known SQL injection attacks that will be successfull against a parameterized query? Can you for example send a string that causes a buffer overflow on the server? There are of course other considerations to make to ensure that a web application is safe (like sanitizing user input and all that stuff) but now I am thinking of SQL injections. I'm especially interested in attacks against MsSQL 2005 and 2008 since they are my primary databases, but all databases are interesting. Edit: To clarify what I mean by parameters and parameterized queries. By using parameters I mean using "variables" instead of building the sql query in a string. So instead of doing this: SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = 'a name' We do this: SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = @Name and then set the value of the @Name parameter on the query / command object.

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  • Is this a good starting point for iptables in Linux?

    - by sbrattla
    Hi, I'm new to iptables, and i've been trying to put together a firewall which purpose is to protect a web server. The below rules are the ones i've put together so far, and i would like to hear if the rules makes sense - and wether i've left out anything essential? In addition to port 80, i also need to have port 3306 (mysql) and 22 (ssh) open for external connections. Any feedback is highly appreciated! #!/bin/sh # Clear all existing rules. iptables -F # ACCEPT connections for loopback network connection, 127.0.0.1. iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT # ALLOW established traffic iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT # DROP packets that are NEW but does not have the SYN but set. iptables -A INPUT -p tcp ! --syn -m state --state NEW -j DROP # DROP fragmented packets, as there is no way to tell the source and destination ports of such a packet. iptables -A INPUT -f -j DROP # DROP packets with all tcp flags set (XMAS packets). iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j DROP # DROP packets with no tcp flags set (NULL packets). iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j DROP # ALLOW ssh traffic (and prevent against DoS attacks) iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport ssh -m limit --limit 1/s -j ACCEPT # ALLOW http traffic (and prevent against DoS attacks) iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport http -m limit --limit 5/s -j ACCEPT # ALLOW mysql traffic (and prevent against DoS attacks) iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport mysql -m limit --limit 25/s -j ACCEPT # DROP any other traffic. iptables -A INPUT -j DROP

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  • Secure Government Series Part 3

    - by Naresh Persaud
    Secure Government Training SeriesSafeguarding Government CyberspaceClick here, to register for the live webcast. Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges. While technologies empower government to lead and innovate, they also enable those who seek to disrupt and destroy progress. Cloud computing, mobile devices and social networks help government reduce costs and streamline service delivery, but also introduce heightened security vulnerabilities. How can government organizations keep pace with heightened service delivery demands and advancements in technology without compromising security? Join us November 28th for a webcast as part of the “Secure Government Training Series” to learn about a security portfolio that helps organizations mitigate cyber attacks by providing Full-spectrum cybersecurity capabilities that harden the data tier, lock down sensitive information, and provide access controls and visibility for frequently targeted systems.Gain insights to an integrated security framework and overall strategy for preventing attacks that will help your organization: Deploy resilient IT infrastructure Catalog and classify sensitive and mission-critical data Secure the enterprise data tier and lock down trusted insider privileges at all levels Automate and centralize enterprise auditing Enable automated alerting and situational awareness of security threats and incidents For more information, access the Secure Government Resource Center or to speak with an Oracle representative, please call1.800.ORACLE1. LIVE Webcast Safeguarding Government Cyberspace Date: Wednesday, November 28th, 2012 Time: 2:00 p.m. ET Visit the Secure Government Resource CenterClick here for information on enterprise security solutions that help government safeguard information, resources and networks. ACCESS NOW Copyright © 2012, Oracle. All rights reserved. Contact Us | Legal Notices | Privacy Statement

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  • Brainstorm: Flood/DoS/DDoS Attack prevention ideas.

    - by Gnarly
    This is not a question asking how to stop an attack. This is simply a thread for anyone and everyone to discuss ideas for preventing, dealing with, and keeping your server alive during these attacks. Do not discuss using 3rd party software, this is a place to make your own ideas and read others. Post examples if you'd like. Post ideas how to filter out flood attacks. Post ideas how to keep your server alive while being under a heavy DDoS attack.

