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  • Would Microsoft Security Essentials be adequate protection?

    - by Xavierjazz
    Is Microsoft Security Essentials (MSE) adequate protection for my computer? What is the experience with this product? EDIT. On 2009-10-31 I found out about a comparison of AV Suites. MSE did VERY well. EDIT: One that I found interesting was "Raven", who mentioned that AV software has to hook deeply into the OS, and who better to design this than the designer of the OS. EDIT: My personal experience is that I like it, but I also use Malwarebytes and Superantispyware. Each of them sometimes come up with one the others missed or ignored.

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  • Windows 7: Open File - Security Warning box appears for every app on the desktop

    - by Michael Ratanapintha
    Whenever I double-click to open an executable on the desktop (.exe, .bat, etc.), or a shortcut on the desktop that points to an executable, the "Security Warning" pops up and asks me "Are you really sure you want to open that? Stuff from the Internet is dangerous!" I don't usually mind this warning and don't want to disable it globally, but now I'm getting it for any executable on the desktop, even ones that I didn't download from the Web and don't have the Mark of the Web alternate data stream. (That is, streams -d * shouldn't and doesn't help.) This started fairly recently, but I can't really point to anything I did that triggered it. It only occurs in one user account on the machine; the other account doesn't have this problem. Running System Restore didn't help. How can I fix the problem and make the pop-up warning appear only when it's supposed to?

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  • How can i enter in Network Security Field

    - by Master
    I am thinking of Entering in Network Security Field. It can be securing windows network , linux network But exactly don't ave the full picture how does that area is divided I only have the vague idea. i want some position where company call me to check their system to see if its secure. Or govt can hire to secure network from external access. Any thing like that Can anyone give me some idea how can i start. Is there any scope in that area. How its growing in future. Are there any certification which ican do to start with thanks

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  • Security in OBIEE 11g, Part 2

    - by Rob Reynolds
    Continuing the series on OBIEE 11g, our guest blogger this week is Pravin Janardanam. Here is Part 2 of his overview of Security in OBIEE 11g. OBIEE 11g Security Overview, Part 2 by Pravin Janardanam In my previous blog on Security, I discussed the OBIEE 11g changes regarding Authentication mechanism, RPD protection and encryption. This blog will include a discussion about OBIEE 11g Authorization and other Security aspects. Authorization: Authorization in 10g was achieved using a combination of Users, Groups and association of privileges and object permissions to users and Groups. Two keys changes to Authorization in OBIEE 11g are: Application Roles Policies / Permission Groups Application Roles are introduced in OBIEE 11g. An application role is specific to the application. They can be mapped to other application roles defined in the same application scope and also to enterprise users or groups, and they are used in authorization decisions. Application roles in 11g take the place of Groups in 10g within OBIEE application. In OBIEE 10g, any changes to corporate LDAP groups require a corresponding change to Groups and their permission assignment. In OBIEE 11g, Application roles provide insulation between permission definitions and corporate LDAP Groups. Permissions are defined at Application Role level and changes to LDAP groups just require a reassignment of the Group to the Application Roles. Permissions and privileges are assigned to Application Roles and users in OBIEE 11g compared to Groups and Users in 10g. The diagram below shows the relationship between users, groups and application roles. Note that the Groups shown in the diagram refer to LDAP Groups (WebLogic Groups by default) and not OBIEE application Groups. The following screenshot compares the permission windows from Admin tool in 10g vs 11g. Note that the Groups in the OBIEE 10g are replaced with Application Roles in OBIEE 11g. The same is applicable to OBIEE web catalog objects.    The default Application Roles available after OBIEE 11g installation are BIAdministrator, BISystem, BIConsumer and BIAuthor. Application policies are the authorization policies that an application relies upon for controlling access to its resources. An Application Role is defined by the Application Policy. The following screenshot shows the policies defined for BIAdministrator and BISystem Roles. Note that the permission for impersonation is granted to BISystem Role. In OBIEE 10g, the permission to manage repositories and Impersonation were assigned to “Administrators” group with no control to separate these permissions in the Administrators group. Hence user “Administrator” also had the permission to impersonate. In OBI11g, BIAdministrator does not have the permission to impersonate. This gives more flexibility to have multiple users perform different administrative functions. Application Roles, Policies, association of Policies to application roles and association of users and groups to application roles are managed using Fusion Middleware Enterprise Manager (FMW EM). They reside in the policy store, identified by the system-jazn-data.xml file. The screenshots below show where they are created and managed in FMW EM. The following screenshot shows the assignment of WebLogic Groups to Application Roles. The following screenshot shows the assignment of Permissions to Application Roles (Application Policies). Note: Object level permission association to Applications Roles resides in the RPD for repository objects. Permissions and Privilege for web catalog objects resides in the OBIEE Web Catalog. Wherever Groups were used in the web catalog and RPD has been replaced with Application roles in OBIEE 11g. Following are the tools used in OBIEE 11g Security Administration: ·       Users and Groups are managed in Oracle WebLogic Administration console (by default). If WebLogic is integrated with other LDAP products, then Users and Groups needs to managed using the interface provide by the respective LDAP vendor – New in OBIEE 11g ·       Application Roles and Application Policies are managed in Oracle Enterprise Manager - Fusion Middleware Control – New in OBIEE 11g ·       Repository object permissions are managed in OBIEE Administration tool – Same as 10g but the assignment is to Application Roles instead of Groups ·       Presentation Services Catalog Permissions and Privileges are managed in OBI Application administration page - Same as 10g but the assignment is to Application Roles instead of Groups Credential Store: Credential Store is a single consolidated service provider to store and manage the application credentials securely. The credential store contains credentials that either user supplied or system generated. Credential store in OBIEE 10g is file based and is managed using cryptotools utility. In 11g, Credential store can be managed directly from the FMW Enterprise Manager and is stored in cwallet.sso file. By default, the Credential Store stores password for deployed RPDs, BI Publisher data sources and BISystem user. In addition, Credential store can be LDAP based but only Oracle Internet Directory is supported right now. As you can see OBIEE security is integrated with Oracle Fusion Middleware security architecture. This provides a common security framework for all components of Business Intelligence and Fusion Middleware applications.

