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  • How to get value array of object using jquery

    - by Sthepen
    Hi there.. i have problem to get all element in array of object using jquery... i get this code from internet... var id = 123; var test = new Object(); test.Identification = id; test.Group = "users"; test.Persons = new Array(); test.Persons.push({"FirstName":" AA ","LastName":"LA"}); test.Persons.push({"FirstName":" BB ","LastName":"LBB"}); test.Persons.push({"FirstName":" CC","LastName":"LC"}); test.Persons.push({"FirstName":" DD","LastName":"LD"}); how to get each of "FirstName" and "LastName" in Persons using JQuery??

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  • Delay-Load equivalent in unix based systems

    - by saran
    What is the delay load equivalent in unix based system. I have a code foo.cpp, While compiling with gcc I link it to shared objects(totally three .so files are there.).Each of the .so file for different option. ./foo -v needs libversion.so ./foo -update needs libupdate.so I need the symbol for those libraries should be resolved only at the run time. ./foo -v should not break even if libupdate.so library is not there. It is working in windows using the delay load option(in properties of dll). What is its equivalent in unix systems. Will '-lazy' option does the same in UNIX?. If so,Where to include this option? (in makefile or with linker ld). I am not good in unix. Please help me.. Thanks in advance.

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  • C++ - defining static const integer members in class definition

    - by HighCommander4
    My understanding is that C++ allows static const members to be defined inside a class so long as it's an integer type. Why, then, does the following code give me a linker error? #include <algorithm> #include <iostream> class test { public: static const int N = 10; }; int main() { std::cout << test::N << "\n"; std::min(9, test::N); } The error I get is: test.cpp:(.text+0x130): undefined reference to `test::N' collect2: ld returned 1 exit status Interestingly, if I comment out the call to std::min, the code compiles and links just fine (even though test::N is also referenced on the previous line). Any idea as to what's going on? My compiler is gcc 4.4 on Linux.

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  • Cache bandwidth per tick for modern CPUs

    - by osgx
    Hello What is a speed of cache accessing for modern CPUs? How many bytes can be read or written from memory every processor clock tick by Intel P4, Core2, Corei7, AMD? Please, answer with both theoretical (width of ld/sd unit with its throughput in uOPs/tick) and practical numbers (even memcpy speed tests, or STREAM benchmark), if any. PS it is question, related to maximal rate of load/store instructions in assembler. There can be theoretical rate of loading (all Instructions Per Tick are widest loads), but processor can give only part of such, a practical limit of loading.

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  • Oh no, Not another Undefined Reference Question!

    - by roony
    Unfortunately yes. I have my shared library compiled, the linker doesn't complain about not finding it but still I get undefined reference error. Thinking that I might be doing something wrong I did a little research and found this nice, simple walkthrough: http://www.adp-gmbh.ch/cpp/gcc/create_lib.html which I've followed to the letter but still I get: $ gcc -Wall main.c -o dynamically_linked -L.\ -lmean /tmp/ccZjkkkl.o: In function `main': main.c:(.text+0x42): undefined reference to `mean' collect2: ld returned 1 exit status This is pretty simple stuff so what's going wrong?!?!? Can anyone suggest something in my set up that might need checking/tweeking? GCC 4.3.2 Fedora 10 64-bit

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  • Access to Oracle Database with sqlapi C++

    - by Meloun
    Hi, I need to write some data in several database. I choose sqlapi.com I have made it for mysql and mssql. Now I have Problem with Oracle database. I have installed server and client on Ubuntu. In browser it works, but sqlapi says: libnnz10.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory DBMS API Library 'libclntsh.so' loading fails This library is a part of DBMS client installation, not SQLAPI++ Make sure DBMS client is installed and this required library is available for dynamic loading Linux/Unix: 1) The directories in the user's LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable 2) The list of libraries cached in /etc/ld.so.cache 3) /usr/lib, followed by /lib There are both of these files depp inside /usr/lib. I have tried a lot of ways to say eclipse path to this folder, but nothing works. Thanks for help.

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  • XCode 5 says I got a duplicate, which I don't

    - by GoodMove
    The point is every time I try to run a C++ code in XCode 5 (the file s "File.cpp") xcode returns this: duplicate symbol _main ld: 1 duplicate symbol for architecture i386 clang: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see invocation) And it only returns the error, when I got the following function whatever it contains: int main() { } I checked the folder, which XCode points to (where it says the duplicates are placed), but didn't find anything though. What am I supposed to do??? #include "File.h" using namespace std; void func (void){ cout << "Hello World!" << endl; }

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  • Executing ffmpeg from php running in apache

    - by foobar
    I was executing ffmpeg from php running inside apache. I used to get the error " error while loading shared libraries: libavdevice.so.52: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory". It used to work perfectly if the php script was executed from the command prompt or ffpmeg was directly invoked from the command prompt. I followed the below steps to fix the apache error: Step 1: Check if the file “libavdevice.so.52? exists in the server using the following command. find / -name ‘libavdevice.so.*’ Step 2: You will get the directory in which the file “libavdevice.so.52? exists from the above command. Suppose the directory is “/usr/local/lib/” in this example. Step 3: You have to add the directory name in the file “/etc/ld.so.conf”. Step 4: Execute the command “ldconfig”. How did doing the above make a difference to apache?

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  • How to link .lib library in linux

    - by giga
    I'm pretty new to c programming and want to port a windows c application to linux. My code uses a .lib file va_g729.lib - is it possible to use the same library in Linux and compile it with gcc? All my .c and .h files along with the one .lib files are in the same directory. What I'm doing now is executing this command in the directory: gcc *.c -lm and I get following errors: lbcodec2.c:(.text+0xa6b): undefined reference to `va_g729a_init_encoder' lbcodec2.c:(.text+0xa83): undefined reference to `va_g729a_encoder' collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status Is it possible to link the .lib file and compile with gcc? Thanks.

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  • Linker Error : Statically Linking of Boost Serialization Library

    - by Manikanda raj S
    I'm trying to link the Boost Serialization Library to my Code. But it doesn't seem to be working. g++ serialize.cpp -L"/usr/local/lib/libboost_serialization.a" Error : /tmp/ccw7eX4A.o: In function boost::archive::text_oarchive::text_oarchive(std::basic_ostream<char, std::char_traits<char> >&, unsigned int)': serializep.cpp:(.text._ZN5boost7archive13text_oarchiveC2ERSoj[_ZN5boost7archive13text_oarchiveC5ERSoj]+0x25): undefined reference toboost::archive::text_oarchive_impl::text_oarchive_impl(std::basic_ostream &, unsigned int)' .......... collect2: ld returned 1 exit status But when i link as a shared library, g++ serialize.cpp -lboost_serialization , it works fine. What am i missing here P.S : Other StackOverflow posts with the same question has no answers that work for the above error

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  • get function address from name [.debug_info ??]

    - by user361190
    Hi, I was trying to write a small debug utility and for this I need to get the function/global variable address given its name. This is built-in debug utility, which means that the debug utility will run from within the code to be debugged or in plain words I cannot parse the executable file. Now is there a well-known way to do that ? The plan I have is to make the .debug_* sections to to be loaded into to memory [which I plan to do by a cheap trick like this in ld script] .data { *(.data) __sym_start = .; (debug_); __sym_end = .; } Now I have to parse the section to get the information I need, but I am not sure this is doable or is there issues with this - this is all just theory. But it also seems like too much of work :-) is there a simple way. Or if someone can tell upfront why my scheme will not work, it ill also be helpful. Thanks in Advance, Alex.

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  • Toorcon 15 (2013)

