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  • SOA Anti-pattern: Nanoservices

    After a long hiatus, I guess it is time for another SOA anti-pattern to see the light. It is probably also a good time to remind you that I am looking for your insights on this project. In any event I hope youd find this anti-pattern useful and as always comments are more than welcomed (do keep in mind this is an unedited draft :) ) ------------------------------------- There are many unsolved mysteries, youve probably heard about some of them like the Loch...Did you know that DotNetSlackers also publishes .net articles written by top known .net Authors? We already have over 80 articles in several categories including Silverlight. Take a look: here.

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  • How anti-virus on the host machne affects performance of virtual machines?

    - by Ladislav Mrnka
    I'm diagnosing some issue with Oracle virtual box where virtual machine sometimes perform terribly slow (much slower then notebook with worse configuration): Notebook i7 (2 cores with HT = 4 logical CPUs), 4GB RAM, 5400 rpm disk, Win 7 64bit Virtual machine (Oracle Virtual Box) Host: i7 (4 cores with HT = 8 logical CPUs, 12 GB RAM, system runs from SSD, virtual machine from 7200 rpm disk, Win 7 64bit) Virtual machine: 4 cores assigned, 8 GB RAM assigned, Win 2008 R2 Enterprise (64 bit) Virtual machine uses bridge to separate network interface (machine has two) VPN for network communication No other virtual machine runs on the host Host has installed ESET Smart Security All SW is updated with last version. My question is if anti-virus on the host machine can somehow affect performance of the virtual machine and if so how can I turn it off without turning the anti-virus itself?

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  • Microsoft Forefront Endpoint Protection 2010 sort en version RTM avec un nouveau moteur anti-malwares

    Microsoft Forefront Endpoint Protection 2010 sort en version RTM Pour les constructeurs et les revendeurs, elle embarque un nouveau moteur anti-malwares Microsoft vient d'annoncer la disponibilité pour les constructeurs et revendeurs (version RTM) de Forefront Endpoint Security 2010, sa solution d'administration unifiée pour la protection contre les malwares pour les serveurs et les postes de travail des entreprises. En Release Candidate depuis novembre, cette version s'appuie sur « System Center Configuration Manager 2007 », facilitant ainsi le déploiement au niveau des entreprises ayant déjà mis en place des infrastructures de gestion des postes clients de Microsoft. Fore...

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  • Are there any well known anti-patterns in the field of system administration?

    - by ojblass
    I know a few common patterns that seem to bedevil nearly every project at some point in its life cycle: Inability to take outages Third party components locking out upgrades Non uniform environments Lack of monitoring and alerting Missing redundancy Lack of Capacity Poor Change Management Too liberal or tight access policies Organizational changes adversely blur infrastructure ownership I was hoping there is some well articulated library of these anti-patterns summarized in a book or web site. I am almost positive that many organizations are learning through trial by fire methods. If not let's start one.

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  • Nanoservices anti-pattern pdf version

    The formatting on the html version of the nano-services is a bit off (Word to HTML is so much fun) so I am also making it available as PDF.if you don’t rememberNonoservice is an Anti-pattern where a service is too fine grained. Nanoservice is a service whose overhead (communications, maintenance etc.) out-weights its utility.* illustration [...]...Did you know that DotNetSlackers also publishes .net articles written by top known .net Authors? We already have over 80 articles in several categories including Silverlight. Take a look: here.

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  • Nanoservices anti-pattern pdf version

    The formatting on the html version of the nano-services is a bit off (Word to HTML is so much fun) so I am also making it available as PDF.if you don’t rememberNonoservice is an Anti-pattern where a service is too fine grained. Nanoservice is a service whose overhead (communications, maintenance etc.) out-weights its utility.* illustration [...]...Did you know that DotNetSlackers also publishes .net articles written by top known .net Authors? We already have over 80 articles in several categories including Silverlight. Take a look: here.

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  • Apple soupçonné d'anti-compétitivité avec sa régie publicitaire iAd, une investigation d'antitrust p

    Mise à jour du 14.06.2010 par Katleen Apple soupçonné d'anti-compétitivité avec sa régie publicitaire iAd, une investigation d'antitrust pourrait bientôt être lancée D'après le très sérieux Financial Times, Apple pourrait écoper très bientôt d'une enquête pour Antitrust, afin de déterminer si l'iAd serait trop préjudiciable à des sociétés comme Microsoft ou Google au niveau de la publicité sur iPhone et iPad. Les régulateurs américains s'interessent de près aux agissements de la firme à la pomme. On ne sait pas encore qui de la Federal Trade Commission ou de l'U.S. Department of Justice investiguera l'affaire. Les nouvelles conditions d'utilisation du service pour les développeurs ajo...