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  • What’s New In Microsoft Security Essentials 2.0 And How To Upgrade To 2.0

    - by Gopinath
    Since Microsoft released Microsoft Security Essentials(MSE) couple of years ago, I stopped worrying about antivirus programs on all my Windows PCs. MSE is just awesome and it’s the best free antivirus available in the market. Microsoft released version 2.0 of MSE yesterday with enhanced security features and more love for Windows users. New features introduced in this version are New protection engine - Heuristic scanning engine is introduced to bump the virus detection and cleaning mechanism. Network inspection system to monitor network traffic as we browse and protects us from malicious scripts and programs. Better integration with Windows Firewall With this upgrade, MSE is irresistible antivirus application to have on every Windows PC. How To Upgrade MSE 1.0 to 2.0 Generally upgrading Microsoft applications are kids play. All one would require to upgrade is to go to Help->Check for upgrades menu option and follow the wizard to complete upgrade process. Microsoft Security Essentials 1.0 to 2.0 upgrade is also expected to be this way, but somehow it’s not working for me in India. May be I guess, MSE 2.0 is not released for Indian users. What ever may be the reason, it’s very easy to upgrade MSE 1.0 to 2.0  manually. Just download the installer from Microsoft(link given below) and run the installer. Choose Upgrade option when the installer is executing to have MSE 2.0 installed on your PC. MSE 2.0 Download Link You can download Microsoft Security Essentials 2.0 at Microsoft Download Center. This article titled,What’s New In Microsoft Security Essentials 2.0 And How To Upgrade To 2.0, was originally published at Tech Dreams. Grab our rss feed or fan us on Facebook to get updates from us.

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  • Steps to Mitigate Database Security Worst Practices

    - by Troy Kitch
    The recent Top 6 Database Security Worst Practices webcast revealed the Top 6, and a bonus 7th , database security worst practices: Privileged user "all access pass" Allow application bypass Minimal and inconsistent monitoring/auditing Not securing application data from OS-level user No SQL injection defense Sensitive data in non-production environments Not securing complete database environment These practices are uncovered in the 2010 IOUG Data Security Survey. As part of the webcast we looked at each one of these practices and how you can mitigate them with the Oracle Defense-in-Depth approach to database security. There's a lot of additional information to glean from the webcast, so I encourage you to check it out here and see how your organization measures up.