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  • Bridging VirtualBox over OpenVPN TAP adapter on Windows

    - by Sean Edwards
    I'm trying to configure a virtual machine (VirtualBox guest running Backtrack 4) with a bridged adapter over a VPN connection. The VPN is is hosted by the cybersecurity club at my university, and connects to a sandboxed LAN designed for penetration testing against various servers that the club has built. My host (Windows 7 Ultimate) connects to the VPN fine and is assigned an IP through DHCP, but for some reason the VM can't do the same thing, and I'm not sure why. It's like OpenVPN is filtering out packets from the MAC address it doesn't recognize. I want the virtual machine to bridge over the VPN connection, because our IT office has very strict policies about what you can and can't do on the network. I want to be able to run active attacks (ARP spoofing, nmap, Nessus scans) in the sandbox environment without risking the traffic accidentally going over the university network and getting my internet access revoked. Bridging over the VPN connection and running all attacks from inside the VM would solve that problem. Any idea why the host can use this interface, but the VM can't?

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  • Bridging VirtualBox over OpenVPN TAC adapter on Windows

    - by Sean Edwards
    I'm trying to configure a virtual machine (VirtualBox guest running Backtrack 4) with a bridged adapter over a VPN connection. The VPN is is hosted by the cybersecurity club at my university, and connects to a sandboxed LAN designed for penetration testing against various servers that the club has built. My host (Windows 7 Ultimate) connects to the VPN fine and is assigned an IP through DHCP, but for some reason the VM can't do the same thing, and I'm not sure why. It's like OpenVPN is filtering out packets from the MAC address it doesn't recognize. I want the virtual machine to bridge over the VPN connection, because our IT office has very strict policies about what you can and can't do on the network. I want to be able to run active attacks (ARP spoofing, nmap, Nessus scans) in the sandbox environment without risking the traffic accidentally going over the university network and getting my internet access revoked. Bridging over the VPN connection and running all attacks from inside the VM would solve that problem. Any idea why the host can use this interface, but the VM can't?

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  • Oracle buys Secerno

    - by Paulo Folgado
    Adds Heterogeneous Database Firewall to Oracle's Industry-leading Database Security SolutionsRedwood Shores, CA - May 20, 2010News FactsOracle has agreed to acquire Secerno, a provider of database firewall solutions for Oracle and non-Oracle databases.Organizations require a comprehensive security solution which includes database firewall functionality to prevent sophisticated attacks from reaching databases.Secerno's solution adds a critical defensive layer of security around databases, which blocks unauthorized activity in real-time.Secerno's products are expected to augment Oracle's industry-leading portfolio of database security solutions, including Oracle Advanced Security, Oracle Database Vault and Oracle Audit Vault to further ensure data privacy, protect against threats, and enable regulatory compliance.The combination of Oracle and Secerno underscores Oracle's commitment to provide customers with the most comprehensive and advanced security offering that helps reduce the costs and complexity of securing their information throughout the enterprise.The transaction is expected to close before end of June 2010. Financial details of the transaction were not disclosed.Supporting Quote:"The Secerno acquisition is in direct response to increasing customer challenges around mitigating database security risk," said Andrew Mendelsohn, senior vice president, Oracle Database Server Technologies. "Secerno's database firewall product acts as a first line of defense against external threats and unauthorized internal access with a protective perimeter around Oracle and non-Oracle databases. Together, Oracle's complete set of database security solutions and Secerno's technology will provide customers with the ability to safeguard their critical business information.""As a provider of database firewall solutions that help customers safeguard their enterprise databases, Secerno is a natural addition to Oracle's industry-leading database security solutions," said Steve Hurn, CEO Secerno. "Secerno has been providing enterprises and their IT Security departments strong assurance that their databases are protected from attacks and breaches. We are excited to bring Secerno's domain expertise to Oracle, and ensure continuity and success for our current customers, partners and prospects."Support Resources:About Oracle and SecernoGeneral PresentationFAQCustomer LetterPartner Letter

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  • Ask a DNS server what sites it hosts - and how to possibly prevent misuse

    - by Exit
    I've got a server which I host my company website as well as some of my clients. I noticed a domain which I created, but never used, was being attacked by a poke and hope hacker. I imagine that the hacker collected the domain from either hitting my DNS server and requesting what domains are hosted. So, in the interest of prevention and better server management, how would I ask my own DNS server (Linux CentOS 4) what sites are being hosted on it? Also, is there a way to prevent these types of attacks by hiding this information? I would assume that DNS servers would need to keep some information public, but I'm not sure if there is something that most hosts do to help prevent these bandwidth wasting poke and hope attacks. Thanks in advance.