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  • does class reference itself static anti pattern in prism

    - by Michael Riva
    I have an application and my desing approach look like this: class Manager { public int State; static Manager _instance = null; public static Manager Instance { get { return _instance; } set { if (_instance == value) return; _instance = value; } } public Manager() { State = 0; Instance=this; } } class Module1 { public void GetState() { Console.WriteLine(Manager.Instance.State); } } class Module2 { public void GetState() { Console.WriteLine(Manager.Instance.State); } } class Module3 { public void GetState() { Console.WriteLine(Manager.Instance.State); } } Manager class already registered in Bootstrapper like : protected override void ConfigureContainer() { base.ConfigureContainer(); Container.RegisterType<Manager>(new ContainerControlledLifetimeManager()); } protected override void InitializeModules() { Manager man= Container.Resolve<Manager>(); } Question is do I need to define my manager object as static in its field to be able to reach its state? Or this is anti pattern or bad for performance?

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  • Scuttlebutt Reconciliation in the paper “Efficient Reconciliation and Flow Control for Anti-Entropy Protocols”

    - by soulmachine
    I am reading the paper "Efficient Reconciliation and Flow Control for Anti-Entropy Protocols"! , I couldn't clearly understand Section 3.2 "Scuttlebutt Reconciliation". Here I extract out some sentences from the paper, which especially confuse me. If gossip messages were unlimited in size, then the sets contains the exact differences,just like with precise reconciliation. Scuttlebutt requires that if a certain delta (r; k; v; n) is omitted, then all the deltas with higher version numbers for the same r should be omitted as well. Scuttlebutt satises the global invariant C(p;q) for any two processes p and q:

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  • Why does my company's software download get blocked by anti-virus programs when downloading from the company website but not other websites?

    - by Adam Burgess
    My company distributes software via website download off of a URL that is on our company's website. The download is an .EXE. We are getting calls from multiple customers saying the download is being blocked. We can help them download by turning off the virus-scan software, but wondering what is causing the block. Here are the details: We have other downloadable .EXEs that download fine without being blocked from the same company website. Our problem download file downloads fine from other websites (i.e., Dropbox) without being blocked. In summary, this one particular download from our company website is being blocked by various anti-virus programs a high percentage of the time. Any suggestions?

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  • Anti-Forgery Request in ASP.NET MVC and AJAX

    - by Dixin
    Background To secure websites from cross-site request forgery (CSRF, or XSRF) attack, ASP.NET MVC provides an excellent mechanism: The server prints tokens to cookie and inside the form; When the form is submitted to server, token in cookie and token inside the form are sent by the HTTP request; Server validates the tokens. To print tokens to browser, just invoke HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken():<% using (Html.BeginForm()) { %> <%: this.Html.AntiForgeryToken(Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)%> <%-- Other fields. --%> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <% } %> which writes to token to the form:<form action="..." method="post"> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP" /> <!-- Other fields. --> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </form> and the cookie: __RequestVerificationToken_Lw__=J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP When the above form is submitted, they are both sent to server. [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is used to specify the controllers or actions to validate them:[HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult Action(/* ... */) { // ... } This is very productive for form scenarios. But recently, when resolving security vulnerabilities for Web products, I encountered 2 problems: It is expected to add [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] to each controller, but actually I have to add it for each POST actions, which is a little crazy; After anti-forgery validation is turned on for server side, AJAX POST requests will consistently fail. Specify validation on controller (not on each action) Problem For the first problem, usually a controller contains actions for both HTTP GET and HTTP POST requests, and usually validations are expected for HTTP POST requests. So, if the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] is declared on the controller, the HTTP GET requests become always invalid:[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Index page cannot work at all. { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } If user sends a HTTP GET request from a link: http://Site/Some/Index, validation definitely fails, because no token is provided. So the result is, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute must be distributed to each HTTP POST action in the application:public class SomeController : Controller { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Works. { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } Solution To avoid a large number of [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes (one attribute for one HTTP POST action), I created a wrapper class of ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute, where HTTP verbs can be specified:[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)] public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) : this(verbs, null) { } public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } public void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } When this attribute is declared on controller, only HTTP requests with the specified verbs are validated:[ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper(HttpVerbs.Post, Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { // Actions for HTTP GET requests are not affected. // Only HTTP POST requests are validated. } Now one single attribute on controller turns on validation for all HTTP POST actions. Submit token via AJAX Problem For AJAX scenarios, when request is sent by JavaScript instead of form:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 // Token is not posted. }, callback); This kind of AJAX POST requests will always be invalid, because server side code cannot see the token in the posted data. Solution The token must be printed to browser then submitted back to server. So first of all, HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be called in the page where the AJAX POST will be sent. Then jQuery must find the printed token in the page, and post it:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1, __RequestVerificationToken: getToken() // Token is posted. }, callback); To be reusable, this can be encapsulated in a tiny jQuery plugin:(function ($) { $.getAntiForgeryToken = function () { // HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be invoked to print the token. return $("input[type='hidden'][name='__RequestVerificationToken']").val(); }; var addToken = function (data) { // Converts data if not already a string. if (data && typeof data !== "string") { data = $.param(data); } data = data ? data + "&" : ""; return data + "__RequestVerificationToken=" + encodeURIComponent($.getAntiForgeryToken()); }; $.postAntiForgery = function (url, data, callback, type) { return $.post(url, addToken(data), callback, type); }; $.ajaxAntiForgery = function (settings) { settings.data = addToken(settings.data); return $.ajax(settings); }; })(jQuery); Then in the application just replace $.post() invocation with $.postAntiForgery(), and replace $.ajax() instead of $.ajaxAntiForgery():$.postAntiForgery(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 }, callback); // Token is posted. This solution looks hard coded and stupid. If you have more elegant solution, please do tell me.