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  • SQLAuthority News – 2 Security Updates for SQL Server 2000 SP 4 Users

    - by pinaldave
    If you are using SQL Server 2000 still today my very first recommendation to you is to upgrade to SQL Server 2012. SQL Server 2000 is now 12 years old product and since then many new enhancements as well features which are relevant to current growth and progress in Informational Industry. Now is the time to catch up with the latest trends. Here is one more point for you to notice if this helps you consider to upgrade to the latest version. One can’t upgrade directly from SQL Server 2000 to SQL Server 2012. You need to first upgrade to either SQL Server 2005/2008/R2 and then further plan to upgrade to SQL Server 2012. There is no direct upgrade path for SQL Server 2000 to SQL Server 2012. I strongly believe this is the time to upgrade to the latest version. Well, also there is a rule that to let something continue if it is not broken and working fine. If you are following that rule and still using SQL Server 2000 I strongly suggest that you upgrade your SQL Server 2000 SP4 and update it with latest Security updates. Here are two important SQL Server Security Updates. Security Update for SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 4 (KB983811) Security Update for SQL Server 2000 Service Pack 4 (KB983812) As we are talking about SQL Server 2000 let me ask you a quick question – how many of you are still using SQL Server 2000 or earlier version in a production system on at least one server? Reference: Pinal Dave (http://blog.sqlauthority.com) Filed under: PostADay, SQL, SQL Authority, SQL Download, SQL Query, SQL Security, SQL Server, SQL Tips and Tricks, T SQL, Technology

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  • Web security course ?

    - by vtortola
    I'd like to do a course about web security. I've seen some certifications that could be interesting: CIW Web Security Professional CISSP® - Certified Information Systems Security Professional Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional What do you know about these certifications? are they recognized? I'm not trying to become a hacker, I just want to ensure I have enough knowledge about web security to cope with today internet. From my inexpert point of view, "Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional" looks exactly as I want, the problem is that it cost more than 500 bucks! Why certification? well, I want to learn but I would like also have a way to demonstrate to a future employer/customer that I had to study and pass exams, not only attend to a course. Regards.

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  • Security aspects of an ASP.NET that can be pointed out to the client

    - by Maxim V. Pavlov
    I need to write several passages of text in an offer to the client about the security layer in ASP.NET MVC web solution. I am aware of security that comes along with MVC 3 and an improvements in MVC 4. But all of them are non conceptual, except for AntiForgeryToken (AntiXSS) and built-in SQL Injection immunity (with a little of encoding needed by hand). What would be the main point of ASP.NET security I can "show off" in an offer to the client?

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  • Open Source Security packages for Rails

    - by Edwin
    I'm currently creating a complete web application using Rails 3 to familiarize myself with its inner workings and to gain a better appreciation of a working web application's moving parts. (Plus, since I'm still working on my degree, I hope that it will give me a better idea of what's BS in my education requirements and which weaknesses/skills I should focus on.) The example application I'm working on is an ecommerce site, and I've already configured the backend, routes, controllers, and so on. As part of the application, I'd like to integrate a second layer of security on top of the one Rails already provides for user authentication. However, I've been unable to find any on Google, with the exception of OAuth - which, from my understanding, is meant to secure API calls. While I could roll my own secure authentication system, I'm only in my second year of college and recognize that A) I know little about security, and B) there are developers that know much more about security that are working on open-source projects. What are some actively developed open-source security packages or frameworks that can be easily added to Rails? Pros and cons are not necessary, as I can do the research myself. P.S. I'm not sure whether I posted this in the right SE site; please migrate to SO or Security if it is more appropriate there.

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  • j2ee implementing security and using a framwork pros and cons

    - by Ismail Marmoush
    I'm a newbie to j2ee security, and i'm not j2ee expert either, though i'm really willing to put some effort and learn I've an application that i'm about to develop on Google App Engine (GAE) --with no time constraints. As you know GAE handles a lot of web container security issues for you, also I will be using openID for authentication exclusively (sessions will be handled by provider). GAE supports SSL which will help with confidentiality and integrity maybe. Authorization can be done through filters. I know reinventing the wheel is a mess, but I was looking forward to learn something about security and implement that in my new app. so what the pros and cons of using a framework like shiro, spring security, jguard etc or filling the rest of gaps on my own ?

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  • Weaknesses of 3-Strike Security

    - by prelic
    I've been reading some literature on security, specifically password security/encryption, and there's been one thing that I've been wondering: is the 3-strike rule a perfect solution to password security? That is, if the number of password attempts is limited to some small number, after which all authentication requests will not be honored, will that not protect users from intrusion? I realize gaining access or control over something doesn't always mean going through the authentication system, but doesn't this feature make dictionary/brute-force attacks obsolete? Is there something I'm missing?