    - by danx
    The Toorcon gang (senior staff): h1kari (founder), nfiltr8, and Geo Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Making Attacks Go Backwards Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Introduction to Toorcon 15 (2013) Toorcon 15 is the 15th annual security conference held in San Diego. I've attended about a third of them and blogged about previous conferences I attended here starting in 2003. As always, I've only summarized the talks I attended and interested me enough to write about them. Be aware that I may have misrepresented the speaker's remarks and that they are not my remarks or opinion, or those of my employer, so don't quote me or them. Those seeking further details may contact the speakers directly or use The Google. For some talks, I have a URL for further information. A Tale of One Software Bypass of MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Andrew Furtak and Oleksandr Bazhaniuk Yuri Bulygin, Oleksandr ("Alex") Bazhaniuk, and (not present) Andrew Furtak Yuri and Alex talked about UEFI and Bootkits and bypassing MS Windows 8 Secure Boot, with vendor recommendations. They previously gave this talk at the BlackHat 2013 conference. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Overview UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) is interface between hardware and OS. UEFI is processor and architecture independent. Malware can replace bootloader (bootx64.efi, bootmgfw.efi). Once replaced can modify kernel. Trivial to replace bootloader. Today many legacy bootkits—UEFI replaces them most of them. MS Windows 8 Secure Boot verifies everything you load, either through signatures or hashes. UEFI firmware relies on secure update (with signed update). You would think Secure Boot would rely on ROM (such as used for phones0, but you can't do that for PCs—PCs use writable memory with signatures DXE core verifies the UEFI boat loader(s) OS Loader (winload.efi, winresume.efi) verifies the OS kernel A chain of trust is established with a root key (Platform Key, PK), which is a cert belonging to the platform vendor. Key Exchange Keys (KEKs) verify an "authorized" database (db), and "forbidden" database (dbx). X.509 certs with SHA-1/SHA-256 hashes. Keys are stored in non-volatile (NV) flash-based NVRAM. Boot Services (BS) allow adding/deleting keys (can't be accessed once OS starts—which uses Run-Time (RT)). Root cert uses RSA-2048 public keys and PKCS#7 format signatures. SecureBoot — enable disable image signature checks SetupMode — update keys, self-signed keys, and secure boot variables CustomMode — allows updating keys Secure Boot policy settings are: always execute, never execute, allow execute on security violation, defer execute on security violation, deny execute on security violation, query user on security violation Attacking MS Windows 8 Secure Boot Secure Boot does NOT protect from physical access. Can disable from console. Each BIOS vendor implements Secure Boot differently. There are several platform and BIOS vendors. It becomes a "zoo" of implementations—which can be taken advantage of. Secure Boot is secure only when all vendors implement it correctly. Allow only UEFI firmware signed updates protect UEFI firmware from direct modification in flash memory protect FW update components program SPI controller securely protect secure boot policy settings in nvram protect runtime api disable compatibility support module which allows unsigned legacy Can corrupt the Platform Key (PK) EFI root certificate variable in SPI flash. If PK is not found, FW enters setup mode wich secure boot turned off. Can also exploit TPM in a similar manner. One is not supposed to be able to directly modify the PK in SPI flash from the OS though. But they found a bug that they can exploit from User Mode (undisclosed) and demoed the exploit. It loaded and ran their own bootkit. The exploit requires a reboot. Multiple vendors are vulnerable. They will disclose this exploit to vendors in the future. Recommendations: allow only signed updates protect UEFI fw in ROM protect EFI variable store in ROM Breaching SSL, One Byte at a Time Yoel Gluck and Angelo Prado Angelo Prado and Yoel Gluck, Salesforce.com CRIME is software that performs a "compression oracle attack." This is possible because the SSL protocol doesn't hide length, and because SSL compresses the header. CRIME requests with every possible character and measures the ciphertext length. Look for the plaintext which compresses the most and looks for the cookie one byte-at-a-time. SSL Compression uses LZ77 to reduce redundancy. Huffman coding replaces common byte sequences with shorter codes. US CERT thinks the SSL compression problem is fixed, but it isn't. They convinced CERT that it wasn't fixed and they issued a CVE. BREACH, breachattrack.com BREACH exploits the SSL response body (Accept-Encoding response, Content-Encoding). It takes advantage of the fact that the response is not compressed. BREACH uses gzip and needs fairly "stable" pages that are static for ~30 seconds. It needs attacker-supplied content (say from a web form or added to a URL parameter). BREACH listens to a session's requests and responses, then inserts extra requests and responses. Eventually, BREACH guesses a session's secret key. Can use compression to guess contents one byte at-a-time. For example, "Supersecret SupersecreX" (a wrong guess) compresses 10 bytes, and "Supersecret Supersecret" (a correct guess) compresses 11 bytes, so it can find each character by guessing every character. To start the guess, BREACH needs at least three known initial characters in the response sequence. Compression length then "leaks" information. Some roadblocks include no winners (all guesses wrong) or too many winners (multiple possibilities that compress the same). The solutions include: lookahead (guess 2 or 3 characters at-a-time instead of 1 character). Expensive rollback to last known conflict check compression ratio can brute-force first 3 "bootstrap" characters, if needed (expensive) block ciphers hide exact plain text length. Solution is to align response in advance to block size Mitigations length: use variable padding secrets: dynamic CSRF tokens per request secret: change over time separate secret to input-less servlets Future work eiter understand DEFLATE/GZIP HTTPS extensions Running at 99%: Surviving an Application DoS Ryan Huber Ryan Huber, Risk I/O Ryan first discussed various ways to do a denial of service (DoS) attack against web services. One usual method is to find a slow web page and do several wgets. Or download large files. Apache is not well suited at handling a large number of connections, but one can put something in front of it Can use Apache alternatives, such as nginx How to identify malicious hosts short, sudden web requests user-agent is obvious (curl, python) same url requested repeatedly no web page referer (not normal) hidden links. hide a link and see if a bot gets it restricted access if not your geo IP (unless the website is global) missing common headers in request regular timing first seen IP at beginning of attack count requests per hosts (usually a very large number) Use of captcha can mitigate attacks, but you'll lose a lot of genuine users. Bouncer, goo.gl/c2vyEc and www.github.com/rawdigits/Bouncer Bouncer is software written by Ryan in netflow. Bouncer has a small, unobtrusive footprint and detects DoS attempts. It closes blacklisted sockets immediately (not nice about it, no proper close connection). Aggregator collects requests and controls your web proxies. Need NTP on the front end web servers for clean data for use by bouncer. Bouncer is also useful for a popularity storm ("Slashdotting") and scraper storms. Future features: gzip collection data, documentation, consumer library, multitask, logging destroyed connections. Takeaways: DoS mitigation is easier with a complete picture Bouncer designed to make it easier to detect and defend DoS—not a complete cure Security Response in the Age of Mass Customized Attacks Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman Peleus Uhley and Karthik Raman, Adobe ASSET, blogs.adobe.com/asset/ Peleus and Karthik talked about response to mass-customized exploits. Attackers behave much like a business. "Mass customization" refers to concept discussed in the book Future Perfect by Stan Davis of Harvard Business School. Mass customization is differentiating a product for an individual customer, but at a mass production price. For example, the same individual with a debit card receives basically the same customized ATM experience around the world. Or designing your own PC from commodity parts. Exploit kits are another example of mass customization. The kits support multiple browsers and plugins, allows new modules. Exploit kits are cheap and customizable. Organized gangs use exploit kits. A group at Berkeley looked at 77,000 malicious websites (Grier et al., "Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service", 2012). They found 10,000 distinct binaries among them, but derived from only a dozen or so exploit kits. Characteristics of Mass Malware: potent, resilient, relatively low cost Technical characteristics: multiple OS, multipe payloads, multiple scenarios, multiple languages, obfuscation Response time for 0-day exploits has gone down from ~40 days 5 years ago to about ~10 days now. So the drive with malware is towards mass customized exploits, to avoid detection There's plenty of evicence that exploit development has Project Manager bureaucracy. They infer from the malware edicts to: support all versions of reader support all versions of windows support all versions of flash support all browsers write large complex, difficult to main code (8750 lines of JavaScript for example Exploits have "loose coupling" of multipe versions of software (adobe), OS, and browser. This allows specific attacks against specific versions of multiple pieces of software. Also allows exploits of more obscure software/OS/browsers and obscure versions. Gave examples of exploits that exploited 2, 3, 6, or 14 separate bugs. However, these complete exploits are more likely to be buggy or fragile in themselves and easier to defeat. Future research includes normalizing malware and Javascript. Conclusion: The coming trend is that mass-malware with mass zero-day attacks will result in mass customization of attacks. x86 Rewriting: Defeating RoP and other Shinanighans Richard Wartell Richard Wartell The attack vector we are addressing here is: First some malware causes a buffer overflow. The malware has no program access, but input access and buffer overflow code onto stack Later the stack became non-executable. The workaround malware used was to write a bogus return address to the stack jumping to malware Later came ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) to randomize memory layout and make addresses non-deterministic. The workaround malware used was to jump t existing code segments in the program that can be used in bad ways "RoP" is Return-oriented Programming attacks. RoP attacks use your own code and write return address on stack to (existing) expoitable code found in program ("gadgets"). Pinkie Pie was paid $60K last year for a RoP attack. One solution is using anti-RoP compilers that compile source code with NO return instructions. ASLR does not randomize address space, just "gadgets". IPR/ILR ("Instruction Location Randomization") randomizes each instruction with a virtual machine. Richard's goal was to randomize a binary with no source code access. He created "STIR" (Self-Transofrming Instruction Relocation). STIR disassembles binary and operates on "basic blocks" of code. The STIR disassembler is conservative in what to disassemble. Each basic block is moved to a random location in memory. Next, STIR writes new code sections with copies of "basic blocks" of code in randomized locations. The old code is copied and rewritten with jumps to new code. the original code sections in the file is marked non-executible. STIR has better entropy than ASLR in location of code. Makes brute force attacks much harder. STIR runs on MS Windows (PEM) and Linux (ELF). It eliminated 99.96% or more "gadgets" (i.e., moved the address). Overhead usually 5-10% on MS Windows, about 1.5-4% on Linux (but some code actually runs faster!). The unique thing about STIR is it requires no source access and the modified binary fully works! Current work is to rewrite code to enforce security policies. For example, don't create a *.