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  • Anti-Forgery Request Helpers for ASP.NET MVC and jQuery AJAX

    - by Dixin
    Background To secure websites from cross-site request forgery (CSRF, or XSRF) attack, ASP.NET MVC provides an excellent mechanism: The server prints tokens to cookie and inside the form; When the form is submitted to server, token in cookie and token inside the form are sent in the HTTP request; Server validates the tokens. To print tokens to browser, just invoke HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken():<% using (Html.BeginForm()) { %> <%: this.Html.AntiForgeryToken(Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)%> <%-- Other fields. --%> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <% } %> This invocation generates a token then writes inside the form:<form action="..." method="post"> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP" /> <!-- Other fields. --> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </form> and also writes into the cookie: __RequestVerificationToken_Lw__= J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP When the above form is submitted, they are both sent to server. In the server side, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is used to specify the controllers or actions to validate them:[HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult Action(/* ... */) { // ... } This is very productive for form scenarios. But recently, when resolving security vulnerabilities for Web products, some problems are encountered. Specify validation on controller (not on each action) The server side problem is, It is expected to declare [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] on controller, but actually it has be to declared on each POST actions. Because POST actions are usually much more then controllers, this is a little crazy Problem Usually a controller contains actions for HTTP GET and actions for HTTP POST requests, and usually validations are expected for HTTP POST requests. So, if the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] is declared on the controller, the HTTP GET requests become invalid:[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller // One [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Index() cannot work. { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } If browser sends an HTTP GET request by clicking a link: http://Site/Some/Index, validation definitely fails, because no token is provided. So the result is, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute must be distributed to each POST action:public class SomeController : Controller // Many [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Works. { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } This is a little bit crazy, because one application can have a lot of POST actions. Solution To avoid a large number of [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes (one for each POST action), the following ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute wrapper class can be helpful, where HTTP verbs can be specified:[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)] public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) : this(verbs, null) { } public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } public void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } When this attribute is declared on controller, only HTTP requests with the specified verbs are validated:[ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper(HttpVerbs.Post, Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { // GET actions are not affected. // Only HTTP POST requests are validated. } Now one single attribute on controller turns on validation for all POST actions. Maybe it would be nice if HTTP verbs can be specified on the built-in [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute, which is easy to implemented. Submit token via AJAX The browser side problem is, if server side turns on anti-forgery validation for POST, then AJAX POST requests will fail be default. Problem For AJAX scenarios, when request is sent by jQuery instead of form:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 // Token is not posted. }, callback); This kind of AJAX POST requests will always be invalid, because server side code cannot see the token in the posted data. Solution The tokens are printed to browser then sent back to server. So first of all, HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be called somewhere. Now the browser has token in HTML and cookie. Then jQuery must find the printed token in the HTML, and append token to the data before sending:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1, __RequestVerificationToken: getToken() // Token is posted. }, callback); To be reusable, this can be encapsulated into a tiny jQuery plugin:/// <reference path="jquery-1.4.2.js" /> (function ($) { $.getAntiForgeryToken = function (tokenWindow, appPath) { // HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be invoked to print the token. tokenWindow = tokenWindow && typeof tokenWindow === typeof window ? tokenWindow : window; appPath = appPath && typeof appPath === "string" ? "_" + appPath.toString() : ""; // The name attribute is either __RequestVerificationToken, // or __RequestVerificationToken_{appPath}. tokenName = "__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath; // Finds the <input type="hidden" name={tokenName} value="..." /> from the specified. // var inputElements = $("input[type='hidden'][name='__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath + "']"); var inputElements = tokenWindow.document.getElementsByTagName("input"); for (var i = 0; i < inputElements.length; i++) { var inputElement = inputElements[i]; if (inputElement.type === "hidden" && inputElement.name === tokenName) { return { name: tokenName, value: inputElement.value }; } } return null; }; $.appendAntiForgeryToken = function (data, token) { // Converts data if not already a string. if (data && typeof data !== "string") { data = $.param(data); } // Gets token from current window by default. token = token ? token : $.getAntiForgeryToken(); // $.getAntiForgeryToken(window). data = data ? data + "&" : ""; // If token exists, appends {token.name}={token.value} to data. return token ? data + encodeURIComponent(token.name) + "=" + encodeURIComponent(token.value) : data; }; // Wraps $.post(url, data, callback, type). $.postAntiForgery = function (url, data, callback, type) { return $.post(url, $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data), callback, type); }; // Wraps $.ajax(settings). $.ajaxAntiForgery = function (settings) { settings.data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(settings.data); return $.ajax(settings); }; })(jQuery); In most of the scenarios, it is Ok to just replace $.post() invocation with $.postAntiForgery(), and replace $.ajax() with $.ajaxAntiForgery():$.postAntiForgery(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 }, callback); // Token is posted. There might be some scenarios of custom token. Here $.appendAntiForgeryToken() is provided:data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, token); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); And there are scenarios that the token is not in the current window. For example, an HTTP POST request can be sent by iframe, while the token is in the parent window. Here window can be specified for $.getAntiForgeryToken():data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, $.getAntiForgeryToken(window.parent)); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); If you have better solution, please do tell me.