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  • Monday, Oct 1 at OpenWorld - Database Security Must See Sessions

    - by Troy Kitch
    TIME TITLE LOCATION 12:15 - 1:15 PM Database Security Inside-Out: Latest Innovations in Database Security (CON8686) Moscone South - 102 3:15 - 4:15 PM Oracle Database Security Solutions Customer Panel: Real-World Case Studies (CON8674) Moscone South - 270 4:45 - 5:45 PM Latest Innovations and Best Practices for Oracle Database Auditing (CON8661) Moscone South - 303

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  • Spring security request matcher is not working with regex

    - by Felipe Cardoso Martins
    Using Spring MVC + Security I have a business requirement that the users from SEC (Security team) has full access to the application and FRAUD (Anti-fraud team) has only access to the pages that URL not contains the words "block" or "update" with case insensitive. Bellow, all spring dependencies: $ mvn dependency:tree | grep spring [INFO] +- org.springframework:spring-webmvc:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-asm:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-beans:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-context:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-context-support:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | \- org.springframework:spring-expression:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework:spring-core:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework:spring-web:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-core:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | \- org.springframework:spring-aop:jar:3.0.7.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-web:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | +- org.springframework:spring-jdbc:jar:3.0.7.RELEASE:compile [INFO] | \- org.springframework:spring-tx:jar:3.0.7.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-config:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile [INFO] +- org.springframework.security:spring-security-acl:jar:3.1.2.RELEASE:compile Bellow, some examples of mapped URL path from spring log: Mapped URL path [/index] onto handler 'homeController' Mapped URL path [/index.*] onto handler 'homeController' Mapped URL path [/index/] onto handler 'homeController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/block] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/block.*] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/block/] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/confirmBlock] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/confirmBlock.*] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/cellphone/confirmBlock/] onto handler 'cellphoneController' Mapped URL path [/user/update] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/update.*] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/update/] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/index] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/index.*] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/user/index/] onto handler 'userController' Mapped URL path [/search] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/search.*] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/search/] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/doSearch] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/doSearch.*] onto handler 'searchController' Mapped URL path [/doSearch/] onto handler 'searchController' Bellow, a test of the regular expressions used in spring-security.xml (I'm not a regex speciality, improvements are welcome =]): import java.util.Arrays; import java.util.List; public class RegexTest { public static void main(String[] args) { List<String> pathSamples = Arrays.asList( "/index", "/index.*", "/index/", "/cellphone/block", "/cellphone/block.*", "/cellphone/block/", "/cellphone/confirmBlock", "/cellphone/confirmBlock.*", "/cellphone/confirmBlock/", "/user/update", "/user/update.*", "/user/update/", "/user/index", "/user/index.*", "/user/index/", "/search", "/search.*", "/search/", "/doSearch", "/doSearch.*", "/doSearch/"); for (String pathSample : pathSamples) { System.out.println("Path sample: " + pathSample + " - SEC: " + pathSample.matches("^.*$") + " | FRAUD: " + pathSample.matches("^(?!.*(?i)(block|update)).*$")); } } } Bellow, the console result of Java class above: Path sample: /index - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /index.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /index/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /cellphone/block - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/block.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/block/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/confirmBlock - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/confirmBlock.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /cellphone/confirmBlock/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/update - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/update.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/update/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: false Path sample: /user/index - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /user/index.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /user/index/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /search - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /search.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /search/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /doSearch - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /doSearch.* - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Path sample: /doSearch/ - SEC: true | FRAUD: true Tests Scenario 1 Bellow, the important part of spring-security.xml: <security:http entry-point-ref="entryPoint" request-matcher="regex"> <security:intercept-url pattern="^.*$" access="ROLE_SEC" /> <security:intercept-url pattern="^(?!.*(?i)(block|update)).*$" access="ROLE_FRAUD" /> <security:access-denied-handler error-page="/access-denied.html" /> <security:form-login always-use-default-target="false" login-processing-url="/doLogin.html" authentication-failure-handler-ref="authFailHandler" authentication-success-handler-ref="authSuccessHandler" /> <security:logout logout-url="/logout.html" success-handler-ref="logoutSuccessHandler" /> </security:http> Behaviour: FRAUD group **can't" access any page SEC group works fine Scenario 2 NOTE that I only changed the order of intercept-url in spring-security.xml bellow: <security:http entry-point-ref="entryPoint" request-matcher="regex"> <security:intercept-url pattern="^(?!.*(?i)(block|update)).*$" access="ROLE_FRAUD" /> <security:intercept-url pattern="^.*$" access="ROLE_SEC" /> <security:access-denied-handler error-page="/access-denied.html" /> <security:form-login always-use-default-target="false" login-processing-url="/doLogin.html" authentication-failure-handler-ref="authFailHandler" authentication-success-handler-ref="authSuccessHandler" /> <security:logout logout-url="/logout.html" success-handler-ref="logoutSuccessHandler" /> </security:http> Behaviour: SEC group **can't" access any page FRAUD group works fine Conclusion I did something wrong or spring-security have a bug. The problem already was solved in a very bad way, but I need to fix it quickly. Anyone knows some tricks to debug better it without open the frameworks code? Cheers, Felipe