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  • Bridging VirtualBox over OpenVPN TAP adapter on Windows

    - by Sean Edwards
    I'm trying to configure a virtual machine (VirtualBox guest running Backtrack 4) with a bridged adapter over a VPN connection. The VPN is is hosted by the cybersecurity club at my university, and connects to a sandboxed LAN designed for penetration testing against various servers that the club has built. My host (Windows 7 Ultimate) connects to the VPN fine and is assigned an IP through DHCP, but for some reason the VM can't do the same thing, and I'm not sure why. It's like OpenVPN is filtering out packets from the MAC address it doesn't recognize. I want the virtual machine to bridge over the VPN connection, because our IT office has very strict policies about what you can and can't do on the network. I want to be able to run active attacks (ARP spoofing, nmap, Nessus scans) in the sandbox environment without risking the traffic accidentally going over the university network and getting my internet access revoked. Bridging over the VPN connection and running all attacks from inside the VM would solve that problem. Any idea why the host can use this interface, but the VM can't?

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  • Energy Firms Targetted for Sensitive Documents

    - by martin.abrahams
    Numerous multinational energy companies have been targeted by hackers who have been focusing on financial documents related to oil and gas field exploration, bidding contracts, and drilling rights, as well as proprietary industrial process documents, according to a new McAfee report. "It ... speaks to quite a sad state of our critical infrastructure security. These were not sophisticated attacks ... yet they were very successful in achieving their goals," said Dmitri Alperovitch, McAfee's vice president for threat research. Apparently, the attacks can be traced back over several years, creating a sustained security compromise that has provided access to highly sensitive information that is of huge financial value to competitors. The value of IRM as an additional layer of protection is clear. Whether your infrastructure security is in a sad state or is state of the art, breaches are always a possibility - and in any case, a lot of sensitive information is shared with third parties whose infrastructure security might not be as good as yours. IRM protects the individual information assets directly so that, even if infrastructure security is compromised, your critical information is enrypted and trackable and only accessible to authenticated, authorised, audited users. The full McAfee report is available here.

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  • iptables : how to correctly allow incoming and outgoing traffic for certain ports?

    - by Rubytastic
    Im trying to get incoming and outgoing traffic to be enabled on specific ports, because I block everything at the end of the iptables rules. INPUT and FORWARD reject. What would be the appropiate way to open certain ports for all traffic incoming and outgoing? From docs I found below but one has to really define both lines? iptables -A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT iptables -A OUTPUT -o eth0 -p tcp --sport 22 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT I try to open ports for xmpp service and some other deamons running on server. Rules: *filter # Allow all loopback (lo0) traffic and drop all traffic to 127/8 that doesn't use lo0 -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -d 127.0.0.0/8 -j REJECT # Accept all established inbound connections -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT # Allow all outbound traffic - you can modify this to only allow certain traffic -A OUTPUT -j ACCEPT # Allow HTTP # Prevent DDOS attacks (http://blog.bodhizazen.net/linux/prevent-dos-with-iptables/) # Disallow HTTPS -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 50/minute --limit-burst 200 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -m limit --limit 50/second --limit-burst 50 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -j DROP # Allow SSH connections # The -dport number should be the same port number you set in sshd_config -A INPUT -p tcp -s <myip> --dport ssh -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p tcp -s <myip> --dport 5984 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p tcp --dport ssh -j REJECT # Attempt to block portscans # Anyone who tried to portscan us is locked out for an entire day. -A INPUT -m recent --name portscan --rcheck --seconds 86400 -j DROP -A FORWARD -m recent --name portscan --rcheck --seconds 86400 -j DROP # Once the day has passed, remove them from the portscan list -A INPUT -m recent --name portscan --remove -A FORWARD -m recent --name portscan --remove # These rules add scanners to the portscan list, and log the attempt. -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 139 -m recent --name portscan --set -j LOG --log-prefix "Portscan:" -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --dport 139 -m recent --name portscan --set -j DROP -A FORWARD -p tcp -m tcp --dport 139 -m recent --name portscan --set -j LOG --log-prefix "Portscan:" -A FORWARD -p tcp -m tcp --dport 139 -m recent --name portscan --set -j DROP # Stop smurf attacks -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type address-mask-request -j DROP -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type timestamp-request -j DROP -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp -j DROP # Drop excessive RST packets to avoid smurf attacks -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags RST RST -m limit --limit 2/second --limit-burst 2 -j ACCEPT # Don't allow pings through -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type 8 -j DROP # Log iptables denied calls -A INPUT -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "iptables denied: " --log-level 7 # Reject all other inbound - default deny unless explicitly allowed policy -A INPUT -j REJECT -A FORWARD -j REJECT COMMIT