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  • Anti-Forgery Request Recipes For ASP.NET MVC And AJAX

    - by Dixin
    Background To secure websites from cross-site request forgery (CSRF, or XSRF) attack, ASP.NET MVC provides an excellent mechanism: The server prints tokens to cookie and inside the form; When the form is submitted to server, token in cookie and token inside the form are sent in the HTTP request; Server validates the tokens. To print tokens to browser, just invoke HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken():<% using (Html.BeginForm()) { %> <%: this.Html.AntiForgeryToken(Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)%> <%-- Other fields. --%> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> <% } %> This invocation generates a token then writes inside the form:<form action="..." method="post"> <input name="__RequestVerificationToken" type="hidden" value="J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP" /> <!-- Other fields. --> <input type="submit" value="Submit" /> </form> and also writes into the cookie: __RequestVerificationToken_Lw__= J56khgCvbE3bVcsCSZkNVuH9Cclm9SSIT/ywruFsXEgmV8CL2eW5C/gGsQUf/YuP When the above form is submitted, they are both sent to server. In the server side, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute is used to specify the controllers or actions to validate them:[HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult Action(/* ... */) { // ... } This is very productive for form scenarios. But recently, when resolving security vulnerabilities for Web products, some problems are encountered. Specify validation on controller (not on each action) The server side problem is, It is expected to declare [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] on controller, but actually it has be to declared on each POST actions. Because POST actions are usually much more then controllers, the work would be a little crazy. Problem Usually a controller contains actions for HTTP GET and actions for HTTP POST requests, and usually validations are expected for HTTP POST requests. So, if the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] is declared on the controller, the HTTP GET requests become invalid:[ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller // One [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Index() cannot work. { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } If browser sends an HTTP GET request by clicking a link: http://Site/Some/Index, validation definitely fails, because no token is provided. So the result is, [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute must be distributed to each POST action:public class SomeController : Controller // Many [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes. { [HttpGet] public ActionResult Index() // Works. { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction1(/* ... */) { // ... } [HttpPost] [ValidateAntiForgeryToken(Salt = Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public ActionResult PostAction2(/* ... */) { // ... } // ... } This is a little bit crazy, because one application can have a lot of POST actions. Solution To avoid a large number of [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attributes (one for each POST action), the following ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute wrapper class can be helpful, where HTTP verbs can be specified:[AttributeUsage(AttributeTargets.Class | AttributeTargets.Method, AllowMultiple = false, Inherited = true)] public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) : this(verbs, null) { } public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } public void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } When this attribute is declared on controller, only HTTP requests with the specified verbs are validated:[ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper(HttpVerbs.Post, Constants.AntiForgeryTokenSalt)] public class SomeController : Controller { // GET actions are not affected. // Only HTTP POST requests are validated. } Now one single attribute on controller turns on validation for all POST actions. Maybe it would be nice if HTTP verbs can be specified on the built-in [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] attribute, which is easy to implemented. Specify Non-constant salt in runtime By default, the salt should be a compile time constant, so it can be used for the [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] or [ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper] attribute. Problem One Web product might be sold to many clients. If a constant salt is evaluated in compile time, after the product is built and deployed to many clients, they all have the same salt. Of course, clients do not like this. Even some clients might want to specify a custom salt in configuration. In these scenarios, salt is required to be a runtime value. Solution In the above [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] and [ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapper] attribute, the salt is passed through constructor. So one solution is to remove this