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  • Deploying an ADF Secure Application using WLS Console

    - by juan.ruiz
    Last week I worked on a requirement from a customer that wanted to understand how to deploy to WLS an application with ADF Security without using JDeveloper. The main question was, what steps where needed in order to set up Enterprise Roles, Security Policies and Application Credentials. In this entry I will explain the steps taken using JDeveloper 11.1.1.2. 0 Requirements: Instead of building a sample application from scratch, we can use Andrejus 's sample application that contains all the security pieces that we need. Open and migrate the project. Also make sure you adjust the database settings accordingly. Creating the EAR file Review the Security settings of the application by going into the Application -> Secure menu and see that there are two enterprise roles as well as the ADF Policies enforcing security on the main page. Make sure the Application Module uses the Data Source instead of JDBC URL for its connection type, also take note of the data source name - in my case I have: java:comp/env/jdbc/HrDS To facilitate the access to this application once we deploy it. Go to your ViewController project properties select the Java EE Application category and give it a meaningful name to the context root as well to the Application Name Go to the ADFSecurityWL Application properties -> Deployment  and create a new EAR deployment profile. Uncheck the Auto generate and Synchronize weblogic-jdbc.xml Descriptors During Deployment Deploy the application as an EAR file. Deploying the Application to WLS using the WLS Console On the WLS console create a JNDI data source. This is the part that I found more tricky of the hole exercise given that the name should match the AM's data source name, however the naming convention that worked for me was jdbc.HrDS Now, deploy the application manually by selecting deployments ->Install look for the EAR and follow the default steps. If this is the firs time you deploy the application, once the deployment finishes you will be asked to Activate Changes on the domain, these changes contain all the security policies and application roles insertion into the WLS instance. Creating Roles and User Groups for the Application To finish the after-deployment set up, we need to create the groups that are the equivalent of the Enterprise Roles of ADF Security. For our sample we have two Enterprise Roles employeesApplication and managersApplication. After that, we create the application users and assign them into their respective groups. Now we can run the application and test the security constraints

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  • Spring Security - is Role and ACL security overkill?

    - by HDave
    I have a 3 tier application that requires security authorizations be placed on various domain objects. Whether I use Spring's ACL implementation or roll my own, it seems to me that ACL based security can only be used to authorize (service) methods and cannot be used to authorize URL or web service invocations. I think this because how could a web service call check the ACL before it has hydrated the XML payload? Also, all the examples for web access security in the Spring documentation are securing URL's based on Role. Is it typical to use Spring's roles to secure web presentation and web service calls, while at the same time using ACL's to secure the business methods? Is this overkill?

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  • How I might think like a hacker so that I can anticipate security vulnerabilities in .NET or Java before a hacker hands me my hat [closed]

    - by Matthew Patrick Cashatt
    Premise I make a living developing web-based applications for all form-factors (mobile, tablet, laptop, etc). I make heavy use of SOA, and send and receive most data as JSON objects. Although most of my work is completed on the .NET or Java stacks, I am also recently delving into Node.js. This new stack has got me thinking that I know reasonably well how to secure applications using known facilities of .NET and Java, but I am woefully ignorant when it comes to best practices or, more importantly, the driving motivation behind the best practices. You see, as I gain more prominent clientele, I need to be able to assure them that their applications are secure and, in order to do that, I feel that I should learn to think like a malevolent hacker. What motivates a malevolent hacker: What is their prime mover? What is it that they are most after? Ultimately, the answer is money or notoriety I am sure, but I think it would be good to understand the nuanced motivators that lead to those ends: credit card numbers, damning information, corporate espionage, shutting down a highly visible site, etc. As an extension of question #1--but more specific--what are the things most likely to be seeked out by a hacker in almost any application? Passwords? Financial info? Profile data that will gain them access to other applications a user has joined? Let me be clear here. This is not judgement for or against the aforementioned motivations because that is not the goal of this post. I simply want to know what motivates a hacker regardless of our individual judgement. What are some heuristics followed to accomplish hacker goals? Ultimately specific processes would be great to know; however, in order to think like a hacker, I would really value your comments on the broader heuristics followed. For example: "A hacker always looks first for the low-hanging fruit such as http spoofing" or "In the absence of a CAPTCHA or other deterrent, a hacker will likely run a cracking script against a login prompt and then go from there." Possibly, "A hacker will try and attack a site via Foo (browser) first as it is known for Bar vulnerability. What are the most common hacks employed when following the common heuristics? Specifics here. Http spoofing, password cracking, SQL injection, etc. Disclaimer I am not a hacker, nor am I judging hackers (Heck--I even respect their ingenuity). I simply want to learn how I might think like a hacker so that I may begin to anticipate vulnerabilities before .NET or Java hands me a way to defend against them after the fact.