{exe,msi,bat} file. Or don't connect to the network after reading from the disk. Clowntown Express: interesting bugs and running a bug bounty program Collin Greene Collin Greene, Facebook Collin talked about Facebook's bug bounty program. Background at FB: FB has good security frameworks, such as security teams, external audits, and cc'ing on diffs. But there's lots of "deep, dark, forgotten" parts of legacy FB code. Collin gave several examples of bountied bugs. Some bounty submissions were on software purchased from a third-party (but bounty claimers don't know and don't care). We use security questions, as does everyone else, but they are basically insecure (often easily discoverable). Collin didn't expect many bugs from the bounty program, but they ended getting 20+ good bugs in first 24 hours and good submissions continue to come in. Bug bounties bring people in with different perspectives, and are paid only for success. Bug bounty is a better use of a fixed amount of time and money versus just code review or static code analysis. The Bounty program started July 2011 and paid out $1.5 million to date. 14% of the submissions have been high priority problems that needed to be fixed immediately. The best bugs come from a small % of submitters (as with everything else)—the top paid submitters are paid 6 figures a year. Spammers like to backstab competitors. The youngest sumitter was 13. Some submitters have been hired. Bug bounties also allows to see bugs that were missed by tools or reviews, allowing improvement in the process. Bug bounties might not work for traditional software companies where the product has release cycle or is not on Internet. Active Fingerprinting of Encrypted VPNs Anna Shubina Anna Shubina, Dartmouth Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (I missed the start of her talk because another track went overtime. But I have the DVD of the talk, so I'll expand later) IPsec leaves fingerprints. Using netcat, one can easily visually distinguish various crypto chaining modes just from packet timing on a chart (example, DES-CBC versus AES-CBC) One can tell a lot about VPNs just from ping roundtrips (such as what router is used) Delayed packets are not informative about a network, especially if far away from the network More needed to explore about how TCP works in real life with respect to timing Making Attacks Go Backwards Fuzzynop FuzzyNop, Mandiant This talk is not about threat attribution (finding who), product solutions, politics, or sales pitches. But who are making these malware threats? It's not a single person or group—they have diverse skill levels. There's a lot of fat-fingered fumblers out there. Always look for low-hanging fruit first: "hiding" malware in the temp, recycle, or root directories creation of unnamed scheduled tasks obvious names of files and syscalls ("ClearEventLog") uncleared event logs. Clearing event log in itself, and time of clearing, is a red flag and good first clue to look for on a suspect system Reverse engineering is hard. Disassembler use takes practice and skill. A popular tool is IDA Pro, but it takes multiple interactive iterations to get a clean disassembly. Key loggers are used a lot in targeted attacks. They are typically custom code or built in a backdoor. A big tip-off is that non-printable characters need to be printed out (such as "[Ctrl]" "[RightShift]") or time stamp printf strings. Look for these in files. Presence is not proof they are used. Absence is not proof they are not used. Java exploits. Can parse jar file with idxparser.py and decomile Java file. Java typially used to target tech companies. Backdoors are the main persistence mechanism (provided externally) for malware. Also malware typically needs command and control. Application of Artificial Intelligence in Ad-Hoc Static Code Analysis John Ashaman John Ashaman, Security Innovation Initially John tried to analyze open source files with open source static analysis tools, but these showed thousands of false positives. Also tried using grep, but tis fails to find anything even mildly complex. So next John decided to write his own tool. His approach was to first generate a call graph then analyze the graph. However, the problem is that making a call graph is really hard. For example, one problem is "evil" coding techniques, such as passing function pointer. First the tool generated an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) with the nodes created from method declarations and edges created from method use. Then the tool generated a control flow graph with the goal to find a path through the AST (a maze) from source to sink. The algorithm is to look at adjacent nodes to see if any are "scary" (a vulnerability), using heuristics for search order. The tool, called "Scat" (Static Code Analysis Tool), currently looks for C# vulnerabilities and some simple PHP. Later, he plans to add more PHP, then JSP and Java. For more information see his posts in Security Innovation blog and NRefactory on GitHub. Mask Your Checksums—The Gorry Details Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Eric (XlogicX) Davisson Sometimes in emailing or posting TCP/IP packets to analyze problems, you may want to mask the IP address. But to do this correctly, you need to mask the checksum too, or you'll leak information about the IP. Problem reports found in stackoverflow.com, sans.org, and pastebin.org are usually not masked, but a few companies do care. If only the IP is masked, the IP may be guessed from checksum (that is, it leaks data). Other parts of packet may leak more data about the IP. TCP and IP checksums both refer to the same data, so can get more bits of information out of using both checksums than just using one checksum. Also, one can usually determine the OS from the TTL field and ports in a packet header. If we get hundreds of possible results (16x each masked nibble that is unknown), one can do other things to narrow the results, such as look at packet contents for domain or geo information. With hundreds of results, can import as CSV format into a spreadsheet. Can corelate with geo data and see where each possibility is located. Eric then demoed a real email report with a masked IP packet attached. Was able to find the exact IP address, given the geo and university of the sender. Point is if you're going to mask a packet, do it right. Eric wouldn't usually bother, but do it correctly if at all, to not create a false impression of security. Adventures with weird machines thirty years after "Reflections on Trusting Trust" Sergey Bratus Sergey Bratus, Dartmouth College (and Julian Bangert and Rebecca Shapiro, not present) "Reflections on Trusting Trust" refers to Ken Thompson's classic 1984 paper. "You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself." There's invisible links in the chain-of-trust, such as "well-installed microcode bugs" or in the compiler, and other planted bugs. Thompson showed how a compiler can introduce and propagate bugs in unmodified source. But suppose if there's no bugs and you trust the author, can you trust the code? Hell No! There's too many factors—it's Babylonian in nature. Why not? Well, Input is not well-defined/recognized (code's assumptions about "checked" input will be violated (bug/vunerabiliy). For example, HTML is recursive, but Regex checking is not recursive. Input well-formed but so complex there's no telling what it does For example, ELF file parsing is complex and has multiple ways of parsing. Input is seen differently by different pieces of program or toolchain Any Input is a program input executes on input handlers (drives state changes & transitions) only a well-defined execution model can be trusted (regex/DFA, PDA, CFG) Input handler either is a "recognizer" for the inputs as a well-defined language (see langsec.org) or it's a "virtual machine" for inputs to drive into pwn-age ELF ABI (UNIX/Linux executible file format) case study. Problems can arise from these steps (without planting bugs): compiler linker loader ld.so/rtld relocator DWARF (debugger info) exceptions The problem is you can't really automatically analyze code (it's the "halting problem" and undecidable). Only solution is to freeze code and sign it. But you can't freeze everything! Can't freeze ASLR or loading—must have tables and metadata. Any sufficiently complex input data is the same as VM byte code Example, ELF relocation entries + dynamic symbols == a Turing Complete Machine (TM). @bxsays created a Turing machine in Linux from relocation data (not code) in an ELF file. For more information, see Rebecca "bx" Shapiro's presentation from last year's Toorcon, "Programming Weird Machines with ELF Metadata" @bxsays did same thing with Mach-O bytecode Or a DWARF exception handling data .eh_frame + glibc == Turning Machine X86 MMU (IDT, GDT, TSS): used address translation to create a Turning Machine. Page handler reads and writes (on page fault) memory. Uses a page table, which can be used as Turning Machine byte code. Example on Github using this TM that will fly a glider across the screen Next Sergey talked about "Parser Differentials". That having one input format, but two parsers, will create confusion and opportunity for exploitation. For example, CSRs are parsed during creation by cert requestor and again by another parser at the CA. Another example is ELF—several parsers in OS tool chain, which are all different. Can have two different Program Headers (PHDRs) because ld.so parses multiple PHDRs. The second PHDR can completely transform the executable. This is described in paper in the first issue of International Journal of PoC. Conclusions trusting computers not only about bugs! Bugs are part of a problem, but no by far all of it complex data formats means bugs no "chain of trust" in Babylon! (that is, with parser differentials) we need to squeeze complexity out of data until data stops being "code equivalent" Further information See and langsec.org. USENIX WOOT 2013 (Workshop on Offensive Technologies) for "weird machines" papers and videos.