parameter:public class ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute : FilterAttribute, IAuthorizationFilter { public ValidateAntiForgeryTokenWrapperAttribute(HttpVerbs verbs) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = AntiForgeryToken.Value }; } // Other members. } But here the injected dependency becomes a hard dependency. So the other solution is moving validation code into controller to work around the limitation of attributes:public abstract class AntiForgeryControllerBase : Controller { private readonly ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute _validator; private readonly AcceptVerbsAttribute _verbs; protected AntiForgeryControllerBase(HttpVerbs verbs, string salt) { this._verbs = new AcceptVerbsAttribute(verbs); this._validator = new ValidateAntiForgeryTokenAttribute() { Salt = salt }; } protected override void OnAuthorization(AuthorizationContext filterContext) { base.OnAuthorization(filterContext); string httpMethodOverride = filterContext.HttpContext.Request.GetHttpMethodOverride(); if (this._verbs.Verbs.Contains(httpMethodOverride, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)) { this._validator.OnAuthorization(filterContext); } } } Then make controller classes inheriting from this AntiForgeryControllerBase class. Now the salt is no long required to be a compile time constant. Submit token via AJAX For browser side, once server side turns on anti-forgery validation for HTTP POST, all AJAX POST requests will fail by default. Problem In AJAX scenarios, the HTTP POST request is not sent by form. Take jQuery as an example:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 // Token is not posted. }, callback); This kind of AJAX POST requests will always be invalid, because server side code cannot see the token in the posted data. Solution Basically, the tokens must be printed to browser then sent back to server. So first of all, HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() need to be called somewhere. Now the browser has token in both HTML and cookie. Then jQuery must find the printed token in the HTML, and append token to the data before sending:$.post(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1, __RequestVerificationToken: getToken() // Token is posted. }, callback); To be reusable, this can be encapsulated into a tiny jQuery plugin:/// <reference path="jquery-1.4.2.js" /> (function ($) { $.getAntiForgeryToken = function (tokenWindow, appPath) { // HtmlHelper.AntiForgeryToken() must be invoked to print the token. tokenWindow = tokenWindow && typeof tokenWindow === typeof window ? tokenWindow : window; appPath = appPath && typeof appPath === "string" ? "_" + appPath.toString() : ""; // The name attribute is either __RequestVerificationToken, // or __RequestVerificationToken_{appPath}. tokenName = "__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath; // Finds the <input type="hidden" name={tokenName} value="..." /> from the specified. // var inputElements = $("input[type='hidden'][name='__RequestVerificationToken" + appPath + "']"); var inputElements = tokenWindow.document.getElementsByTagName("input"); for (var i = 0; i < inputElements.length; i++) { var inputElement = inputElements[i]; if (inputElement.type === "hidden" && inputElement.name === tokenName) { return { name: tokenName, value: inputElement.value }; } } return null; }; $.appendAntiForgeryToken = function (data, token) { // Converts data if not already a string. if (data && typeof data !== "string") { data = $.param(data); } // Gets token from current window by default. token = token ? token : $.getAntiForgeryToken(); // $.getAntiForgeryToken(window). data = data ? data + "&" : ""; // If token exists, appends {token.name}={token.value} to data. return token ? data + encodeURIComponent(token.name) + "=" + encodeURIComponent(token.value) : data; }; // Wraps $.post(url, data, callback, type). $.postAntiForgery = function (url, data, callback, type) { return $.post(url, $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data), callback, type); }; // Wraps $.ajax(settings). $.ajaxAntiForgery = function (settings) { settings.data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(settings.data); return $.ajax(settings); }; })(jQuery); In most of the scenarios, it is Ok to just replace $.post() invocation with $.postAntiForgery(), and replace $.ajax() with $.ajaxAntiForgery():$.postAntiForgery(url, { productName: "Tofu", categoryId: 1 }, callback); // Token is posted. There might be some scenarios of custom token, where $.appendAntiForgeryToken() is useful:data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, token); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); And there are scenarios that the token is not in the current window. For example, an HTTP POST request can be sent by an iframe, while the token is in the parent window. Here, token's container window can be specified for $.getAntiForgeryToken():data = $.appendAntiForgeryToken(data, $.getAntiForgeryToken(window.parent)); // Token is already in data. No need to invoke $.postAntiForgery(). $.post(url, data, callback); If you have better solution, please do tell me.