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  • How can I remove the Translation entries in apt?

    - by Lord of Time
    This is the output of aptitude update: Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty InRelease Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty InRelease Ign http://dl.google.com stable InRelease Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security InRelease Hit http://deb.torproject.org natty InRelease Get:1 http://dl.google.com stable Release.gpg [198 B] Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty InRelease Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates InRelease Hit http://archive.canonical.com natty Release.gpg Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty Release.gpg Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security Release.gpg Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty Release.gpg Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security Release Hit http://archive.canonical.com natty Release Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty Release Get:2 http://dl.google.com stable Release [1,338 B] Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates Release.gpg Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main Sources Hit http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner amd64 Packages Hit http://deb.torproject.org natty/main amd64 Packages Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty Release Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted Sources Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe Sources Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse Sources Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main amd64 Packages Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted amd64 Packages Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner TranslationIndex Hit http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe amd64 Packages Hit http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse amd64 Packages Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main TranslationIndex Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse TranslationIndex Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted TranslationIndex Ign http://deb.torproject.org natty/main TranslationIndex Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe TranslationIndex Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates Release Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse amd64 Packages Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe TranslationIndex Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe Sources Get:3 http://dl.google.com stable/main amd64 Packages [469 B] Ign http://dl.google.com stable/main TranslationIndex Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse Sources Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe amd64 Packages Hit http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse amd64 Packages Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe TranslationIndex Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner Translation-en_US Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://extras.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en Ign http://archive.canonical.com natty/partner Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/main Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/multiverse Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/restricted Translation-en Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe Translation-en_US Ign http://security.ubuntu.com natty-security/universe Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty InRelease Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release.gpg Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Ign http://dl.google.com stable/main Translation-en_US Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty Release Ign http://dl.google.com stable/main Translation-en Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Sources Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/main Translation-en Hit http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main amd64 Packages Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main TranslationIndex Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/multiverse Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/restricted Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty/universe Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/main Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/multiverse Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/restricted Translation-en Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe Translation-en_US Ign http://us.archive.ubuntu.com natty-updates/universe Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb InRelease Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://ppa.launchpad.net natty/main Translation-en Hit http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb Release.gpg Hit http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb Release Ign http://deb.torproject.org natty/main Translation-en_US Ign http://deb.torproject.org natty/main Translation-en Hit http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps amd64 Packages Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps TranslationIndex Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps Translation-en_US Ign http://archive.getdeb.net natty-getdeb/apps Translation-en Fetched 2,005 B in 45s (44 B/s) Reading package lists... Is there any way I can get rid of the Translation stuff? I'm tired of it resulting in tons of repository checks rather than it checking far less repositories (69 actual repos vs. 169 checks)

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  • Should I be using a JavaScript SPA designed when security is important

    - by ryanzec
    I asked something kind of similar on stackoverflow with a particular piece of code however I want to try to ask this in a broader sense. So I have this web application that I have started to write in backbone using a Single Page Architecture (SPA) however I am starting to second guess myself because of security. Now we are not storing and sending credit card information or anything like that through this web application but we are storing sensitive information that people are uploading to us and will have the ability to re-download too. The obviously security concern that I have with JavaScript is that you can't trust anything that comes from JavaScript however in a Backbone SPA application, everything is being sent through JavaScript. There are two security features that I will have to build in JavaScript; permissions and authentication. The authentication piece is just me override the Backbone.Router.prototype.navigate method to check the fragment it is trying to load and if the JavaScript application.session.loggedIn is not set to true (and they are not viewing a none authenticated page), they are redirected to the login page automatically. The user could easily modify application.session.loggedIn to equal true (or modify Backbone.Router.prototype.navigate method) but then they would also have to not so easily dynamically embedded a link into the page (or modify a current one) that has the proper classes, data-* attributes, and href values to then load a page that should only be loaded when they user has logged in (and has the permissions). So I have an acl object that deals with the permissions stuff. All someone would have to do to view pages or parts of pages they should not be able to is to call acl.addPermission(resource, permission) with the proper permissions or modify the acl.hasPermission() to always return true and then navigate away and then back to the page. Now certain things is EMCAScript 5 like Object.seal() or Object.freeze() would help with some of this however we have to support IE 8 which does not support those pieces of functionality. Now the REST API also performs security checks on every request so technically even if they are able to see parts of the interface that they should not be able to, they still should not be able to actually affect any data. The main benefits for me in developing a JavaScript SPA application is that the application is a lot more responsive since it is only transferring the minimum amount of JSON data for the requested action and performing the minimum amount of work too. There are also other things that I think are beneficial like you are going to have to develop an API for the data (which is good if you want expand your application to different platforms/technologies) or their is more of a separation between front-end and back-end however if security is a concern, it is really wise to go down the road of a JavaScript SPA application for the front-end?