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  • Which is prefered internet security + Antivirus solution for Windows, with good detection rate? [clo

    - by metal gear solid
    Possible Duplicate: Free antivirus solutions for Windows Which is the best internet security + Antivirus solution for Windows? free/opensource or commercial it doesn't matter I need best solution. Is Kaspersky best ? or any other? http://www.kaspersky.com/kaspersky_internet_security Award-winning technologies in Kaspersky Internet Security 2010 protect you from cybercrime and a wide range of IT threats: * Viruses, Trojans, worms and other malware, spyware and adware * Rootkits, bootkits and other complex threats * Identity theft by keyloggers, screen capture malware or phishing scams * Botnets and various illegal methods of taking control of your PC or Netbook * Zero-day attacks, new fast emerging and unknown threats * Drive-by download infections, network attacks and intrusions * Unwanted, offensive web content and spam

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  • What is a good solution for an adaptive iptables daemon?

    - by Matt
    I am running a series of web servers and already have a pretty good set of firewall rules set up, however I'm looking for something to monitor the traffic and add rules as needed. I have denyhosts monitoring for bad SSH logins, and that's great - but I'd love something I could apply to the whole machine that would help prevent bute force attacks against my web applications as well, and add rules to block IPs that display evidence of common attacks. I've seen APF, but it looks as though it hasn't been updated in several years. Is it still in use and would it be good for this? Also, what other solutions are out there that would manipulate iptables to behave in some adaptive fashion? I'm running Ubuntu Linux, if that helps.

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  • Which is the best internet security + Antivirus solution for Windows?

    - by metal gear solid
    Which is the best internet security + Antivirus solution for Windows? free/opensource or commercial it doesn't matter I need best solution. Is Kaspersky best ? or any other? http://www.kaspersky.com/kaspersky_internet_security Award-winning technologies in Kaspersky Internet Security 2010 protect you from cybercrime and a wide range of IT threats: * Viruses, Trojans, worms and other malware, spyware and adware * Rootkits, bootkits and other complex threats * Identity theft by keyloggers, screen capture malware or phishing scams * Botnets and various illegal methods of taking control of your PC or Netbook * Zero-day attacks, new fast emerging and unknown threats * Drive-by download infections, network attacks and intrusions * Unwanted, offensive web content and spam

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  • How can I estimate the entropy of a password?

