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  • PHP -- automatic SQL injection protection?

    - by ashgromnies
    I took over maintenance of a PHP app recently and I'm not super familiar with PHP but some of the things I've been seeing on the site are making me nervous that it could be vulnerable to a SQL injection attack. For example, see how this code for logging into the administrative section works: $password = md5(HASH_SALT . $_POST['loginPass']); $query = "SELECT * FROM `administrators` WHERE `active`='1' AND `email`='{$_POST['loginEmail']}' AND `password`='{$password}'"; $userInfo = db_fetch_array(db_query($query)); if($userInfo['id']) { $_SESSION['adminLoggedIn'] = true; // user is logged in, other junk happens here, not important The creators of the site made a special db_query method and db_fetch_array method, shown here: function db_query($qstring,$print=0) { return @mysql(DB_NAME,$qstring); } function db_fetch_array($qhandle) { return @mysql_fetch_array($qhandle); } Now, this makes me think I should be able to do some sort of SQL injection attack with an email address like: ' OR 'x'='x' LIMIT 1; and some random password. When I use that on the command line, I get an administrative user back, but when I try it in the application, I get an invalid username/password error, like I should. Could there be some sort of global PHP configuration they have enabled to block these attacks? Where would that be configured? Here is the PHP --version information: # php --version PHP 5.2.12 (cli) (built: Feb 28 2010 15:59:21) Copyright (c) 1997-2009 The PHP Group Zend Engine v2.2.0, Copyright (c) 1998-2009 Zend Technologies with the ionCube PHP Loader v3.3.14, Copyright (c) 2002-2010, by ionCube Ltd., and with Zend Optimizer v3.3.9, Copyright (c) 1998-2009, by Zend Technologies

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  • When will a TCP network packet be fragmented at the application layer?

    - by zooropa
    When will a TCP packet be fragmented at the application layer? When a TCP packet is sent from an application, will the recipient at the application layer ever receive the packet in two or more packets? If so, what conditions cause the packet to be divided. It seems like a packet won't be fragmented until it reaches the Ethernet (at the network layer) limit of 1500 bytes. But, that fragmentation will be transparent to the recipient at the application layer since the network layer will reassemble the fragments before sending the packet up to the next layer, right?

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  • Concatenating Date Values - SQL Injection

    - by Kyle Rozendo
    Hi All, We currently receive parameters of values as VARCHAR's, and then build a date from them. I am wanting to confirm that the method would stop the possibility of SQL injection from this statement: select CONVERT(datetime, '2010' + '-' + '02' + '-' + '21' + ' ' + '15:11:38.990') Another note is that the actual parameters being passed through to the stored proc are length bound at (4, 2, 2, 10, 12) in correspondence to the above. Thanks a ton, Kyle

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  • How would I go about prevent DLL injection.

    - by wowus
    So the other day, I saw this: http://www.edgeofnowhere.cc/viewtopic.php?p=2483118 and it goes over three different methods of DLL injection. How would I prevent these from the process? Or at a bare minimum, how do I prevent the first one? I was thinking maybe a Ring 0 driver might be the only way to stop all three, but I'd like to see what the community thinks.

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  • Does this PHP function protect against SQL injection?

    - by George Edison
    I have this function I'm using and I want to be sure that it fully protects against SQL injection attacks: function MakeSafeForQuery($string) { // replace all of the quote // chars by their escape sequence $ret = str_replace("\\","\\\\",$string); $ret = str_replace("'","\\'",$ret); $ret = str_replace("\"","\\\"",$ret); return $ret; } Am I missing anything serious?