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  • Which Free Online Antivirus Scanner is the Best? [Comparison Test and Results]

    - by Asian Angel
    There are times when an online or supplementary scanner can be very useful when cleaning up an infected computer or just to get a second opinion on the security of your system. With this purpose in mind, the good folks over at the 7 Tutorials blog decided to do a test using the ten most popular online security scanners to see what worked the best and what did not. The following scanners were used for the test: Bitdefender QuickScan, BullGuard Online Scanner, Comodo Cloud Scanner, ESET Free Online Scanner, F-Secure Online Scanner, Kaspersky Security Scan, McAfee Security Scan Plus, Norton Security Scan, Panda ActiveScan and Trend Micro HouseCall. Are there any online or supplementary scanners that you use and depend on? Do you agree or disagree with the results? Let us know in the comments! Test Comparison – What is the Best Free Online Antivirus Scanner? [7 Tutorials] HTG Explains: Why Linux Doesn’t Need Defragmenting How to Convert News Feeds to Ebooks with Calibre How To Customize Your Wallpaper with Google Image Searches, RSS Feeds, and More

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  • TDE Tablespace Encryption 11.2.0.1 Certified with EBS 11i

    - by Steven Chan
    Oracle Advanced Security is an optional licenced Oracle 11g Database add-on.  Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) offers two different features:  column encryption and tablespace encryption.  TDE Tablespace Encryption 11.2.0.1 is now certified with Oracle E-Business Suite Release 11i. What is Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) ? Oracle Advanced Security Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) allows you to protect data at rest. TDE helps address privacy and PCI requirements by encrypting personally identifiable information (PII) such as Social Security numbers and credit card numbers. TDE is completely transparent to existing applications with no triggers, views or other application changes required. Data is transparently encrypted when written to disk and transparently decrypted after an application user has successfully authenticated and passed all authorization checks. Authorization checks include verifying the user has the necessary select and update privileges on the application table and checking Database Vault, Label Security and Virtual Private Database enforcement policies.

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  • Where to draw the line between development-led security and administration-led security?

    - by haylem
    There are cases where you have the opportunity, as a developer, to enforce stricter security features and protections on a software, though they could very well be managed at an environmental level (ie, the operating system would take care of it). Where would you say you draw the line, and what elements do you factor in your decision? Concrete Examples User Management is the OS's responsibility Not exactly meant as a security feature, but in a similar case Google Chrome used to not allow separate profiles. The invoked reason (though it now supports multiple profiles for a same OS user) used to be that user management was the operating system's responsibility. Disabling Web-Form Fields A recurrent request I see addressed online is to have auto-completion be disabled on form fields. Auto-completion didn't exist in old browsers, and was a welcome feature at the time it was introduced for people who needed to fill in forms often. But it also brought in some security concerns, and so some browsers started to implement, on top of the (obviously needed) setting in their own preference/customization panel, an autocomplete attribute for form or input fields. And this has now been introduced into the upcoming HTML5 standard. For browsers who do not listen to this attribute, strange hacks *\ are offered, like generating unique IDs and names for fields to avoid them from being suggested in future forms (which comes with another herd of issues, like polluting your local auto-fill cache and not preventing a password from being stored in it, but instead probably duplicating its occurences). In this particular case, and others, I'd argue that this is a user setting and that it's the user's desire and the user's responsibility to enable or disable auto-fill (by disabling the feature altogether). And if it is based on an internal policy and security requirement in a corporate environment, then substitute the user for the administrator in the above. I assume it could be counter-argued that the user may want to access non-critical applications (or sites) with this handy feature enabled, and critical applications with this feature disabled. But then I'd think that's what security zones are for (in some browsers), or the sign that you need a more secure (and dedicated) environment / account to use these applications. * I obviously don't deny the ingenuity of the people who were forced to find workarounds, just the necessity of said workarounds. Questions That was a tad long-winded, so I guess my questions are: Would you in general consider it to be the application's (hence, the developer's) responsiblity? Where do you draw the line, if not in the "general" case?