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  • Ancillary Objects: Separate Debug ELF Files For Solaris

    - by Ali Bahrami
    We introduced a new object ELF object type in Solaris 11 Update 1 called the Ancillary Object. This posting describes them, using material originally written during their development, the PSARC arc case, and the Solaris Linker and Libraries Manual. ELF objects contain allocable sections, which are mapped into memory at runtime, and non-allocable sections, which are present in the file for use by debuggers and observability tools, but which are not mapped or used at runtime. Typically, all of these sections exist within a single object file. Ancillary objects allow them to instead go into a separate file. There are different reasons given for wanting such a feature. One can debate whether the added complexity is worth the benefit, and in most cases it is not. However, one important case stands out — customers with very large 32-bit objects who are not ready or able to make the transition to 64-bits. We have customers who build extremely large 32-bit objects. Historically, the debug sections in these objects have used the stabs format, which is limited, but relatively compact. In recent years, the industry has transitioned to the powerful but verbose DWARF standard. In some cases, the size of these debug sections is large enough to push the total object file size past the fundamental 4GB limit for 32-bit ELF object files. The best, and ultimately only, solution to overly large objects is to transition to 64-bits. However, consider environments where: Hundreds of users may be executing the code on large shared systems. (32-bits use less memory and bus bandwidth, and on sparc runs just as fast as 64-bit code otherwise). Complex finely tuned code, where the original authors may no longer be available. Critical production code, that was expensive to qualify and bring online, and which is otherwise serving its intended purpose without issue. Users in these risk adverse and/or high scale categories have good reasons to push 32-bits objects to the limit before moving on. Ancillary objects offer these users a longer runway. Design The design of ancillary objects is intended to be simple, both to help human understanding when examining elfdump output, and to lower the bar for debuggers such as dbx to support them. The primary and ancillary objects have the same set of section headers, with the same names, in the same order (i.e. each section has the same index in both files). A single added section of type SHT_SUNW_ANCILLARY is added to both objects, containing information that allows a debugger to identify and validate both files relative to each other. Given one of these files, the ancillary section allows you to identify the other. Allocable sections go in the primary object, and non-allocable ones go into the ancillary object. A small set of non-allocable objects, notably the symbol table, are copied into both objects. As noted above, most sections are only written to one of the two objects, but both objects have the same section header array. The section header in the file that does not contain the section data is tagged with the SHF_SUNW_ABSENT section header flag to indicate its placeholder status. Compiler writers and others who produce objects can set the SUNW_SHF_PRIMARY section header flag to mark non-allocable sections that should go to the primary object rather than the ancillary. If you don't request an ancillary object, the Solaris ELF format is unchanged. Users who don't use ancillary objects do not pay for the feature. This is important, because they exist to serve a small subset of our users, and must not complicate the common case. If you do request an ancillary object, the runtime behavior of the primary object will be the same as that of a normal object. There is no added runtime cost. The primary and ancillary object together represent a logical single object. This is facilitated by the use of a single set of section headers. One can easily imagine a tool that can merge a primary and ancillary object into a single file, or the reverse. (Note that although this is an interesting intellectual exercise, we don't actually supply such a tool because there's little practical benefit above and beyond using ld to create the files). Among the benefits of this approach are: There is no need for per-file symbol tables to reflect the contents of each file. The same symbol table that would be produced for a standard object can be used. The section contents are identical in either case — there is no need to alter data to accommodate multiple files. It is very easy for a debugger to adapt to these new files, and the processing involved can be encapsulated in input/output routines. Most of the existing debugger implementation applies without modification. The limit of a 4GB 32-bit output object is now raised to 4GB of code, and 4GB of debug data. There is also the future possibility (not currently supported) to support multiple ancillary objects, each of which could contain up to 4GB of additional debug data. It must be noted however that the 32-bit DWARF debug format is itself inherently 32-bit limited, as it uses 32-bit offsets between debug sections, so the ability to employ multiple ancillary object files may not turn out to be useful. Using Ancillary Objects (From the Solaris Linker and Libraries Guide) By default, objects contain both allocable and non-allocable sections. Allocable sections are the sections that contain executable code and the data needed by that code at runtime. Non-allocable sections contain supplemental information that is not required to execute an object at runtime. These sections support the operation of debuggers and other observability tools. The non-allocable sections in an object are not loaded into memory at runtime by the operating system, and so, they have no impact on memory use or other aspects of runtime performance no matter their size. For convenience, both allocable and non-allocable sections are normally maintained in the same file. However, there are situations in which it can be useful to separate these sections. To reduce the size of objects in order to improve the speed at which they can be copied across wide area networks. To support fine grained debugging of highly optimized code requires considerable debug data. In modern systems, the debugging data can easily be larger than the code it describes. The size of a 32-bit object is limited to 4 Gbytes. In very large 32-bit objects, the debug data can cause this limit to be exceeded and prevent the creation of the object. To limit the exposure of internal implementation details. Traditionally, objects have been stripped of non-allocable sections in order to address these issues. Stripping is effective, but destroys data that might be needed later. The Solaris link-editor can instead write non-allocable sections to an ancillary object. This feature is enabled with the -z ancillary command line option. $ ld ... -z ancillary[=outfile] ...By default, the ancillary file is given the same name as the primary output object, with a .anc file extension. However, a different name can be provided by providing an outfile value to the -z ancillary option. When -z ancillary is specified, the link-editor performs the following actions. All allocable sections are written to the primary object. In addition, all non-allocable sections containing one or more input sections that have the SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY section header flag set are written to the primary object. All remaining non-allocable sections are written to the ancillary object. The following non-allocable sections are written to both the primary object and ancillary object. .shstrtab The section name string table. .symtab The full non-dynamic symbol table. .symtab_shndx The symbol table extended index section associated with .symtab. .strtab The non-dynamic string table associated with .symtab. .SUNW_ancillary Contains the information required to identify the primary and ancillary objects, and to identify the object being examined. The primary object and all ancillary objects contain the same array of sections headers. Each section has the same section index in every file. Although the primary and ancillary objects all define the same section headers, the data for most sections will be written to a single file as described above. If the data for a section is not present in a given file, the SHF_SUNW_ABSENT section header flag is set, and the sh_size field is 0. This organization makes it possible to acquire a full list of section headers, a complete symbol table, and a complete list of the primary and ancillary objects from either of the primary or ancillary objects. The following example illustrates the underlying implementation of ancillary objects. An ancillary object is created by adding the -z ancillary command line option to an otherwise normal compilation. The file utility shows that the result is an executable named a.out, and an associated ancillary object named a.out.anc. $ cat hello.c #include <stdio.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { (void) printf("hello, world\n"); return (0); } $ cc -g -zancillary hello.c $ file a.out a.out.anc a.out: ELF 32-bit LSB executable 80386 Version 1 [FPU], dynamically linked, not stripped, ancillary object a.out.anc a.out.anc: ELF 32-bit LSB ancillary 80386 Version 1, primary object a.out $ ./a.out hello worldThe resulting primary object is an ordinary executable that can be executed in the usual manner. It is no different at runtime than an executable built without the use of ancillary objects, and then stripped of non-allocable content using the strip or mcs commands. As previously described, the primary object and ancillary objects contain the same section headers. To see how this works, it is helpful to use the elfdump utility to display these section headers and compare them. The following table shows the section header information for a selection of headers from the previous link-edit example. Index Section Name Type Primary Flags Ancillary Flags Primary Size Ancillary Size 13 .text PROGBITS ALLOC EXECINSTR ALLOC EXECINSTR SUNW_ABSENT 0x131 0 20 .data PROGBITS WRITE ALLOC WRITE ALLOC SUNW_ABSENT 0x4c 0 21 .symtab SYMTAB 0 0 0x450 0x450 22 .strtab STRTAB STRINGS STRINGS 0x1ad 0x1ad 24 .debug_info PROGBITS SUNW_ABSENT 0 0 0x1a7 28 .shstrtab STRTAB STRINGS STRINGS 0x118 0x118 29 .SUNW_ancillary SUNW_ancillary 0 0 0x30 0x30 The data for most sections is only present in one of the two files, and absent from the other file. The SHF_SUNW_ABSENT section header flag is set when the data is absent. The data for allocable sections needed at runtime are found in the primary object. The data for non-allocable sections used for debugging but not needed at runtime are placed in the ancillary file. A small set of non-allocable sections are fully present in both files. These are the .SUNW_ancillary section used to relate the primary and ancillary objects together, the section name string table .shstrtab, as well as the symbol table.symtab, and its associated string table .strtab. It is possible to strip the symbol table from the primary object. A debugger that encounters an object without a symbol table can use the .SUNW_ancillary section to locate the ancillary object, and access the symbol contained within. The primary object, and all associated ancillary objects, contain a .SUNW_ancillary section that allows all the objects to be identified and related together. $ elfdump -T SUNW_ancillary a.out a.out.anc a.out: Ancillary Section: .SUNW_ancillary index tag value [0] ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM 0x8724 [1] ANC_SUNW_MEMBER 0x1 a.out [2] ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM 0x8724 [3] ANC_SUNW_MEMBER 0x1a3 a.out.anc [4] ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM 0xfbe2 [5] ANC_SUNW_NULL 0 a.out.anc: Ancillary Section: .SUNW_ancillary index tag value [0] ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM 0xfbe2 [1] ANC_SUNW_MEMBER 0x1 a.out [2] ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM 0x8724 [3] ANC_SUNW_MEMBER 0x1a3 a.out.anc [4] ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM 0xfbe2 [5] ANC_SUNW_NULL 0 The ancillary sections for