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  • Violation of the DRY Principle

    - by Onorio Catenacci
    I am sure there's a name for this anti-pattern somewhere; however I am not familiar enough with the anti-pattern literature to know it. Consider the following scenario: or0 is a member function in a class. For better or worse, it's heavily dependent on class member variables. Programmer A comes along and needs functionality like or0 but rather than calling or0, Programmer A copies and renames the entire class. I'm guessing that she doesn't call or0 because, as I say, it's heavily dependent on member variables for its functionality. Or maybe she's a junior programmer and doesn't know how to call it from other code. So now we've got or0 and c0 (c for copy). I can't completely fault Programmer A for this approach--we all get under tight deadlines and we hack code to get work done. Several programmers maintain or0 so it's now version orN. c0 is now version cN. Unfortunately most of the programmers that maintained the class containing or0 seemed to be completely unaware of c0--which is one of the strongest arguments I can think of for the wisdom of the DRY principle. And there may also have been independent maintainance of the code in c. Either way it appears that or0 and c0 were maintained independent of each other. And, joy and happiness, an error is occurring in cN that does not occur in orN. So I have a few questions: 1.) Is there a name for this anti-pattern? I've seen this happen so often I'd find it hard to believe this is not a named anti-pattern. 2.) I can see a few alternatives: a.) Fix orN to take a parameter that specifies the values of all the member variables it needs. Then modify cN to call orN with all of the needed parameters passed in. b.) Try to manually port fixes from orN to cN. (Mind you I don't want to do this but it is a realistic possibility.) c.) Recopy orN to cN--again, yuck but I list it for sake of completeness. d.) Try to figure out where cN is broken and then repair it independently of orN. Alternative a seems like the best fix in the long term but I doubt the customer will let me implement it. Never time or money to fix things right but always time and money to repair the same problem 40 or 50 times, right? Can anyone suggest other approaches I may not have considered? If you were in my place, which approach would you take? If there are other questions and answers here along these lines, please post links to them. I don't mind removing this question if it's a dupe but my searching hasn't turned up anything that addresses this question yet. EDIT: Thanks everyone for all the thoughtful responses. I asked about a name for the anti-pattern so I could research it further on my own. I'm surprised this particular bad coding practice doesn't seem to have a "canonical" name for it.

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  • My program is getting a false positive from a certain 3 letter Anti Virus Company.

    - by JimDel
    My program is getting a false positive from a certain 3 letter Anti Virus Company. Its just our companies branded version of Ultra VNC. Its only this one company that's identifying it as a virus and we've been using the same copy of that program for almost a year. I know its possible to tell this Anti Virus program the VNC client is safe, but I can't do that for all of our clients. I've tried to find a way to contact this company to see if they can do something to prevent this from happening, but I'm not getting anywhere. Has anyone who's experiened this issue with thier software, found a solution? Thanks