    - by Wug
    Having read various resources about password strength I'm trying to create an algorithm that will provide a rough estimation of how much entropy a password has. I'm trying to create an algorithm that's as comprehensive as possible. At this point I only have pseudocode, but the algorithm covers the following: password length repeated characters patterns (logical) different character spaces (LC, UC, Numeric, Special, Extended) dictionary attacks It does NOT cover the following, and SHOULD cover it WELL (though not perfectly): ordering (passwords can be strictly ordered by output of this algorithm) patterns (spatial) Can anyone provide some insight on what this algorithm might be weak to? Specifically, can anyone think of situations where feeding a password to the algorithm would OVERESTIMATE its strength? Underestimations are less of an issue. The algorithm: // the password to test password = ? length = length(password) // unique character counts from password (duplicates discarded) uqlca = number of unique lowercase alphabetic characters in password uquca = number of uppercase alphabetic characters uqd = number of unique digits uqsp = number of unique special characters (anything with a key on the keyboard) uqxc = number of unique special special characters (alt codes, extended-ascii stuff) // algorithm parameters, total sizes of alphabet spaces Nlca = total possible number of lowercase letters (26) Nuca = total uppercase letters (26) Nd = total digits (10) Nsp = total special characters (32 or something) Nxc = total extended ascii characters that dont fit into other categorys (idk, 50?) // algorithm parameters, pw strength growth rates as percentages (per character) flca = entropy growth factor for lowercase letters (.25 is probably a good value) fuca = EGF for uppercase letters (.4 is probably good) fd = EGF for digits (.4 is probably good) fsp = EGF for special chars (.5 is probably good) fxc = EGF for extended ascii chars (.75 is probably good) // repetition factors. few unique letters == low factor, many unique == high rflca = (1 - (1 - flca) ^ uqlca) rfuca = (1 - (1 - fuca) ^ uquca) rfd = (1 - (1 - fd ) ^ uqd ) rfsp = (1 - (1 - fsp ) ^ uqsp ) rfxc = (1 - (1 - fxc ) ^ uqxc ) // digit strengths strength = ( rflca * Nlca + rfuca * Nuca + rfd * Nd + rfsp * Nsp + rfxc * Nxc ) ^ length entropybits = log_base_2(strength) A few inputs and their desired and actual entropy_bits outputs: INPUT DESIRED ACTUAL aaa very pathetic 8.1 aaaaaaaaa pathetic 24.7 abcdefghi weak 31.2 H0ley$Mol3y_ strong 72.2 s^fU¬5ü;y34G< wtf 88.9 [a^36]* pathetic 97.2 [a^20]A[a^15]* strong 146.8 xkcd1** medium 79.3 xkcd2** wtf 160.5 * these 2 passwords use shortened notation, where [a^N] expands to N a's. ** xkcd1 = "Tr0ub4dor&3", xkcd2 = "correct horse battery staple" The algorithm does realize (correctly) that increasing the alphabet size (even by one digit) vastly strengthens long passwords, as shown by the difference in entropy_bits for the 6th and 7th passwords, which both consist of 36 a's, but the second's 21st a is capitalized. However, they do not account for the fact that having a password of 36 a's is not a good idea, it's easily broken with a weak password cracker (and anyone who watches you type it will see it) and the algorithm doesn't reflect that. It does, however, reflect the fact that xkcd1 is a weak password compared to xkcd2, despite having greater complexity density (is this even a thing?). How can I improve this algorithm? Addendum 1 Dictionary attacks and pattern based attacks seem to be the big thing, so I'll take a stab at addressing those. I could perform a comprehensive search through the password for words from a word list and replace words with tokens unique to the words they represent. Word-tokens would then be treated as characters and have their own weight system, and would add their own weights to the password. I'd need a few new algorithm parameters (I'll call them lw, Nw ~= 2^11, fw ~= .5, and rfw) and I'd factor the weight into the password as I would any of the other weights. This word search could be specially modified to match both lowercase and uppercase letters as well as common character substitutions, like that of E with 3. If I didn't add extra weight to such matched words, the algorithm would underestimate their strength by a bit or two per word, which is OK. Otherwise, a general rule would be, for each non-perfect character match, give the word a bonus bit. I could then perform simple pattern checks, such as searches for runs of repeated characters and derivative tests (take the difference between each character), which would identify patterns such as 'aaaaa' and '12345', and replace each detected pattern with a pattern token, unique to the pattern and length. The algorithmic parameters (specifically, entropy per pattern) could be generated on the fly based on the pattern. At this point, I'd take the length of the password. Each word token and pattern token would count as one character; each token would replace the characters they symbolically represented. I made up some sort of pattern notation, but it includes the pattern length l, the pattern order o, and the base element b. This information could be used to compute some arbitrary weight for each pattern. I'd do something better in actual code. Modified Example: Password: 1234kitty$$$$$herpderp Tokenized: 1 2 3 4 k i t t y $ $ $ $ $ h e r p d e r p Words Filtered: 1 2 3 4 @W5783 $ $ $ $ $ @W9001 @W9002 Patterns Filtered: @P[l=4,o=1,b='1'] @W5783 @P[l=5,o=0,b='$'] @W9001 @W9002 Breakdown: 3 small, unique words and 2 patterns Entropy: about 45 bits, as per modified algorithm Password: correcthorsebatterystaple Tokenized: c o r r e c t h o r s e b a t t e r y s t a p l e Words Filtered: @W6783 @W7923 @W1535 @W2285 Breakdown: 4 small, unique words and no patterns Entropy: 43 bits, as per modified algorithm The exact semantics of how entropy is calculated from patterns is up for discussion. I was thinking something like: entropy(b) * l * (o + 1) // o will be either zero or one The modified algorithm would find flaws with and reduce the strength of each password in the original table, with the exception of s^fU¬5ü;y34G<, which contains no words or patterns.