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  • Prevent SQL Injection in Dynamic column names

    - by Mr Shoubs
    I can't get away without writing some dynamic sql conditions in a part of my system (using Postgres). My question is how best to avoid SQL Injection with the method I am currently using. EDIT (Reasoning): There are many of columns in a number of tables (a number which grows (only) and is maintained elsewhere). I need a method of allowing the user to decide which (predefined) column they want to query (and if necessary apply string functions to). The query itself is far too complex for the user to write themselves, nor do they have access to the db. There are 1000's of users with varying requirements and I need to remain as flexible as possible - I shouldn't have to revisit the code unless the main query needs to change - Also, there is no way of knowing what conditions the user will need to use. I have objects (received via web service) that generates a condition (the generation method is below - it isn't perfect yet) for some large sql queries. The _FieldName is user editable (parameter name was, but it didn't need to be) and I am worried it could be an attack vector. I put double quotes (see quoted identifier) around the field name in an attempt to sanitize the string, this way it can never be a key word. I could also look up the field name against a list of fields, but it would be difficult to maintain on a timely basis. Unfortunately the user must enter the condition criteria, I am sure there must be more I can add to the sanatize method? and does quoting the column name make it safe? (my limited testing seems to think so). an example built condition would be "AND upper(brandloaded.make) like 'O%' and upper(brandloaded.make) not like 'OTHERBRAND'" ... Any help or suggestions are appreciated. Public Function GetCondition() As String Dim sb As New Text.StringBuilder 'put quote around the table name in an attempt to prevent some sql injection 'http://www.postgresql.org/docs/8.2/static/sql-syntax-lexical.html sb.AppendFormat(" {0} ""{1}"" ", _LogicOperator.ToString, _FieldName) Select Case _ConditionOperator Case ConditionOperatorOptions.Equals sb.Append(" = ") ... End Select sb.AppendFormat(" {0} ", Me.UniqueParameterName) 'for parameter Return Me.Sanitize(sb) End Function Private Function Sanitize(ByVal sb As Text.StringBuilder) As String 'compare against a similar blacklist mentioned here: http://forums.asp.net/t/1254125.aspx sb.Replace(";", "") sb.Replace("'", "") sb.Replace("\", "") sb.Replace(Chr(8), "") Return sb.ToString End Function Public ReadOnly Property UniqueParameterName() As String Get Return String.Concat(":" _UniqueIdentifier) End Get End Property

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  • Dependency Injection wcf

    - by Diego Dias
    I want inject a implementation of my Interface in the WCF but I want initialize my container of Dependency Injection in the Client of the WCF. So I can have a different implementation for each client of the my service. Help me please.

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  • Recovering From An SQL Injection

    - by Bryan
    Let's not go so far as to say that I'm paranoid, but I've been spending hour after hour learning how to prevent SQL injections (and XSS for what it's worth). What I'm wondering is that a SQL injection doesn't seem like it would do permanent harm to my database if I've made daily backups. Doesn't importing yesterday's copy of my tables just restore them and then I can be on my merry way?

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  • Dependency Injection: I don't get where to start!

    - by Andy
    I have several articles about Dependency Injection, and I can see the benefits, especially when it comes to unit testing. The units can me loosely coupled, and mocking of dependencies can be made. The trouble is - I just don't get where to start. Consider this snippet below of (much edited for the purpose of this post) code that I have. I am instantiating a Plc object from the main form, and passing in a communications mode via the Connect method. In it's present form it becomes hard to test, because I can't isolate the Plc from the CommsChannel to unit test it. (Can I?) The class depends on using a CommsChannel object, but I am only passing in a mode that is used to create this channel within the Plc itself. To use dependancy injection, I should really pass in an already created CommsChannel (via an 'ICommsChannel' interface perhaps) to the Connect method, or maybe via the Plc constructor. Is that right? But then that would mean creating the CommsChannel in my main form first, and this doesn't seem right either, because it feels like everything will come back to the base layer of the main form, where everything begins. Somehow it feels like I am missing a crucial piece of the puzzle. Where do you start? You have to create an instance of something somewhere, but I'm struggling to understand where that should be. public class Plc() { public bool Connect(CommsMode commsMode) { bool success = false; // Create new comms channel. this._commsChannel = this.GetCommsChannel(commsMode); // Attempt connection success = this._commsChannel.Connect(); return this._connected; } private CommsChannel GetCommsChannel(CommsMode mode) { CommsChannel channel; switch (mode) { case CommsMode.RS232: channel = new SerialCommsChannel( SerialCommsSettings.Default.ComPort, SerialCommsSettings.Default.BaudRate, SerialCommsSettings.Default.DataBits, SerialCommsSettings.Default.Parity, SerialCommsSettings.Default.StopBits); break; case CommsMode.Tcp: channel = new TcpCommsChannel( TCPCommsSettings.Default.IP_Address, TCPCommsSettings.Default.Port); break; default: // Throw unknown comms channel exception. } return channel; } }

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  • SYN flooding still a threat to servers?