both objects contain the same number of elements, and are identical except for the first element. Each object, starting with the primary object, is introduced with a MEMBER element that gives the file name, followed by a CHECKSUM that identifies the object. In this example, the primary object is a.out, and has a checksum of 0x8724. The ancillary object is a.out.anc, and has a checksum of 0xfbe2. The first element in a .SUNW_ancillary section, preceding the MEMBER element for the primary object, is always a CHECKSUM element, containing the checksum for the file being examined. The presence of a .SUNW_ancillary section in an object indicates that the object has associated ancillary objects. The names of the primary and all associated ancillary objects can be obtained from the ancillary section from any one of the files. It is possible to determine which file is being examined from the larger set of files by comparing the first checksum value to the checksum of each member that follows. Debugger Access and Use of Ancillary Objects Debuggers and other observability tools must merge the information found in the primary and ancillary object files in order to build a complete view of the object. This is equivalent to processing the information from a single file. This merging is simplified by the primary object and ancillary objects containing the same section headers, and a single symbol table. The following steps can be used by a debugger to assemble the information contained in these files. Starting with the primary object, or any of the ancillary objects, locate the .SUNW_ancillary section. The presence of this section identifies the object as part of an ancillary group, contains information that can be used to obtain a complete list of the files and determine which of those files is the one currently being examined. Create a section header array in memory, using the section header array from the object being examined as an initial template. Open and read each file identified by the .SUNW_ancillary section in turn. For each file, fill in the in-memory section header array with the information for each section that does not have the SHF_SUNW_ABSENT flag set. The result will be a complete in-memory copy of the section headers with pointers to the data for all sections. Once this information has been acquired, the debugger can proceed as it would in the single file case, to access and control the running program. Note - The ELF definition of ancillary objects provides for a single primary object, and an arbitrary number of ancillary objects. At this time, the Oracle Solaris link-editor only produces a single ancillary object containing all non-allocable sections. This may change in the future. Debuggers and other observability tools should be written to handle the general case of multiple ancillary objects. ELF Implementation Details (From the Solaris Linker and Libraries Guide) To implement ancillary objects, it was necessary to extend the ELF format to add a new object type (ET_SUNW_ANCILLARY), a new section type (SHT_SUNW_ANCILLARY), and 2 new section header flags (SHF_SUNW_ABSENT, SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY). In this section, I will detail these changes, in the form of diffs to the Solaris Linker and Libraries manual. Part IV ELF Application Binary Interface Chapter 13: Object File Format Object File Format Edit Note: This existing section at the beginning of the chapter describes the ELF header. There's a table of object file types, which now includes the new ET_SUNW_ANCILLARY type. e_type Identifies the object file type, as listed in the following table. NameValueMeaning ET_NONE0No file type ET_REL1Relocatable file ET_EXEC2Executable file ET_DYN3Shared object file ET_CORE4Core file ET_LOSUNW0xfefeStart operating system specific range ET_SUNW_ANCILLARY0xfefeAncillary object file ET_HISUNW0xfefdEnd operating system specific range ET_LOPROC0xff00Start processor-specific range ET_HIPROC0xffffEnd processor-specific range Sections Edit Note: This overview section defines the section header structure, and provides a high level description of known sections. It was updated to define the new SHF_SUNW_ABSENT and SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY flags and the new SHT_SUNW_ANCILLARY section. ... sh_type Categorizes the section's contents and semantics. Section types and their descriptions are listed in Table 13-5. sh_flags Sections support 1-bit flags that describe miscellaneous attributes. Flag definitions are listed in Table 13-8. ... Table 13-5 ELF Section Types, sh_type NameValue . . . SHT_LOSUNW0x6fffffee SHT_SUNW_ancillary0x6fffffee . . . ... SHT_LOSUNW - SHT_HISUNW Values in this inclusive range are reserved for Oracle Solaris OS semantics. SHT_SUNW_ANCILLARY Present when a given object is part of a group of ancillary objects. Contains information required to identify all the files that make up the group. See Ancillary Section. ... Table 13-8 ELF Section Attribute Flags NameValue . . . SHF_MASKOS0x0ff00000 SHF_SUNW_NODISCARD0x00100000 SHF_SUNW_ABSENT0x00200000 SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY0x00400000 SHF_MASKPROC0xf0000000 . . . ... SHF_SUNW_ABSENT Indicates that the data for this section is not present in this file. When ancillary objects are created, the primary object and any ancillary objects, will all have the same section header array, to facilitate merging them to form a complete view of the object, and to allow them to use the same symbol tables. Each file contains a subset of the section data. The data for allocable sections is written to the primary object while the data for non-allocable sections is written to an ancillary file. The SHF_SUNW_ABSENT flag is used to indicate that the data for the section is not present in the object being examined. When the SHF_SUNW_ABSENT flag is set, the sh_size field of the section header must be 0. An application encountering an SHF_SUNW_ABSENT section can choose to ignore the section, or to search for the section data within one of the related ancillary files. SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY The default behavior when ancillary objects are created is to write all allocable sections to the primary object and all non-allocable sections to the ancillary objects. The SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY flag overrides this behavior. Any output section containing one more input section with the SHF_SUNW_PRIMARY flag set is written to the primary object without regard for its allocable status. ... Two members in the section header, sh_link, and sh_info, hold special information, depending on section type. Table 13-9 ELF sh_link and sh_info Interpretation sh_typesh_linksh_info . . . SHT_SUNW_ANCILLARY The section header index of the associated string table. 0 . . . Special Sections Edit Note: This section describes the sections used in Solaris ELF objects, using the types defined in the previous description of section types. It was updated to define the new .SUNW_ancillary (SHT_SUNW_ANCILLARY) section. Various sections hold program and control information. Sections in the following table are used by the system and have the indicated types and attributes. Table 13-10 ELF Special Sections NameTypeAttribute . . . .SUNW_ancillarySHT_SUNW_ancillaryNone . . . ... .SUNW_ancillary Present when a given object is part of a group of ancillary objects. Contains information required to identify all the files that make up the group. See Ancillary Section for details. ... Ancillary Section Edit Note: This new section provides the format reference describing the layout of a .SUNW_ancillary section and the meaning of the various tags. Note that these sections use the same tag/value concept used for dynamic and capabilities sections, and will be familiar to anyone used to working with ELF. In addition to the primary output object, the Solaris link-editor can produce one or more ancillary objects. Ancillary objects contain non-allocable sections that would normally be written to the primary object. When ancillary objects are produced, the primary object and all of the associated ancillary objects contain a SHT_SUNW_ancillary section, containing information that identifies these related objects. Given any one object from such a group, the ancillary section provides the information needed to identify and interpret the others. This section contains an array of the following structures. See sys/elf.h. typedef struct { Elf32_Word a_tag; union { Elf32_Word a_val; Elf32_Addr a_ptr; } a_un; } Elf32_Ancillary; typedef struct { Elf64_Xword a_tag; union { Elf64_Xword a_val; Elf64_Addr a_ptr; } a_un; } Elf64_Ancillary; For each object with this type, a_tag controls the interpretation of a_un. a_val These objects represent integer values with various interpretations. a_ptr These objects represent file offsets or addresses. The following ancillary tags exist. Table 13-NEW1 ELF Ancillary Array Tags NameValuea_un ANC_SUNW_NULL0Ignored ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM1a_val ANC_SUNW_MEMBER2a_ptr ANC_SUNW_NULL Marks the end of the ancillary section. ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM Provides the checksum for a file in the c_val element. When ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM precedes the first instance of ANC_SUNW_MEMBER, it provides the checksum for the object from which the ancillary section is being read. When it follows an ANC_SUNW_MEMBER tag, it provides the checksum for that member. ANC_SUNW_MEMBER Specifies an object name. The a_ptr element contains the string table offset of a null-terminated string, that provides the file name. An ancillary section must always contain an ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM before the first instance of ANC_SUNW_MEMBER, identifying the current object. Following that, there should be an ANC_SUNW_MEMBER for each object that makes up the complete set of objects. Each ANC_SUNW_MEMBER should be followed by an ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM for that object. A typical ancillary section will therefore be structured as: TagMeaning ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUMChecksum of this object ANC_SUNW_MEMBERName of object #1 ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUMChecksum for object #1 . . . ANC_SUNW_MEMBERName of object N ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUMChecksum for object N ANC_SUNW_NULL An object can therefore identify itself by comparing the initial ANC_SUNW_CHECKSUM to each of the ones that follow, until it finds a match. Related Other Work The GNU developers have also encountered the need/desire to support separate debug information files, and use the solution detailed at http://sourceware.org/gdb/onlinedocs/gdb/Separate-Debug-Files.html. At the current time, the separate debug file is constructed by building the standard object first, and then copying the debug data out of it in a separate post processing step, Hence, it is limited to a total of 4GB of code and debug data, just as a single object file would be. They are aware of this, and I have seen online comments indicating that they may add direct support for generating these separate files to their link-editor. It is worth noting that the GNU objcopy utility is available on Solaris, and that the Studio dbx debugger is able to use these GNU style separate debug files even on Solaris. Although this is interesting in terms giving Linux users a familiar environment on Solaris, the 4GB limit means it is not an answer to the problem of very large 32-bit objects. We have also encountered issues with objcopy not understanding Solaris-specific ELF sections, when using this approach. The GNU community also has a current effort to adapt their DWARF debug sections in order to move them to separate files before passing the relocatable objects to the linker. The details of Project Fission can be found at http://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/DebugFission. The goal of this project appears to be to reduce the amount of data seen by the link-editor. The primary effort revolves around moving DWARF data to separate .dwo files so that the link-editor never encounters them. The details of modifying the DWARF data to be usable in this form are involved — please see the above URL for details.