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  • CodeGolf: Brothers

    - by John McClane
    Hi guys, I just finished participating in the 2009 ACM ICPC Programming Conest in the Latinamerican Finals. These questions were for Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, etc. My team and I could only finish two questions out of the eleven (not bad I think for the first try). Here's one we could finish. I'm curious to seeing any variations to the code. The question in full: ps: These questions can also be found on the official ICPC website available to everyone. In the land of ACM ruled a greeat king who became obsessed with order. The kingdom had a rectangular form, and the king divided the territory into a grid of small rectangular counties. Before dying the king distributed the counties among his sons. The king was unaware of the rivalries between his sons: The first heir hated the second but not the rest, the second hated the third but not the rest, and so on...Finally, the last heir hated the first heir, but not the other heirs. As soon as the king died, the strange rivaly among the King's sons sparked off a generalized war in the kingdom. Attacks only took place between pairs of adjacent counties (adjacent counties are those that share one vertical or horizontal border). A county X attacked an adjacent county Y whenever X hated Y. The attacked county was always conquered. All attacks where carried out simultanously and a set of simultanous attacks was called a battle. After a certain number of battles, the surviving sons made a truce and never battled again. For example if the king had three sons, named 0, 1 and 2, the figure below shows what happens in the first battle for a given initial land distribution: INPUT The input contains several test cases. The first line of a test case contains four integers, N, R, C and K. N - The number of heirs (2 <= N <= 100) R and C - The dimensions of the land. (2 <= R,C <= 100) K - Number of battles that are going to take place. (1 <= K <= 100) Heirs are identified by sequential integers starting from zero. Each of the next R lines contains C integers HeirIdentificationNumber (saying what heir owns this land) separated by single spaces. This is to layout the initial land. The last test case is a line separated by four zeroes separated by single spaces. (To exit the program so to speak) Output For each test case your program must print R lines with C integers each, separated by single spaces in the same format as the input, representing the land distribution after all battles. Sample Input: Sample Output: 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 2 2 Another example: Sample Input: Sample Output: 4 2 3 4 1 0 3 1 0 3 2 1 2 2 1 2

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  • Ask a DNS server what sites it hosts - and how to possibly prevent misuse

    - by Exit
    I've got a server which I host my company website as well as some of my clients. I noticed a domain which I created, but never used, was being attacked by a poke and hope hacker. I imagine that the hacker collected the domain from either hitting my DNS server and requesting what domains are hosted. So, in the interest of prevention and better server management, how would I ask my own DNS server (Linux CentOS 4) what sites are being hosted on it? Also, is there a way to prevent these types of attacks by hiding this information? I would assume that DNS servers would need to keep some information public, but I'm not sure if there is something that most hosts do to help prevent these bandwidth wasting poke and hope attacks. Thanks in advance.