    - by Rob
    Well recently I've been reading about different Denial of Service methods. One method that kind of stuck out was SYN flooding. I'm a member of some not-so-nice forums, and someone was selling a python script that would DoS a server using SYN packets with a spoofed IP address. However, if you sent a SYN packet to a server, with a spoofed IP address, the target server would return the SYN/ACK packet to the host that was spoofed. In which case, wouldn't the spoofed host return an RST packet, thus negating the 75 second long-wait, and ultimately failing in its attempt to DoS the server?

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  • Prevent SQL injection from form-generated SQL - NO PreparedStmts

    - by Markos Fragkakis
    Hi all, I have a search table where user will be able to filter results with a filter of the type: Field [Name], Value [John], Remove Rule Field [Surname], Value [Blake], Remove Rule Field [Has Children], Value [Yes], Remove Rule Add Rule So the user will be able to set an arbitrary set of filters, which will result essentially in a completely dynamic WHERE clause. In the future I will also have to implement more complicated logical expressions, like Where (name=John OR name=Nick) AND (surname=Blake OR surname=Bourne), Of all 10 fields the user may or may not filter by, I don't know how many and which filters the user will set. So, I cannot use a prepared statement (which assumes that at least we know the fields in the WHERE clause). This is why prepared statements are unfortunately out of the question, I have to do it with plain old, generated SQL. What measures can I take to protect the application from SQL Injection (REGEX-wise or any other way)?

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  • How to prevent code/option injection in a bash script

    - by asmaier
    I have written a small bash script called "isinFile.sh" for checking if the first term given to the script can be found in the file "file.txt": #!/bin/bash FILE="file.txt" if [ `grep -w "$1" $FILE` ]; then echo "true" else echo "false" fi However, running the script like > ./isinFile.sh -x breaks the script, since -x is interpreted by grep as an option. So I improved my script #!/bin/bash FILE="file.txt" if [ `grep -w -- "$1" $FILE` ]; then echo "true" else echo "false" fi using -- as an argument to grep. Now running > ./isinFile.sh -x false works. But is using -- the correct and only way to prevent code/option injection in bash scripts? I have not seen it in the wild, only found it mentioned in ABASH: Finding Bugs in Bash Scripts.

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  • C++: Dependency injection, circular dependency and callbacks

    - by Jonathan
    Consider the (highly simplified) following case: class Dispatcher { public: receive() {/*implementation*/}; // callback } class CommInterface { public: send() = 0; // call } class CommA : public CommInterface { public: send() {/*implementation*/}; } Various classes in the system send messages via the dispatcher. The dispatcher uses a comm to send. Once an answer is returned, the comm relays it back to the dispatcher which dispatches it back to the appropriate original sender. Comm is polymorphic and which implementation to choose can be read from a settings file. Dispatcher has a dependency on the comm in order to send. Comm has a dependency on dispatcher in order to callback. Therefor there's a circular dependency here and I can't seem to implement the dependency injection principle (even after encountering this nice blog post).

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  • SQL Injection with Plain-Vanilla NHibernate

    - by James D
    Hello, Plain-vanilla NHibernate setup, eg, no fluent NHibernate, no HQL, nothing except domain objects and NHibernate mapping files. I load objects via: _lightSabers = session.CreateCriteria(typeof(LightSaber)).List<LightSaber>(); I apply raw user input directly to one property on the "LightSaber" class: myLightSaber.NameTag = "Raw malicious text from user"; I then save the LightSaber: session.SaveOrUpdate(myLightSaber); Everything I've seen says that yes, under this situation you are immune to SQL injection, because of the way NHibernate parameterizes and escapes the queries under the hood. However, I'm also a relative NHibernate beginner so I wanted to double-check. *waves hand* these aren't the droids you're looking for. Thanks!

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