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  • ming 0.4.2 compilation errors on Ubuntu 12.04 when installing from source code

    - by gmuhammad
    I am trying to install ming 0.4.2 from source code and it was compilable before on Ubuntu 10.04, but now it' giving following compilation errors when I try to install using command sudo make install (libpng is already installed). /bin/bash ../libtool --tag=CC --mode=link gcc -g -O2 -Wall -DSWF_LITTLE_ENDIAN -o img2swf img2swf.o ../src/libming.la libtool: link: gcc -g -O2 -Wall -DSWF_LITTLE_ENDIAN -o .libs/img2swf img2swf.o ../src/.libs/libming.so gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I../src -I../src -g -O2 -Wall -DSWF_LITTLE_ENDIAN -MT png2dbl.o -MD -MP -MF .deps/png2dbl.Tpo -c -o png2dbl.o png2dbl.c png2dbl.c: In function ‘readPNG’: png2dbl.c:64:8: warning: ignoring return value of ‘fread’, declared with attribute warn_unused_result [-Wunused-result] mv -f .deps/png2dbl.Tpo .deps/png2dbl.Po /bin/bash ../libtool --tag=CC --mode=link gcc -g -O2 -Wall -DSWF_LITTLE_ENDIAN -o png2dbl png2dbl.o ../src/libming.la libtool: link: gcc -g -O2 -Wall -DSWF_LITTLE_ENDIAN -o .libs/png2dbl png2dbl.o ../src/.libs/libming.so png2dbl.o: In function `readPNG': /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:69: undefined reference to `png_create_read_struct' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:74: undefined reference to `png_create_info_struct' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:82: undefined reference to `png_create_info_struct' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:97: undefined reference to `png_init_io' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:98: undefined reference to `png_set_sig_bytes' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:99: undefined reference to `png_read_info' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:101: undefined reference to `png_get_IHDR' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:127: undefined reference to `png_get_valid' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:156: undefined reference to `png_read_update_info' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:158: undefined reference to `png_get_IHDR' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:162: undefined reference to `png_get_channels' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:187: undefined reference to `png_get_rowbytes' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:194: undefined reference to `png_read_image' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:128: undefined reference to `png_set_expand' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:135: undefined reference to `png_set_strip_16' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:143: undefined reference to `png_set_gray_to_rgb' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:151: undefined reference to `png_set_filler' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:125: undefined reference to `png_set_packing' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:107: undefined reference to `png_get_valid' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:117: undefined reference to `png_get_PLTE' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:78: undefined reference to `png_destroy_read_struct' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:92: undefined reference to `png_destroy_read_struct' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:86: undefined reference to `png_destroy_read_struct' png2dbl.o: In function `writeDBL': /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:278: undefined reference to `floor' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:280: undefined reference to `compress2' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:278: undefined reference to `floor' /home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util/png2dbl.c:280: undefined reference to `compress2' collect2: ld returned 1 exit status make[1]: *** [png2dbl] Error 1 make[1]: Leaving directory `/home/gmuhammad/Downloads/ming-0.4.2/util' make: *** [install-recursive] Error 1

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  • apt-get install is not able to access /etc

    - by HorusKol
    I put together an ubuntu 12.04 server a couple of weeks ago and everything seemed fine until this morning. Suddenly, I'm having trouble installing new packages - at first I thought there was something wrong with tinyproxy and so I tried installing squid instead. However, I get similar results: Starting tinyproxy: tinyproxy: Could not open config file "/etc/tinyproxy.conf".\ ... /var/lib/dpkg/info/squid3.postinst: 1: /var/lib/dpkg/info/squid3.postinst: cannot open /etc/squid3/squid.conf: No such file It seems that apt-get is not creating the configuration files needed for these programs. I haven't modified any configuration or user groups since the last successful update/install of packages. /etc is present, and is populated with a nice healthy tree of configuration files. It is owned and grouped to root, and has the properties drwxr-xr-x - all the files and folders inside seem to be fine to, as far as I can tell. I've even been able to edit/save a couple as sudo. Full output from installing tinyproxy: Reading package lists... Done Building dependency tree Reading state information... Done The following NEW packages will be installed: tinyproxy 0 upgraded, 1 newly installed, 0 to remove and 0 not upgraded. Need to get 0 B/61.6 kB of archives. After this operation, 201 kB of additional disk space will be used. Selecting previously unselected package tinyproxy. (Reading database ... 58916 files and directories currently installed.) Unpacking tinyproxy (from .../tinyproxy_1.8.3-1_amd64.deb) ... Processing triggers for ureadahead ... Processing triggers for man-db ... Setting up tinyproxy (1.8.3-1) ... Starting tinyproxy: tinyproxy: Could not open config file "/etc/tinyproxy.conf". invoke-rc.d: initscript tinyproxy, action "start" failed. dpkg: error processing tinyproxy (--configure): subprocess installed post-installation script returned error exit status 70 Errors were encountered while processing: tinyproxy E: Sub-process /usr/bin/dpkg returned an error code (1) Result of strace after installation: 18467 open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 18467 open("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) = 3 18467 read(3, "\177ELF\2\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0>\0\1\0\0\0\200\30\2\0\0\0\0\0"..., 832) = 832 18467 open("/etc/tinyproxy.conf", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)

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  • Installing Age of Empires II using PlayOnLinux doesn't work?

    - by user70342
    I have tried installing age of empires 2 using PlayOnLinux, the installation appeared to go fine but when I try and open the game it says there is a serious fault. The error report is below, unfortunately this doesn't mean alot to me, I was wondering if you could help, a) By highlighting the problem and b) by suggesting a solution. Many Thanks Unhandled exception: page fault on read access to 0xffffffff in 32-bit code (0x0040aaad). Register dump: CS:0073 SS:007b DS:007b ES:007b FS:0033 GS:003b EIP:0040aaad ESP:0033fd00 EBP:0033fde4 EFLAGS:00010293( R- -- I S -A- -C) EAX:00000001 EBX:bde88d9d ECX:00000067 EDX:00400000 ESI:7b867c00 EDI:00400000 Stack dump: 0x0033fd00:00410fed 00000000 00400000 00000067 0x0033fd10:0041ab90 00130d8a 7b895848 7bc483b1 0x0033fd20:0044c800 00000002 0044bdd0 7bca4e6c 0x0033fd30:7bc3590f 00000800 00000094 00000005 0x0033fd40:00000000 00000893 00000002 76726553 0x0033fd50:20656369 6b636150 00003420 00000800 Backtrace: =0 0x0040aaad in empires2 (+0xaaad) (0x0033fde4) 1 0x0041ace2 in empires2 (+0x1ace1) (0x0033fe70) 2 0x7b85ac0c call_process_entry+0xb() in kernel32 (0x0033fe88) 3 0x7b85e13b in kernel32 (+0x4e13a) (0x0033fec8) 4 0x7bc714f0 call_thread_func_wrapper+0xb() in ntdll (0x0033fed8) 5 0x7bc7172d call_thread_func+0x7c() in ntdll (0x0033ffa8) 6 0x7bc714ce RtlRaiseException+0x21() in ntdll (0x0033ffc8) 7 0x7bc4c30e in ntdll (+0x3c30d) (0x0033ffe8) 0x0040aaad: pop %ss Modules: Module Address Debug info Name (51 modules) PE 400000- 44b000 Export empires2 PE 10000000-1000c000 Deferred drvmgt ELF 35cae000-35d24000 Deferred rpcrt4 -PE 35cc0000-35d24000 \ rpcrt4 ELF 68000000-68022000 Deferred ld-linux.so.2 ELF 68022000-681c7000 Deferred libc.so.6 ELF 681c7000-681cc000 Deferred libdl.so.2 ELF 681cc000-681f8000 Deferred libm.so.6 ELF 681f8000-68201000 Deferred libnss_compat.so.2 ELF 68201000-6821b000 Deferred libnsl.so.1 ELF 6821b000-68228000 Deferred libnss_files.so.2 ELF 68228000-68366000 Deferred user32 -PE 68240000-68366000 \ user32 ELF 68366000-68421000 Deferred gdi32 -PE 68370000-68421000 \ gdi32 ELF 68421000-68481000 Deferred advapi32 -PE 68430000-68481000 \ advapi32 ELF 68481000-68499000 Deferred version -PE 68490000-68499000 \ version ELF 68499000-68533000 Deferred libfreetype.so.6 ELF 68533000-68549000 Deferred libz.so.1 ELF 68549000-685db000 Deferred winex11 -PE 68550000-685db000 \ winex11 ELF 685db000-685e4000 Deferred libsm.so.6 ELF 685e4000-685fe000 Deferred libice.so.6 ELF 685fe000-68610000 Deferred libxext.so.6 ELF 68610000-68744000 Deferred libx11.so.6 ELF 68744000-6874a000 Deferred libuuid.so.1 ELF 6874a000-68751000 Deferred libxdmcp.so.6 ELF 68751000-68755000 Deferred libxinerama.so.1 ELF 68755000-6875b000 Deferred libxxf86vm.so.1 ELF 6875b000-68765000 Deferred libxrender.so.1 ELF 68765000-6876e000 Deferred libxrandr.so.2 ELF 6876e000-68772000 Deferred libxcomposite.so.1 ELF 68772000-68782000 Deferred libxi.so.6 ELF 68782000-687b6000 Deferred libfontconfig.so.1 ELF 687b6000-687e0000 Deferred libexpat.so.1 ELF 687e0000-687eb000 Deferred libxcursor.so.1 ELF 687eb000-687f1000 Deferred libxfixes.so.3 ELF 6f102000-6f10e000 Deferred libnss_nis.so.2 ELF 7194d000-7196e000 Deferred imm32 -PE 71950000-7196e000 \ imm32 ELF 72c76000-72db7000 Dwarf libwine.so.1 ELF 75d65000-75d86000 Deferred libxcb.so.1 ELF 79223000-79227000 Deferred libxau.so.6 ELF 7b800000-7b8f5000 Dwarf kernel32 -PE 7b810000-7b8f5000 \ kernel32 ELF 7bc00000-7bcc1000 Dwarf ntdll -PE 7bc10000-7bcc1000 \ ntdll ELF 7bf00000-7bf03000 Deferred ELF 7c708000-7c723000 Deferred libpthread.so.0 Threads: process tid prio (all id:s are in hex) 00000008 (D) C:\Program Files\Microsoft Games\Age of Empires II\empires2.exe 00000009 0 <== 0000000e services.exe 00000039 0 00000038 0 0000001f 0 00000019 0 00000018 0 00000017 0 00000015 0 00000010 0 0000000f 0 00000012 winedevice.exe 0000001e 0 0000001a 0 00000014 0 00000013 0 0000001b plugplay.exe 00000021 0 0000001d 0 0000001c 0 00000024 explorer.exe 00000025 0 00000035 winedevice.exe 0000003a 0 00000037 0 00000036 0 System information: Wine build: wine-1.4-rc1 Platform: i386 Host system: Linux Host version: 3.2.0-24-generic