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  • Top techniques to avoid 'data scraping' from a website database

    - by Addsy
    I am setting up a site using PHP and MySQL that is essentially just a web front-end to an existing database. Understandably my client is very keen to prevent anyone from being able to make a copy of the data in the database yet at the same time wants everything publicly available and even a "view all" link to display every record in the db. Whilst I have put everything in place to prevent attacks such as SQL injection attacks, there is nothing to prevent anyone from viewing all the records as html and running some sort of script to parse this data back into another database. Even if I was to remove the "view all" link, someone could still, in theory, use an automated process to go through each record one by one and compile these into a new database, essentially pinching all the information. Does anyone have any good tactics for preventing or even just dettering this that they could share. Thanks

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  • Valid Email Addresses - XSS and SQL Injection

    - by PAAMAYIM_NEKUDOTAYIM
    Since there are so many valid characters for email addresses, are there any valid email addresses that can in themselves be XSS attacks or SQL injections? I couldn't find any information on this on the web. The local-part of the e-mail address may use any of these ASCII characters: Uppercase and lowercase English letters (a–z, A–Z) Digits 0 to 9 Characters ! # $ % & ' * + - / = ? ^ _ ` { | } ~ Character . (dot, period, full stop) provided that it is not the last character, and provided also that it does not appear two or more times consecutively (e.g. [email protected]). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-mail_address#RFC_specification I'm not asking how to prevent these attacks (I'm already using parametrized queries and HTML purifier), this is more a proof-of-concept. The first thing that came to mind was 'OR [email protected], except that spaces are not allowed. Do all SQL injections require spaces?

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  • Adding the New HTML Editor Extender to a Web Forms Application using NuGet