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  • Anti-DDoS Question

    - by Andre
    Our company´s main owner (telecon group) wants us to deploy anti-DDoS mechanisms, such as Arbor Pravail, which is a great idea. Although... I have a question... If our main ISP Backbone provider have no anti-DDoS mechanism, means that there is no point we get the Arbor Pravail? An DDoS attack can make damage uniquely the destination IP or to the whole network that the DDoS packets go through? Regards,

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  • Week in Geek: Internet Service Providers to Implement New Anti-Piracy Monitoring in July

    - by Asian Angel
    Our latest edition of WIG is filled with news link goodness such as Google’s plans for a Metro version of Chrome, Microsoft’s seeking of a patent for TV-viewing tolls, Encyclopaedia Britannica’s switch to a digital only format, and more. Screenshot by Asian Angel. Make Your Own Windows 8 Start Button with Zero Memory Usage Reader Request: How To Repair Blurry Photos HTG Explains: What Can You Find in an Email Header?

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  • How Scan any File or Folder Using Windows 8’s Built-in Anti-Virus

    - by Taylor Gibb
    Windows 8 includes a built-in antivirus solution that runs in the background. You might, however, be surprised that there is no obvious way to scan an item on demand. Here’s how to launch the Windows Defender GUI as well as add a scan option to the context menu. Manually Opening Windows Defender The first way to scan your files is to use the Windows Defender GUI, to do so navigate to: C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Then launch: MSASCui.exe When the GUI opens, choose to do a custom scan, then click the Scan now button. Now choose the folder you want to scan, and then click OK. That’s all there it to it. Scan Using the Context Menu If you don’t fancy opening the GUI, you could always add an option to the context menu. To do so, press the Windows + R keyboard combination to open a run box and type: shell:sendto Then press enter. Now go ahead and download this batch file we wrote, then unzip its contents into the SendTo folder. Now when you right click on a file or folder, you will be able to scan items using the “Send to” menu. Unfortunately it does use the command line scanner, nevertheless it gets the job done. That’s all there is to it. Secure Yourself by Using Two-Step Verification on These 16 Web Services How to Fix a Stuck Pixel on an LCD Monitor How to Factory Reset Your Android Phone or Tablet When It Won’t Boot

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  • Set Up Anti-Brick Protection to Safeguard and Supercharge Your Wii

    - by Jason Fitzpatrick
    We’ve shown you how to hack your Wii for homebrew software, emulators, and DVD playback, now it’s time to safeguard your Wii against bricking and fix some annoyances—like that stupid “Press A” health screen. The thing about console modding and jailbreaking—save for the rare company like Amazon that doesn’t seem to care—is companies will play a game of cat and mouse to try and knock modded console out of commission, undo your awesome mods, or even brick your device. Although extreme moves like bricktacular-updates are rare once you modify your device you have to be vigilante in protecting it against updates that could hurt your sweet setup. Today we’re going to walk you through hardening your Wii and giving it the best brick protection available Latest Features How-To Geek ETC The 50 Best Registry Hacks that Make Windows Better The How-To Geek Holiday Gift Guide (Geeky Stuff We Like) LCD? LED? Plasma? The How-To Geek Guide to HDTV Technology The How-To Geek Guide to Learning Photoshop, Part 8: Filters Improve Digital Photography by Calibrating Your Monitor Our Favorite Tech: What We’re Thankful For at How-To Geek Snowy Christmas House Personas Theme for Firefox The Mystic Underground Tunnel Wallpaper Ubunchu! – The Ubuntu Manga Available in Multiple Languages Breathe New Life into Your PlayStation 2 Peripherals by Hooking Them Up to Your Computer Move the Window Control Buttons to the Left Side in Windows Fun and Colorful Firefox Theme for Windows 7

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  • Anti-cheat Javascript for browser/HTML5 game

    - by Billy Ninja
    I'm planning on venturing on making a single player action rpg in js/html5, and I'd like to prevent cheating. I don't need 100% protection, since it's not going to be a multiplayer game, but I want some level of protection. So what strategies you suggest beyond minify and obfuscation? I wouldn't bother to make some server side simple checking, but I don't want to go the Diablo 3 path keeping all my game state changes on the server side. Since it's going to be a rpg of sorts I came up with the idea of making a stats inspector that checks abrupt changes in their values, but I'm not sure how it consistent and trusty it can be. What about variables and functions escopes? Working on smaller escopes whenever possible is safer, but it's worth the effort? Is there anyway for the javascript to self inspect it's text, like in a checksum? There are browser specific solutions? I wouldn't bother to restrain it for Chrome only in the early builds.

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