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  • How do I reinstate my admin user privileges to global read/write

    - by Matt
    I am running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. I only have the one user which I created when I installed Ubuntu. Everything has been fine - love it - until I updated a software package recently from the command line using sudo (not gksudo). I was having a little bother which did not make sense to me and in a fluff changed my user read/write privileges through the GUI (not even clear how I got there!). After restart I was stuck in a login loop - using the right login password but kept getting looped back to the login and could only login as Guest. I could still login with my user/password via ctrl + alt + f1 Eventually I was able to login again at start up. Not sure exactly what it was I changed that worked but it was one of/or a combination of installing latest security updates, changing login manager from LightDM to DGM and back again, removing the ICE/Xauthority and chown user. Current dilemma is my primary admin user privileges were read only. In the command line ls -ls /home/user returned this value: drwx------ 48 username username 20480 I have since changed this using sudo chmod 0755 /home/username (from my limited understanding 755 should return my user privileges to their original read/write glory). ls -ld /home/user currently shows my user privileges as: drwxr-xr-x 48 username username 20480 I still seem to have only read access permissions. I've been through lots of threads (and the help file) that talk about creating new users/groups permissions etc. but specific info on returning my existing global/admin/primary users privileges to what they were when I first created that user - baffling me. I feel this is something really simple I'm just not getting it. Please help! sudo mount /dev/sda1 on / type ext4 (rw,errors=remount-ro) proc on /proc type proc (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev) sysfs on /proc type sysfs (rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev) none on /sys/fs/fuse/connections type fusect1 (rw) none on /sys/kernel/debug type debugfs (rw) none on /sys/kernel/security type securityfs (rw) udev on /dev type devtmpfs (rw,mode=07pe tmpfs55) devpts on /dev/pts type devpts (rw,noexec,nosuid,gid=5,mode=0620) tmpfs on /run type tmpfs (rw,noexec,nosuid,size=10%,mode=0755) none on /run/lock type tmpfs (rw, ,nosuid,nodev,size=5242880 none on /run/shm type tmpfs (rw,nosuid,nodev) gvfs-fuse-daemon on /home/meng/.gvfs type fuse.gvfs-fuse-daemon (rw,nosuid,nodev,user=meng) none on /tmp/guest-1R2Fi5 type tmpsf (rw,mode=700)

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  • Package dependency errors : libc

    - by piyush
    I was trying to install kde-full when the libc had some unmet dependencies error. When saying sudo apt-get install kde-full the terminal has this in the end libc6 : Depends: libc-bin (= 2.15-0ubuntu10) libc6:i386 : Depends: libc-bin:i386 (= 2.15-0ubuntu10) libc6-dev : Depends: libc6 (= 2.15-0ubuntu10.3) but 2.15-0ubuntu10 is to be installed libc6-i386 : Depends: libc6 (= 2.15-0ubuntu10.3) but 2.15-0ubuntu10 is to be installed When running sudo apt-get -f install, this shows up at the end De-configuring libc6:i386 ... A copy of the C library was found in an unexpected directory: '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.15.so' It is not safe to upgrade the C library in this situation; please remove that copy of the C library or get it out of '/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu' and try again. dpkg: error processing /var/cache/apt/archives/libc6_2.15-0ubuntu10.3_amd64.deb (--unpack): subprocess new pre-installation script returned error exit status 1 Preparing to replace libc6:i386 2.15-0ubuntu10 (using .../libc6_2.15-0ubuntu10.3_i386.deb) ... De-configuring libc6 ... A copy of the C library was found in an unexpected directory: '/lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.15.so' It is not safe to upgrade the C library in this situation; please remove that copy of the C library or get it out of '/lib/i386-linux-gnu' and try again. dpkg: error processing /var/cache/apt/archives/libc6_2.15-0ubuntu10.3_i386.deb (--unpack): subprocess new pre-installation script returned error exit status 1 Errors were encountered while processing: /var/cache/apt/archives/libc6_2.15-0ubuntu10.3_amd64.deb /var/cache/apt/archives/libc6_2.15-0ubuntu10.3_i386.deb E: Sub-process /usr/bin/dpkg returned an error code (1) Any suggestions how to fix this. I don't desire to have kde-full anymore; only that other installations should work. I've done sudo apt-get update several times, so those suggestions can be kept away UPD : here is output of dpkg configure ~$ sudo dpkg --configure -a dpkg: dependency problems prevent configuration of libc6-dev: libc6-dev depends on libc6 (= 2.15-0ubuntu10.3); however: Version of libc6 on system is 2.15-0ubuntu10. dpkg: error processing libc6-dev (--configure): dependency problems - leaving unconfigured dpkg: dependency problems prevent configuration of libc6-i386: libc6-i386 depends on libc6 (= 2.15-0ubuntu10.3); however: Version of libc6 on system is 2.15-0ubuntu10. dpkg: error processing libc6-i386 (--configure): dependency problems - leaving unconfigured Errors were encountered while processing: libc6-dev libc6-i386 ~$

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  • What's the best way to install the GD graphics library for Nagios?

    - by user1196
    While trying to install Nagios 3.2.3, I ran their ./configure script and got these errors: checking for main in -liconv... no checking for gdImagePng in -lgd (order 1)... no checking for gdImagePng in -lgd (order 2)... no checking for gdImagePng in -lgd (order 3)... no checking for gdImagePng in -lgd (order 4)... no *** GD, PNG, and/or JPEG libraries could not be located... ********* Boutell's GD library is required to compile the statusmap, trends and histogram CGIs. Get it from http://www.boutell.com/gd/, compile it, and use the --with-gd-lib and --with-gd-inc arguments to specify the locations of the GD library and include files. NOTE: In addition to the gd-devel library, you'll also need to make sure you have the png-devel and jpeg-devel libraries installed on your system. NOTE: After you install the necessary libraries on your system: 1. Make sure /etc/ld.so.conf has an entry for the directory in which the GD, PNG, and JPEG libraries are installed. 2. Run 'ldconfig' to update the run-time linker options. 3. Run 'make clean' in the Nagios distribution to clean out any old references to your previous compile. 4. Rerun the configure script. NOTE: If you can't get the configure script to recognize the GD libs on your system, get over it and move on to other things. The CGIs that use the GD libs are just a small part of the entire Nagios package. Get everything else working first and then revisit the problem. Make sure to check the nagios-users mailing list archives for possible solutions to GD library problems when you resume your troubleshooting. ******************************************************************** Which package do I want? libgd2-xpm-dev? libgd2-noxpm-dev? php5-gd? I'm not looking to do any image processing myself - I just want to get Nagios working.

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  • Inline template efficiency

    - by Darryl Gove
    I like inline templates, and use them quite extensively. Whenever I write code with them I'm always careful to check the disassembly to see that the resulting output is efficient. Here's a potential cause of inefficiency. Suppose we want to use the mis-named Leading Zero Detect (LZD) instruction on T4 (this instruction does a count of the number of leading zero bits in an integer register - so it should really be called leading zero count). So we put together an inline template called lzd.il looking like: .inline lzd lzd %o0,%o0 .end And we throw together some code that uses it: int lzd(int); int a; int c=0; int main() { for(a=0; a<1000; a++) { c=lzd(c); } return 0; } We compile the code with some amount of optimisation, and look at the resulting code: $ cc -O -xtarget=T4 -S lzd.c lzd.il $ more lzd.s .L77000018: /* 0x001c 11 */ lzd %o0,%o0 /* 0x0020 9 */ ld [%i1],%i3 /* 0x0024 11 */ st %o0,[%i2] /* 0x0028 9 */ add %i3,1,%i0 /* 0x002c */ cmp %i0,999 /* 0x0030 */ ble,pt %icc,.L77000018 /* 0x0034 */ st %i0,[%i1] What is surprising is that we're seeing a number of loads and stores in the code. Everything could be held in registers, so why is this happening? The problem is that the code is only inlined at the code generation stage - when the actual instructions are generated. Earlier compiler phases see a function call. The called functions can do all kinds of nastiness to global variables (like 'a' in this code) so we need to load them from memory after the function call, and store them to memory before the function call. Fortunately we can use a #pragma directive to tell the compiler that the routine lzd() has no side effects - meaning that it does not read or write to memory. The directive to do that is #pragma no_side_effect(<routine name), and it needs to be placed after the declaration of the function. The new code looks like: int lzd(int); #pragma no_side_effect(lzd) int a; int c=0; int main() { for(a=0; a<1000; a++) { c=lzd(c); } return 0; } Now the loop looks much neater: /* 0x0014 10 */ add %i1,1,%i1 ! 11 ! { ! 12 ! c=lzd(c); /* 0x0018 12 */ lzd %o0,%o0 /* 0x001c 10 */ cmp %i1,999 /* 0x0020 */ ble,pt %icc,.L77000018 /* 0x0024 */ nop