    - by Stephen Walther
    The July 2011 release of the Ajax Control Toolkit includes a new, lightweight, HTML5 compatible HTML Editor extender. In this blog entry, I explain how you can take advantage of NuGet to quickly add the new HTML Editor control extender to a new or existing ASP.NET Web Forms application. Installing the Latest Version of the Ajax Control Toolkit with NuGet NuGet is a package manager. It enables you to quickly install new software directly from within Visual Studio 2010. You can use NuGet to install additional software when building any type of .NET application including ASP.NET Web Forms and ASP.NET MVC applications. If you have not already installed NuGet then you can install NuGet by navigating to the following address and clicking the giant install button: http://nuget.org/ After you install NuGet, you can add the Ajax Control Toolkit to a new or existing ASP.NET Web Forms application by selecting the Visual Studio menu option Tools, Library Package Manager, Package Manager Console: Selecting this menu option opens the Package Manager Console. You can enter the command Install-Package AjaxControlToolkit in the console to install the Ajax Control Toolkit: After you install the Ajax Control Toolkit with NuGet, your application will include an assembly reference to the AjaxControlToolkit.dll and SanitizerProviders.dll assemblies: Furthermore, your Web.config file will be updated to contain a new tag prefix for the Ajax Control Toolkit controls: <configuration> <system.web> <compilation debug="true" targetFramework="4.0" /> <pages> <controls> <add tagPrefix="ajaxToolkit" assembly="AjaxControlToolkit" namespace="AjaxControlToolkit" /> </controls> </pages> </system.web> </configuration> The configuration file installed by NuGet adds the prefix ajaxToolkit for all of the Ajax Control Toolkit controls. You can type ajaxToolkit: in source view to get auto-complete in Source view. You can, of course, change this prefix to anything you want. Using the HTML Editor Extender After you install the Ajax Control Toolkit, you can use the HTML Editor Extender with the standard ASP.NET TextBox control to enable users to enter rich formatting such as bold, underline, italic, different fonts, and different background and foreground colors. For example, the following page can be used for entering comments. The page contains a standard ASP.NET TextBox, Button, and Label control. When you click the button, any text entered into the TextBox is displayed in the Label control. It is a pretty boring page: Let’s make this page fancier by extending the standard ASP.NET TextBox with the HTML Editor extender control: Notice that the ASP.NET TextBox now has a toolbar which includes buttons for performing various kinds of formatting. For example, you can change the size and font used for the text. You also can change the foreground and background color – and make many other formatting changes. You can customize the toolbar buttons which the HTML Editor extender displays. To learn how to customize the toolbar, see the HTML Editor Extender sample page here: http://www.asp.net/ajaxLibrary/AjaxControlToolkitSampleSite/HTMLEditorExtender/HTMLEditorExtender.aspx Here’s the source code for the ASP.NET page: <%@ Page Language="C#" AutoEventWireup="true" CodeBehind="Default.aspx.cs" Inherits="WebApplication1.Default" %> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head runat="server"> <title>Add Comments</title> </head> <body> <form id="form1" runat="server"> <div> <ajaxToolkit:ToolkitScriptManager ID="TSM1" runat="server" /> <asp:TextBox ID="txtComments" TextMode="MultiLine" Columns="50" Rows="8" Runat="server" /> <ajaxToolkit:HtmlEditorExtender ID="hee" TargetControlID="txtComments" Runat="server" /> <br /><br /> <asp:Button ID="btnSubmit" Text="Add Comment" Runat="server" onclick="btnSubmit_Click" /> <hr /> <asp:Label ID="lblComment" Runat="server" /> </div> </form> </body> </html> Notice that the page above contains 5 controls. The page contains a standard ASP.NET TextBox, Button, and Label control. However, the page also contains an Ajax Control Toolkit ToolkitScriptManager control and HtmlEditorExtender control. The HTML Editor extender control extends the standard ASP.NET TextBox control. The HTML Editor TargetID attribute points at the TextBox control. Here’s the code-behind for the page above:   using System; namespace WebApplication1 { public partial class Default : System.Web.UI.Page { protected void btnSubmit_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) { lblComment.Text = txtComments.Text; } } }   Preventing XSS/JavaScript Injection Attacks If you use an HTML Editor -- any HTML Editor -- in a public facing web page then you are opening your website up to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. An evil hacker could submit HTML using the HTML Editor which contains JavaScript that steals private information such as other user’s passwords. Imagine, for example, that you create a web page which enables your customers to post comments about your website. Furthermore, imagine that you decide to redisplay the comments so every user can see them. In that case, a malicious user could submit JavaScript which displays a dialog asking for a user name and password. When an unsuspecting customer enters their secret password, the script could transfer the password to the hacker’s website. So how do you accept HTML content without opening your website up to JavaScript injection attacks? The Ajax Control Toolkit HTML Editor supports the Anti-XSS library. You can use the Anti-XSS library to sanitize any HTML content. The Anti-XSS library, for example, strips away all JavaScript automatically. You can download the Anti-XSS library from NuGet. Open the Package Manager Console and execute the command Install-Package AntiXSS: Adding the Anti-XSS library to your application adds two assemblies to your application named AntiXssLibrary.dll and HtmlSanitizationLibrary.dll. After you install the Anti-XSS library, you can configure the HTML Editor extender to use the Anti-XSS library your application’s web.config file: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <configuration> <configSections> <sectionGroup name="system.web"> <section name="sanitizer" requirePermission="false" type="AjaxControlToolkit.Sanitizer.ProviderSanitizerSection, AjaxControlToolkit"/> </sectionGroup> </configSections> <system.web> <sanitizer defaultProvider="AntiXssSanitizerProvider"> <providers> <add name="AntiXssSanitizerProvider" type="AjaxControlToolkit.Sanitizer.AntiXssSanitizerProvider"></add> </providers> </sanitizer> <compilation debug="true" targetFramework="4.0" /> <pages> <controls> <add tagPrefix="ajaxToolkit" assembly="AjaxControlToolkit" namespace="AjaxControlToolkit" /> </controls> </pages> </system.web> </configuration> Summary In this blog entry, I described how you can quickly get started using the new HTML Editor extender – included with the July 2011 release of the Ajax Control Toolkit – by installing the Ajax Control Toolkit with NuGet. If you want to learn more about the HTML Editor then please take a look at the Ajax Control Toolkit sample site: http://www.asp.net/ajaxLibrary/AjaxControlToolkitSampleSite/HTMLEditorExtender/HTMLEditorExtender.aspx

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  • Why not use JavaScript but libraries instead?

    - by shareef
    I read this article Unobtrusive JavaScript with jQuery and I noticed these points in the slide page 11 some companies strip JavaScript at the firewall some run the NoScript Firefox extension to protect themselves from common XSS and CSRF attacks many mobile devices ignore JavaScript entirely screen readers do execute JavaScript but accessibility issues mean you may not want them to I did not understand the fourth point. What does it mean? I need your comment and responses on these points. Is not using JavaScript and switching to libraries like jQuery worth it?

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