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  • New security configuration flag in UCM PS3

    - by kyle.hatlestad
    While the recent Patch Set 3 (PS3) release was mostly focused on bug fixes and such, a new configuration flag was added for security. In 10gR3 and prior versions, UCM had a component called Collaboration Manager which allowed for project folders to be created and groups of users assigned as members to collaborate on documents. With this component came access control lists (ACL) for content and folders. Users could assign specific security rights on each and every document and folder within a project. And it was possible to enable these ACL's without having the Collaboration Manager component enabled. But it took some special instructions (see technote# 603148.1) and added some extraneous pieces still related to Collaboration Manager. When 11g came out, Collaboration Manager was no longer available. But the configuration settings to turn on ACLs were still there. Well, in PS3 they've been cleaned up a bit and a new configuration flag has been added to simply turn on the ACL fields and none of the other collaboration bits. To enable ACLs: UseEntitySecurity=true Along with this configuration flag to turn ACLs on, you also need to define which Security Groups will honor the ACL fields. If an ACL is applied to a content item with a Security Group outside this list, it will be ignored. SpecialAuthGroups=HumanResources,Legal,Marketing Save the settings and restart the instance. Upon restart, two new metadata fields will be created: xClbraUserList, xClbraAliasList. If you are using OracleTextSearch as the search indexer, be sure to run a Fast Rebuild on the collection. On the Check In, Search, and Update pages, values are added by simply typing in the value and getting a type-ahead list of possible values. Select the value, click Add and then set the level of access (Read, Write, Delete, or Admin). If all of the fields are blank, then it simply falls back to just Security Group and Account access. As for how they are stored in the metadata fields, each entry starts with it's identifier: ampersand (&) symbol for users, "at" (@) symbol for groups, and colon (:) for roles. Following that is the entity name. And at the end is the level of access in paranthesis. e.g. (RWDA). And each entry is separated by a comma. So if you were populating values through batch loader or an external source, the values would be defined this way. Detailed information on Access Control Lists can be found in the Oracle Fusion Middleware System Administrator's Guide for Oracle Content Server.

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  • Development-led security vs administration-led security in a software product?

    - by haylem
    There are cases where you have the opportunity, as a developer, to enforce stricter security features and protections on a software, though they could very well be managed at an environmental level (ie, the operating system would take care of it). Where would you say you draw the line, and what elements do you factor in your decision? Concrete Examples User Management is the OS's responsibility Not exactly meant as a security feature, but in a similar case Google Chrome used to not allow separate profiles. The invoked reason (though it now supports multiple profiles for a same OS user) used to be that user management was the operating system's responsibility. Disabling Web-Form Fields A recurrent request I see addressed online is to have auto-completion be disabled on form fields. Auto-completion didn't exist in old browsers, and was a welcome feature at the time it was introduced for people who needed to fill in forms often. But it also brought in some security concerns, and so some browsers started to implement, on top of the (obviously needed) setting in their own preference/customization panel, an autocomplete attribute for form or input fields. And this has now been introduced into the upcoming HTML5 standard. For browsers that do not listen to this attribute, strange hacks* are offered, like generating unique IDs and names for fields to avoid them from being suggested in future forms (which comes with another herd of issues, like polluting your local auto-fill cache and not preventing a password from being stored in it, but instead probably duplicating its occurences). In this particular case, and others, I'd argue that this is a user setting and that it's the user's desire and the user's responsibility to enable or disable auto-fill (by disabling the feature altogether). And if it is based on an internal policy and security requirement in a corporate environment, then substitute the user for the administrator in the above. I assume it could be counter-argued that the user may want to access non-critical applications (or sites) with this handy feature enabled, and critical applications with this feature disabled. But then I'd think that's what security zones are for (in some browsers), or the sign that you need a more secure (and dedicated) environment / account to use these applications. * I obviously don't deny the ingeniosity of the people who were forced to find workarounds, just the necessity of said workarounds. Questions That was a tad long-winded, so I guess my questions are: Would you in general consider it to be the application's (hence, the developer's) responsiblity? Where do you draw the line, if not in the "general" case?

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