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  • Solaris 11

    - by user9154181
    Oracle has a strict policy about not discussing product features until they appear in shipping product. Now that Solaris 11 is publically available, it is time to catch up. I will be shortly posting articles on a variety of new developments in the Solaris linkers and related bits: 64-bit Archives After 40+ years of Unix, the archive file format has run out of room. The ar and link-editor (ld) commands have been enhanced to allow archives to grow past their previous 32-bit limits. Guidance The link-editor is now willing and able to tell you how to alter your link lines in order to build better objects. Stub Objects This is one of the bigger projects I've undertaken since joining the Solaris group. Stub objects are shared objects, built entirely from mapfiles, that supply the same linking interface as the real object, while containing no code or data. You can link to them, but cannot use them at runtime. It was pretty simple to add this ability to the link-editor, but the changes to the OSnet in order to apply them to building Solaris were massive. I discuss how we came to invent stub objects, how we apply them to build the OSnet in a more parallel and scalable manner, and about the follow on opportunities that have emerged from the new stub proto area we created to hold them. The elffile Utility A new standard Solaris utility, elffile is a variant of the file utility, focused exclusively on linker related files. elffile is of particular value for examining archives, as it allows you to find out what is inside them without having to first extract the archive members into temporary files. This release has been a long time coming. I joined the Solaris group in late 2005, and this will be my first FCS. From a user perspective, Solaris 11 is probably the biggest change to Solaris since Solaris 2.0. Solaris 11 polishes the ground breaking features from Solaris 10 (DTrace, FMA, ZFS, Zones), and uses them to add a powerful new packaging system, numerous other enhacements and features, along with a huge modernization effort. I'm excited to see it go out into the world. I hope you enjoy using it as much as we did creating it. Software is never done. On to the next one...

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  • "You are missing the following 32-bit libraries, and Steam may not run: libc.so.6" The common fixes don't work,

    - by M_Steam_User
    So I know this is a problem that has been asked around a lot, but I've tried a bunch of solutions with no success. I'm running Ubuntu 12.04 (64 bit), and I just installed it yesterday. This is my first time working with linux. The error is: You are missing the following 32-bit libraries, and Steam may not run: libc.so.6 Things I've tried. First, I had downloaded from the steam website. I uninstalled it, and tried again from the ubuntu software centre. sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install ia32-libs sudo apt-get upgrade This installed a bunch of the 32 bit libraries, but did not fix the issue. This seems like the major fix for most people. The direct approach of sudo apt-get install libc.so.6 returns this: Reading package lists... Done Building dependency tree Reading state information... Done E: Unable to locate package libc.so.6 E: Couldn't find any package by regex 'libc.so.6' I guess libc.so.6 isn't a package, just a single file or something? I also tried gksudo gedit /etc/ld.so.conf.d/steam.conf Added these two lines, those the second one was all ready in the file, but copied over: /usr/lib32 /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/mesa Then executed: sudo ldconfig But nothing seemed to happen, steam still doesn't work. So, I feel like it is more likely that I have the library and steam isn't looking in the right place. One thing I've seen is people usually reference /usr/local/lib/ for your library locations. However, I can't find where to cd into /usr/, it isn't in my home folder. If /usr/ is the home folder, there is only a /.local folder which only has /share, no lib anywhere. Sorry for my linux ignorance. I appreciate any help, I honestly have no idea how to confirm I have the library and point steam to it, or if that is even the right thing to do. Edit: Tried this, not entirely sure what it means ~$ ls -l /lib32/libc* -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1721832 Sep 30 11:06 /lib32/libc-2.15.so -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 185928 Sep 30 11:06 /lib32/libcidn-2.15.so lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 15 Sep 30 11:06 /lib32/libcidn.so.1 -> libcidn-2.15.so -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 34316 Sep 30 11:06 /lib32/libcrypt-2.15.so lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 Sep 30 11:06 /lib32/libcrypt.so.1 -> libcrypt-2.15.so lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 12 Sep 30 11:06 /lib32/libc.so.6 -> libc-2.15.so

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  • Help recovering broken OS (permissions issue)

    - by Guandalino
    (At the bottom there is an important update.) I was doing experiments in order to backup a remote account to my local system, Ubuntu 12.04 LTS. I'm not confident with duplicity and probably, due to wrong syntax, some local files have been replaced with remote files. This is just a supposition, I'm not sure this is the real cause of OS corruption. The corruption happened after experimenting with backups, so I think I did something wrong at this regard. I was aware there was a problem when I tried to access a command using sudo: $ sudo ls sudo: unable to open /etc/sudoers: Permission denied sudo: no valid sudoers sources found, quitting sudo: unable to initialize policy plugin This is how /etc/sudoers looks like: $ ls -ald /etc/sudoers -r--r----- 1 root root 788 Oct 2 18:30 /etc/sudoers At this point I tried to reboot and now this is the message I get: The system is running in low graphics mode. Your screen, graphics card and input device settings could not be detected correctly. You will need to configure these yourself. I tried to follow the wizard to configure these settings, but without luck (the system prevents me going on when I press "Next"). The thing that makes me a bit less worried is that all the data on the disk seems readable and I'm able to access them using a live cd. I run memtest and RAM seems to be OK. Do you have any idea about how to recover my system? I'm very glad to provide further information, just let me know what info could be helpful. UPDATE. The issue is about wrong permissions and this is how I discovered: I mounted the root partition of the broken OS on /mnt/broken/ (live CD) and did ls /mnt/broken/. I got a permission denied error, while I expected to have the directory listing. I had to do sudo ls /mnt/broken/ and this worked. Thus without having root permission via sudo it's impossible to access the root of broken os. The current output of ls -ld /mnt/broken/ is: drwxr-x--- 29 1000 812 4096 2012-12-08 21:58 /mnt/broken Any thoughts on how to restore the old (working) set of permissions?

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  • Active directory over SSL Error 81 = ldap_connect(hLdap, NULL);

    - by Kossel
    I have been several day to getting AD over SSL (LDAPS) I followed exactly this guide. I have Active Directory Certifica Service installed (stand alone Root CA), I can request cert, install certs. but whenever I want to test the connection using LDP.exe I got this famous error ld = ldap_sslinit("localhost", 636, 1); Error 0 = ldap_set_option(hLdap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3); Error 81 = ldap_connect(hLdap, NULL); Server error: <empty> Error <0x51>: Fail to connect to localhost. I have been searching, I know there are many thing can cause of this error, I tried most thing I can then I decided to post it here. I tried to look if any error in system log, but nothing :/ (but I could be wwrong) can anyone tell me what else to look? UPDATE: I restarted AD service following error showed in event viewer: LDAP over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) will be unavailable at this time because the server was unable to obtain a certificate. Additional Data Error value: 8009030e No credentials are available in the security package

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  • Pain removing a perl rootkit

    - by paul.ago
    So, we host a geoservice webserver thing at the office. Someone apparently broke into this box (probably via ftp or ssh), and put some kind of irc-managed rootkit thing. Now I'm trying to clean the whole thing up, I found the process pid who tries to connect via irc, but i can't figure out who's the invoking process (already looked with ps, pstree, lsof) The process is a perl script owned by www user, but ps aux |grep displays a fake file path on the last column. Is there another way to trace that pid and catch the invoker? Forgot to mention: the kernel is 2.6.23, which is exploitable to become root, but I can't touch this machine too much, so I can't upgrade the kernel EDIT: lsof might help: lsof -p 9481 COMMAND PID USER FD TYPE DEVICE SIZE NODE NAMEss perl 9481 www cwd DIR 8,2 608 2 /ss perl 9481 www rtd DIR 8,2 608 2 /ss perl 9481 www txt REG 8,2 1168928 38385 /usr/bin/perl5.8.8ss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 135348 23286 /lib64/ld-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 103711 23295 /lib64/libnsl-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 19112 23292 /lib64/libdl-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 586243 23293 /lib64/libm-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 27041 23291 /lib64/libcrypt-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 14262 23307 /lib64/libutil-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 128642 23303 /lib64/libpthread-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 1602809 23289 /lib64/libc-2.5.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 19256 38662 /usr/lib64/perl5/5.8.8/x86_64-linux-threa d-multi/auto/IO/IO.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 21328 38877 /usr/lib64/perl5/5.8.8/x86_64-linux-threa d-multi/auto/Socket/Socket.soss perl 9481 www mem REG 8,2 52512 23298 /lib64/libnss_files-2.5.soss perl 9481 www 0r FIFO 0,5 1068892 pipess perl 9481 www 1w FIFO 0,5 1071920 pipess perl 9481 www 2w FIFO 0,5 1068894 pipess perl 9481 www 3u IPv4 130646198 TCP 192.168.90.7:60321-www.**.net:ircd (SYN_SENT)

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